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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Methods to activate firewall mechanism have been introduced in this research. 
The purpose is to build stronger protection for the intranet from the threats of Internet. 
The foundation of the work is the threat reduction strategies that are derived from 
formalizing and identifying the interaction between internal users and external parties. 
Internet access model is developed to facilitate this task. Mechanism of active firewall 
are divided into two main process i.e. initialisation and runtime process. The former 
process deals with the mechanism to start up and bring the active firewall into a point 
of its operation. Three approaches are introduced, namely open condition, close 
condition and lattice-based method. The open condition and close condition set the 
firewall into its extreme condition i.e. to open all available communication line or to 
close all connection respectively, while the lattice-based method affords to bring 
firewall into its optimum level to protect the intranet by establishing Internet 
connection based on the predetermined security level. In the runtime process, three 
methods are introduced as well i.e. adaptively updating security policy using fuzzy 
reasoning, detecting suspicious process using distributed agent-based module, and 
zero-based approach to have minimal network services at runtime. Besides analysing 
each method using its own parameters such as processing time, accuracy and speed for 
organizing canals, global evaluations were also held to investigate the protection can 
be delivered to the intranet. In this evaluation, security analysis and comparative study 
is held, in which each initialisation and runtime process are combined and analysed 
using three parameters that are created based on RFC 2979 i.e. probability of available 
network services, probability of exposed line, and denial of services. Results of this 
study deliver the combination of lattice-based and agent-based module become the 
best method for activating firewall. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
 
Dalam penyelidikan ini, kaedah untuk mengaktifkan mekanisma dinding api 
telah diperkenalkan untuk membina perlindungan yang lebih kukuh daripada ancaman 
Internet. Asas kepada kajian ini ialah strategi pengurangan ancaman yang diambil 
daripada penformalan dan pengenalpastian hubungan antara pengguna dalaman dan 
luaran. Model capaian Internet dibangunkan untuk memudahkan tugas ini. Mekanisma 
bagi dinding api aktif dibahagikan kepada dua proses utama iaitu proses permulaan 
dan masa larian. Proses permulaan bertindak menguruskan mekanisma untuk memula 
dan mengaktifkan dinding api bagi membolehkan ia beroperasi. Tiga pendekatan telah 
diperkenalkan iaitu keadaan terbuka, keadaan tertutup dan kaedah berasaskan kekisi. 
Dalam keadaan terbuka dan keadaan tertutup, dinding api ditetapkan kepada keadaan 
ekstrimnya iaitu untuk membuka semua talian komunikasi yang ada atau menutup 
semua talian tersebut. Sementara itu, kaedah berasaskan kekisi berperanan untuk 
menetapkan dinding api kepada tahap optimumnya untuk melindungi intranet dengan 
membina hubungan Internet berdasarkan peringkat keselamatan yang telah ditetapkan. 
Dalam proses masa larian pula, tiga kaedah diperkenalkan iaitu penyesuaian 
pengemaskinian polisi keselamatan menggunakan fuzzy reasoning, mengenalpasti 
proses yang meragukan menggunakan modul berasaskan agen teragih dan pendekatan 
berasaskan sifar untuk memperolehi perkhidmatan rangkaian yang minimum pada 
masa larian. Selain menganalisa setiap kaedah yang dicadangkan menggunakan 
parameter-parameternya seperti masa pemprosesan, ketepatan dan kelajuan untuk 
menguruskan saluran, kajian keseluruhan juga dijalankan untuk menyelidik 
keselamatan kepada intranet. Dalam penilaian ini, setiap proses permulaan dan masa 
larian adalah digabungkan dan dianalisa menggunakan tiga parameter yang dibina 
daripada RFC 2979, iaitu kebarangkalian perkhidmatan rangkain yang ada, 
kebarangkalian talian yang terdedah dan penafian perkhidmatan. Hasil daripada kajian 
ini menunjukkan gabungan antara modul berasaskan kekisi dan modul berasaskan 
agen menjadi kaedah terbaik untuk mengaktifkan dinding api. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
Nowadays Internet become more and more important to many organisations 
due to the advantages delivered by the Internet to support and facilitate their business 
and activities. The needs for Internet access exist on broad and differ activities. They 
range from doing a simple and daily routine such as updating antivirus database, 
reading stock market index, and obtaining weather report, to a complex and critical 
task such as conducting e-commerce and bank transaction. In fact, to some 
organisations Internet has become their main tool to conduct the business. Besides its 
benefit, Internet is widely known to become the sources of many security incidents 
as well (Anagnostakis, 2003; Huang et al., 2004; Lai, 2004). Therefore organisations 
having Internet connection needs to give more protection to their information system 
and internal network in order to reduce or even to eliminate the Internet threat. 
Commonly this strategy is implemented by installing firewall between the protected 
internal network or intranet and the outside network or Internet.  
 
During the first decade of its discovery i.e. in 1980 to 1990, firewalls had 
gained so much popularity (Arbaugh, 2002). However, the effectiveness of firewall 
to enforce security has been called into question recently. In the last three years, 
there are dozens reports disclosing the security incidents happening in many business 
and private information systems originated from and even facilitated by Internet. 
Consider the following facts. In 29 September 2002, Bugbear Internet virus was first 
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spotted in Malaysia, and within 24 hours this virus was spreading in over 100 
countries and infecting million computers (Cherry, 2002). In October 2003, 
Spammers were reported for stealing the customers email addresses from Orbitz, the 
online travel agency (Associated Press, 2003). In June 2004, mysterious Internet 
virus stealing credit card information designed by a group of Russians was detected 
spreading through hundreds or possibly thousands of infected websites (Wired, 2004; 
Pruitt, 2004). In October 2004, Purdue’s computer system was cracked by hackers 
that successfully gained unauthorized access to its internal network (Associated 
Press, 2004). This attack forced all users to change their password. The security 
incidents above show that current firewall technology exhibit serious vulnerabilities 
that can easily be exploited to commit attacks. In this research, this issue is 
addressed, thus better intranet protection can be enforced. 
 
 
 
1.2 Background of Study 
 
The performance of firewall to establish intranet protection has been 
receiving a lot of critics recently. Indeed, some reports disclose the vulnerabilities of 
current firewall implementations. Arbaugh (2002; 2003) describes the flaws of 
firewall as being insensitive when it deals with active content of Internet such as 
ActiveX and Javascript, user mobility, and peer-to-peer technology. While 
Eschelbeck (2000) and Hunt and Verwoerd (2003) highlight the static behaviour of 
firewall as the cause of its weaknesses. The static character of firewall shows that 
current firewall implementations depend heavily on the configuration and security 
rules explicitly defined by network administrator. This configuration is created at 
start-up and maintained along the duration of the firewall, without considering the 
condition of the surrounding network. Thus it is not surprising that many firewall 
implementations cannot cope with the raising threats of Internet. 
 
Meanwhile CERT surveys on the threat of Internet show that during the year 
2002, 2003, and 2004, malicious code in terms of worms and automatic intrusion 
becomes the most serious threats endangering many organizations networks (CERT, 
2002; CERT, 2003; CERT, 2004). These results are similar to the survey conducted 
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by Whitman (2003) and CSI/FBI Annual Computer Crime and Security Survey 
(Power, 2002) that produce deliberate software attacks and virus respectively as the 
top rank of Internet threat. In fact, the report of Zetter (2004) supports the above 
survey results. It discloses that 45% of executable files downloaded from Internet 
such as Kazaa contain malicious code in term of viruses, worms, and Trojan horses. 
 
Confronting the above survey results with the critics on firewall performance 
discloses a fact that the technological improvements of Internet contents have been 
undermining the intranet protection provided by current firewall technology. 
Although this phenomenon can be easily discovered from many organization 
networks, however survey held by CERT on electronic crimes (CERT, 2004) shows 
that firewall are still considered as the most effective security tools for protecting the 
trusted intranet from the danger of Internet. The survey also shows that firewall 
become the most common technologies deployed to combat electronic crimes. 
Therefore it is crucial to upgrade the mechanism of firewall in order to enable 
firewall to cope with the raising threats of Internet.  
 
Some research groups have been holding the effort to develop smart firewall, 
with the purpose is to enable firewall aware of the security condition of the 
surrounding network. The work of Eschelbeck (2000) in Network Associates to 
develop active security notably initiated the development of this field by introducing 
active firewall concept i.e. firewall collaborate with other security tool, such as IDS 
and anti virus, in order to recognize any intrusion and possible vulnerabilities of the 
protected network. This approach however draws some critics from the researchers, 
such as Kamara et al. (2003) who reports the appearance of denial of service in 
Gauntlet active firewall as the product of implementing this concept. Moreover 
Haixin et al. (2000) emphasizes a number of possible security problems might be 
driven by the firewall such as asymmetric routing and performance decreasing. 
 
Referring to the survey results of Internet security that produce malicious 
code as the most serious threat, Arbaugh (2002) applies a different approach to 
afford intranet protection. By considering the lesson obtained from the incidents of 
Code Red worm, which the spreading of this code could not be prevented although 
the software patch for stopping it’s spreading and it’s action had been available, an 
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active security management was proposed. This concept puts greater responsibility 
on the management of the organization to manually managing its network security. 
However, by considering the rapid growth of malicious code that always increases 
from year to year (Kientzle and Elder, 2003), this approach would probably be more 
burdening the management and fall short in the implementation.  
 
Considering the importance of the firewall to many organization networks, 
and learning from the past lessons for providing more secure systems, a well-defined 
security strategy that appropriately combats the Internet threat while in the same time 
facilitating the connection to the external parties is required. Thus a study on 
activating the mechanism of network firewall seems become a promising approach in 
dealing with this issue. 
 
 
 
1.3 Objectives  
 
As discussed in the research background, the reason for conducting this study 
is due to incapability of existing firewall methods to deal with the threat of Internet 
driven by the growth of Internet technology. The static behaviour of firewall is 
suspected causing this problem. In fact, based on CERT survey (CERT, 2004) 
firewalls are still required by most organization information systems to establish 
internal network protection. Thus the main objective of this study is to develop 
correct strategy for protecting intranet from the threats of Internet, in which the 
methods to activate and to improve the mechanism of firewall are observed. It is 
expected that this approach is capable to recognize any possible threats originating 
from Internet, and to restrict the Internet threats from entering the protected intranet. 
To accomplish this task, the study needs to achieve some other objectives as follows: 
 
(i) Formulating the security strategy to combat the appearance of Internet 
threats. This strategy is built by identifying the possible security conditions 
caused by accessing Internet. 
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(ii) Developing a model of active firewall to host the implementation of the 
security strategy developed in point (i). 
 
(iii) Formulating and developing active firewall methods as the implementation of 
each security strategy developed in point (i) in order to combat the Internet 
threats. 
 
(iv) Conducting evaluation on each active firewall method in order to measure the 
applicability of network firewall to provide intranet protection. Security 
analysis on each method together with comparative study among the 
developed methods and to known firewall techniques are held in this study 
 
 
 
1.4 Research Scopes 
 
To properly conducting this study, the conditions limiting the research are set 
up as follows: 
 
(i) It is assumed that all network packets passing through the firewall are un-
encrypted. Therefore analysis on the content of network packet can be done 
without involving any mechanism to decrypt the data. This assumption 
greatly reduces the effort to deal with the content of the packets, thus the 
work can be focused on observing the mechanism to activate the firewall. 
 
(ii) It is assumed that the speed to transfer data from Internet to intranet or vice 
versa is much faster than the speed required by the internal user to 
communicate with more than one external party, or jumping from one 
external party to the others. Thus, at any time the internal user would only be 
able to communicate with an external party. 
 
(iii) With regard to the mechanism of network firewall, the security methods 
developed in this study are intended to guard the gate of intranet. Thus any 
mechanisms to secure the individual host residing inside the intranet, or the 
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individual users and applications, are not taken into account since this 
operation required a mechanism that is beyond the capability of network 
firewall. 
 
 
 
1.5 Contributions  
 
This study improves the mechanism of network firewall in order to provide 
better protection to the intranet by combating the threats of Internet, and in the same 
time to cope with the increasing technology of Internet. To accomplish this research, 
a model of Internet access that consists of model internal users and model external 
parties is developed. Based on these models, a set of security strategies to minimize 
the Internet threats is produced. Implementations of the developed security strategies 
are conducted by activating the mechanism of network firewall, since this device is 
considered capable to prevent the Internet threats from flowing into the protected 
intranet. Moreover based on the CERT survey (CERT, 2004), firewall is considered 
as the most deployed security tools to combat Internet threats. Thus the following 
results are delivered: 
 
(i) The generic model of intranet users, the generic model of external parties, 
and the generic model of Internet access. From the model of Internet access, a 
set of security strategies to combat Internet threats is produced, in which it is 
created by identifying the security conditions of Internet access. 
 
(ii) A model of active firewall utilizing the concept of canalisation is developed. 
This model is used for hosting the implementation of the developed security 
strategies. 
 
(iii) Methods for initialising active firewall i.e. close condition, open condition, 
and lattice-based. 
 
 7
(iv) Methods for handling runtime process i.e. adaptive security rules update 
using fuzzy reasoning, suspicious process detection using agent-based 
module and zero-based configuration. 
 
(v) Research evaluation on each developed active firewall method is presented. 
The evaluation consist of security analysis and comparative study among the 
developed methods and with the known firewall methods i.e. no firewall 
configuration, static and dynamic firewall. This evaluation is to measure the 
applicability of each method.  
 
 
 
1.6 Organisation of Report 
 
This report is organised as follow. Chapter 1, as has been presented, describes 
the background, objective, scope, and contributions of this study. Chapter 2 presents 
the results of studying the literatures in the effort of developing firewall technology. 
Chapter 3 discusses the concept of active firewall and formulating the strategy to 
combat Internet threats. A generic model of intranet users, a generic model of 
external parties, a model of Internet access, and active firewall model are presented 
in this chapter. Chapter 4 presents the development of the initialisation process of 
active firewall, while Chapter 5 to 7 presents the development of runtime process. 
Chapter 5 deals with adaptive update of security rules using fuzzy reasoning in which 
the content of network packet originating from external parties are evaluated. 
Chapter 6 affords to have a mechanism to monitor the activities of internal users by 
scrutinizing the running process of each internal host using distributed agent-based 
module. And Chapter 7 introduces zero configurations to minimize the available 
services at runtime. Chapter 8 conducts the evaluation on all of the methods 
proposed above using security analysis and comparative study with the known 
firewall methods. Finally, conclusion of this study is given in Chapter 9. 
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1.1 Overview 
 
Nowadays Internet become more and more important to many organisations 
due to the advantages delivered by the Internet to support and facilitate their business 
and activities. The needs for Internet access exist on broad and differ activities. They 
range from doing a simple and daily routine such as updating antivirus database, 
reading stock market index, and obtaining weather report, to a complex and critical 
task such as conducting e-commerce and bank transaction. In fact, to some 
organisations Internet has become their main tool to conduct the business. Besides its 
benefit, Internet is widely known to become the sources of many security incidents 
as well (Anagnostakis, 2003; Huang et al., 2004; Lai, 2004). Therefore organisations 
having Internet connection needs to give more protection to their information system 
and internal network in order to reduce or even to eliminate the Internet threat. 
Commonly this strategy is implemented by installing firewall between the protected 
internal network or intranet and the outside network or Internet.  
 
During the first decade of its discovery i.e. in 1980 to 1990, firewalls had 
gained so much popularity (Arbaugh, 2002). However, the effectiveness of firewall 
to enforce security has been called into question recently. In the last three years, 
there are dozens reports disclosing the security incidents happening in many business 
and private information systems originated from and even facilitated by Internet. 
Consider the following facts. In 29 September 2002, Bugbear Internet virus was first 
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spotted in Malaysia, and within 24 hours this virus was spreading in over 100 
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Spammers were reported for stealing the customers email addresses from Orbitz, the 
online travel agency (Associated Press, 2003). In June 2004, mysterious Internet 
virus stealing credit card information designed by a group of Russians was detected 
spreading through hundreds or possibly thousands of infected websites (Wired, 2004; 
Pruitt, 2004). In October 2004, Purdue’s computer system was cracked by hackers 
that successfully gained unauthorized access to its internal network (Associated 
Press, 2004). This attack forced all users to change their password. The security 
incidents above show that current firewall technology exhibit serious vulnerabilities 
that can easily be exploited to commit attacks. In this research, this issue is 
addressed, thus better intranet protection can be enforced. 
 
 
 
1.2 Background of Study 
 
The performance of firewall to establish intranet protection has been 
receiving a lot of critics recently. Indeed, some reports disclose the vulnerabilities of 
current firewall implementations. Arbaugh (2002; 2003) describes the flaws of 
firewall as being insensitive when it deals with active content of Internet such as 
ActiveX and Javascript, user mobility, and peer-to-peer technology. While 
Eschelbeck (2000) and Hunt and Verwoerd (2003) highlight the static behaviour of 
firewall as the cause of its weaknesses. The static character of firewall shows that 
current firewall implementations depend heavily on the configuration and security 
rules explicitly defined by network administrator. This configuration is created at 
start-up and maintained along the duration of the firewall, without considering the 
condition of the surrounding network. Thus it is not surprising that many firewall 
implementations cannot cope with the raising threats of Internet. 
 
Meanwhile CERT surveys on the threat of Internet show that during the year 
2002, 2003, and 2004, malicious code in terms of worms and automatic intrusion 
becomes the most serious threats endangering many organizations networks (CERT, 
2002; CERT, 2003; CERT, 2004). These results are similar to the survey conducted 
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by Whitman (2003) and CSI/FBI Annual Computer Crime and Security Survey 
(Power, 2002) that produce deliberate software attacks and virus respectively as the 
top rank of Internet threat. In fact, the report of Zetter (2004) supports the above 
survey results. It discloses that 45% of executable files downloaded from Internet 
such as Kazaa contain malicious code in term of viruses, worms, and Trojan horses. 
 
Confronting the above survey results with the critics on firewall performance 
discloses a fact that the technological improvements of Internet contents have been 
undermining the intranet protection provided by current firewall technology. 
Although this phenomenon can be easily discovered from many organization 
networks, however survey held by CERT on electronic crimes (CERT, 2004) shows 
that firewall are still considered as the most effective security tools for protecting the 
trusted intranet from the danger of Internet. The survey also shows that firewall 
become the most common technologies deployed to combat electronic crimes. 
Therefore it is crucial to upgrade the mechanism of firewall in order to enable 
firewall to cope with the raising threats of Internet.  
 
Some research groups have been holding the effort to develop smart firewall, 
with the purpose is to enable firewall aware of the security condition of the 
surrounding network. The work of Eschelbeck (2000) in Network Associates to 
develop active security notably initiated the development of this field by introducing 
active firewall concept i.e. firewall collaborate with other security tool, such as IDS 
and anti virus, in order to recognize any intrusion and possible vulnerabilities of the 
protected network. This approach however draws some critics from the researchers, 
such as Kamara et al. (2003) who reports the appearance of denial of service in 
Gauntlet active firewall as the product of implementing this concept. Moreover 
Haixin et al. (2000) emphasizes a number of possible security problems might be 
driven by the firewall such as asymmetric routing and performance decreasing. 
 
Referring to the survey results of Internet security that produce malicious 
code as the most serious threat, Arbaugh (2002) applies a different approach to 
afford intranet protection. By considering the lesson obtained from the incidents of 
Code Red worm, which the spreading of this code could not be prevented although 
the software patch for stopping it’s spreading and it’s action had been available, an 
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active security management was proposed. This concept puts greater responsibility 
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However, by considering the rapid growth of malicious code that always increases 
from year to year (Kientzle and Elder, 2003), this approach would probably be more 
burdening the management and fall short in the implementation.  
 
Considering the importance of the firewall to many organization networks, 
and learning from the past lessons for providing more secure systems, a well-defined 
security strategy that appropriately combats the Internet threat while in the same time 
facilitating the connection to the external parties is required. Thus a study on 
activating the mechanism of network firewall seems become a promising approach in 
dealing with this issue. 
 
 
 
1.3 Objectives  
 
As discussed in the research background, the reason for conducting this study 
is due to incapability of existing firewall methods to deal with the threat of Internet 
driven by the growth of Internet technology. The static behaviour of firewall is 
suspected causing this problem. In fact, based on CERT survey (CERT, 2004) 
firewalls are still required by most organization information systems to establish 
internal network protection. Thus the main objective of this study is to develop 
correct strategy for protecting intranet from the threats of Internet, in which the 
methods to activate and to improve the mechanism of firewall are observed. It is 
expected that this approach is capable to recognize any possible threats originating 
from Internet, and to restrict the Internet threats from entering the protected intranet. 
To accomplish this task, the study needs to achieve some other objectives as follows: 
 
(i) Formulating the security strategy to combat the appearance of Internet 
threats. This strategy is built by identifying the possible security conditions 
caused by accessing Internet. 
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(ii) Developing a model of active firewall to host the implementation of the 
security strategy developed in point (i). 
 
(iii) Formulating and developing active firewall methods as the implementation of 
each security strategy developed in point (i) in order to combat the Internet 
threats. 
 
(iv) Conducting evaluation on each active firewall method in order to measure the 
applicability of network firewall to provide intranet protection. Security 
analysis on each method together with comparative study among the 
developed methods and to known firewall techniques are held in this study 
 
 
 
1.4 Research Scopes 
 
To properly conducting this study, the conditions limiting the research are set 
up as follows: 
 
(i) It is assumed that all network packets passing through the firewall are un-
encrypted. Therefore analysis on the content of network packet can be done 
without involving any mechanism to decrypt the data. This assumption 
greatly reduces the effort to deal with the content of the packets, thus the 
work can be focused on observing the mechanism to activate the firewall. 
 
(ii) It is assumed that the speed to transfer data from Internet to intranet or vice 
versa is much faster than the speed required by the internal user to 
communicate with more than one external party, or jumping from one 
external party to the others. Thus, at any time the internal user would only be 
able to communicate with an external party. 
 
(iii) With regard to the mechanism of network firewall, the security methods 
developed in this study are intended to guard the gate of intranet. Thus any 
mechanisms to secure the individual host residing inside the intranet, or the 
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individual users and applications, are not taken into account since this 
operation required a mechanism that is beyond the capability of network 
firewall. 
 
 
 
1.5 Contributions  
 
This study improves the mechanism of network firewall in order to provide 
better protection to the intranet by combating the threats of Internet, and in the same 
time to cope with the increasing technology of Internet. To accomplish this research, 
a model of Internet access that consists of model internal users and model external 
parties is developed. Based on these models, a set of security strategies to minimize 
the Internet threats is produced. Implementations of the developed security strategies 
are conducted by activating the mechanism of network firewall, since this device is 
considered capable to prevent the Internet threats from flowing into the protected 
intranet. Moreover based on the CERT survey (CERT, 2004), firewall is considered 
as the most deployed security tools to combat Internet threats. Thus the following 
results are delivered: 
 
(i) The generic model of intranet users, the generic model of external parties, 
and the generic model of Internet access. From the model of Internet access, a 
set of security strategies to combat Internet threats is produced, in which it is 
created by identifying the security conditions of Internet access. 
 
(ii) A model of active firewall utilizing the concept of canalisation is developed. 
This model is used for hosting the implementation of the developed security 
strategies. 
 
(iii) Methods for initialising active firewall i.e. close condition, open condition, 
and lattice-based. 
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(iv) Methods for handling runtime process i.e. adaptive security rules update 
using fuzzy reasoning, suspicious process detection using agent-based 
module and zero-based configuration. 
 
(v) Research evaluation on each developed active firewall method is presented. 
The evaluation consist of security analysis and comparative study among the 
developed methods and with the known firewall methods i.e. no firewall 
configuration, static and dynamic firewall. This evaluation is to measure the 
applicability of each method.  
 
 
 
1.6 Organisation of Report 
 
This report is organised as follow. Chapter 1, as has been presented, describes 
the background, objective, scope, and contributions of this study. Chapter 2 presents 
the results of studying the literatures in the effort of developing firewall technology. 
Chapter 3 discusses the concept of active firewall and formulating the strategy to 
combat Internet threats. A generic model of intranet users, a generic model of 
external parties, a model of Internet access, and active firewall model are presented 
in this chapter. Chapter 4 presents the development of the initialisation process of 
active firewall, while Chapter 5 to 7 presents the development of runtime process. 
Chapter 5 deals with adaptive update of security rules using fuzzy reasoning in which 
the content of network packet originating from external parties are evaluated. 
Chapter 6 affords to have a mechanism to monitor the activities of internal users by 
scrutinizing the running process of each internal host using distributed agent-based 
module. And Chapter 7 introduces zero configurations to minimize the available 
services at runtime. Chapter 8 conducts the evaluation on all of the methods 
proposed above using security analysis and comparative study with the known 
firewall methods. Finally, conclusion of this study is given in Chapter 9. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Firewall is defined as a device to isolate the protected internal network from 
the untrusted external parties in the networking world (Garfinkel and Spafford, 
1997). This device has gain so much popularity in the last decade for protecting 
many organisations network, and become a part of organisations security strategy 
even today. Motivated by this condition, research on developing firewall have been 
reactivated in the last half-decade. Many types of firewall mechanisms have been 
discovered during this period. This chapter aims to literally study the latest 
development of network firewalls. Report produced from the last several years are 
explored. This approach becomes a fundamental step towards disclosing the issue in 
the development of firewall technology. Knowledge obtained from this stage is used 
for formulating a new method to provide secure internal network with regard to 
Internet connection.  
 
 
 
2.2 Internet Threat 
 
Survey of Whitman (2003) and CERT (2004) discover a fact that Internet 
connection is frequently exploited. These incidents are purposely committed in order 
to breach the security of many organizations networks. Some efforts to study Internet 
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threats (CERT, 2002; CERT 2003; Whitman, 2003; Kienzle and Elder, 2003; 
Anagnostakis, 2003; Huang et al., 2004; CERT, 2004) found that vary attacks can be 
committed from the Internet. They span from the action of hacker and eavesdropper, 
information stealing, to the spreading of virus, worm, backdoor, etc. In order to get 
thorough figure of these attacks, here Internet attacks are classified into two 
categories i.e. interactive attack and malicious code. The former is characterized by 
interactive activities held by the offenders to obtain unauthorized access or even to 
gain control over a network or internal hosts. The attacks in this class include 
network and host scanning and penetration, hackers, remote buffer overflows, 
eavesdropping, etc. The latter category of attack is always started by the injection of 
malicious code into the internal network, and then it is followed by the automatic 
execution of the code that compromises the internal network. Currently there are 
broad types of malicious code can be discovered, among them are computer viruses 
and worm, Trojan software, back door, program causing buffer over flows and spy 
software. 
 
While firewalls and other network security methods such as VPN and 
encryption are very effective to deter the action of interactive attack, the action of 
malicious code have been causing a great deal of losses (Christodorescu and Jha, 
2003; Lai et al., 2004). According to the survey of CERT, during the year 2002, 
2003 and 2004, malicious code becomes the top threat compromising many 
organizations information system (CERT, 2002; CERT, 2003; CERT, 2004). The 
factors facilitating malicious code to gain so successful record in attacking 
organization network is due to the absence of preventive security methods to prevent 
this type of program from reaching the internal network, besides smart injection of 
the code to spread and replicate the contiguous program or to directly attacking the 
networking systems. Currently the available security methods such as intrusion 
detection and antivirus are able to respond only if the malicious code has been 
injected or the attack is appearing inside the internal network. The vendors of the 
security software commonly assume that the security software is quickly enough to 
respond on the intrusion. However these types of security tools mostly suffer from 
high runtime overhead (Anagnostakis, 2003; Toth and Kruegel, 2002). Problem of 
late patching the software increase the vulnerabilities of these method as well (Lai et 
al., 2004; Arbaugh, 2002). Meanwhile, the available firewall technology has been 
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known to have no capability to sense the security conditions of the surrounding 
environment (Arbaugh, 2003). Therefore it is not surprising that many proposed 
system employing the integration between firewall and intrusion detection system 
and even antivirus software (Venkatesan and Bhattacharya, 1997; Eschelbeck, 2000; 
Hwang and Gangadharan, 2001) fall short in providing secure network environment. 
 
 
 
2.3 Recent Development of Firewall Technology 
 
As widely known, the purpose of having firewall is to protect the intranet 
from the threats of external networks. It is achieved by preventing the threats from 
getting into the protected network and compromising the organization information 
system and data (Ogletree, 2000). The mechanism of firewall to handle this task is to 
allow or to block traffic flowing from the intranet to outside or vice versa. This way, 
any sensitive information of the organization can be kept inside and prevented not to 
flow outside while any untrusted content that may jeopardizing internal system and 
data can be prevented from flowing inside. However, due to the growth of Internet 
technology, the task of firewall becomes more difficult. As noted by Arbaugh (2002; 
2003), there are three factors that may undermine the protection of firewalls i.e. 
active content of Internet, mobile users and peer-to-peer technology. Therefore 
security breaches that exploit these factors would probably be committed 
successfully (Bellovin, 1999; Arbaugh, 2002; Kienzle and Elder, 2003). Hence the 
efforts to develop firewall mostly focuses on fixing these problems. 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Distributed Firewalls 
 
Concept of distributed firewalls was originally proposed by Bellovin (1999) 
to deal with mobile users. In Bellovin proposition, distributed firewall are defined as 
a firewall system that contain a set of individual firewalls installed in each host of 
internal network, which every individual firewall enforces security policy defined 
centrally by the administrator. This system is claimed capable to solve the problem 
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of insider attacks that compromise the intranet protected by traditional firewall. An 
effort to implement Bellovin concept into a prototype system was conducted by 
Ioannidis et al. (2000). However this concept draws some critiques as well. Although 
Bellovin (1999) proves that imposing access control as individual host leads to fine-
grained security process, communication between individual hosts leads to a high 
runtime overhead (Hwang and Gangadharan, 2001). The use of encryption in IPSEC 
also creates a problem for facilitating network-based intrusion as reported by Xian et 
al.  (2002). This problem is due to insensitive mechanism of distributed firewall to 
the existence of malicious host that may commit a network-based attack by 
communicating with other host (Payne and Markham, 2001). The last problem is also 
caused by the mechanism of distributed firewall to leave network boundary concept 
as applied by traditional firewall. Other weakness of distributed firewall as noted by 
Payne and Markham (2001) is the vulnerability of untrusted operating system since it 
run on top of operating system in every host in the intranet. Issue of tamper 
resistance is raised from this condition, as it is difficult to control the widely 
deployed individual firewalls.  
 
Development of microfirewall as reported by Hwang and Gangadharan 
(2001) notably solves the problem of malicious host and reduced runtime overhead 
suffered by Bellovin concept. Here microfirewall were implemented as the functional 
modules acting as packet filtering rules constructed at the kernel space. A single 
microfirewall is installed in each host of the protected network. Architecture 
developed by Hwang and Gangadharan is to combine microfirewall, policy manager 
and the gate firewall to establish security in an intranet. The purpose of putting 
gateway firewall here is to have network boundary for isolating the intranet from the 
outside network. This approach is expected to eliminate malicious host as mentioned 
previously. Meanwhile, the employed policy manager is used for updating security 
policy in each microfirewall unit. Mobile agents, CORBA, and RMI middleware are 
used optionally in this task. This strategy however creates a trade off between speeds 
and robustness. Mobile agents that are capable to provide robust mechanism as they 
can easily be created, suspended, terminated and reboot dynamically, only deliver 
low speed and even vulnerable to be attacked by other agents or hosts.  
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The work of Payne and Markham (2001) aims to solve tamper resistance 
problems caused by untrusted operating system. Distributed embedded firewall 
developed in this effort utilizes embedded computing. The firewall is built on top of 
network interface card to avoid the problem of untrusted host operating system. 
Although this method is claimed solving the problem of untrusted host operating 
system and protect the intranet from malicious hosts using gateway firewall that 
guards network perimeter, firewall developed using this method cannot achieve 
dynamic security policy since the embedded method implemented on the interface 
card, thus it tends to have static configuration. Moreover, communication among 
hosts for applying security policy can also lead to high runtime overhead. 
 
Xian et al. (2002) intends to improve Bellovin concept by revisiting the 
development of distributed microfirewall system. Domain type enforce is used in this 
project to enforce mandatory access control to the firewall. The purpose is to keep 
microfirewall being tampered by unwitting insiders or malicious host. This effort 
however cannot prevent network from the possibility of malicious host as gateway-
firewall is removed from the implementation. Thus no security perimeter is defined 
to protect the internal network. 
 
 
 
2.3.2 Adaptive Firewalls 
 
Research on adaptive firewall is intended for understanding and dealing with 
the changing conditions of network security as well as the Internet threats. Although 
research on adaptive firewall have been running for sometimes, the author cannot 
determine who and when started the development of this method. However the oldest 
effort found in the literature for developing adaptive firewall is the work of 
Venkatesan and Bhattacharya (1997). Firewall developed in this effort is capable to 
adapt the security policy with the changes of the network threat endangering the 
internal system. To measure the threat, users activities is captured and analysed at 
any point of time, and then trusted level of each user defined priorly is adjusted. 
Whenever a threat is discovered from the log of user activities causes user trusted 
level to be decreased, otherwise it is increased. And to monitor the appearance of 
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intrusive action, existing intrusion detection such as expert system and statistically 
anomaly detection are employed. The method used in this system leads to create a 
security hole as it may trust the user too soon, or raise even denial of service if the 
employed intrusion detection system suffer from false positive. Moreover, the 
application of time period creates an opportunity that malicious users can be trusted. 
And as widely known, statistical anomaly has a pitfall that an intruder can train the 
system to believe on the suspicious activities, and the expert system only deals with 
the known intrusion. Therefore a new suspicious behaviour of user will not be 
detected by the system.  
 
The development of adaptive packet filters by Reumann et al. (2001) notably 
solves the problem of security holes caused by malicious users. The approach used in 
the method is to allow alternative security rules to be loaded into a filter controller. 
The rules here are ordered by the increasing restrictiveness, which the least 
restrictive does not filter the incoming traffic while the most restrictive drops all 
packets. Users of the network are assigned specific security rule to access the outside 
network. This way any potentially malicious users can be identified prior to the 
intrusion, and therefore specific access policy can be enforced. This approach 
however reduces network access performance since firewall must check each 
incoming packet against its rule-base, and the mechanism of switching among the 
rule as well. The performance is even dropped when the number of rules becomes 
large. 
 
Zou et al.  (2003) afford to build an intelligent firewall based on adaptive 
security method. Fuzzy logic is employed to handle security classification based on 
the source and destination of the packet. This approach besides presenting an 
advantage to bring soft computing to the security world, it also causes performance 
decreasing due to algorithm complexity to process each flowing packet using fuzzy 
algorithm. To cope with this problem, Zou et al. simplify the analysis using a set of 
predetermined security levels for the source and destination of network packets. This 
approach results in producing shallow packet analysis.  
 
The problem of performance overhead is also suffered by adaptive firewall of 
Verwoerd and Hunt (2002). Although this effort simplifies the mechanism to develop 
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adaptive security using packet filtering, performance decreasing due to processing 
intensive and complex calculations cannot be avoided, especially for computing 
network bandwidth. This problem indeed becomes the open issue in the research of 
adaptive firewall. 
 
 
 
2.3.3 Hardware-Based Firewalls 
 
The development of hardware-based firewall is motivated by slow processing 
speed of software-based system. The approach used in this research is to hold 
network packet processing in the hardware. The strategy to speed up the process is 
due to elimination of many software-based procedures. A number of efforts, such as 
the work of Kayssi et al. (2000) and Lee et al. (2002), afford to implement this 
approach by developing an FGPA (Field Programmable Gate Array) firewall. They 
make use the reprogramability of FPGA chips to process network packets. Different 
types of security rules are implemented. These works however carry a number of 
drawbacks leading to inefficient firewall implementation. Most of hardware-based 
firewalls experience difficulties in mapping security rules into the chips. Meanwhile, 
only limited security rules can be deployed in the chip due to hardware constraint. 
And as widely known, every reprogramable chip has its operational lifetime. 
Therefore exploiting its reprogramability will probably shorten its lifetime. 
Moreover, some complexities are raised by the effort to build dynamic security. 
Firewall developed by Kayssi et al. (2000) requires to power off the system for 
updating security rules. It causes performance decreasing since network transaction 
can be aborted when the system is down.  
 
The work of Lee et al. (2002) to overcome the problem of security rule 
reconfiguration, by employing a high level programming language namely Ponder, 
also create a drawback in holding rule modification. This effort creates more 
algorithm complexity since it requires the framework to integrate the mechanism of 
hardware and software. And the effort of Lockwood et al. (2003) notably creates the 
extension of FGPA-based firewall to detect malicious content of Internet traffic. This 
work implements an algorithm to process the flowing packet in the hardware. 
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However this system cannot avoid hardware-based constraint, thus only limited 
filtering rules can be implemented. 
 
 
 
2.3.4 Active Firewalls 
 
The term of active firewalls was originally discovered from the result of 
developing security tools in two research-domains i.e. active network (Alexander et 
al., 1999) and regular network (Eschelbeck, 2000). In the domain of active network, 
active firewalls actually have similar function as regular firewall devices, however 
they are developed to serve the mechanism of active network. It is worth to note that 
up to this time no serious active firewall development in the domain of active 
network is reported. It is due to the definition and the implementation of the platform 
of active network that are still progressing. The implementation of active firewall 
under active network such as presented by Alexander et al. (1999), Silva et al. (2001) 
and Hicks et al. (2003) are merely to prove that the proposed active networks capable 
to cope with networking devices. 
 
On the contrary, researches for developing firewall in regular network have 
been delivering some useful methods by building active firewall. The basic notion of 
this method is to have active mechanism to detect and combat the threats, thus any 
attacks endangering the protected network can be prevented. The effort of 
Eschelbeck (2000), notably initiates the development of active firewall concept. In 
this work, active firewall is built by collaborating dynamic firewall with other 
security components to respond on the changing threat. This system works by 
actively detecting any intrusion using antivirus and intrusion detection. The active 
firewall proposed by Eschelbeck is also equipped with the function of vulnerability 
scanner to detect the existing host vulnerabilities. Although many types of security 
software are employed in this method, however this approach has no capabilities to 
measure the threat originating from the Internet. Therefore, it is still uncertain 
whether active firewall proposed by Eschelbeck capable to react on the changing 
Internet threat since it has to wait for an intrusion to update its security policy. 
Formalization of this method does not include any experimental result to justify the 
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claim nor any measurement to prove that active firewall has preventive action to 
secure network. 
 
Lehtonen (2003) presented a different approach to build activate firewall. 
Although it is motivated by the programmability of active network and the idea of 
Eschelbeck firewall, the work is intended to serve the wireless network. Using a 
packet filtering functionality, security rules are built into a tree-like structure. Each 
network packet passing through the firewall is directed to a suitable leaf and 
branches nodes of the active firewall to enter or leaf the intranet. As clearly shown 
from this mechanism, this work fails to develop the mechanism for recognizing 
network threat. The function of firewall here is only to organize security policy, a 
similar method as presented by regular packet filtering firewall. 
 
Different approach to build active firewall is presented by Hunt and 
Verwoerd (2003) for developing reactive firewall. Utilizing packet-filtering rules, the 
proposed method affords to provide safe network environment by identifying the 
requirements of internal network in term of bandwidth reservation and network 
transaction. The computation to specify the bandwidth usage is conducted based on 
the flowing traffic, which the source and destination of each packet are identified and 
compared against a predetermined security rules. Besides its complex computation 
that creates performance overhead, this method does not consider the condition of 
external network that potentially become the sources of many type of Internet threats. 
 
 
 
2.4 Firewall Validation Standard 
 
Due to the importance of firewall in the Internet community, some standards 
have been created for the purpose of validating firewall technologies. It is important 
to fulfil the requirements defined in these standards for creating a new firewall 
technique, since it warrants the usability of the developed firewall. This section aims 
to describe these standards, so the appropriate validation mechanism can be 
identified and be referred in validating the firewall developed in this research. 
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Basically there are two aspects influencing the behaviour of firewall devices, 
namely performance and security. Internet community uses a different standard for 
dealing with each of these aspects (Hickman et al., 2003). For the purpose of 
validating firewall performance, some benchmarking terminologies have been 
presented and well described in RFC 2647 (Newman, 1999). This standard discusses 
the definition used in the benchmarking test such as allowed traffic, authentication, 
bit forwarding rate, connection, good put etc. The methodology for conducting 
benchmarking is presented in RFC 3511 (Hickman et al., 2003). In this standard, the 
set up for testing firewall and the parameters to be tested are described. However as 
noted by Hickman et al., the aspect of security is beyond the scope of this standard. 
 
Meanwhile for the purpose of validating firewall security, the behaviour of 
and requirements for Internet firewalls are standardize in RFC 2979 (Freed, 2000). In 
this standard, two aspects, namely security and usability, are considered become the 
main function of firewall. However there is tradeoff between both aspects. Therefore 
a transparency rule is defined in this standard as the requirements for improving the 
security of firewall. This rule states that the introduction of firewall in the 
networking system must not cause unintended failures of the legitimate and standards 
compliant usage that would work were the firewall not present. Thus any security 
improvement will not prevent people from performing a useful works. 
 
 
 
2.5 Discussion 
 
Firewall developments are classified into four methods i.e. distributed, 
adaptive, hardware-based, and active firewalls. The first three methods have had a 
clear definition and formulation, therefore they become attractive to the researchers 
for improving firewall mechanism. Currently a number of reports have been 
presenting the achievements in enhancing firewall based on these methods. However, 
some issues are raised as well. Common pitfall suffered by the firewalls built using 
these methods are performance decreasing due to the increased of algorithm 
complexity and the processing load. Besides, these methods also suffer from specific 
drawbacks, such as the possible existence of malicious host in the distributed firewall 
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and hardware constraint of hardware-based firewall. Those drawbacks, of course, 
become the barrier for the acceptance of firewall development.  
 
And as mentioned earlier in Session 2.2, the factor that has more influence in 
network security is the appearance of Internet threat in which some surveys (CERT, 
2002; CERT, 2003; CERT, 2004; Whitman, 2003; Anagnostakis, 2003; Kientzle and 
Elder, 2003) conclude that malicious code has the bigger portion for causing this 
threat. Therefore a mechanism to keep the bad stuff of Internet from coming into the 
protected intranet is required. The method based on distributed, adaptive, and 
hardware-based firewalls apparently show lack performance to stop the action of 
malicious code. However, adaptive firewall that is combined with intrusion detection 
or antivirus tools may reduce this threat. This strategy is significantly influenced by 
the performance of the employed security tools, such as intrusion detection system 
that may suffer from false positive and false negative, or antivirus software that can 
be compromised due to late updating virus database. Moreover communication 
method between firewall and other security tools potentially create performance 
decreasing that causes security holes in the network. By considering the issues 
above, active firewall concept introduced by Eschelbeck (2000) has the promising 
mechanism to provide security for the intranet. The main idea behind this concept is 
to equip firewall with active mechanism to detect, recognize and take an action 
against the Internet threat. This method however suffers from similar problem as 
adaptive firewall combined with other security tools, since the mechanism applied in 
this effort relies on the collaboration with other methods. Meanwhile, other works 
such as presented by Lehtonen (2003) and Hunt and Verwoerd (2003) fail to 
accommodate the requirements to deal with the changing pattern of network threats. 
Thus improvement for developing active firewall is still required. 
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2.6 Summary 
 
The development of firewall technology that consists of distributed, adaptive, 
hardware-based, and active firewall has been presented. The purpose is to discover 
the direction of the research in the field of network firewall and to highlight the issue 
produced from these efforts. Referring to the survey results that produce malicious 
code as the top threat of Internet (CERT, 2002; CERT, 2003; CERT, 2004), only the 
adaptive and active firewalls that are capable to deter this threat. However if we 
compare adaptive and active firewall, it shows that adaptive method tends to have 
passive mechanism that wait for the incidents to happen before changing the security 
rules, thus it might be too late to react. Active firewall has more promising approach 
in protecting intranet since this method has active mechanism to search any 
indication of security threats. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Firewall is defined as a device to isolate the protected internal network from 
the untrusted external parties in the networking world (Garfinkel and Spafford, 
1997). This device has gain so much popularity in the last decade for protecting 
many organisations network, and become a part of organisations security strategy 
even today. Motivated by this condition, research on developing firewall have been 
reactivated in the last half-decade. Many types of firewall mechanisms have been 
discovered during this period. This chapter aims to literally study the latest 
development of network firewalls. Report produced from the last several years are 
explored. This approach becomes a fundamental step towards disclosing the issue in 
the development of firewall technology. Knowledge obtained from this stage is used 
for formulating a new method to provide secure internal network with regard to 
Internet connection.  
 
 
 
2.2 Internet Threat 
 
Survey of Whitman (2003) and CERT (2004) discover a fact that Internet 
connection is frequently exploited. These incidents are purposely committed in order 
to breach the security of many organizations networks. Some efforts to study Internet 
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threats (CERT, 2002; CERT 2003; Whitman, 2003; Kienzle and Elder, 2003; 
Anagnostakis, 2003; Huang et al., 2004; CERT, 2004) found that vary attacks can be 
committed from the Internet. They span from the action of hacker and eavesdropper, 
information stealing, to the spreading of virus, worm, backdoor, etc. In order to get 
thorough figure of these attacks, here Internet attacks are classified into two 
categories i.e. interactive attack and malicious code. The former is characterized by 
interactive activities held by the offenders to obtain unauthorized access or even to 
gain control over a network or internal hosts. The attacks in this class include 
network and host scanning and penetration, hackers, remote buffer overflows, 
eavesdropping, etc. The latter category of attack is always started by the injection of 
malicious code into the internal network, and then it is followed by the automatic 
execution of the code that compromises the internal network. Currently there are 
broad types of malicious code can be discovered, among them are computer viruses 
and worm, Trojan software, back door, program causing buffer over flows and spy 
software. 
 
While firewalls and other network security methods such as VPN and 
encryption are very effective to deter the action of interactive attack, the action of 
malicious code have been causing a great deal of losses (Christodorescu and Jha, 
2003; Lai et al., 2004). According to the survey of CERT, during the year 2002, 
2003 and 2004, malicious code becomes the top threat compromising many 
organizations information system (CERT, 2002; CERT, 2003; CERT, 2004). The 
factors facilitating malicious code to gain so successful record in attacking 
organization network is due to the absence of preventive security methods to prevent 
this type of program from reaching the internal network, besides smart injection of 
the code to spread and replicate the contiguous program or to directly attacking the 
networking systems. Currently the available security methods such as intrusion 
detection and antivirus are able to respond only if the malicious code has been 
injected or the attack is appearing inside the internal network. The vendors of the 
security software commonly assume that the security software is quickly enough to 
respond on the intrusion. However these types of security tools mostly suffer from 
high runtime overhead (Anagnostakis, 2003; Toth and Kruegel, 2002). Problem of 
late patching the software increase the vulnerabilities of these method as well (Lai et 
al., 2004; Arbaugh, 2002). Meanwhile, the available firewall technology has been 
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known to have no capability to sense the security conditions of the surrounding 
environment (Arbaugh, 2003). Therefore it is not surprising that many proposed 
system employing the integration between firewall and intrusion detection system 
and even antivirus software (Venkatesan and Bhattacharya, 1997; Eschelbeck, 2000; 
Hwang and Gangadharan, 2001) fall short in providing secure network environment. 
 
 
 
2.3 Recent Development of Firewall Technology 
 
As widely known, the purpose of having firewall is to protect the intranet 
from the threats of external networks. It is achieved by preventing the threats from 
getting into the protected network and compromising the organization information 
system and data (Ogletree, 2000). The mechanism of firewall to handle this task is to 
allow or to block traffic flowing from the intranet to outside or vice versa. This way, 
any sensitive information of the organization can be kept inside and prevented not to 
flow outside while any untrusted content that may jeopardizing internal system and 
data can be prevented from flowing inside. However, due to the growth of Internet 
technology, the task of firewall becomes more difficult. As noted by Arbaugh (2002; 
2003), there are three factors that may undermine the protection of firewalls i.e. 
active content of Internet, mobile users and peer-to-peer technology. Therefore 
security breaches that exploit these factors would probably be committed 
successfully (Bellovin, 1999; Arbaugh, 2002; Kienzle and Elder, 2003). Hence the 
efforts to develop firewall mostly focuses on fixing these problems. 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Distributed Firewalls 
 
Concept of distributed firewalls was originally proposed by Bellovin (1999) 
to deal with mobile users. In Bellovin proposition, distributed firewall are defined as 
a firewall system that contain a set of individual firewalls installed in each host of 
internal network, which every individual firewall enforces security policy defined 
centrally by the administrator. This system is claimed capable to solve the problem 
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of insider attacks that compromise the intranet protected by traditional firewall. An 
effort to implement Bellovin concept into a prototype system was conducted by 
Ioannidis et al. (2000). However this concept draws some critiques as well. Although 
Bellovin (1999) proves that imposing access control as individual host leads to fine-
grained security process, communication between individual hosts leads to a high 
runtime overhead (Hwang and Gangadharan, 2001). The use of encryption in IPSEC 
also creates a problem for facilitating network-based intrusion as reported by Xian et 
al.  (2002). This problem is due to insensitive mechanism of distributed firewall to 
the existence of malicious host that may commit a network-based attack by 
communicating with other host (Payne and Markham, 2001). The last problem is also 
caused by the mechanism of distributed firewall to leave network boundary concept 
as applied by traditional firewall. Other weakness of distributed firewall as noted by 
Payne and Markham (2001) is the vulnerability of untrusted operating system since it 
run on top of operating system in every host in the intranet. Issue of tamper 
resistance is raised from this condition, as it is difficult to control the widely 
deployed individual firewalls.  
 
Development of microfirewall as reported by Hwang and Gangadharan 
(2001) notably solves the problem of malicious host and reduced runtime overhead 
suffered by Bellovin concept. Here microfirewall were implemented as the functional 
modules acting as packet filtering rules constructed at the kernel space. A single 
microfirewall is installed in each host of the protected network. Architecture 
developed by Hwang and Gangadharan is to combine microfirewall, policy manager 
and the gate firewall to establish security in an intranet. The purpose of putting 
gateway firewall here is to have network boundary for isolating the intranet from the 
outside network. This approach is expected to eliminate malicious host as mentioned 
previously. Meanwhile, the employed policy manager is used for updating security 
policy in each microfirewall unit. Mobile agents, CORBA, and RMI middleware are 
used optionally in this task. This strategy however creates a trade off between speeds 
and robustness. Mobile agents that are capable to provide robust mechanism as they 
can easily be created, suspended, terminated and reboot dynamically, only deliver 
low speed and even vulnerable to be attacked by other agents or hosts.  
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The work of Payne and Markham (2001) aims to solve tamper resistance 
problems caused by untrusted operating system. Distributed embedded firewall 
developed in this effort utilizes embedded computing. The firewall is built on top of 
network interface card to avoid the problem of untrusted host operating system. 
Although this method is claimed solving the problem of untrusted host operating 
system and protect the intranet from malicious hosts using gateway firewall that 
guards network perimeter, firewall developed using this method cannot achieve 
dynamic security policy since the embedded method implemented on the interface 
card, thus it tends to have static configuration. Moreover, communication among 
hosts for applying security policy can also lead to high runtime overhead. 
 
Xian et al. (2002) intends to improve Bellovin concept by revisiting the 
development of distributed microfirewall system. Domain type enforce is used in this 
project to enforce mandatory access control to the firewall. The purpose is to keep 
microfirewall being tampered by unwitting insiders or malicious host. This effort 
however cannot prevent network from the possibility of malicious host as gateway-
firewall is removed from the implementation. Thus no security perimeter is defined 
to protect the internal network. 
 
 
 
2.3.2 Adaptive Firewalls 
 
Research on adaptive firewall is intended for understanding and dealing with 
the changing conditions of network security as well as the Internet threats. Although 
research on adaptive firewall have been running for sometimes, the author cannot 
determine who and when started the development of this method. However the oldest 
effort found in the literature for developing adaptive firewall is the work of 
Venkatesan and Bhattacharya (1997). Firewall developed in this effort is capable to 
adapt the security policy with the changes of the network threat endangering the 
internal system. To measure the threat, users activities is captured and analysed at 
any point of time, and then trusted level of each user defined priorly is adjusted. 
Whenever a threat is discovered from the log of user activities causes user trusted 
level to be decreased, otherwise it is increased. And to monitor the appearance of 
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intrusive action, existing intrusion detection such as expert system and statistically 
anomaly detection are employed. The method used in this system leads to create a 
security hole as it may trust the user too soon, or raise even denial of service if the 
employed intrusion detection system suffer from false positive. Moreover, the 
application of time period creates an opportunity that malicious users can be trusted. 
And as widely known, statistical anomaly has a pitfall that an intruder can train the 
system to believe on the suspicious activities, and the expert system only deals with 
the known intrusion. Therefore a new suspicious behaviour of user will not be 
detected by the system.  
 
The development of adaptive packet filters by Reumann et al. (2001) notably 
solves the problem of security holes caused by malicious users. The approach used in 
the method is to allow alternative security rules to be loaded into a filter controller. 
The rules here are ordered by the increasing restrictiveness, which the least 
restrictive does not filter the incoming traffic while the most restrictive drops all 
packets. Users of the network are assigned specific security rule to access the outside 
network. This way any potentially malicious users can be identified prior to the 
intrusion, and therefore specific access policy can be enforced. This approach 
however reduces network access performance since firewall must check each 
incoming packet against its rule-base, and the mechanism of switching among the 
rule as well. The performance is even dropped when the number of rules becomes 
large. 
 
Zou et al.  (2003) afford to build an intelligent firewall based on adaptive 
security method. Fuzzy logic is employed to handle security classification based on 
the source and destination of the packet. This approach besides presenting an 
advantage to bring soft computing to the security world, it also causes performance 
decreasing due to algorithm complexity to process each flowing packet using fuzzy 
algorithm. To cope with this problem, Zou et al. simplify the analysis using a set of 
predetermined security levels for the source and destination of network packets. This 
approach results in producing shallow packet analysis.  
 
The problem of performance overhead is also suffered by adaptive firewall of 
Verwoerd and Hunt (2002). Although this effort simplifies the mechanism to develop 
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adaptive security using packet filtering, performance decreasing due to processing 
intensive and complex calculations cannot be avoided, especially for computing 
network bandwidth. This problem indeed becomes the open issue in the research of 
adaptive firewall. 
 
 
 
2.3.3 Hardware-Based Firewalls 
 
The development of hardware-based firewall is motivated by slow processing 
speed of software-based system. The approach used in this research is to hold 
network packet processing in the hardware. The strategy to speed up the process is 
due to elimination of many software-based procedures. A number of efforts, such as 
the work of Kayssi et al. (2000) and Lee et al. (2002), afford to implement this 
approach by developing an FGPA (Field Programmable Gate Array) firewall. They 
make use the reprogramability of FPGA chips to process network packets. Different 
types of security rules are implemented. These works however carry a number of 
drawbacks leading to inefficient firewall implementation. Most of hardware-based 
firewalls experience difficulties in mapping security rules into the chips. Meanwhile, 
only limited security rules can be deployed in the chip due to hardware constraint. 
And as widely known, every reprogramable chip has its operational lifetime. 
Therefore exploiting its reprogramability will probably shorten its lifetime. 
Moreover, some complexities are raised by the effort to build dynamic security. 
Firewall developed by Kayssi et al. (2000) requires to power off the system for 
updating security rules. It causes performance decreasing since network transaction 
can be aborted when the system is down.  
 
The work of Lee et al. (2002) to overcome the problem of security rule 
reconfiguration, by employing a high level programming language namely Ponder, 
also create a drawback in holding rule modification. This effort creates more 
algorithm complexity since it requires the framework to integrate the mechanism of 
hardware and software. And the effort of Lockwood et al. (2003) notably creates the 
extension of FGPA-based firewall to detect malicious content of Internet traffic. This 
work implements an algorithm to process the flowing packet in the hardware. 
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However this system cannot avoid hardware-based constraint, thus only limited 
filtering rules can be implemented. 
 
 
 
2.3.4 Active Firewalls 
 
The term of active firewalls was originally discovered from the result of 
developing security tools in two research-domains i.e. active network (Alexander et 
al., 1999) and regular network (Eschelbeck, 2000). In the domain of active network, 
active firewalls actually have similar function as regular firewall devices, however 
they are developed to serve the mechanism of active network. It is worth to note that 
up to this time no serious active firewall development in the domain of active 
network is reported. It is due to the definition and the implementation of the platform 
of active network that are still progressing. The implementation of active firewall 
under active network such as presented by Alexander et al. (1999), Silva et al. (2001) 
and Hicks et al. (2003) are merely to prove that the proposed active networks capable 
to cope with networking devices. 
 
On the contrary, researches for developing firewall in regular network have 
been delivering some useful methods by building active firewall. The basic notion of 
this method is to have active mechanism to detect and combat the threats, thus any 
attacks endangering the protected network can be prevented. The effort of 
Eschelbeck (2000), notably initiates the development of active firewall concept. In 
this work, active firewall is built by collaborating dynamic firewall with other 
security components to respond on the changing threat. This system works by 
actively detecting any intrusion using antivirus and intrusion detection. The active 
firewall proposed by Eschelbeck is also equipped with the function of vulnerability 
scanner to detect the existing host vulnerabilities. Although many types of security 
software are employed in this method, however this approach has no capabilities to 
measure the threat originating from the Internet. Therefore, it is still uncertain 
whether active firewall proposed by Eschelbeck capable to react on the changing 
Internet threat since it has to wait for an intrusion to update its security policy. 
Formalization of this method does not include any experimental result to justify the 
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claim nor any measurement to prove that active firewall has preventive action to 
secure network. 
 
Lehtonen (2003) presented a different approach to build activate firewall. 
Although it is motivated by the programmability of active network and the idea of 
Eschelbeck firewall, the work is intended to serve the wireless network. Using a 
packet filtering functionality, security rules are built into a tree-like structure. Each 
network packet passing through the firewall is directed to a suitable leaf and 
branches nodes of the active firewall to enter or leaf the intranet. As clearly shown 
from this mechanism, this work fails to develop the mechanism for recognizing 
network threat. The function of firewall here is only to organize security policy, a 
similar method as presented by regular packet filtering firewall. 
 
Different approach to build active firewall is presented by Hunt and 
Verwoerd (2003) for developing reactive firewall. Utilizing packet-filtering rules, the 
proposed method affords to provide safe network environment by identifying the 
requirements of internal network in term of bandwidth reservation and network 
transaction. The computation to specify the bandwidth usage is conducted based on 
the flowing traffic, which the source and destination of each packet are identified and 
compared against a predetermined security rules. Besides its complex computation 
that creates performance overhead, this method does not consider the condition of 
external network that potentially become the sources of many type of Internet threats. 
 
 
 
2.4 Firewall Validation Standard 
 
Due to the importance of firewall in the Internet community, some standards 
have been created for the purpose of validating firewall technologies. It is important 
to fulfil the requirements defined in these standards for creating a new firewall 
technique, since it warrants the usability of the developed firewall. This section aims 
to describe these standards, so the appropriate validation mechanism can be 
identified and be referred in validating the firewall developed in this research. 
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Basically there are two aspects influencing the behaviour of firewall devices, 
namely performance and security. Internet community uses a different standard for 
dealing with each of these aspects (Hickman et al., 2003). For the purpose of 
validating firewall performance, some benchmarking terminologies have been 
presented and well described in RFC 2647 (Newman, 1999). This standard discusses 
the definition used in the benchmarking test such as allowed traffic, authentication, 
bit forwarding rate, connection, good put etc. The methodology for conducting 
benchmarking is presented in RFC 3511 (Hickman et al., 2003). In this standard, the 
set up for testing firewall and the parameters to be tested are described. However as 
noted by Hickman et al., the aspect of security is beyond the scope of this standard. 
 
Meanwhile for the purpose of validating firewall security, the behaviour of 
and requirements for Internet firewalls are standardize in RFC 2979 (Freed, 2000). In 
this standard, two aspects, namely security and usability, are considered become the 
main function of firewall. However there is tradeoff between both aspects. Therefore 
a transparency rule is defined in this standard as the requirements for improving the 
security of firewall. This rule states that the introduction of firewall in the 
networking system must not cause unintended failures of the legitimate and standards 
compliant usage that would work were the firewall not present. Thus any security 
improvement will not prevent people from performing a useful works. 
 
 
 
2.5 Discussion 
 
Firewall developments are classified into four methods i.e. distributed, 
adaptive, hardware-based, and active firewalls. The first three methods have had a 
clear definition and formulation, therefore they become attractive to the researchers 
for improving firewall mechanism. Currently a number of reports have been 
presenting the achievements in enhancing firewall based on these methods. However, 
some issues are raised as well. Common pitfall suffered by the firewalls built using 
these methods are performance decreasing due to the increased of algorithm 
complexity and the processing load. Besides, these methods also suffer from specific 
drawbacks, such as the possible existence of malicious host in the distributed firewall 
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and hardware constraint of hardware-based firewall. Those drawbacks, of course, 
become the barrier for the acceptance of firewall development.  
 
And as mentioned earlier in Session 2.2, the factor that has more influence in 
network security is the appearance of Internet threat in which some surveys (CERT, 
2002; CERT, 2003; CERT, 2004; Whitman, 2003; Anagnostakis, 2003; Kientzle and 
Elder, 2003) conclude that malicious code has the bigger portion for causing this 
threat. Therefore a mechanism to keep the bad stuff of Internet from coming into the 
protected intranet is required. The method based on distributed, adaptive, and 
hardware-based firewalls apparently show lack performance to stop the action of 
malicious code. However, adaptive firewall that is combined with intrusion detection 
or antivirus tools may reduce this threat. This strategy is significantly influenced by 
the performance of the employed security tools, such as intrusion detection system 
that may suffer from false positive and false negative, or antivirus software that can 
be compromised due to late updating virus database. Moreover communication 
method between firewall and other security tools potentially create performance 
decreasing that causes security holes in the network. By considering the issues 
above, active firewall concept introduced by Eschelbeck (2000) has the promising 
mechanism to provide security for the intranet. The main idea behind this concept is 
to equip firewall with active mechanism to detect, recognize and take an action 
against the Internet threat. This method however suffers from similar problem as 
adaptive firewall combined with other security tools, since the mechanism applied in 
this effort relies on the collaboration with other methods. Meanwhile, other works 
such as presented by Lehtonen (2003) and Hunt and Verwoerd (2003) fail to 
accommodate the requirements to deal with the changing pattern of network threats. 
Thus improvement for developing active firewall is still required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19
2.6 Summary 
 
The development of firewall technology that consists of distributed, adaptive, 
hardware-based, and active firewall has been presented. The purpose is to discover 
the direction of the research in the field of network firewall and to highlight the issue 
produced from these efforts. Referring to the survey results that produce malicious 
code as the top threat of Internet (CERT, 2002; CERT, 2003; CERT, 2004), only the 
adaptive and active firewalls that are capable to deter this threat. However if we 
compare adaptive and active firewall, it shows that adaptive method tends to have 
passive mechanism that wait for the incidents to happen before changing the security 
rules, thus it might be too late to react. Active firewall has more promising approach 
in protecting intranet since this method has active mechanism to search any 
indication of security threats. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
ACTIVE FIREWALL MODEL 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Development of active firewall has been started by Eschelbeck (2000) to 
produce active security. The concept of active firewall notably deliver new paradigm 
in protecting organization internal network. Idea of this effort is to create firewall 
capable to respond actively to the raising and changing Internet threats. Although 
implementations of this method still carry some drawbacks and weaknesses as 
described in Chapter 2, the effort opens a new view to counter Internet threat. This 
chapter aims to continue the work on developing active firewall concept by 
identifying the requirements that shall be fulfilled in establishing secure network 
environment. The work includes the development of Internet access model that 
consist of the models of intranet users and external parties, the formulation of 
network security strategy, and the implementation of this strategy into a model of 
active firewall. 
 
 
 
3.2 Definition of Active Firewall 
 
Currently definition of active firewall has not been settled among the 
researchers. Yet few efforts have started proposing the mechanism of active firewall 
by describing how this device should behave. Eschelbeck (2000) defines active 
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firewall as active guards working in concert with other security components in the 
network to actively respond to the changing threats. Collaborative security approach 
is delivered from this definition. Meanwhile Hunt and Verwoerd (2003) tends to 
have adaptive method by defining active firewall as device capable to change or 
adapt its rules in the face of adverse situation. Both efforts created different 
approaches in implementing active mechanism into the firewall, however they agree 
that active firewall shall be able to respond on the adverse condition caused by the 
changing threat. It means active firewall shall develop intelligent mechanism to 
understand the condition of the surrounding network both internal and external, and 
then to detect and to recognize any possible threat that can be raised from 
unfavourable network conditions, and finally to change its configuration in order to 
counter the threats. 
 
Based on this paradigm, here active firewall is defined as firewall aware of 
the conditions of its surrounding network and capable to identify and to develop 
security requirement for guarding the protected network. From this point, 
requirement for developing active firewall is described by identifying possible threat 
caused by accessing Internet and modelling the root cause of this condition, and then 
developing security strategy for providing intranet protection. The developed active 
firewall will follow this strategy in the implementation stage. 
 
 
 
3.3 Modelling Internet Access 
 
Formulating an Internet access model is a useful approach towards reviewing 
the interaction between the protected internal users and the Internet. The model 
provides a schematic point of view in developing security strategy for intranet 
protection. Using set theory, each possible condition raised from accessing Internet is 
sought and examined. This approach delivers three separate models i.e. intranet users 
model, external parties model and Internet access model in which the last model 
become the product of integrating both former ones. Description of each model 
follows. 
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3.3.1 Intranet Users Model 
 
Model of intranet users is implemented by developing the interaction between 
the possible safety conditions experienced by each user. Let U becomes a domain of 
intranet users that consist of two safety regions namely protected and unprotected. 
These regions correspond to the protection and unprotection index denoted by p and 
up respectively. Assuming that an intranet user is an entity, which each user Uu∈ is 
defined as a tuple >< upp, , hence 
 
1=+ upp      (3.1) 
 
Equation (3.1) must be fulfilled for each >=< uppu , . Illustration of this model is 
depicted in Figure 3.1.  
 
Protected (p) Unprotected (up)
User 2
p = 0.75
up = 0.25
User 1
p = 1
up = 0
User 3
p = 0.5
up = 0.5
User 4
p = 0.25
up = 0.75
User 5
p = 0
up = 1
Full-protected Un-protected
Half-protected
 
Figure 3.1: Intranet users model 
 
 
To measure the safety factor of an intranet, the total protection index and 
unprotection index are computed as follow.  
 
∑=
i
ui
pP      (3.2) 
∑=
i
ui
upUP      (3.3) 
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Thus safety factor is obtained by correlating total protection and unprotection 
index as follow.  
 
   
PUP
PS +=      (3.4) 
 
The safety factor here is used to measure the security of an intranet for providing a 
safe environment for its users. Here the value of safety factor ranges from S = 0 
means the intranet provide lowest protection to the users, to S = 1 means users are 
fully protected by the intranet. To determine the value of protection and unprotection 
index, the security methods proposed by Eschelbeck (2000) in studying the intranet 
protection are used as the input parameters, together with the survey result of CERT 
(2004) in developing effective network security. The former effort proposes the 
collaboration of firewall, intrusion detection, vulnerability assessment and antivirus 
to protect an intranet. Analysis of integrating these methods by Davies (2000) show 
the added advantages can be delivered i.e. a proactive approach is produced by 
vulnerability assessment, and a reactive approach is delivered by intrusion detection. 
Meanwhile CERT (2004) shows the most effective security methods as follows 
firewall, encryption in transmitting data, encryption in storage, manual patch 
management, regular security audits, and the recording of user activities. Based on 
those aspects, protection of intranet user is computed by measuring the availability of 
the following factors: 
 
(i) Firewall 
(ii) Intrusion detection 
(iii) Vulnerability assessment 
(iv) Antivirus 
(v) Encryption in transmitting data 
(vi) Encryption in storage 
(vii) Manual patching and update management 
(viii) Regular security audits 
(ix) User activities recording 
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To simplify the model, it is assumed that the factors above contribute to the 
same portion of user protection, with total protection derived from the integration of 
those factors is 100%. Therefore the absence of a single security method for 
protecting the individual user in the intranet causes the reduction of protection index 
by factor  
 
m
x %100=       (3.5) 
 
with m denotes the number of identified security methods used to protect intranet 
users as listed above. Since 9=m , then %11.11=x . In other words, the unprotected 
index will increase by factor 11.11% for the absence of a single security method. 
Illustration of this approach is depicted in Figure 3.2. It is worth to note that the 
effort for developing the user model as explained in this subsection enables the 
empirical measurement of intranet security of the organization network, which the 
protection index and security hole can quantitatively be calculated using Equation 
(3.2) to (3.5). 
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Figure 3.2: Illustration for computing protection and unprotection index 
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3.3.2 External Parties Model 
 
External parties are modelled using the similar way as intranet users. Instead 
of using protection and unprotection index, this model utilizes trusted and untrusted 
index denoted by t and ut respectively, in which the following relation 
 
1=+ utt      (3.6) 
 
must be fulfilled for each external party by assuming that a single external party is an 
entity. And let O become a domain of external parties, an external party Oo∈  is 
defined as a tuple >< utt, satisfying Equation (3.6). Illustration of this model is 
given in Figure 3.3. 
 
Trusted objects (t) Un-trusted objects (ut)
Object 2
t = 0.75
ut = 0.25
Object 1
t = 1
ut = 0
Object 3
t = 0.5
ut = 0.5
Object 4
t = 0.25
ut = 0.75
Object 5
t = 0
ut = 1
Full-Trusted Un-Trusted
Half-Trusted
 
Figure 3.3: Model of external parties 
 
 
To compute the total trusted and untrusted index, the following calculations 
are held 
 
∑=
i
i
tT 0      (3.7) 
∑=
i
oi
utUT      (3.8) 
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Thus the safety factor of the domain O is computed as follows 
 
TUT
TS +=      (3.9) 
 
To determine the trusted and untrusted index of an individual external party, 
categories of Internet threat defined by Seo et al. (2004) are employed in this model. 
It is due to complete presentation of the sources of web attack by Seo et al. in which 
explanation of those attack can also be found partially from the works of Arbaugh 
(2003), Kienzle and Elder (2003), and Hernandez (2001). According to Seo et al. 
(2004), threats originated from external parties are classified into twelve items i.e. 
code scanning, cookie poisoning, hidden manipulation, forceful site browsing, third-
party misconfiguration, known vulnerabilities, buffer overflow, debug option and 
back doors, parameter tampering, stealth commanding, cross site scripting, and 
application denial of service. Thus the trusted index of an external party is 
determined by measuring the presence of these threats. Assuming that each threat 
contribute to the same portion of trusted index, then the absence of a threat will 
increase the trusted index by factor 
 
n
y %100=      (3.10) 
 
with n denotes the number of identified threats. Referring to Seo et al. (2004), it 
produces n = 12, and y = 8.33%. It means the presence of each threat above reduces 
trusted index by 8.33 %. Illustration of this approach is shown in Figure 3.4. After 
computing the trusted and untrusted index, each external party can be mapped into 
the external parties model as given in Figure 3.3 to define the safety factor of 
permitted Internet access using Equation (3.7) to (3.9).  
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Figure 3.4: The category of Internet threats to compute the trusted index 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Internet Access Model 
 
Model of Internet access is built by intersecting the model of intranet users 
against the model of external parties. It is illustrated in Figure 3.5. The new model 
creates some security regions as the product of the interaction between the protected 
and unprotected index of intranet users model with the trusted and untrusted index of 
the model of external parties. The new security regions correspond to the safety 
condition for accessing intranet. Formulation of each region follows. 
 
Let { }threatcontrolledsafeSC ,,=  become the domain of security condition, 
the interaction between the intranet users U and the external parties O can be 
expressed as 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∩←
∩∨∩←
∩←
=∩
utup
tuputp
tp
OU
OUthreat
OUOUcontrolled
OUsafe
SC   (3.11) 
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Equation (3.11) states that the threat condition is produced from the 
interaction between unprotected user and untrusted external parties. Therefore the 
efforts to minimize the interaction between unprotected users and untrusted external 
parties are required in order to develop more secure environment for accessing 
Internet. These efforts are formulated into the security strategies described in the next 
section. 
 
Protected users (Up)
Unprotected users (Uup)
Network Users External Parties
Un-trusted parties (Out)
Trusted parties (Ot)
Threat
(Uup?Out)
Safe
(Up?Ot)
Controlled Controlled
 
Figure 3.5: Model of Internet access 
 
 
 
3.4 Threat Reduction Strategies 
 
Knowledge obtained from developing Internet access model clearly shows 
the root causing threat condition i.e. the interaction between unprotected users and 
untrusted external parties. Hence the strategies to minimize, or if possible to 
eliminate, the threat condition will significantly deliver more secure Internet access. 
Based on Equation (3.11), the following approaches can be used to reduce the 
threats: 
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• Minimizing upU (unprotected users) 
It is implemented by fulfilling all factors to produce maximum protection 
index as described in Section 3.3.1. This approach intends to bring all 
security methods to protect intranet users, thus safe or controlled condition 
can be achieved. However the cost will be too expensive to execute this 
strategy since many security tools are required. This strategy may introduce 
performance overhead as well. Other approach to run this strategy is to equip 
all intranet users with the distributed detectors such as antivirus or intrusion 
detection system, hence any condition leading to the threats can be detected 
and passed to firewall. This way firewall can take an action to secure the 
internal users e.g. to drop the communication line of the victim machines. 
The last approach is considered more applicable rather than installing all 
available security tools on each intranet machines that causes performance 
decreasing. 
 
 
• Minimizing utO (untrusted external parties) 
Similar to the first approach, this strategy intends to fulfil all factors in order 
to provide maximum trusted index. It is conducted by restricting the access to 
the external parties that contain the threats as described in Section 3.3.2. 
Since various Internet contents can be found at present, this approach 
potentially reduces the flexibility of Internet access. If this problem cannot be 
avoided, accessing Internet will not be as easy as before executing this 
strategy. Hence a correct mechanism to reduce untrusted external parties 
without burdening user flexibility too much is desired in implementing this 
strategy. 
 
 
• Minimizing utup OU ∩  (the interaction between unprotected users and 
untrusted external parties) 
This approach is implemented by regulating the interaction between 
unprotected users and untrusted external parties. Compared to both previous 
strategies, this approach seems delivering a promising mechanism to provide 
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better network protection since it is potentially capable to avoid performance 
decreasing due to minimizing upU  and the problem of lack flexibility caused 
by minimizing utO . The advantages provided by this strategy are twofold. 
First, it is not necessary to install many security tools in the intranet or 
internal machines, although bigger protection index is desired. And second, it 
does not require filtering all network traffic to prevent various Internet threat. 
However content analysis on the flowing network traffic is still necessary for 
the purpose of recognizing the security conditions in accessing the external 
parties. Hence a soft computing or artificial intelligence can be employed to 
handle this task. In implementing this strategy, the developed content analysis 
algorithm is used for supporting the access control method for regulating the 
interaction between internal users and external parties. 
 
 
 
3.5 Active Firewall Model 
 
This section present the development of active firewall model in order to host 
the implementation of the developed threat reduction strategies defined in Section 
3.4. Let active firewall control a set of reconfigureable canals { }kcccC ,,, 21 ΛΛ=  
connecting an intranet that consists of k internal machines to the Internet, and let n  
denotes the integer number and nc  becomes a set of canals corresponding to the 
particular connection of an internal machine to an external party, in which the 
connection status is given by { }0,1=nc  with 1=nc  represent a connected line while 
0=nc  means a close condition. To manage the Internet connection, active firewall 
enables and disables nc  as visualized in Figure 3.6. This way, using particular 
method to compute and detect the Internet threats, the strategies developed in Section 
3.4 can be implemented for managing the Internet connection.  
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Intranet Internet
Active Firewall
c1
c2
cn
 
 
Figure 3.6: Mechanism of active firewall to control the canals 
 
 
In this research, active firewall is implemented by developing the technique 
to handle initialisation and runtime process. Here initialisation refers to the 
mechanism to start the firewall up from its off condition, while the runtime refers to 
the operation of firewall at all time after the firewall is started up to a time before it is 
shutdown. The active firewall process is depicted in Figure 3.7.  
 
 
Start
End
Initialization process
Runtime process
for i = 1 to ? do
 
Figure 3.7: Active firewall process 
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3.6 Summary 
 
This chapter discusses the concept and proposes a model of active firewall. 
The concept of active firewall is defined as the firewall aware of the security 
condition of its surrounding network, actively detecting the appearance of security 
threats, and capable to take an action to stop the threats. Meanwhile the model of 
active firewall is designed using a concept of canalisation of the connections of 
intranet to Internet or vice versa. This model is used as the platform for 
implementing the security strategies to reduce Internet threats. In this chapter, the 
development of security strategies to combat Internet threats is presented as well. 
This effort is held by developing a generic model of intranet users that consist of 
protected and unprotected index, and a generic model of external parties that consists 
of trusted and untrusted index. By intersecting both models, a model of Internet 
access is built, in which three security conditions are obtained namely safe, 
controlled and threats. The security strategy defined in this chapter deals with the last 
condition of Internet access i.e. reducing the threats condition. Thus the 
implementation of security strategy in active firewall will also aim to reduce the 
threat condition, in which it is achieved by running one of this activities i.e. 
minimizing the unprotected internal users, minimizing the untrusted external parties, 
or minimizing the interaction between unprotected users with untrusted external 
parties. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
ACTIVE FIREWALL MODEL 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Development of active firewall has been started by Eschelbeck (2000) to 
produce active security. The concept of active firewall notably deliver new paradigm 
in protecting organization internal network. Idea of this effort is to create firewall 
capable to respond actively to the raising and changing Internet threats. Although 
implementations of this method still carry some drawbacks and weaknesses as 
described in Chapter 2, the effort opens a new view to counter Internet threat. This 
chapter aims to continue the work on developing active firewall concept by 
identifying the requirements that shall be fulfilled in establishing secure network 
environment. The work includes the development of Internet access model that 
consist of the models of intranet users and external parties, the formulation of 
network security strategy, and the implementation of this strategy into a model of 
active firewall. 
 
 
 
3.2 Definition of Active Firewall 
 
Currently definition of active firewall has not been settled among the 
researchers. Yet few efforts have started proposing the mechanism of active firewall 
by describing how this device should behave. Eschelbeck (2000) defines active 
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firewall as active guards working in concert with other security components in the 
network to actively respond to the changing threats. Collaborative security approach 
is delivered from this definition. Meanwhile Hunt and Verwoerd (2003) tends to 
have adaptive method by defining active firewall as device capable to change or 
adapt its rules in the face of adverse situation. Both efforts created different 
approaches in implementing active mechanism into the firewall, however they agree 
that active firewall shall be able to respond on the adverse condition caused by the 
changing threat. It means active firewall shall develop intelligent mechanism to 
understand the condition of the surrounding network both internal and external, and 
then to detect and to recognize any possible threat that can be raised from 
unfavourable network conditions, and finally to change its configuration in order to 
counter the threats. 
 
Based on this paradigm, here active firewall is defined as firewall aware of 
the conditions of its surrounding network and capable to identify and to develop 
security requirement for guarding the protected network. From this point, 
requirement for developing active firewall is described by identifying possible threat 
caused by accessing Internet and modelling the root cause of this condition, and then 
developing security strategy for providing intranet protection. The developed active 
firewall will follow this strategy in the implementation stage. 
 
 
 
3.3 Modelling Internet Access 
 
Formulating an Internet access model is a useful approach towards reviewing 
the interaction between the protected internal users and the Internet. The model 
provides a schematic point of view in developing security strategy for intranet 
protection. Using set theory, each possible condition raised from accessing Internet is 
sought and examined. This approach delivers three separate models i.e. intranet users 
model, external parties model and Internet access model in which the last model 
become the product of integrating both former ones. Description of each model 
follows. 
 
 22
3.3.1 Intranet Users Model 
 
Model of intranet users is implemented by developing the interaction between 
the possible safety conditions experienced by each user. Let U becomes a domain of 
intranet users that consist of two safety regions namely protected and unprotected. 
These regions correspond to the protection and unprotection index denoted by p and 
up respectively. Assuming that an intranet user is an entity, which each user Uu∈ is 
defined as a tuple >< upp, , hence 
 
1=+ upp      (3.1) 
 
Equation (3.1) must be fulfilled for each >=< uppu , . Illustration of this model is 
depicted in Figure 3.1.  
 
Protected (p) Unprotected (up)
User 2
p = 0.75
up = 0.25
User 1
p = 1
up = 0
User 3
p = 0.5
up = 0.5
User 4
p = 0.25
up = 0.75
User 5
p = 0
up = 1
Full-protected Un-protected
Half-protected
 
Figure 3.1: Intranet users model 
 
 
To measure the safety factor of an intranet, the total protection index and 
unprotection index are computed as follow.  
 
∑=
i
ui
pP      (3.2) 
∑=
i
ui
upUP      (3.3) 
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Thus safety factor is obtained by correlating total protection and unprotection 
index as follow.  
 
   
PUP
PS +=      (3.4) 
 
The safety factor here is used to measure the security of an intranet for providing a 
safe environment for its users. Here the value of safety factor ranges from S = 0 
means the intranet provide lowest protection to the users, to S = 1 means users are 
fully protected by the intranet. To determine the value of protection and unprotection 
index, the security methods proposed by Eschelbeck (2000) in studying the intranet 
protection are used as the input parameters, together with the survey result of CERT 
(2004) in developing effective network security. The former effort proposes the 
collaboration of firewall, intrusion detection, vulnerability assessment and antivirus 
to protect an intranet. Analysis of integrating these methods by Davies (2000) show 
the added advantages can be delivered i.e. a proactive approach is produced by 
vulnerability assessment, and a reactive approach is delivered by intrusion detection. 
Meanwhile CERT (2004) shows the most effective security methods as follows 
firewall, encryption in transmitting data, encryption in storage, manual patch 
management, regular security audits, and the recording of user activities. Based on 
those aspects, protection of intranet user is computed by measuring the availability of 
the following factors: 
 
(i) Firewall 
(ii) Intrusion detection 
(iii) Vulnerability assessment 
(iv) Antivirus 
(v) Encryption in transmitting data 
(vi) Encryption in storage 
(vii) Manual patching and update management 
(viii) Regular security audits 
(ix) User activities recording 
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To simplify the model, it is assumed that the factors above contribute to the 
same portion of user protection, with total protection derived from the integration of 
those factors is 100%. Therefore the absence of a single security method for 
protecting the individual user in the intranet causes the reduction of protection index 
by factor  
 
m
x %100=       (3.5) 
 
with m denotes the number of identified security methods used to protect intranet 
users as listed above. Since 9=m , then %11.11=x . In other words, the unprotected 
index will increase by factor 11.11% for the absence of a single security method. 
Illustration of this approach is depicted in Figure 3.2. It is worth to note that the 
effort for developing the user model as explained in this subsection enables the 
empirical measurement of intranet security of the organization network, which the 
protection index and security hole can quantitatively be calculated using Equation 
(3.2) to (3.5). 
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Figure 3.2: Illustration for computing protection and unprotection index 
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3.3.2 External Parties Model 
 
External parties are modelled using the similar way as intranet users. Instead 
of using protection and unprotection index, this model utilizes trusted and untrusted 
index denoted by t and ut respectively, in which the following relation 
 
1=+ utt      (3.6) 
 
must be fulfilled for each external party by assuming that a single external party is an 
entity. And let O become a domain of external parties, an external party Oo∈  is 
defined as a tuple >< utt, satisfying Equation (3.6). Illustration of this model is 
given in Figure 3.3. 
 
Trusted objects (t) Un-trusted objects (ut)
Object 2
t = 0.75
ut = 0.25
Object 1
t = 1
ut = 0
Object 3
t = 0.5
ut = 0.5
Object 4
t = 0.25
ut = 0.75
Object 5
t = 0
ut = 1
Full-Trusted Un-Trusted
Half-Trusted
 
Figure 3.3: Model of external parties 
 
 
To compute the total trusted and untrusted index, the following calculations 
are held 
 
∑=
i
i
tT 0      (3.7) 
∑=
i
oi
utUT      (3.8) 
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Thus the safety factor of the domain O is computed as follows 
 
TUT
TS +=      (3.9) 
 
To determine the trusted and untrusted index of an individual external party, 
categories of Internet threat defined by Seo et al. (2004) are employed in this model. 
It is due to complete presentation of the sources of web attack by Seo et al. in which 
explanation of those attack can also be found partially from the works of Arbaugh 
(2003), Kienzle and Elder (2003), and Hernandez (2001). According to Seo et al. 
(2004), threats originated from external parties are classified into twelve items i.e. 
code scanning, cookie poisoning, hidden manipulation, forceful site browsing, third-
party misconfiguration, known vulnerabilities, buffer overflow, debug option and 
back doors, parameter tampering, stealth commanding, cross site scripting, and 
application denial of service. Thus the trusted index of an external party is 
determined by measuring the presence of these threats. Assuming that each threat 
contribute to the same portion of trusted index, then the absence of a threat will 
increase the trusted index by factor 
 
n
y %100=      (3.10) 
 
with n denotes the number of identified threats. Referring to Seo et al. (2004), it 
produces n = 12, and y = 8.33%. It means the presence of each threat above reduces 
trusted index by 8.33 %. Illustration of this approach is shown in Figure 3.4. After 
computing the trusted and untrusted index, each external party can be mapped into 
the external parties model as given in Figure 3.3 to define the safety factor of 
permitted Internet access using Equation (3.7) to (3.9).  
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Figure 3.4: The category of Internet threats to compute the trusted index 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Internet Access Model 
 
Model of Internet access is built by intersecting the model of intranet users 
against the model of external parties. It is illustrated in Figure 3.5. The new model 
creates some security regions as the product of the interaction between the protected 
and unprotected index of intranet users model with the trusted and untrusted index of 
the model of external parties. The new security regions correspond to the safety 
condition for accessing intranet. Formulation of each region follows. 
 
Let { }threatcontrolledsafeSC ,,=  become the domain of security condition, 
the interaction between the intranet users U and the external parties O can be 
expressed as 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∩←
∩∨∩←
∩←
=∩
utup
tuputp
tp
OU
OUthreat
OUOUcontrolled
OUsafe
SC   (3.11) 
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Equation (3.11) states that the threat condition is produced from the 
interaction between unprotected user and untrusted external parties. Therefore the 
efforts to minimize the interaction between unprotected users and untrusted external 
parties are required in order to develop more secure environment for accessing 
Internet. These efforts are formulated into the security strategies described in the next 
section. 
 
Protected users (Up)
Unprotected users (Uup)
Network Users External Parties
Un-trusted parties (Out)
Trusted parties (Ot)
Threat
(Uup?Out)
Safe
(Up?Ot)
Controlled Controlled
 
Figure 3.5: Model of Internet access 
 
 
 
3.4 Threat Reduction Strategies 
 
Knowledge obtained from developing Internet access model clearly shows 
the root causing threat condition i.e. the interaction between unprotected users and 
untrusted external parties. Hence the strategies to minimize, or if possible to 
eliminate, the threat condition will significantly deliver more secure Internet access. 
Based on Equation (3.11), the following approaches can be used to reduce the 
threats: 
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• Minimizing upU (unprotected users) 
It is implemented by fulfilling all factors to produce maximum protection 
index as described in Section 3.3.1. This approach intends to bring all 
security methods to protect intranet users, thus safe or controlled condition 
can be achieved. However the cost will be too expensive to execute this 
strategy since many security tools are required. This strategy may introduce 
performance overhead as well. Other approach to run this strategy is to equip 
all intranet users with the distributed detectors such as antivirus or intrusion 
detection system, hence any condition leading to the threats can be detected 
and passed to firewall. This way firewall can take an action to secure the 
internal users e.g. to drop the communication line of the victim machines. 
The last approach is considered more applicable rather than installing all 
available security tools on each intranet machines that causes performance 
decreasing. 
 
 
• Minimizing utO (untrusted external parties) 
Similar to the first approach, this strategy intends to fulfil all factors in order 
to provide maximum trusted index. It is conducted by restricting the access to 
the external parties that contain the threats as described in Section 3.3.2. 
Since various Internet contents can be found at present, this approach 
potentially reduces the flexibility of Internet access. If this problem cannot be 
avoided, accessing Internet will not be as easy as before executing this 
strategy. Hence a correct mechanism to reduce untrusted external parties 
without burdening user flexibility too much is desired in implementing this 
strategy. 
 
 
• Minimizing utup OU ∩  (the interaction between unprotected users and 
untrusted external parties) 
This approach is implemented by regulating the interaction between 
unprotected users and untrusted external parties. Compared to both previous 
strategies, this approach seems delivering a promising mechanism to provide 
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better network protection since it is potentially capable to avoid performance 
decreasing due to minimizing upU  and the problem of lack flexibility caused 
by minimizing utO . The advantages provided by this strategy are twofold. 
First, it is not necessary to install many security tools in the intranet or 
internal machines, although bigger protection index is desired. And second, it 
does not require filtering all network traffic to prevent various Internet threat. 
However content analysis on the flowing network traffic is still necessary for 
the purpose of recognizing the security conditions in accessing the external 
parties. Hence a soft computing or artificial intelligence can be employed to 
handle this task. In implementing this strategy, the developed content analysis 
algorithm is used for supporting the access control method for regulating the 
interaction between internal users and external parties. 
 
 
 
3.5 Active Firewall Model 
 
This section present the development of active firewall model in order to host 
the implementation of the developed threat reduction strategies defined in Section 
3.4. Let active firewall control a set of reconfigureable canals { }kcccC ,,, 21 ΛΛ=  
connecting an intranet that consists of k internal machines to the Internet, and let n  
denotes the integer number and nc  becomes a set of canals corresponding to the 
particular connection of an internal machine to an external party, in which the 
connection status is given by { }0,1=nc  with 1=nc  represent a connected line while 
0=nc  means a close condition. To manage the Internet connection, active firewall 
enables and disables nc  as visualized in Figure 3.6. This way, using particular 
method to compute and detect the Internet threats, the strategies developed in Section 
3.4 can be implemented for managing the Internet connection.  
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Intranet Internet
Active Firewall
c1
c2
cn
 
 
Figure 3.6: Mechanism of active firewall to control the canals 
 
 
In this research, active firewall is implemented by developing the technique 
to handle initialisation and runtime process. Here initialisation refers to the 
mechanism to start the firewall up from its off condition, while the runtime refers to 
the operation of firewall at all time after the firewall is started up to a time before it is 
shutdown. The active firewall process is depicted in Figure 3.7.  
 
 
Start
End
Initialization process
Runtime process
for i = 1 to ? do
 
Figure 3.7: Active firewall process 
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3.6 Summary 
 
This chapter discusses the concept and proposes a model of active firewall. 
The concept of active firewall is defined as the firewall aware of the security 
condition of its surrounding network, actively detecting the appearance of security 
threats, and capable to take an action to stop the threats. Meanwhile the model of 
active firewall is designed using a concept of canalisation of the connections of 
intranet to Internet or vice versa. This model is used as the platform for 
implementing the security strategies to reduce Internet threats. In this chapter, the 
development of security strategies to combat Internet threats is presented as well. 
This effort is held by developing a generic model of intranet users that consist of 
protected and unprotected index, and a generic model of external parties that consists 
of trusted and untrusted index. By intersecting both models, a model of Internet 
access is built, in which three security conditions are obtained namely safe, 
controlled and threats. The security strategy defined in this chapter deals with the last 
condition of Internet access i.e. reducing the threats condition. Thus the 
implementation of security strategy in active firewall will also aim to reduce the 
threat condition, in which it is achieved by running one of this activities i.e. 
minimizing the unprotected internal users, minimizing the untrusted external parties, 
or minimizing the interaction between unprotected users with untrusted external 
parties. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
INITIALISATION PROCESS 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Developing initialisation strategy is essential to set firewall into the suitable 
condition for runtime process. According to Ren et al. (2004), initialisation refers to 
the procedure of starting up and bringing the system to a point on its operation. To 
develop this procedure condition before and after the firewall turned up are 
identified. 
 
 
 
4.2 Closed-Condition Approach 
 
This approach is based on the experience of Ranum and Avolio (1994), which 
suggest to turning off system services at minimum to have more secure system. Thus 
in this effort, it intends to minimize the availability of services in the beginning of 
runtime operation. Formalization of close-condition approach is described as follow. 
 
Let firewall controls a set of reconfigureable canals { }kn ccccC ,,,,, 21 ΚΚ=  
in which each canal nc  corresponds to the individual intranet machine n . Starting up 
the firewall means to bring the firewall from the off condition at time 0tt =  to the 
initial condition at time itt = , where firewall is ready to hold its runtime process. 
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Hence close-condition approach introduced here forces the firewall to close all 
available canal at time itt = , thus it can be formalized as follows 
 
0)( =∀ in tc     (4.1) 
 
A timeline visualization of this approach is given in Figure 4.1. 
 
ti
End of initialization
Initialization process
Time (t)
Canals
(cn)
cn(t)
Runtime process
0
cn(ti)
 
Figure 4.1: Timeline visualization of close-condition approach 
 
It can be noted that close-condition approach enables firewall to always 
authenticate all the requested Internet access, thus strict Internet transactions are 
produced at runtime. Here traffic analyser and canal modification must be 
established to support the function of firewall to organize external network 
transaction, otherwise no internal machine can reach the Internet since no opened 
canals are available at runtime. Implementation of this approach is conducted by 
developing the following script: 
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# To have default DROP policy 
   iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT 
   iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT 
   iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT 
 
# Delete and flush all rules 
   iptables --flush            
   iptables --table nat --flush 
   iptables --delete-chain      
   iptables --table nat --delete-chain 
 
# Set up IP Forwarding and Masquerading 
   iptables -T nat -A POSTROUTING --out-interface eth0 -j MASQUERADE 
   iptables -A FORWARD --in-interface eth1 -j DROP 
   echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
 
 
 
4.3 Open-Condition Approach 
 
Just like the mechanism of the close-condition approach, this method 
similarly projects the firewall into its edge-condition. Rather than closing all 
available canals as held by close-condition, here canals are opened after passing the 
initialisation stage. It can be formalized as follows 
 
1)( =∀ in tc     (4.2) 
 
Visualization of this approach is given in Figure 4.2. This method is implemented by 
executing the following script: 
 
# To have default DROP policy 
   iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT 
   iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT 
   iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT 
 
# Delete and flush.  
   iptables --flush             
   iptables --table nat --flush 
   iptables --delete-chain      
   iptables --table nat --delete-chain 
 
# Set up IP Forwarding and Masquerading 
   iptables -T nat -A POSTROUTING --out-interface eth0 -j MASQUERADE 
   iptables -A FORWARD --in-interface eth1 -j ACCEPT 
   echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward              
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ti
End of initialization
Initialization process
time (t)
Canals 
(cn)
Runtime process
0
cn(t)
cn(ti)
 
Figure 4.2: Timeline visualization of open-condition approach 
 
 
 
4.4 Lattice-Based Method 
 
Motivation for using lattice-based to handle initialisation process is due to the 
advantage provided by this method to enable the development of security policy 
based on information flow. Referring to the security strategy to reduce Internet threat 
defined in Chapter 3, this method can be classified as implementing the strategy to 
reduce the interaction between unprotected users and untrusted external parties. 
Review of this method and the formulation of the proposed initialisation process 
using lattice-based approach are described in the following subsection. 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Review of Lattice-Based 
 
Lattice-based is originally proposed by Denning (1976) to model the 
information flows implied by the given sets of access right in the system. This 
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method aims to determine the requirements to achieve secure information flows 
using a set of lattices. Due to its advantage, this model receives wide attentions from 
the security community. Some works notably afford to re-discuss lattice-based 
method such as conducted by Sandhu (1993) and Castano et al. (1994). According to 
Denning (1976), information flow policy is a triple >⊕→< ,,SC  with SC denotes a 
set of security classes, SCSC ×→⊆ is a binary can-flow relation on SC, and 
SCSCSC →×⊕ : is a binary operation for class-combination. Denning also states 
that the set of security classes SC is finite, the can flow relation →  is a partial order 
on SC, SC has a lower bound with respect to → , and the join operator ⊕  is a least 
upper bound operator (Sandhu, 1993). 
 
Based on the definition above, for { }SCUSC ,,=  with UU → , CU → , 
SU → , SC →  and UUU =⊕ , CCU =⊕ , SSU =⊕ , SSC =⊕ , the 
information flow can be visualized using a Hasse diagram as depicted in Figure 4.3. 
Here the information is flowed upwards from U to S. It presents a dominance relation 
UCS >> . 
 
U
C
S
 
Figure 4.3: The information flow of S, C, U 
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4.4.2 Formulating Initialisation Process using Lattice-Based 
 
The initialisation process employing lattice-based method is formulated as 
follows. Let Uuim ∈  becomes an intranet user m with the protection level i, and let 
Oo jn ∈  becomes an external party n with the predetermined safety level j. Access 
request of user imu  to external party 
j
no  is granted by the firewall if only if ji ≥ . 
This policy can be represented by the following equation: 
 
Access: jiou jn
i
m ≥⇔→    (4.3) 
 
Equation (4.3) states that the protection level of a network user must be 
greater or at least equal to the safety level of an external party for the requirement of 
firewall for granting access of a user to Internet. It becomes the basic mechanism to 
develop lattice-based initialisation process. Implementation is held by designing 
three protection levels of the internal users i.e. protected, half-protected and 
unprotected, and three safety level of external parties i.e. trusted, half-trusted and un-
trusted. Interactions of each protection level of internal users and the safety level of 
external parties are presented in Figure 4.4. 
 
Protected users (i+1)
Unprotected users (i-1)
Network Users Internet Objects
Un-trusted objects 
(j=i+1)
Trusted objects (j=i-1)
Half-protected users (i) Half-trusted objects 
(j=i)
Firewall
 
Figure 4.4: Mechanism of lattice-based initialisation 
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4.4.3 Implementation 
 
Lattice-based initialisation process is implemented by defining the protection 
level of internal users as follows: 
 
• Protection level 1 (unprotected) is owned by a group of internal machines 
having IP address 24.4.76.0/24. 
• Protection level 2 (half-protected) is owned by a group of internal machines 
having IP address 24.4.75.0/24. 
• Protection level 3 (protected) is owned by a group of internal machines 
having IP address 24.4.74.0/24. 
 
Meanwhile criteria of the trusted levels to classify Internet objects are 
subjectively and manually defined by the administrator, in which the definition of 
these criteria depend on the type and function of the organization. Since this research 
was held in the university research lab, thus the criteria developed here follow the 
priorities for facilitating the research. Here it is implemented as follows: 
 
• Trusted level 1 is the trusted group of external parties. The example of this 
group is the outside parties publishing education-oriented paper works such 
as IEEE, ACM and Elsevier. 
• Trusted level 2 is the half-trusted group of external parties. The example is 
the outside parties delivering public-oriented news such as Readers Digest, 
BBC and Kompas. 
• Trusted level 3 is the un-trusted group of external parties. The example is the 
outside parties providing search engine function such as Google, Altavista 
and Infoseek. 
 
The interaction between the protection levels of intranet users and the trusted 
levels of external parties is implemented by developing the algorithm as depicted in 
Figure 4.5. The implemented script of this algorithm is given in Appendix A1. 
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Procedure Lattice-Based Initialisation Process (P, T) 
‘Input parameter P is the table of protection-level of internal users 
‘Input parameter T is the table of trusted-level of Internet objects 
Var i, j : integer 
Begin 
 For i = 1 to P.length do 
       For j = 1 to T.length do 
   If P(i) ≥  T(j) then 
         Activate canal P(i) ↔  T(j) 
End 
 
Figure 4.5: Algorithm of lattice-based initialisation process 
 
 
 
4.5 Experiment 
 
Experiments for evaluating the proposed initialisation methods are presented 
in this section. Set up of the experiment is shown in Figure 4.6. The developed 
initialisation programs were run in the firewall machine having specification as Intel 
Pentium 4 1.6GHz, 128 Kbytes RAM and 40Gbytes local disk. Procedures for 
conducting experiments are as follows: 
 
• Run each initialisation program in the firewall machine 
• Record the security policy produced by each method 
• Measure time consumption of each method, and for lattice-based method 
measurement is done by increasing the number of security rules. 
 
Experimental results are presented as follows. The security policies produced 
by the initialisation methods are shown in Figure 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 for close-condition 
approach, open-condition and lattice-based method respectively. These figures show 
successful implementation of initialisation methods to set the desired condition to 
start the runtime operation. Referring to Figure 4.7, close-condition approach 
requires a mechanism to open up the canal in the runtime to enable Internet access. 
Meanwhile, Figure 4.8 discloses the necessity of open-condition approach to have 
security threat detection to inform firewall at the time intrusion is happening, thus 
firewall can take an action to close the connection. Successful Internet access 
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restrictions by enforcing security rules are produced by lattice-based initialisation 
algorithm, in which the results is shown in Figure 4.9. In this figure, security rules 
for each trusted level of external parties are enforced for each corresponding 
protection level of internal users. Other results of security rules enforced by lattice-
based initialisation for different rules number are also given in Appendix A2. 
 
Internet
Active firewall
Intranet
24.4.74.0/24
24.4.74.1
172.16.0.66
24.4.75.0/24 24.4.76.0/24
 
Figure 4.6: Set up of the experiment 
 
 
Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT) 
target     prot opt source               destination 
 
Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT) 
target     prot opt source               destination 
DROP       all  --  anywhere             anywhere 
 
Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT) 
target     prot opt source               destination 
Figure 4.7: Security policy produced by close-condition approach 
 
Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT) 
target     prot opt source               destination 
 
Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT) 
target     prot opt source               destination 
ACCEPT     all  --  anywhere             anywhere    
 
Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT) 
target     prot opt source               destination 
Figure 4.8: Security policy produced by open-condition approach 
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Chain INPUT (policy DROP) 
target     prot opt source               destination    
 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP) 
target     prot opt source               destination    
ACCEPT     tcp  --  24.4.74.0/24         209.202.220.97 
ACCEPT     tcp  -- 209.202.220.97       24.4.74.0/24   
ACCEPT     tcp  --  24.4.74.0/24         212.58.240.120 
ACCEPT     tcp  --  212.58.240.120       24.4.74.0/24   
ACCEPT     tcp  --  24.4.74.0/24         129.35.76.177  
ACCEPT     tcp  --  129.35.76.177        24.4.74.0/24   
ACCEPT     tcp  --  24.4.75.0/24         212.58.240.120 
ACCEPT     tcp  --  212.58.240.120       24.4.75.0/24   
ACCEPT     tcp  --  24.4.75.0/24         129.35.76.177  
ACCEPT     tcp  --  129.35.76.177        24.4.75.0/24   
ACCEPT     tcp  --  24.4.76.0/24         129.35.76.177  
ACCEPT     tcp  --  129.35.76.177        24.4.76.0/24   
 
Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT) 
target     prot opt source               destination    
Figure 4.9: Security policy produced by lattice-based method 
 
 
Results of measuring time consumption are presented in Table 4.1, Table 4.2, 
and Table 4.3 for close-condition, open-condition and lattice-based respectively. 
Graph presentation of these data is given in Figure 4.10.  
 
 
Table 4.1: Close-Condition 
No. Start Time (time) 
End Time 
(time) 
Elapsed Time 
(seconds) 
1 45.46575342 45.46575 0 
2 50.89473684 50.89474 0 
3 53.68493151 53.68493 0 
4 56.6344086 56.63441 0 
5 0.276923077 0.276923 0 
6 11.69135802 11.69136 0 
7 25.01886792 25.01887 0 
8 29.79487179 29.79487 0 
9 33.27272727 33.27273 0 
10 36.90697674 36.90698 0 
11 43.97647059 43.97647 0 
Average 0 
Std dev 0 
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Table 4.2: Open-Condition 
No. Start Time (time) 
End Time 
(time) 
Elapsed Time 
(seconds) 
1 50.85 50.85 0 
2 55.66666667 55.66666667 0 
3 59.13846154 59.13846154 0 
4 3 3 0 
5 8.962962963 8.962962963 0 
6 11.81081081 11.81081081 0 
7 14.88541667 14.88541667 0 
8 19.15151515 19.15151515 0 
9 24 24 0 
10 28.88541667 28.88541667 0 
Average 0 
Std dev 0 
 
 
The graph in Figure 4.10 shows close-condition and open-condition take very 
small time consumption, i.e. 0≅∆t . This condition is due to simple process 
executed by these methods. Meanwhile lattice-based method takes longer time 
consumption to complete its process, in which referring to the algorithm of lattice 
initialisation depicted in Figure 4.5, the processing time can be computed using the 
following formula. 
 
ntnpt ×=∆     (4.4) 
 
with np refers to the number of the predefined protection level, and nt is the number 
of external parties. Based on the implementation stage presented in Section 4.4.3, 
np=3, while nt is a variable. In this experiment, nt ranges from 1 to 5, as shown in 
Table 4.3. Comparing the processing time obtained using Equation (4.4) against the 
experimental results in Table 4.3 produces the data as shown in Table 4.4. As can be 
seen from Table 4.4, similar data are produced from both computation and empirical 
measurements. It is evident that the consumed time of lattice-based initialisation is 
linear to the number of rules being used in the initialisation process. This 
phenomenon is also shown by the graph of processing time in Figure 4.10. 
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Table 4.3: Lattice-Based 
No. 
1 rule 
Elapsed Time 
(seconds) 
2 rule 
Elapsed Time 
(seconds) 
3 rule 
Elapsed Time 
(seconds) 
5 rule 
Elapsed Time 
(seconds) 
1 0.6814904 1.5802469 2.6428571 5.1186299 
2 0.6214158 1.703871 2.5263158 5.2997619 
3 0.7367484 1.4949101 2.4084507 5.0096154 
4 0.8723404 1.5282682 2.8947368 5.0076923 
5 0.7195908 1.8014027 2.3032828 4.8507099 
6 0.9420635 1.6369048 2.6516921 4.870269 
7 0.925 1.5957035 2.4325397 4.9344262 
8 0.9927596 1.7791925 2.6591199 5.1429078 
9 0.8322119 1.8268008 2.6634409 4.1143376 
10 0.9759317 1.8813559 2.4420842 4.6762452 
11 0.7679475 1.6916667 2.6603774 4.3934938 
12 1 1.8135593 2.4083333 5.0192308 
13 0.6699929 1.8355099 3.1706798 4.7044289 
14 0.9791667 1.8612981 2.6735019 4.8090909 
15 0.9285714 1.7813559 2.5395702 4.7811265 
16 0.6203736 1.862069 2.2600733 4.794772 
17 0.8326118 1.4545455 2.3977117 4.554569 
18 0.3134921 1.475641 2.6285609 4.5821386 
19 0.5954156 1.8666667 2.9523185 4.8124171 
20 1.0333333 1.7692308 3.2174899 5.1855006 
21 0.3508696 1.6206897 2.9264347 4.625 
22 1.0317693 1.7669837 2.9341282 5.3122587 
23 0.4592889 1.798951 2.6079658 4.5419192 
24 1.008547 1.64 2.7075893 4.9803922 
25 0.8884381 1.6666667 2.4350193 4.7929167 
26 0.8454545 1.578125 2.2633929 4.9356187 
27 0.6772727 1.6470457 2.7837349 4.8607804 
28 0.8038847 1.475891 2.717033 4.9393939 
29 0.7664577 1.8852459 2.9859155 4.3073752 
30 1.0585271 1.837146 2.4051587 5.008 
Average 0.7976989 1.7052315 2.6433328 4.8321673 
Std dev 0.1988975 0.1371058 0.2583105 0.2776129 
 
 
Table 4.4: Time consumptions of lattice-based initialisation 
Number of 
Rules 
Theoretical 
(seconds) 
Empirical 
(seconds) 
1 0.9 0.798 
2 1.8 1.705 
3 2.7 2.643 
5 4.5 4.832 
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Figure 4.10: Graph presentation of time consumption 
 
 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
Three methods for handling initialisation process have been presented in this 
chapter. They consist of close-condition, open-condition, and lattice-based method. 
Close-condition drop all canals as the result of initialisation, while open-condition 
open all canals. Lattice-based takes a different approach by opening only the canals 
having equalled or higher protection level than the trusted level of external parties. 
Experiment show that very small processing time is consumed by close and open-
condition. Meanwhile, lattice-based produces a linear processing time against the 
number of security rules.  
  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
INITIALISATION PROCESS 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Developing initialisation strategy is essential to set firewall into the suitable 
condition for runtime process. According to Ren et al. (2004), initialisation refers to 
the procedure of starting up and bringing the system to a point on its operation. To 
develop this procedure condition before and after the firewall turned up are 
identified. 
 
 
 
4.2 Closed-Condition Approach 
 
This approach is based on the experience of Ranum and Avolio (1994), which 
suggest to turning off system services at minimum to have more secure system. Thus 
in this effort, it intends to minimize the availability of services in the beginning of 
runtime operation. Formalization of close-condition approach is described as follow. 
 
Let firewall controls a set of reconfigureable canals { }kn ccccC ,,,,, 21 ΚΚ=  
in which each canal nc  corresponds to the individual intranet machine n . Starting up 
the firewall means to bring the firewall from the off condition at time 0tt =  to the 
initial condition at time itt = , where firewall is ready to hold its runtime process. 
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Hence close-condition approach introduced here forces the firewall to close all 
available canal at time itt = , thus it can be formalized as follows 
 
0)( =∀ in tc     (4.1) 
 
A timeline visualization of this approach is given in Figure 4.1. 
 
ti
End of initialization
Initialization process
Time (t)
Canals
(cn)
cn(t)
Runtime process
0
cn(ti)
 
Figure 4.1: Timeline visualization of close-condition approach 
 
It can be noted that close-condition approach enables firewall to always 
authenticate all the requested Internet access, thus strict Internet transactions are 
produced at runtime. Here traffic analyser and canal modification must be 
established to support the function of firewall to organize external network 
transaction, otherwise no internal machine can reach the Internet since no opened 
canals are available at runtime. Implementation of this approach is conducted by 
developing the following script: 
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# To have default DROP policy 
   iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT 
   iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT 
   iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT 
 
# Delete and flush all rules 
   iptables --flush            
   iptables --table nat --flush 
   iptables --delete-chain      
   iptables --table nat --delete-chain 
 
# Set up IP Forwarding and Masquerading 
   iptables -T nat -A POSTROUTING --out-interface eth0 -j MASQUERADE 
   iptables -A FORWARD --in-interface eth1 -j DROP 
   echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
 
 
 
4.3 Open-Condition Approach 
 
Just like the mechanism of the close-condition approach, this method 
similarly projects the firewall into its edge-condition. Rather than closing all 
available canals as held by close-condition, here canals are opened after passing the 
initialisation stage. It can be formalized as follows 
 
1)( =∀ in tc     (4.2) 
 
Visualization of this approach is given in Figure 4.2. This method is implemented by 
executing the following script: 
 
# To have default DROP policy 
   iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT 
   iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT 
   iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT 
 
# Delete and flush.  
   iptables --flush             
   iptables --table nat --flush 
   iptables --delete-chain      
   iptables --table nat --delete-chain 
 
# Set up IP Forwarding and Masquerading 
   iptables -T nat -A POSTROUTING --out-interface eth0 -j MASQUERADE 
   iptables -A FORWARD --in-interface eth1 -j ACCEPT 
   echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward              
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ti
End of initialization
Initialization process
time (t)
Canals 
(cn)
Runtime process
0
cn(t)
cn(ti)
 
Figure 4.2: Timeline visualization of open-condition approach 
 
 
 
4.4 Lattice-Based Method 
 
Motivation for using lattice-based to handle initialisation process is due to the 
advantage provided by this method to enable the development of security policy 
based on information flow. Referring to the security strategy to reduce Internet threat 
defined in Chapter 3, this method can be classified as implementing the strategy to 
reduce the interaction between unprotected users and untrusted external parties. 
Review of this method and the formulation of the proposed initialisation process 
using lattice-based approach are described in the following subsection. 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Review of Lattice-Based 
 
Lattice-based is originally proposed by Denning (1976) to model the 
information flows implied by the given sets of access right in the system. This 
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method aims to determine the requirements to achieve secure information flows 
using a set of lattices. Due to its advantage, this model receives wide attentions from 
the security community. Some works notably afford to re-discuss lattice-based 
method such as conducted by Sandhu (1993) and Castano et al. (1994). According to 
Denning (1976), information flow policy is a triple >⊕→< ,,SC  with SC denotes a 
set of security classes, SCSC ×→⊆ is a binary can-flow relation on SC, and 
SCSCSC →×⊕ : is a binary operation for class-combination. Denning also states 
that the set of security classes SC is finite, the can flow relation →  is a partial order 
on SC, SC has a lower bound with respect to → , and the join operator ⊕  is a least 
upper bound operator (Sandhu, 1993). 
 
Based on the definition above, for { }SCUSC ,,=  with UU → , CU → , 
SU → , SC →  and UUU =⊕ , CCU =⊕ , SSU =⊕ , SSC =⊕ , the 
information flow can be visualized using a Hasse diagram as depicted in Figure 4.3. 
Here the information is flowed upwards from U to S. It presents a dominance relation 
UCS >> . 
 
U
C
S
 
Figure 4.3: The information flow of S, C, U 
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4.4.2 Formulating Initialisation Process using Lattice-Based 
 
The initialisation process employing lattice-based method is formulated as 
follows. Let Uuim ∈  becomes an intranet user m with the protection level i, and let 
Oo jn ∈  becomes an external party n with the predetermined safety level j. Access 
request of user imu  to external party 
j
no  is granted by the firewall if only if ji ≥ . 
This policy can be represented by the following equation: 
 
Access: jiou jn
i
m ≥⇔→    (4.3) 
 
Equation (4.3) states that the protection level of a network user must be 
greater or at least equal to the safety level of an external party for the requirement of 
firewall for granting access of a user to Internet. It becomes the basic mechanism to 
develop lattice-based initialisation process. Implementation is held by designing 
three protection levels of the internal users i.e. protected, half-protected and 
unprotected, and three safety level of external parties i.e. trusted, half-trusted and un-
trusted. Interactions of each protection level of internal users and the safety level of 
external parties are presented in Figure 4.4. 
 
Protected users (i+1)
Unprotected users (i-1)
Network Users Internet Objects
Un-trusted objects 
(j=i+1)
Trusted objects (j=i-1)
Half-protected users (i) Half-trusted objects 
(j=i)
Firewall
 
Figure 4.4: Mechanism of lattice-based initialisation 
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4.4.3 Implementation 
 
Lattice-based initialisation process is implemented by defining the protection 
level of internal users as follows: 
 
• Protection level 1 (unprotected) is owned by a group of internal machines 
having IP address 24.4.76.0/24. 
• Protection level 2 (half-protected) is owned by a group of internal machines 
having IP address 24.4.75.0/24. 
• Protection level 3 (protected) is owned by a group of internal machines 
having IP address 24.4.74.0/24. 
 
Meanwhile criteria of the trusted levels to classify Internet objects are 
subjectively and manually defined by the administrator, in which the definition of 
these criteria depend on the type and function of the organization. Since this research 
was held in the university research lab, thus the criteria developed here follow the 
priorities for facilitating the research. Here it is implemented as follows: 
 
• Trusted level 1 is the trusted group of external parties. The example of this 
group is the outside parties publishing education-oriented paper works such 
as IEEE, ACM and Elsevier. 
• Trusted level 2 is the half-trusted group of external parties. The example is 
the outside parties delivering public-oriented news such as Readers Digest, 
BBC and Kompas. 
• Trusted level 3 is the un-trusted group of external parties. The example is the 
outside parties providing search engine function such as Google, Altavista 
and Infoseek. 
 
The interaction between the protection levels of intranet users and the trusted 
levels of external parties is implemented by developing the algorithm as depicted in 
Figure 4.5. The implemented script of this algorithm is given in Appendix A1. 
 
 
 40
Procedure Lattice-Based Initialisation Process (P, T) 
‘Input parameter P is the table of protection-level of internal users 
‘Input parameter T is the table of trusted-level of Internet objects 
Var i, j : integer 
Begin 
 For i = 1 to P.length do 
       For j = 1 to T.length do 
   If P(i) ≥  T(j) then 
         Activate canal P(i) ↔  T(j) 
End 
 
Figure 4.5: Algorithm of lattice-based initialisation process 
 
 
 
4.5 Experiment 
 
Experiments for evaluating the proposed initialisation methods are presented 
in this section. Set up of the experiment is shown in Figure 4.6. The developed 
initialisation programs were run in the firewall machine having specification as Intel 
Pentium 4 1.6GHz, 128 Kbytes RAM and 40Gbytes local disk. Procedures for 
conducting experiments are as follows: 
 
• Run each initialisation program in the firewall machine 
• Record the security policy produced by each method 
• Measure time consumption of each method, and for lattice-based method 
measurement is done by increasing the number of security rules. 
 
Experimental results are presented as follows. The security policies produced 
by the initialisation methods are shown in Figure 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 for close-condition 
approach, open-condition and lattice-based method respectively. These figures show 
successful implementation of initialisation methods to set the desired condition to 
start the runtime operation. Referring to Figure 4.7, close-condition approach 
requires a mechanism to open up the canal in the runtime to enable Internet access. 
Meanwhile, Figure 4.8 discloses the necessity of open-condition approach to have 
security threat detection to inform firewall at the time intrusion is happening, thus 
firewall can take an action to close the connection. Successful Internet access 
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restrictions by enforcing security rules are produced by lattice-based initialisation 
algorithm, in which the results is shown in Figure 4.9. In this figure, security rules 
for each trusted level of external parties are enforced for each corresponding 
protection level of internal users. Other results of security rules enforced by lattice-
based initialisation for different rules number are also given in Appendix A2. 
 
Internet
Active firewall
Intranet
24.4.74.0/24
24.4.74.1
172.16.0.66
24.4.75.0/24 24.4.76.0/24
 
Figure 4.6: Set up of the experiment 
 
 
Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT) 
target     prot opt source               destination 
 
Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT) 
target     prot opt source               destination 
DROP       all  --  anywhere             anywhere 
 
Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT) 
target     prot opt source               destination 
Figure 4.7: Security policy produced by close-condition approach 
 
Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT) 
target     prot opt source               destination 
 
Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT) 
target     prot opt source               destination 
ACCEPT     all  --  anywhere             anywhere    
 
Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT) 
target     prot opt source               destination 
Figure 4.8: Security policy produced by open-condition approach 
 42
 
Chain INPUT (policy DROP) 
target     prot opt source               destination    
 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP) 
target     prot opt source               destination    
ACCEPT     tcp  --  24.4.74.0/24         209.202.220.97 
ACCEPT     tcp  -- 209.202.220.97       24.4.74.0/24   
ACCEPT     tcp  --  24.4.74.0/24         212.58.240.120 
ACCEPT     tcp  --  212.58.240.120       24.4.74.0/24   
ACCEPT     tcp  --  24.4.74.0/24         129.35.76.177  
ACCEPT     tcp  --  129.35.76.177        24.4.74.0/24   
ACCEPT     tcp  --  24.4.75.0/24         212.58.240.120 
ACCEPT     tcp  --  212.58.240.120       24.4.75.0/24   
ACCEPT     tcp  --  24.4.75.0/24         129.35.76.177  
ACCEPT     tcp  --  129.35.76.177        24.4.75.0/24   
ACCEPT     tcp  --  24.4.76.0/24         129.35.76.177  
ACCEPT     tcp  --  129.35.76.177        24.4.76.0/24   
 
Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT) 
target     prot opt source               destination    
Figure 4.9: Security policy produced by lattice-based method 
 
 
Results of measuring time consumption are presented in Table 4.1, Table 4.2, 
and Table 4.3 for close-condition, open-condition and lattice-based respectively. 
Graph presentation of these data is given in Figure 4.10.  
 
 
Table 4.1: Close-Condition 
No. Start Time (time) 
End Time 
(time) 
Elapsed Time 
(seconds) 
1 45.46575342 45.46575 0 
2 50.89473684 50.89474 0 
3 53.68493151 53.68493 0 
4 56.6344086 56.63441 0 
5 0.276923077 0.276923 0 
6 11.69135802 11.69136 0 
7 25.01886792 25.01887 0 
8 29.79487179 29.79487 0 
9 33.27272727 33.27273 0 
10 36.90697674 36.90698 0 
11 43.97647059 43.97647 0 
Average 0 
Std dev 0 
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Table 4.2: Open-Condition 
No. Start Time (time) 
End Time 
(time) 
Elapsed Time 
(seconds) 
1 50.85 50.85 0 
2 55.66666667 55.66666667 0 
3 59.13846154 59.13846154 0 
4 3 3 0 
5 8.962962963 8.962962963 0 
6 11.81081081 11.81081081 0 
7 14.88541667 14.88541667 0 
8 19.15151515 19.15151515 0 
9 24 24 0 
10 28.88541667 28.88541667 0 
Average 0 
Std dev 0 
 
 
The graph in Figure 4.10 shows close-condition and open-condition take very 
small time consumption, i.e. 0≅∆t . This condition is due to simple process 
executed by these methods. Meanwhile lattice-based method takes longer time 
consumption to complete its process, in which referring to the algorithm of lattice 
initialisation depicted in Figure 4.5, the processing time can be computed using the 
following formula. 
 
ntnpt ×=∆     (4.4) 
 
with np refers to the number of the predefined protection level, and nt is the number 
of external parties. Based on the implementation stage presented in Section 4.4.3, 
np=3, while nt is a variable. In this experiment, nt ranges from 1 to 5, as shown in 
Table 4.3. Comparing the processing time obtained using Equation (4.4) against the 
experimental results in Table 4.3 produces the data as shown in Table 4.4. As can be 
seen from Table 4.4, similar data are produced from both computation and empirical 
measurements. It is evident that the consumed time of lattice-based initialisation is 
linear to the number of rules being used in the initialisation process. This 
phenomenon is also shown by the graph of processing time in Figure 4.10. 
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Table 4.3: Lattice-Based 
No. 
1 rule 
Elapsed Time 
(seconds) 
2 rule 
Elapsed Time 
(seconds) 
3 rule 
Elapsed Time 
(seconds) 
5 rule 
Elapsed Time 
(seconds) 
1 0.6814904 1.5802469 2.6428571 5.1186299 
2 0.6214158 1.703871 2.5263158 5.2997619 
3 0.7367484 1.4949101 2.4084507 5.0096154 
4 0.8723404 1.5282682 2.8947368 5.0076923 
5 0.7195908 1.8014027 2.3032828 4.8507099 
6 0.9420635 1.6369048 2.6516921 4.870269 
7 0.925 1.5957035 2.4325397 4.9344262 
8 0.9927596 1.7791925 2.6591199 5.1429078 
9 0.8322119 1.8268008 2.6634409 4.1143376 
10 0.9759317 1.8813559 2.4420842 4.6762452 
11 0.7679475 1.6916667 2.6603774 4.3934938 
12 1 1.8135593 2.4083333 5.0192308 
13 0.6699929 1.8355099 3.1706798 4.7044289 
14 0.9791667 1.8612981 2.6735019 4.8090909 
15 0.9285714 1.7813559 2.5395702 4.7811265 
16 0.6203736 1.862069 2.2600733 4.794772 
17 0.8326118 1.4545455 2.3977117 4.554569 
18 0.3134921 1.475641 2.6285609 4.5821386 
19 0.5954156 1.8666667 2.9523185 4.8124171 
20 1.0333333 1.7692308 3.2174899 5.1855006 
21 0.3508696 1.6206897 2.9264347 4.625 
22 1.0317693 1.7669837 2.9341282 5.3122587 
23 0.4592889 1.798951 2.6079658 4.5419192 
24 1.008547 1.64 2.7075893 4.9803922 
25 0.8884381 1.6666667 2.4350193 4.7929167 
26 0.8454545 1.578125 2.2633929 4.9356187 
27 0.6772727 1.6470457 2.7837349 4.8607804 
28 0.8038847 1.475891 2.717033 4.9393939 
29 0.7664577 1.8852459 2.9859155 4.3073752 
30 1.0585271 1.837146 2.4051587 5.008 
Average 0.7976989 1.7052315 2.6433328 4.8321673 
Std dev 0.1988975 0.1371058 0.2583105 0.2776129 
 
 
Table 4.4: Time consumptions of lattice-based initialisation 
Number of 
Rules 
Theoretical 
(seconds) 
Empirical 
(seconds) 
1 0.9 0.798 
2 1.8 1.705 
3 2.7 2.643 
5 4.5 4.832 
 
 45
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Open-
condition
Close-
condition
Lattice-based
(1 rule)
Lattice-based
(2 rules)
Lattice-based
(3 rules)
Lattice-based
(5 rules)
 
Figure 4.10: Graph presentation of time consumption 
 
 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
Three methods for handling initialisation process have been presented in this 
chapter. They consist of close-condition, open-condition, and lattice-based method. 
Close-condition drop all canals as the result of initialisation, while open-condition 
open all canals. Lattice-based takes a different approach by opening only the canals 
having equalled or higher protection level than the trusted level of external parties. 
Experiment show that very small processing time is consumed by close and open-
condition. Meanwhile, lattice-based produces a linear processing time against the 
number of security rules.  
  
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
RUNTIME PROCESS: 
MINIMIZING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN UNPROTECTED USERS 
AND UNTRUSTED EXTERNAL PARTIES 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the development of runtime process for minimizing the 
interaction between unprotected users and untrusted external parties as defined in the 
security strategy in Chapter 3. The methods proposed in this stage are to follow 
initialisation process presented in Chapter 4. With t represent the current time and it  
denote the ending of initialisation process, the operations of firewall at itt >  are 
discussed. To carry on this task, a mechanism to identify which users are unprotected 
and which external parties are untrusted, is developed as well as the mechanism to 
measure the degree of risk produced from each Internet transaction. Since this 
method requires quantifying the abstract parameters such as safety and risk of an 
Internet transaction, thus fuzzy reasoning is employed to handle this task. Referring 
to the work of (Negnevitsky, 2002) that shows successful application of fuzzy 
reasoning for dealing with abstract parameter, and Labuschagne and Eloff (1998) and 
Kim et al. (2004) that show the applicability of fuzzy logic in handling real-time 
analysis on network traffic, fuzzy reasoning is utilized to observe the content of 
network traffic passing through the firewall. The developed strategy is to define 
some parameters indicating or causing the appearance of the threats and to formulate 
their membership function contributing to the risk for accessing Internet. The 
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advantage of this method is due to continues observation of network traffic, therefore 
any arising threats originated from Internet transaction in any time can be detected, 
thus the active firewall can take an action to secure internal network. 
 
 
 
5.2 Review of Fuzzy Logic in Network Security 
 
Since its introduction by Zadeh (1965), fuzzy logic has been applied to many 
systems with the purpose is to inject some degree of intelligence (Klir and Yuan, 
1995; Yen et al., 1995). Today, the implementations of fuzzy logic can be found in 
many disciplines such as finance sector, traffic control and automobile, information 
system, to medical science. In the domain of network security, fuzzy logic has 
successfully presented methods to describe the parameters that are difficult to 
quantify such as the safety and the risk of the network. The work of Ru and Eloff 
(1996) notably introduced the risk analysis method using fuzzy logic, and was 
followed by Labuschagne and Eloff (1998) to develop real time risk analysis for 
securing network. The last effort aims to support firewall to perform identification 
and authentication on specific users by measuring the global risk of every 
transaction. Besides observing the header of IP and TCP packet, no traffic content 
are taken into account by this method, therefore only shallow analysis can be held. 
Meanwhile, the work of Zou et al. (2002) for developing fuzzy adaptive security 
algorithm for intelligent firewall, consider only the membership function of the 
security level that are manually determined based on the source and destination of 
the packet. Although the proposed method is claimed resolving the conflict between 
security and speed, however the approach applied in the developed algorithm 
simplifies the analysis of the flowing packet using the predetermined security level. 
Therefore the algorithm has minimal capability to identify the threat on the flowing 
traffic. This condition also leads to the dependency to manually set the security 
levels. Moreover, it seems inapplicable to manually assign security level to every 
external party. 
 
The effort of Guan et al. (2004) to develop intrusion detection systems and 
Kim et al. (2004) to develop network forensic afford to employ fuzzy reasoning to 
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conduct thorough analysis on network traffic in order to determine the pattern of 
network intrusion. However the proposed methods consider only the header of 
network packet. Thus it will be difficult to identify the threat contained in the 
flowing data. In this research, fuzzy reasoning is used to support the mechanism of 
active firewall to determine the security level of the flowing packet. Unlike the 
works of Labuschagne and Eloff (1998) that rely only on the packet header or Zou et 
al. (2002) that manually determine the security level of the packet, here automatic 
threat analysis is held on the content of the flowing packet. Based on this analysis, 
security policy of the firewall is adaptively updated during the runtime process. 
Formulation of this method is described in the next section. 
 
 
 
5.3 Network Traffic Analysis 
 
Preliminary works to manually analyse the content of network traffic were 
held to disclose the factors influencing Internet threat. This effort observed some 
parameters that might indicate the appearance of the threats as follow, the existence 
of executable file (E), the effort to force user for reading the external information (F), 
the number of advertisements (A), the number of external servers involved in a single 
Internet transaction (M), the number of active script (S) and the number of cookies 
(C). To verify the influence of these parameters for causing the risk of accessing 
Internet, a set of network traffics generated from some well-known Internet parties 
were collected and scrutinized. Here the usage of well-known Internet parties is 
important in order to facilitate the justification of the safety of accessing Internet i.e. 
to determine whether the external party is a normal party or causing threat. Thus, the 
above parameters that lead to the threat could be identified. Results of the 
observation are presented in Table 5.1. 
 
By proportioning the mean υ of the existence of each predetermined 
parameter of normal parties against the threat parties as shown in the last row of 
Table 5.1, and also following the rule of influence presented in Negnevitsky (2002), 
data presented in Table 5.1 show some phenomenon as follow. The existence of 
executable file and forced information carried by the external parties absolutely 
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causes the threat to the internal network users. The number of advertisements slightly 
indicates the threat, and the numbers of external servers has less influence to the 
appearance of threat. Meanwhile the number of cookies and active scripts cannot be 
used to show the appearance of Internet threat since the proportion of the mean of 
these parameters from normal and threat parties produce the values close to or 
greater than one. It means these parameters are indifferent both in normal and threat 
parties, it is shown by large numbers of active scripts and cookies can be found in 
both parties. These phenomenons are obviously presented in Figure 5.1 below. 
Therefore, in this research only first four-listed parameters above are used in 
analysing Internet threats, since the number of cookies and active scripts cannot be 
employed to detect the Internet threats. 
 
 
Table 5.1: Measuring the factors influencing the threat 
Name of External 
Party Status E F A M C S 
www.ukm.my safe 0 0 0 0 2 2 
www.acm.org safe 0 0 0 0 3 1 
www.utm.my safe 0 0 0 0 3 0 
www.mfa.go.th safe 0 0 0 0 3 9 
www.elsevier.com safe 0 0 2 1 4 43 
www.ieee.com safe 0 0 1 3 7 15 
www.xxx.com threat 0 0 2 4 4 2 
www.babes.com threat 0 0 2 7 4 6 
www.sex.com threat 0 4 3 9 2 0 
www.porn.com threat 4 90 9 3 6 33 
υ of safe parties 0 0 1.5 2 3.67 11.67
υ of threat parties 1 23.5 4 5.75 4 10.25
υ of safe / υ of threat 0 0 0.375 0.348 0.918 1.139
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Figure 5.1: Effects of some defined parameters to indicate threats 
 
 
 
5.4 Formulating Security Rules Update using Fuzzy Reasoning 
 
Let Y be the universe of discourse with elements y that denotes the threat of 
the network traffic passing through the firewall. And let E, F, A, and M be the sets of 
components representing the existence of the executable file, the effort to force 
internal user to read the information from external parties, the number of 
advertisements, and the number of the external server involved in a single Internet 
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transaction respectively, hence fuzzy set E, F, A, and M of universe Y are defined by 
the functions )(yEµ , )(yFµ , )(yAµ , and )(yMµ . Those functions are called the 
membership function of set E, F, A, and M respectively, and are described as follow. 
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The graphs visualizing the membership function of the parameters defined in 
Equation (5.2) to (5.5), are depicted in Figure 5.2 to 5.5. These graphs become the 
input of the fuzzy-based security rules update to determine the security level of every 
external party. 
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Figure 5.2: The membership function of executable files 
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Figure 5.3: The membership function of forced information 
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Figure 5.4: The membership function of the number of advertisements 
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Figure 5.5: The membership function of the number of external machines 
 
To obtain the total threat produced by the membership function of the factors 
defined above, the equation below is computed. 
 
   [ ])(),(),(),(max
)()()()(
yyyy
yyyyx
MAFE
MAFE
µµµµ
µµµµ
=
= ΥΥΥ
  (5.6) 
 
with x denote the total threat. Let X becomes the universe of discourse of the threat in 
which Xx∈ . And let LR, MR, and HR become the subsets of X representing the 
low, medium, and high risk respectively, hence 
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And finally the total risk of the external parties can be computed as follows. 
 
[ ])(),(),(max
)()()()(
xxx
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µµµ
=
= ΥΥ
  (5.9) 
 
The value of total risk determine which security level shall be assigned to the 
external party originating the packet of interest. Membership function of the risk is 
depicted in Figure 5.6. To implement the total risk of a transaction into the security 
rules of firewall, the following computation is executed: 
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with Oom ∈  denote a particular external party involved in the transaction, and j is 
the index of trusted level of external party as defined in Section 4.4.2. 
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Figure 5.6: Membership function of the risk 
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5.5 Implementation 
 
Implementation of the proposed security policy update using fuzzy reasoning 
was conducted by developing algorithm to assign security level to external parties, as 
depicted in Figure 5.7. The algorithm consists of two main processes i.e. the 
background process to collect the flowing packets that are stored in the traffic buffer, 
and the foreground process to analyse the content of the buffer and to compute the 
security level assign for each external parties. In order to collect the traffic, ngrep 
network monitor is used to capture and store the flowing packet passing through the 
firewall. The mechanism for collecting packet here is to fill up the traffic buffer with 
network packet during the running time of the foreground process, and then empty 
back the buffer when its content have been supplied to the foreground process for 
running in the next cycle. Result of this program is the security level assigned to each 
external party, which the security levels identify the risk carried by accessing those 
parties. Referring to the formulation in Section 5.4, here three security levels are 
defined namely high risk, medium risk, and low risk. This implementation also 
follows the risk membership function as depicted in Figure 5.6. 
 
In the runtime process of active firewall, the developed security policy update 
based on fuzzy reasoning is run in the background although its algorithm consists of 
the foreground and background process. It is due to the processing intensive of this 
method, particularly in analysing the content of traffic buffer. Execution to update 
security policy in the active firewall is held next after completing each cycle of 
foreground process. Complete implementation of this method is given in Appendix 
B. 
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Procedure Fuzzy Reasoning 
‘TBUF : array of traffic buffer 
Begin 
     Forced Info = {“exit=true”, “exit=false”,”checkexit”} 
     Adv = {“window.open”,”winopen (”,”popup (”} 
     i = 1 
     While i ≤  TBUF.size do 
     Begin 
 Line_content = “” 
 1=j  
 Do Until (TBUF(i) = EOL) Or (i = TBUF.size) 
      Line_content = Line_content + TBUF(i) 
                 If (TBUF(i) = “ “) Then 
      Begin  
  Word(j) = Line_content 
  Line_content = “” 
  1+= jj  
      End 
      1+= ii  
         Loop 
              For 1=j  to Word.size do 
 Begin 
      If External_party = External(Word(j)) And External_party is new Then 
OutsiderArraypartyExternal __ ⇒  
     If Internal_user = Internal(Word(j)) And Internal_user is new Then 
InternalOutsiderArrayuserInternal .__ ⇒  
      If Word(j) = EXE File Then Array_Outsider.EXE = Array_Outsider.EXE + 1
      If Word(j) = Forced Info Then 
Array_Outsider.Forced Info = Array_Outsider.Forced Info + 1 
      If Word(j) = Adv Then Array_Outsider.Adv = Array_Outsider.Adv + 1 
 End 
     End 
     For 1=j  to Array_Outsider.size do 
     Begin 
 For 1=k  to Array_Outsider.size do 
               Begin 
      If j <> k Then 
  If Array_Outsider(j).Internal = Array_Outsider(k).Internal Then 
       If (Array_Outsider(j).Time - Array_Outsider(k).Time) < 15 Then 
   Array_Outsider(j).Machine = Array_Outsider(j).Machine+1 
      Risk_EXE = ComputeRiskEXE(Array_Outsider(j).EXE) 
      Risk_ForcedInfo = ComputeRiskForcedInfo(Array_Outsider(j). Forced Info)
      Risk_Adv = ComputeRiskAdv(Array_Outsider(j).Adv) 
      Risk_Machine = ComputeRiskMachine(Array_Outsider(j).Machine) 
      Total_Risk = max[Risk_EXE, Risk_Machine, Risk_Script] 
      Select Case Total_Risk 
  Total_Risk ≤  2.5 : Array_Outsider(k) ⇒  Low_Risk 
  2.5 < Total_Risk ≤ 7.5 : Array_Outsider(k) ⇒  Medium_Risk 
  Total_Risk > 2.5 : Array_Outsider(k) ⇒  High_Risk 
      End Case 
               End 
     End 
End 
Figure 5.7: Algorithm to assign security level to external parties 
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5.6 Experiment 
 
Experiments to evaluate the proposed fuzzy reasoning method were held on 
the same platform as used in Chapter 4. Some collections of network packet were 
used as the input of the system. These packets were captured from different sources 
of network transaction as listed in the first column of Table 5.2. Observations of the 
collected packets using fuzzy reasoning as formulated in Section 5.4 produce the 
result as presented in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4. These data disclose the aspects of the 
proposed method i.e. accuracy and processing time. The former parameter 
corresponds to the performance of fuzzy reasoning in identifying the risk of external 
parties, while the latter disclose the speed of this method to respond to the malicious 
external parties. Descriptions of each parameter follow. 
 
 
 
5.6.1 Accuracy 
 
Here accuracy is analysed using two well-known parameters i.e. false 
acceptance rate and false rejection rate. False acceptance refers to the error of 
accepting malicious party, while false rejection is the error of rejecting the secure or 
normal outsiders. Both parameters are computed by comparing the data of 
experimental result in Table 5.3 to the reference of the external parties in term of the 
list of safety properties as shown in Table 5.2. Here the reference is obtained by 
holding manual in depth analysis on the global content of each external party, 
combined with the observation on the reputation of each party. The last two 
properties i.e. the global content and the reputation, influence the selection for using 
popular external parties as the object of observation, since it facilitates the creation of 
the reference.  
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Table 5.2: List of reference 
No Name of External Party Risk Comment 
1 www.17tahun.com Threat Pornography 
2 www.acm.org Normal - 
3 www.altavista.com Normal - 
4 www.astro.my Normal - 
5 www.babes.com Threat Pornography 
6 www.cisco.com Normal - 
7 www.cnn.com Normal - 
8 www.elsevier.com Normal - 
9 www.gatra.com Normal - 
10 www.gawab.com Normal - 
11 www.go.com Normal - 
12 www.hotmail.com Normal - 
13 www.hunsa.com Threat Web Portal 
14 www.ieee.com Normal - 
15 www.jaring.my Normal - 
16 www.kompas.com Normal - 
17 www.lycos.com Normal - 
18 www.melayu.com Normal - 
19 www.mfa.go.th Normal - 
20 www.mtreexxx.net Threat Pornography 
21 www.porn.com Threat Pornography 
22 www.sanook.com Threat Web Portal 
23 www.sciencedirect.com Normal - 
24 www.sex.com Threat Pornography 
25 www.thaiamateur.net Threat Pornography 
26 www.thaigirls.net Threat Pornography 
27 www.thestar.com Normal - 
28 www.ukm.my Normal - 
29 www.utm.my Normal - 
30 www.xxx.com Threat Pornography 
 
 
Referring to the experimental result and the reference, from ten external 
parties that are considered dangerous by the reference, two are accepted by fuzzy 
reasoning method. While from twenty external parties that are accepted as normal by 
reference, nine of them are considered malicious by the developed fuzzy reasoning. 
This distinction show the different point of view in evaluating the risk factor of the 
external parties, which the reference uses high level consideration, while the 
proposed fuzzy reasoning method conducts low level evaluation based on the 
predetermined parameters influencing threat as formulated in Section 4. The 
experiment delivers 20% false acceptance and 45% false rejection. The false 
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acceptance here is due to malicious content of some public web sites such as intense 
advertisements and too many external servers include in the transactions, while the 
false rejection is due to polite interface of malicious websites before it launch its 
action. Graph presentation of the experimental results for the normal parties as 
justified by the reference is shown in Figure 5.8, and for the parties carrying threats 
in Figure 5.9. 
 
Table 5.3: Experimental result (risk measurement) 
Name of External Party E F A M Risk Status 
www.17tahun.com 0 0 3 10 0.846 High Risk 
www.acm.org 0 0 0 3 0.646 Medium Risk 
www.altavista.com 0 0 0 4 0.711 Medium Risk 
www.astro.my 0 0 1 2 0.5 Medium Risk 
www.babes.com 0 0 2 4 0.711 Medium Risk 
www.cisco.com 0 0 15 4 0.990 High Risk 
www.cnn.com 0 0 11 9 0.980 High Risk 
www.elsevier.com 0 0 2 4 0.711 Medium Risk 
www.gatra.com 0 0 0 3 0.646 Medium Risk 
www.gawab.com 0 0 1 3 0.646 Medium Risk 
www.go.com 0 0 4 8 0.905 High Risk 
www.hotmail.com 0 0 6 12 0.952 High Risk 
www.hunsa.com 1 0 3 7 1 High Risk 
www.ieee.com 0 0 1 7 0.796 High Risk 
www.jaring.my 0 0 2 2 0.692 Medium Risk 
www.kompas.com 0 0 4 5 0.905 High Risk 
www.lycos.com 0 0 1 11 0.842 High Risk 
www.melayu.com 0 0 0 2 0.5 Medium Risk 
www.mfa.go.th 0 0 0 3 0.646 Medium Risk 
www.mtreexxx.net 167 0 30 6 1 High Risk 
www.porn.com 4 90 9 6 1 High Risk 
www.sanook.com 0 0 8 7 0.935 High Risk 
www.sciencedirect.com 0 0 7 2 0.963 High Risk 
www.sex.com 0 4 3 2 1 High Risk 
www.thaiamateur.net 0 0 0 5 0.75 High Risk 
www.thaigirls.net 0 0 0 6 0.776 High Risk 
www.thestar.com 0 0 18 11 0.993 High Risk 
www.ukm.my 0 0 0 2 0.5 Medium Risk 
www.utm.my 0 0 0 3 0.646 Medium Risk 
www.xxx.com 0 0 2 4 0.711 Medium Risk 
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Figure 5.8: Experimental results for normal external parties 
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Figure 5.9: Experimental results for threat external parties 
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Table 5.4: Experimental result (processing time) 
Name of External Party 
Size  
(Bytes) Time∆  SizeMin
Size  TimeMin
Time
∆
∆
www.altavista.com 28148 0:00:09 1.00 1.00
www.babes.com 86024 0:01:26 3.06 9.56
www.hotmail.com 100777 0:01:53 3.58 12.56
www.thaiamateur.net 104841 0:02:11 3.72 14.56
www.sex.com 109678 0:02:16 3.90 15.11
www.sciencedirect.com 121757 0:02:44 4.33 18.22
www.utm.my 129005 0:03:27 4.58 23.00
www.xxx.com 129985 0:03:10 4.62 21.11
www.acm.org 137546 0:03:35 4.89 23.89
www.jaring.my 149473 0:04:06 5.31 27.33
www.gawab.com 153902 0:04:28 5.47 29.78
www.gatra.com 165407 0:05:19 5.88 35.44
www.astro.my 165775 0:05:01 5.89 33.44
www.lycos.com 214409 0:08:56 7.62 59.56
www.thaigirls.net 225843 0:10:08 8.02 67.56
www.ieee.com 259714 0:14:22 9.23 95.78
www.cnn.com 274236 0:13:59 9.74 93.22
www.cisco.com 277383 0:08:14 9.85 54.89
www.ukm.my 307656 0:18:24 10.93 122.67
www.melayu.com 324279 0:20:44 11.52 138.22
www.17tahun.com 335085 0:22:42 11.90 151.33
www.elsevier.com 338587 0:24:02 12.03 160.22
www.thestar.com 344841 0:22:22 12.25 149.11
www.mfa.go.th 369902 0:25:08 13.14 167.56
www.go.com 378983 0:26:50 13.46 178.89
www.detik.com 460883 0:43:10 16.37 287.78
www.kompas.com 499875 0:50:31 17.76 336.78
www.porn.com 566070 1:03:57 20.11 426.33
www.sanook.com 628835 1:30:31 22.34 603.44
www.hunsa.com 873838 2:41:50 31.04 1078.89
www.mtreexxx.net 1082247 2:14:17 38.45 895.22
 
 
 
 
5.6.2 Processing Time 
 
Referring to the experimental result presented in Table 5.4, the processing 
time of the proposed fuzzy reasoning method increase exponentially following the 
growth of the buffer size, which the buffer is used to store the collection of network 
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packets. And if we look back on the proposed algorithm as shown in Figure 5.7, it 
shows that the iterations to browse and analyse the contents of the buffer become the 
cause of this condition. Bigger size of buffer would create more iterations, thus 
longer time is required to finish the process. Here using the reference of the 
processing time and size buffer that are denoted by reft∆  and refs , the processing 
time of the known buffer size can be computed as follows 
 
ct
s
st ref
ref
+∆⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=∆
2
    (5.11) 
 
with s denote the size of the buffer, and c refers to the time consumption to compute 
other part of the algorithm in addition to the required time to complete the main 
iterations. Figure 5.10 shows the empirical measurements of the processing time 
against the size of buffer for storing network packets. These data shows that 
predicted processing time using Equation (5.11) is satisfied. 
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Figure 5.10: The processing time against the buffer size 
 
 
 
 63
5.6.3 Sensitivity 
 
Sensitivity is defined as the capability of firewall to react on detecting a threat 
by executing an action to secure internal users. This parameter is obtained by 
measuring time distinction between the detection of the threat to the modification of 
canals corresponding to the malicious external parties. Assuming that the worst-case 
condition is met i.e. the threat is detected in the beginning of traffic buffer, hence 
firewall must wait to complete its observation on analysing the packet in the traffic 
buffer before modifying the canals. In this case, the required time to take an action 
against the threat is equal to the processing time to browse the buffer. Hence the 
quadratic increase of processing time as defined in Equation (5.11) is fulfilled. 
 
 
 
5.7 Summary 
 
This chapter discusses a method to adaptively updating security rules using 
fuzzy reasoning. The proposed method uses some parameters to measure the risk of 
external parties i.e. the existence of executable file, the number of forced 
information, the number of advertisements, the number of external machines, and the 
number of cookies. Experiment delivers 20% of false acceptance and 45% of false 
rejection, with the quadratic increase of processing time following the increase of 
buffer size. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
RUNTIME PROCESS: 
MINIMIZING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN UNPROTECTED USERS 
AND UNTRUSTED EXTERNAL PARTIES 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the development of runtime process for minimizing the 
interaction between unprotected users and untrusted external parties as defined in the 
security strategy in Chapter 3. The methods proposed in this stage are to follow 
initialisation process presented in Chapter 4. With t represent the current time and it  
denote the ending of initialisation process, the operations of firewall at itt >  are 
discussed. To carry on this task, a mechanism to identify which users are unprotected 
and which external parties are untrusted, is developed as well as the mechanism to 
measure the degree of risk produced from each Internet transaction. Since this 
method requires quantifying the abstract parameters such as safety and risk of an 
Internet transaction, thus fuzzy reasoning is employed to handle this task. Referring 
to the work of (Negnevitsky, 2002) that shows successful application of fuzzy 
reasoning for dealing with abstract parameter, and Labuschagne and Eloff (1998) and 
Kim et al. (2004) that show the applicability of fuzzy logic in handling real-time 
analysis on network traffic, fuzzy reasoning is utilized to observe the content of 
network traffic passing through the firewall. The developed strategy is to define 
some parameters indicating or causing the appearance of the threats and to formulate 
their membership function contributing to the risk for accessing Internet. The 
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advantage of this method is due to continues observation of network traffic, therefore 
any arising threats originated from Internet transaction in any time can be detected, 
thus the active firewall can take an action to secure internal network. 
 
 
 
5.2 Review of Fuzzy Logic in Network Security 
 
Since its introduction by Zadeh (1965), fuzzy logic has been applied to many 
systems with the purpose is to inject some degree of intelligence (Klir and Yuan, 
1995; Yen et al., 1995). Today, the implementations of fuzzy logic can be found in 
many disciplines such as finance sector, traffic control and automobile, information 
system, to medical science. In the domain of network security, fuzzy logic has 
successfully presented methods to describe the parameters that are difficult to 
quantify such as the safety and the risk of the network. The work of Ru and Eloff 
(1996) notably introduced the risk analysis method using fuzzy logic, and was 
followed by Labuschagne and Eloff (1998) to develop real time risk analysis for 
securing network. The last effort aims to support firewall to perform identification 
and authentication on specific users by measuring the global risk of every 
transaction. Besides observing the header of IP and TCP packet, no traffic content 
are taken into account by this method, therefore only shallow analysis can be held. 
Meanwhile, the work of Zou et al. (2002) for developing fuzzy adaptive security 
algorithm for intelligent firewall, consider only the membership function of the 
security level that are manually determined based on the source and destination of 
the packet. Although the proposed method is claimed resolving the conflict between 
security and speed, however the approach applied in the developed algorithm 
simplifies the analysis of the flowing packet using the predetermined security level. 
Therefore the algorithm has minimal capability to identify the threat on the flowing 
traffic. This condition also leads to the dependency to manually set the security 
levels. Moreover, it seems inapplicable to manually assign security level to every 
external party. 
 
The effort of Guan et al. (2004) to develop intrusion detection systems and 
Kim et al. (2004) to develop network forensic afford to employ fuzzy reasoning to 
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conduct thorough analysis on network traffic in order to determine the pattern of 
network intrusion. However the proposed methods consider only the header of 
network packet. Thus it will be difficult to identify the threat contained in the 
flowing data. In this research, fuzzy reasoning is used to support the mechanism of 
active firewall to determine the security level of the flowing packet. Unlike the 
works of Labuschagne and Eloff (1998) that rely only on the packet header or Zou et 
al. (2002) that manually determine the security level of the packet, here automatic 
threat analysis is held on the content of the flowing packet. Based on this analysis, 
security policy of the firewall is adaptively updated during the runtime process. 
Formulation of this method is described in the next section. 
 
 
 
5.3 Network Traffic Analysis 
 
Preliminary works to manually analyse the content of network traffic were 
held to disclose the factors influencing Internet threat. This effort observed some 
parameters that might indicate the appearance of the threats as follow, the existence 
of executable file (E), the effort to force user for reading the external information (F), 
the number of advertisements (A), the number of external servers involved in a single 
Internet transaction (M), the number of active script (S) and the number of cookies 
(C). To verify the influence of these parameters for causing the risk of accessing 
Internet, a set of network traffics generated from some well-known Internet parties 
were collected and scrutinized. Here the usage of well-known Internet parties is 
important in order to facilitate the justification of the safety of accessing Internet i.e. 
to determine whether the external party is a normal party or causing threat. Thus, the 
above parameters that lead to the threat could be identified. Results of the 
observation are presented in Table 5.1. 
 
By proportioning the mean υ of the existence of each predetermined 
parameter of normal parties against the threat parties as shown in the last row of 
Table 5.1, and also following the rule of influence presented in Negnevitsky (2002), 
data presented in Table 5.1 show some phenomenon as follow. The existence of 
executable file and forced information carried by the external parties absolutely 
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causes the threat to the internal network users. The number of advertisements slightly 
indicates the threat, and the numbers of external servers has less influence to the 
appearance of threat. Meanwhile the number of cookies and active scripts cannot be 
used to show the appearance of Internet threat since the proportion of the mean of 
these parameters from normal and threat parties produce the values close to or 
greater than one. It means these parameters are indifferent both in normal and threat 
parties, it is shown by large numbers of active scripts and cookies can be found in 
both parties. These phenomenons are obviously presented in Figure 5.1 below. 
Therefore, in this research only first four-listed parameters above are used in 
analysing Internet threats, since the number of cookies and active scripts cannot be 
employed to detect the Internet threats. 
 
 
Table 5.1: Measuring the factors influencing the threat 
Name of External 
Party Status E F A M C S 
www.ukm.my safe 0 0 0 0 2 2 
www.acm.org safe 0 0 0 0 3 1 
www.utm.my safe 0 0 0 0 3 0 
www.mfa.go.th safe 0 0 0 0 3 9 
www.elsevier.com safe 0 0 2 1 4 43 
www.ieee.com safe 0 0 1 3 7 15 
www.xxx.com threat 0 0 2 4 4 2 
www.babes.com threat 0 0 2 7 4 6 
www.sex.com threat 0 4 3 9 2 0 
www.porn.com threat 4 90 9 3 6 33 
υ of safe parties 0 0 1.5 2 3.67 11.67
υ of threat parties 1 23.5 4 5.75 4 10.25
υ of safe / υ of threat 0 0 0.375 0.348 0.918 1.139
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Figure 5.1: Effects of some defined parameters to indicate threats 
 
 
 
5.4 Formulating Security Rules Update using Fuzzy Reasoning 
 
Let Y be the universe of discourse with elements y that denotes the threat of 
the network traffic passing through the firewall. And let E, F, A, and M be the sets of 
components representing the existence of the executable file, the effort to force 
internal user to read the information from external parties, the number of 
advertisements, and the number of the external server involved in a single Internet 
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transaction respectively, hence fuzzy set E, F, A, and M of universe Y are defined by 
the functions )(yEµ , )(yFµ , )(yAµ , and )(yMµ . Those functions are called the 
membership function of set E, F, A, and M respectively, and are described as follow. 
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The graphs visualizing the membership function of the parameters defined in 
Equation (5.2) to (5.5), are depicted in Figure 5.2 to 5.5. These graphs become the 
input of the fuzzy-based security rules update to determine the security level of every 
external party. 
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Figure 5.2: The membership function of executable files 
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Figure 5.3: The membership function of forced information 
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Figure 5.4: The membership function of the number of advertisements 
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Figure 5.5: The membership function of the number of external machines 
 
To obtain the total threat produced by the membership function of the factors 
defined above, the equation below is computed. 
 
   [ ])(),(),(),(max
)()()()(
yyyy
yyyyx
MAFE
MAFE
µµµµ
µµµµ
=
= ΥΥΥ
  (5.6) 
 
with x denote the total threat. Let X becomes the universe of discourse of the threat in 
which Xx∈ . And let LR, MR, and HR become the subsets of X representing the 
low, medium, and high risk respectively, hence 
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And finally the total risk of the external parties can be computed as follows. 
 
[ ])(),(),(max
)()()()(
xxx
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HRMRLR
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=
= ΥΥ
  (5.9) 
 
The value of total risk determine which security level shall be assigned to the 
external party originating the packet of interest. Membership function of the risk is 
depicted in Figure 5.6. To implement the total risk of a transaction into the security 
rules of firewall, the following computation is executed: 
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with Oom ∈  denote a particular external party involved in the transaction, and j is 
the index of trusted level of external party as defined in Section 4.4.2. 
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Figure 5.6: Membership function of the risk 
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5.5 Implementation 
 
Implementation of the proposed security policy update using fuzzy reasoning 
was conducted by developing algorithm to assign security level to external parties, as 
depicted in Figure 5.7. The algorithm consists of two main processes i.e. the 
background process to collect the flowing packets that are stored in the traffic buffer, 
and the foreground process to analyse the content of the buffer and to compute the 
security level assign for each external parties. In order to collect the traffic, ngrep 
network monitor is used to capture and store the flowing packet passing through the 
firewall. The mechanism for collecting packet here is to fill up the traffic buffer with 
network packet during the running time of the foreground process, and then empty 
back the buffer when its content have been supplied to the foreground process for 
running in the next cycle. Result of this program is the security level assigned to each 
external party, which the security levels identify the risk carried by accessing those 
parties. Referring to the formulation in Section 5.4, here three security levels are 
defined namely high risk, medium risk, and low risk. This implementation also 
follows the risk membership function as depicted in Figure 5.6. 
 
In the runtime process of active firewall, the developed security policy update 
based on fuzzy reasoning is run in the background although its algorithm consists of 
the foreground and background process. It is due to the processing intensive of this 
method, particularly in analysing the content of traffic buffer. Execution to update 
security policy in the active firewall is held next after completing each cycle of 
foreground process. Complete implementation of this method is given in Appendix 
B. 
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Procedure Fuzzy Reasoning 
‘TBUF : array of traffic buffer 
Begin 
     Forced Info = {“exit=true”, “exit=false”,”checkexit”} 
     Adv = {“window.open”,”winopen (”,”popup (”} 
     i = 1 
     While i ≤  TBUF.size do 
     Begin 
 Line_content = “” 
 1=j  
 Do Until (TBUF(i) = EOL) Or (i = TBUF.size) 
      Line_content = Line_content + TBUF(i) 
                 If (TBUF(i) = “ “) Then 
      Begin  
  Word(j) = Line_content 
  Line_content = “” 
  1+= jj  
      End 
      1+= ii  
         Loop 
              For 1=j  to Word.size do 
 Begin 
      If External_party = External(Word(j)) And External_party is new Then 
OutsiderArraypartyExternal __ ⇒  
     If Internal_user = Internal(Word(j)) And Internal_user is new Then 
InternalOutsiderArrayuserInternal .__ ⇒  
      If Word(j) = EXE File Then Array_Outsider.EXE = Array_Outsider.EXE + 1
      If Word(j) = Forced Info Then 
Array_Outsider.Forced Info = Array_Outsider.Forced Info + 1 
      If Word(j) = Adv Then Array_Outsider.Adv = Array_Outsider.Adv + 1 
 End 
     End 
     For 1=j  to Array_Outsider.size do 
     Begin 
 For 1=k  to Array_Outsider.size do 
               Begin 
      If j <> k Then 
  If Array_Outsider(j).Internal = Array_Outsider(k).Internal Then 
       If (Array_Outsider(j).Time - Array_Outsider(k).Time) < 15 Then 
   Array_Outsider(j).Machine = Array_Outsider(j).Machine+1 
      Risk_EXE = ComputeRiskEXE(Array_Outsider(j).EXE) 
      Risk_ForcedInfo = ComputeRiskForcedInfo(Array_Outsider(j). Forced Info)
      Risk_Adv = ComputeRiskAdv(Array_Outsider(j).Adv) 
      Risk_Machine = ComputeRiskMachine(Array_Outsider(j).Machine) 
      Total_Risk = max[Risk_EXE, Risk_Machine, Risk_Script] 
      Select Case Total_Risk 
  Total_Risk ≤  2.5 : Array_Outsider(k) ⇒  Low_Risk 
  2.5 < Total_Risk ≤ 7.5 : Array_Outsider(k) ⇒  Medium_Risk 
  Total_Risk > 2.5 : Array_Outsider(k) ⇒  High_Risk 
      End Case 
               End 
     End 
End 
Figure 5.7: Algorithm to assign security level to external parties 
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5.6 Experiment 
 
Experiments to evaluate the proposed fuzzy reasoning method were held on 
the same platform as used in Chapter 4. Some collections of network packet were 
used as the input of the system. These packets were captured from different sources 
of network transaction as listed in the first column of Table 5.2. Observations of the 
collected packets using fuzzy reasoning as formulated in Section 5.4 produce the 
result as presented in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4. These data disclose the aspects of the 
proposed method i.e. accuracy and processing time. The former parameter 
corresponds to the performance of fuzzy reasoning in identifying the risk of external 
parties, while the latter disclose the speed of this method to respond to the malicious 
external parties. Descriptions of each parameter follow. 
 
 
 
5.6.1 Accuracy 
 
Here accuracy is analysed using two well-known parameters i.e. false 
acceptance rate and false rejection rate. False acceptance refers to the error of 
accepting malicious party, while false rejection is the error of rejecting the secure or 
normal outsiders. Both parameters are computed by comparing the data of 
experimental result in Table 5.3 to the reference of the external parties in term of the 
list of safety properties as shown in Table 5.2. Here the reference is obtained by 
holding manual in depth analysis on the global content of each external party, 
combined with the observation on the reputation of each party. The last two 
properties i.e. the global content and the reputation, influence the selection for using 
popular external parties as the object of observation, since it facilitates the creation of 
the reference.  
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Table 5.2: List of reference 
No Name of External Party Risk Comment 
1 www.17tahun.com Threat Pornography 
2 www.acm.org Normal - 
3 www.altavista.com Normal - 
4 www.astro.my Normal - 
5 www.babes.com Threat Pornography 
6 www.cisco.com Normal - 
7 www.cnn.com Normal - 
8 www.elsevier.com Normal - 
9 www.gatra.com Normal - 
10 www.gawab.com Normal - 
11 www.go.com Normal - 
12 www.hotmail.com Normal - 
13 www.hunsa.com Threat Web Portal 
14 www.ieee.com Normal - 
15 www.jaring.my Normal - 
16 www.kompas.com Normal - 
17 www.lycos.com Normal - 
18 www.melayu.com Normal - 
19 www.mfa.go.th Normal - 
20 www.mtreexxx.net Threat Pornography 
21 www.porn.com Threat Pornography 
22 www.sanook.com Threat Web Portal 
23 www.sciencedirect.com Normal - 
24 www.sex.com Threat Pornography 
25 www.thaiamateur.net Threat Pornography 
26 www.thaigirls.net Threat Pornography 
27 www.thestar.com Normal - 
28 www.ukm.my Normal - 
29 www.utm.my Normal - 
30 www.xxx.com Threat Pornography 
 
 
Referring to the experimental result and the reference, from ten external 
parties that are considered dangerous by the reference, two are accepted by fuzzy 
reasoning method. While from twenty external parties that are accepted as normal by 
reference, nine of them are considered malicious by the developed fuzzy reasoning. 
This distinction show the different point of view in evaluating the risk factor of the 
external parties, which the reference uses high level consideration, while the 
proposed fuzzy reasoning method conducts low level evaluation based on the 
predetermined parameters influencing threat as formulated in Section 4. The 
experiment delivers 20% false acceptance and 45% false rejection. The false 
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acceptance here is due to malicious content of some public web sites such as intense 
advertisements and too many external servers include in the transactions, while the 
false rejection is due to polite interface of malicious websites before it launch its 
action. Graph presentation of the experimental results for the normal parties as 
justified by the reference is shown in Figure 5.8, and for the parties carrying threats 
in Figure 5.9. 
 
Table 5.3: Experimental result (risk measurement) 
Name of External Party E F A M Risk Status 
www.17tahun.com 0 0 3 10 0.846 High Risk 
www.acm.org 0 0 0 3 0.646 Medium Risk 
www.altavista.com 0 0 0 4 0.711 Medium Risk 
www.astro.my 0 0 1 2 0.5 Medium Risk 
www.babes.com 0 0 2 4 0.711 Medium Risk 
www.cisco.com 0 0 15 4 0.990 High Risk 
www.cnn.com 0 0 11 9 0.980 High Risk 
www.elsevier.com 0 0 2 4 0.711 Medium Risk 
www.gatra.com 0 0 0 3 0.646 Medium Risk 
www.gawab.com 0 0 1 3 0.646 Medium Risk 
www.go.com 0 0 4 8 0.905 High Risk 
www.hotmail.com 0 0 6 12 0.952 High Risk 
www.hunsa.com 1 0 3 7 1 High Risk 
www.ieee.com 0 0 1 7 0.796 High Risk 
www.jaring.my 0 0 2 2 0.692 Medium Risk 
www.kompas.com 0 0 4 5 0.905 High Risk 
www.lycos.com 0 0 1 11 0.842 High Risk 
www.melayu.com 0 0 0 2 0.5 Medium Risk 
www.mfa.go.th 0 0 0 3 0.646 Medium Risk 
www.mtreexxx.net 167 0 30 6 1 High Risk 
www.porn.com 4 90 9 6 1 High Risk 
www.sanook.com 0 0 8 7 0.935 High Risk 
www.sciencedirect.com 0 0 7 2 0.963 High Risk 
www.sex.com 0 4 3 2 1 High Risk 
www.thaiamateur.net 0 0 0 5 0.75 High Risk 
www.thaigirls.net 0 0 0 6 0.776 High Risk 
www.thestar.com 0 0 18 11 0.993 High Risk 
www.ukm.my 0 0 0 2 0.5 Medium Risk 
www.utm.my 0 0 0 3 0.646 Medium Risk 
www.xxx.com 0 0 2 4 0.711 Medium Risk 
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Figure 5.8: Experimental results for normal external parties 
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Figure 5.9: Experimental results for threat external parties 
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Table 5.4: Experimental result (processing time) 
Name of External Party 
Size  
(Bytes) Time∆  SizeMin
Size  TimeMin
Time
∆
∆
www.altavista.com 28148 0:00:09 1.00 1.00
www.babes.com 86024 0:01:26 3.06 9.56
www.hotmail.com 100777 0:01:53 3.58 12.56
www.thaiamateur.net 104841 0:02:11 3.72 14.56
www.sex.com 109678 0:02:16 3.90 15.11
www.sciencedirect.com 121757 0:02:44 4.33 18.22
www.utm.my 129005 0:03:27 4.58 23.00
www.xxx.com 129985 0:03:10 4.62 21.11
www.acm.org 137546 0:03:35 4.89 23.89
www.jaring.my 149473 0:04:06 5.31 27.33
www.gawab.com 153902 0:04:28 5.47 29.78
www.gatra.com 165407 0:05:19 5.88 35.44
www.astro.my 165775 0:05:01 5.89 33.44
www.lycos.com 214409 0:08:56 7.62 59.56
www.thaigirls.net 225843 0:10:08 8.02 67.56
www.ieee.com 259714 0:14:22 9.23 95.78
www.cnn.com 274236 0:13:59 9.74 93.22
www.cisco.com 277383 0:08:14 9.85 54.89
www.ukm.my 307656 0:18:24 10.93 122.67
www.melayu.com 324279 0:20:44 11.52 138.22
www.17tahun.com 335085 0:22:42 11.90 151.33
www.elsevier.com 338587 0:24:02 12.03 160.22
www.thestar.com 344841 0:22:22 12.25 149.11
www.mfa.go.th 369902 0:25:08 13.14 167.56
www.go.com 378983 0:26:50 13.46 178.89
www.detik.com 460883 0:43:10 16.37 287.78
www.kompas.com 499875 0:50:31 17.76 336.78
www.porn.com 566070 1:03:57 20.11 426.33
www.sanook.com 628835 1:30:31 22.34 603.44
www.hunsa.com 873838 2:41:50 31.04 1078.89
www.mtreexxx.net 1082247 2:14:17 38.45 895.22
 
 
 
 
5.6.2 Processing Time 
 
Referring to the experimental result presented in Table 5.4, the processing 
time of the proposed fuzzy reasoning method increase exponentially following the 
growth of the buffer size, which the buffer is used to store the collection of network 
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packets. And if we look back on the proposed algorithm as shown in Figure 5.7, it 
shows that the iterations to browse and analyse the contents of the buffer become the 
cause of this condition. Bigger size of buffer would create more iterations, thus 
longer time is required to finish the process. Here using the reference of the 
processing time and size buffer that are denoted by reft∆  and refs , the processing 
time of the known buffer size can be computed as follows 
 
ct
s
st ref
ref
+∆⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=∆
2
    (5.11) 
 
with s denote the size of the buffer, and c refers to the time consumption to compute 
other part of the algorithm in addition to the required time to complete the main 
iterations. Figure 5.10 shows the empirical measurements of the processing time 
against the size of buffer for storing network packets. These data shows that 
predicted processing time using Equation (5.11) is satisfied. 
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Figure 5.10: The processing time against the buffer size 
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5.6.3 Sensitivity 
 
Sensitivity is defined as the capability of firewall to react on detecting a threat 
by executing an action to secure internal users. This parameter is obtained by 
measuring time distinction between the detection of the threat to the modification of 
canals corresponding to the malicious external parties. Assuming that the worst-case 
condition is met i.e. the threat is detected in the beginning of traffic buffer, hence 
firewall must wait to complete its observation on analysing the packet in the traffic 
buffer before modifying the canals. In this case, the required time to take an action 
against the threat is equal to the processing time to browse the buffer. Hence the 
quadratic increase of processing time as defined in Equation (5.11) is fulfilled. 
 
 
 
5.7 Summary 
 
This chapter discusses a method to adaptively updating security rules using 
fuzzy reasoning. The proposed method uses some parameters to measure the risk of 
external parties i.e. the existence of executable file, the number of forced 
information, the number of advertisements, the number of external machines, and the 
number of cookies. Experiment delivers 20% of false acceptance and 45% of false 
rejection, with the quadratic increase of processing time following the increase of 
buffer size. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
RUNTIME PROCESS: 
MINIMIZING THE UNPROTECTED USERS 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
With regard to security strategy defined in Chapter 3, this chapter presents the 
implementation of the strategy for minimizing the unprotected users. The developed 
method is still intended to handle the runtime process of active firewall. Hence the 
mechanism for itt >  is discussed. As mentioned in Chapter 3, it is more applicable 
to install a distributed detector in the intranet to watch the appearance of the threats, 
rather than having all security packages in every host of internal machines. Thus the 
developed method shall be capable to reduce the unprotected users by identifying 
and isolating the compromised internal machines. The choice spans from having 
intrusion detection, antivirus software, or vulnerability assessment. Since the purpose 
is to detect the compromised users, hence intrusion detection is considered more 
appropriated to be employed in this design. Referring to the work of Li et al. (2004) 
and Bernardes and Moreira (2000), which prove the applicability of agent software to 
guard the security of internal host, an agent-based system is developed with the 
purpose is to assist firewall in detecting malicious program running in the internal 
machines. This way firewall is expected to take a quick action to stop the 
unauthorized information flow that is potentially caused by the malicious program. 
Thus the victim machine can be isolated from getting access to or be exploited by the 
external party. To implement this mechanism, a distributed agent-based method is 
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developed. The advantage is due to the capability of distributed agent to cover an 
area that is considered too large to be handled by a single centralized system (Green 
et al., 1997). Therefore the developed system is expected capable to monitor the 
running processes of all user machines in the intranet.  
 
 
 
6.2 Review of Agent to Support Firewall 
 
The notion of software agent has been around quite sometimes (White, 1996). 
Green et al. (1997) defines agent as an entity having fundamental properties of acting 
on behalf of others and enjoying a degree of autonomy. Agents also exhibit some 
level of proactivity and reactivity in its behaviour. Meanwhile Bernades and Moreira 
(2000) defines agent as a software program capable of executing a complex task on 
behalf of a user. A set of attributes, may equip the agent such as learning capabilities, 
cooperation, mobility, and adaptiveness (Green et al., 1997; He and Leung, 2002). A 
number of advantages are offered by this technology such as capability to assist users 
in understanding a complex task and holding an ongoing execution for a relatively 
long period of time. In the domain of security, software agent have been used 
extensively to develop many types of security method such as security service 
(Shakshuki et al., 2004), active security system (Zaki and Sobh, 2004), intrusion 
detection systems (Bernades and Moreira, 2000; Li et al., 2004), network security 
management (Labiod and Boutapa, 2000) and micro firewalls (Hwang and 
Gangadharan, 2001). And due to its advantage to support distributed system, the use 
of software agent to build intrusion detection is widely accepted. However in the 
field of firewall, only few research efforts are reported formulating software agent to 
support the mechanism of firewall (Hwang and Gangadharan, 2001; Xian et al., 
2002). Mostly the agents in this field hold the function of intrusion detection system. 
These researches are inline with the suggestion of Davies (2000) to combine firewall 
and intrusion detection to have active and reactive security. However real-time 
operation is loosely considered in these efforts such as reported by Xian et al. (2002) 
that produce the empirical response time in the order of minute. Therefore the 
capability of firewall to stop an on going attack is questionable using this scenario. In 
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this research real-time operation of software agent is formulated to support active 
firewall. Detail descriptions follow. 
 
 
 
6.3 Formulating Runtime Process using Agent-Based Module 
 
Active firewall formulated here collaborates with distributed agent-based 
security modules that are deployed in every internal machine. This way, any 
suspicious process running in the internal machine can quickly be identified and then 
be informed to the firewall. Upon receiving any signal of the appearance of a threat, 
active firewall changes its configuration at runtime to isolate the victim machine. Let 
active firewall controls a set of reconfigureable canals C connecting an intranet that 
consist of k internal machines to the Internet, hence a set of active canals of an 
intranet can be formulated below 
 
{ })()()2(),1( kcncccC ΛΛ=     (6.1) 
 
And let Canal Manager handles modification of canals based on the condition of 
each machine, a set of canals correspond to an n-th internal machine is denoted by 
{ }1,0)( =nc . In the normal condition, access to Internet from n-th internal machine is 
allowed to pass through the canals, thus 1)( =nc . Here normal condition is defined 
as the condition during which the internal machine has no detected threat, 0)( =nth . 
However access to Internet will be dropped if a threat is detected, 0)( >nth . This 
mechanism is formalized as: 
 
⎩⎨
⎧
>⇔
=⇔=
0)(0
0)(1
)(
nth
nth
nc     (6.2) 
 
To carry on implementing this scheme, architecture of active firewall 
utilizing agent technology is presented in Figure 6.1. Description of this architecture 
is given by modelling firewall functionalities in term of threat detection process and 
response time requirement. 
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Figure 6.1: Architecture of the proposed agent-based active firewall 
 
 
 
6.3.1 Threat Detection Process 
 
The mechanism of threat detection is handled by installing the distributed 
agent-based security modules in every internal machine. To conduct the detection 
process, each agent-based module verifies every running application in each machine 
using the function of integrity check. Based on the information of the name, location, 
and the size of the running application, comparisons against a reference of authorized 
applications-list are computed as follow. 
 
   
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )⎩⎨
⎧
≠∨≠∨≠⇔>
=∧=∧=⇔=
)()()()()()(0
)()()()()()(0
)(
refszrpszrplcrplcrefnmrpnm
refszrpszrplcrplcrefnmrpnm
nth  (6.3) 
 
with )(nth  denotes the present of the threat in the n-th internal machine. While nm, 
lc and sz represent the name, folder and size of the application respectively, here rp 
and ref denote the running process and reference respectively. The term 0)( >nth  
means there is an appearance of a threat running in the internal machine. Upon 
detecting a threat, agent-based module will quickly communicate the result to active 
firewall. 
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It is notably important to emphasize the difference between a threat and the 
attack or intrusion. Threat identified here is not necessarily an intrusion, however 
with the assumption that an unrecognised object may potentially launch an attack, 
hence any unidentified applications are considered to become a threat to the intranet. 
 
 
 
6.3.2 Response Time Requirement 
 
Formulating this model is necessary to determine the required response time 
of active firewall. When there exist a suspicious process running in any internal 
machine at time t = ts, agent-based security modules deployed in the intranet will 
sense the appearance of the threat at time t = td. Duration of sdd ttt −=∆ seconds is 
needed by agent-based security module to detect the threat. Upon completing the 
detection process, agent-based security module send the information of a threat to 
active firewall. Duration of it∆  seconds is consumed for transmitting the information 
from agent-based module to Information Collector in active firewall machine. And 
then Canal Manager processes the information in which it consumes pt∆  seconds 
before executing its final action to close the communication line of the machine 
where a threat is detected. In this scenario, reconfiguring the canals closes the 
communication line. Let canal reconfiguration is done at time tc, hence tc can be 
computed as: 
 
pidsc ttttt ∆+∆+∆+=    (6.4) 
 
Considering that time consumption of the system is the total time required by 
threat detection process, followed by the communication process between agent-
based security module and firewall, and finally the information processing by active 
firewall to execute canals, thus total time consumption of the system can be 
computed as: 
 
pidw tttt ∆+∆+∆=∆     (6.5) 
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Substituting Equation (6.5) to Equation (6.4) produces 
 
    wsc ttt ∆=−      (6.6) 
 
Since the purpose is to have real-time response to the appearance of a threat, 
thus minimum time consumption is desired, 0→∆ wt . Applying the last condition to 
Equation (6.6) delivers: 
 
0)(lim
0
=−→∆ sct ttw     (6.7) 
 
Equation (6.7) becomes the formal response time model of the proposed 
active firewall. This model presents the condition in which time consumption of the 
system shall be minimized. Therefore active firewall will be able to have real time 
operation to react to the appearance of a threat. In ideal condition when time 
consumption is zero second, the action for blocking the communication line of the 
victim machine can be executed in the same time of the appearance of the threat, i.e. 
sc tt = . If this condition is fulfilled, then it will be effective to prevent any 
unauthorized information flow to outside network.  
 
 
 
6.4 Implementation of Active Firewall with Agent-Based Module 
 
The developed runtime process is composed by two different components i.e. 
active firewall and distributed agent-based security module. The former part has a 
function to manage connection to the Internet, while the latter is to record any 
security incidents happening in every internal machine. In this case, the term incident 
refers to the action of malicious code. Detail explanations of each module follow. 
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6.4.1 Distributed Agent-Based Security Module 
 
The implemented agent-based module has a function to monitor local 
processes of the internal machines by inspecting memory utilization. To identify 
each local process, predetermined authorized-applications list is developed and 
referred. By referring to this list, unrecognised running process is considered 
malicious. In this design, fast and accurate response to the present of the attack is 
desired, and the speed for passing the information of the suspected process to active 
firewall becomes the main concern as well. Algorithm of agent-based security 
module is shown in Figure 6.2. In this scheme, agent-based security modules work 
by sharing the same knowledge of the predefined authorized-applications list that 
become the reference point for conducting comparison against the running process. 
Complete implementation of this module is given in Appendix C1. 
 
 
Procedure Agent Module 
‘REF : array of predetermined applications reference 
‘Pr : array of current process 
Begin 
 i = 0 
 While i < 1 do 
 Begin 
  Pr = GetProcessName() 
  For j = 1 to Pr.max do 
  Begin 
   threat_status = True 
   For k = 1 to REF.max do 
                                           Begin 
    If Pr(j) = REF(k) then 
    Begin 
     process_size = GetFileSize(REF(k). folder) 
     If process_size =REF(k). size then 
                                                                        Begin 
      threat_status = False 
                   Exit For 
                                                                         End 
    End 
                                            End 
   If threat_status = True then 
    SendMsgtoFirewall(IP address of local machine) 
  End 
             End 
End 
Figure 6.2: Algorithm of the agent-based security module 
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6.4.2 Agent-Based Active Firewall 
 
The task of this module is to execute the canals corresponding to the internal 
victim machine upon receiving the information sent by distributed agent-based 
security module, since the information contains a log of the suspicious running 
process. The precaution is to isolate the internal machine where the suspicious 
process is detected, in which it is done by closing the communication line to the 
outside world. This way, the malicious information flow originated from this 
machine can be stopped.  
 
Mechanism of active firewall is given in Figure 6.3. Here active firewall 
initialise communication line by executing a pre-configuration rule for opening 
communication by assuming at time t=0 there is no threat detected. This operation is 
continued by the iterative process to wait any information transferred by the 
distributed agent module. When firewall receives the information from agent-
module, it derives the identity of the victim machine in term of IP address, and based 
on this data firewall close the communication line corresponding to the victim 
machine. Complete implementation is given in Appendix C2. 
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Figure 6.3: Mechanism of agent-based active firewall 
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6.5 Experiment 
 
The purpose of the experiment is to evaluate the proposed agent-based 
method using the same set up as described in Chapter 4. The experiment was 
conducted by running a malicious program that has the mechanism to steal the 
information from the victim machine reside in the intranet. This program has a 
simple attack mechanism as shown in Figure 6.4. And then the agent-based active 
firewall is expected to detect the appearance of this threat and to stop the attack by 
closing the communication lines through modification of canals. Experimental 
results are presented in Table 6.1. To analyse these results, the speed of detecting 
malicious program and the speed to close the canals are discussed. Besides, two other 
parameters are introduced i.e. the probability to stop malicious information flow and 
the proportion of exposed time. The former parameter deals with the possibility that 
firewall capable to actively responding to the appearance of suspicious process, 
while the latter deals with the possible unauthorized release of information due to the 
action of suspicious process.  
 
S tar t
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Figure 6.4: The created malicious program 
 
To facilitate the analysis, a timeline graph visualizing the incident caused by 
a threat and the action of firewall to deter this attack is developed as shown in Figure 
6.5. The graph contains a sequence of events occurring at time st  to ft , which can 
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be listed as follows. At st  a malicious code is active, at mt  malicious code create 
malicious information flow, at dt  agent-based module detects an active threat and 
send this information to the firewall, at ct  firewall close the corresponding canals, 
and finally ft  is the completion of information flow if canals are not disabled at ct . 
Let dt∆ , ct∆ , wt∆ , mt∆ , and ft∆  become random variable with dt∆  denote the 
service time to detect a threat, ct∆  is the service time to close the canals after a threat 
is detected, wt∆  is the total service time required by the firewall to stop the attack, 
mt∆  is the consumed time of a threat to start malicious information flow, and ft∆  is 
the total time consumption of a threat to complete its action. Referring to the graph in 
Figure 6.5, terms defined above are computed as follow. 
 
sdd ttt −=∆  
dcc ttt −=∆  
    cdtw +=∆      (6.8) 
    smm ttt −=∆  
    sff ttt −=∆  
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Figure 6.5: A timeline graph of security incident and the action of active firewall 
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Table 6.1: Experimental results of agent-based active firewall 
Threat Active Firewall 
No. 
mt∆  
(second) 
ft∆  
(second) 
dt∆  
(second) 
st∆  
(second) 
ct∆  
(second) 
wt∆  
(second)
1 0.069999993 0.460999966 0.08928 0.00237 0.22 0.31165
2 0.019999981 0.680999994 0.02711 0.001324 0.02 0.048434
3 0.050000012 0.57099998 0.03996 0.001283 0.08 0.121243
4 0.00999999 0.449999988 0.17068 0.002021 0.04 0.212701
5 0.019999981 0.511000037 0.09984 0.001303 0.11 0.211143
6 0.019999981 0.531000018 0.07188 0.001268 0.06 0.133148
7 0.00999999 0.620999992 0.03174 0.002054 0.01 0.043794
8 0.020999968 0.56099999 0.06797 0.001311 0.03 0.099281
9 0.020000041 0.641000032 0.18968 0.001323 0.03 0.221003
10 0.019999981 0.569999993 0.03311 0.001961 0.02 0.055071
11 0.019999981 0.480000019 0.0437 0.001324 0.28 0.325024
12 0.019999981 0.490999997 0.18768 0.001287 0.04 0.228967
13 0.019999981 0.870999992 0.09354 0.002068 0.05 0.145608
14 0.030000031 0.56099999 0.1428 0.00132 0.05 0.19412
15 0.019999981 0.550999999 0.04657 0.001286 0.04 0.087856
16 0.019999981 0.82099998 0.05503 0.002028 0.04 0.097058
17 0.08100003 0.611000001 0.1549 0.001386 0.04 0.196286
18 0.019999981 0.56099999 0.0627 0.001291 0.04 0.103991
19 0.019999981 0.579999983 0.12215 0.002058 0.11 0.234208
20 0.020000041 0.631000042 0.13076 0.001352 0.03 0.162112
21 0.019999981 0.601000011 0.07679 0.001319 0.06 0.138109
22 0.019999981 0.601000011 0.14363 0.001979 0.05 0.195609
23 0.020000041 0.5 0.07788 0.001292 0.09 0.169172
24 0.039999962 0.590999961 0.00019 0.0013 0.04 0.04149
25 0.019999981 3.11500001 0.09658 0.001997 0.04 0.138577
26 0.019999981 0.781000018 0.05974 0.001305 0.11 0.171045
27 0.019999981 0.640999973 0.15255 0.001302 0.04 0.193852
28 0.020000041 0.621000051 0.0777 0.001999 0.04 0.119699
29 0.01000005 0.711000025 0.0737 0.00132 0.04 0.11502
30 0.020000041 0.490999997 0.02323 0.001303 0.05 0.074533
31 0.00999999 0.651000023 0.11241 0.002062 0.15 0.264472
32 0.019999981 0.56099999 0.14446 0.001301 0.11 0.255761
33 0.019999981 0.550999999 0.19464 0.001347 0.1 0.295987
34 0.070000052 0.429999948 0.0374 0.00186 0.1 0.13926
35 0.020000041 0.641000032 0.07058 0.001304 0.04 0.111884
36 0.079999983 0.600999951 0.0677 0.001287 0.04 0.108987
37 0.00999999 0.430999994 0.04344 0.002047 0.04 0.085487
38 0.00999999 0.590999961 0.10015 0.001302 0.14 0.241452
39 0.00999999 0.591000021 0.08041 0.001273 0.09 0.171683
40 0.020000041 0.611000001 0.10758 0.001999 0.05 0.159579
41 0.020000041 0.560000002 0.02689 0.001303 0.11 0.138193
Average 0.025170732 0.649463414 0.0885056 0.001557 0.07 0.160062
Std Dev 0.018252268 0.405695892 0.0503302 0.000356 0.054037 0.07293
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6.5.1 Speed of Detecting Suspicious Process 
 
This parameter is critical to the performance of agent-based active firewall 
for protecting intranet. Referring to the timeline graph in Figure 6.5, active firewall 
needs to fulfil the following equation: 
 
)()( attackvagentv <     (6.9) 
 
with v denotes the speed of agent or attack. This requirement is necessary for active 
firewall to take action following the detection process by further executing a 
protection mechanism before the attack is completed. Referring to the experimental 
results in Table 6.1, computation to confront the speed of detection against the speed 
of attack is presented as follows. 
 
(i) Develop the function of attack thf  and function of detection speed df  from 
the collected data. Here the experimental results are grouped into some small 
groups of data, i.e. each group consists of six experimental data, in order to 
build accurate functions. Therefore, from 41 data as presented in Table 6.1, 
seven groups of data are created. With x denotes the index of experiments, 
this step produces the following functions: 
 
Group 1: 7757002572955701768001130 234 .x - . x. - x.  x. -(x) f th ++=   
5931082130386100692000420)( 234 . x . - x.  x. - x.  xfd ++=  
 
Group 2: 172519897054590118000860 234 .x + . - x. + x. - x. (x) f th =  
180303860307100817000690 234 .x + . - x. + x. - x. y = (x) f d =  
 
Group 3: 544326745221612201001370 234 .x + . - x. + x. - x. (x) f th =  
6205028581713801531001110 234 .x - . + x. - x. + x. -(x) f d =  
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Group 4: 650184015700441000380 234 .x + . - x. + x. - x. (x) f th =  
106500530046500136000130 234 .x + . + x. - x. + x.-(x) f d =  
 
Group 5: 7193977429724235986003450 234 .x + . - x. + x. - x. (x) f th =  
353204679025810054000370)( 234 .x + . - x. + x. - x.  xfd =  
 
Group 6: 2627077150492901113000820 234 .x + . + x. - x. + x. -(x) f th =  
09230286300953000880052)( 234 .x - . + x. - x. + xE- - xfd =  
 
Group 7: 34029461655201429001130 234 .x - . + x. - x. + x. -(x) f th =  
491209770567201364001160)( 234 .x - . + x. - x. + x. - xfd =  
 
(ii) Compute the area of each function produced from the previous step by 
conducting integration for both ∫= 2
1
)(
x
x
thth dxxfF  and ∫= 2
1
)(
x
x
dd dxxfF . Here 
11 =x  and 62 =x  since each group contains six data, except for the last 
group that only has five data. This step produces: 
 
Group 1: 2.746917=thF  and 0.39075=dF  
Group 2: 2.836083=thF  and 0.434458=dF  
Group 3: 3.110542=thF  and 0.548958=dF  
Group 4: 2.913292=thF  and 0.509=dF  
Group 5: 4.29975=thF  and 0.345917=dF  
Group 6: 2.772625=thF  and 0.536817=dF  
Group 7: 2.32576=thF  and 0.345653=dF  
 
(iii) Compare thF  and dF  from each group. It produces dth FF >  for all groups of 
data, thus it can be concluded that Equation (6.9) is fulfilled by the developed 
agent-based active firewall.  
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Graph presentation of the function of attacks and detection speeds from each 
group of data, together with the function of the speed to start malicious information 
flow and the speed of canals, are presented in Appendix C3. 
 
Repeating the steps above to compare the speed for starting malicious 
information flow against the speed for detecting suspicious process produces 
)()( lowmaliciousfvagentv > . Detail calculations are given in Appendix C4. This fact 
shows that malicious information flows cannot be prevented if the malicious program 
has been activated, although if we scrutinize the experimental results there are about 
10% (4 from 41 data) of the malicious flows can be prevented. Thus the action to 
prevent malicious flows shall only be held before the malicious program is activated. 
Otherwise the unauthorized release of information can only be stopped, not 
prevented. 
 
 
 
6.5.2 Speed of Closing Canals 
 
The speed of closing canals is other important factor influencing the 
performance of agent-based active firewall. This parameter show how fast canals can 
be closed relative to the appearance of malicious code as formulated in Equation 
(6.4). Firewall is effective to protect the intranet if it fulfils the equation below. 
 
)()( attackvcanalsclosingv <    (6.10) 
 
Referring to the experimental results presented in Table 6.1, and repeating the steps 
described in Section 6.5.1 to compare the speed of closing canals against the speed of 
the attacks, it produces thc FF < . Detail calculations are given in Appendix C4 with 
graph presentation in Appendix C3. This condition shows that active firewall capable 
to provide protection against malicious program launching the unauthorized 
information flows. 
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6.5.3 Proportion of Exposed Time 
 
The purpose of formulating the proportion of the exposed time is to measure 
the possibility of unauthorized release of information before the attack is stopped by 
the firewall. With the assumption that fcdms ttttt <<<< , proportion of the 
exposed time fulfils the following equation: 
 
   
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≥⇔
<≤⇔
<⇔
=
c
csFW
s
tt
ttt
ttNA
ET
0
υυ    (6.11) 
 
Proof. Malicious information flow here is defined as a flow of data from intranet to 
the Internet and/or vice versa due to the action of a threat. Referring to timeline 
graph in Figure 6.5, malicious traffic passing the firewall can be analysed as follow. 
At stt <  no threat is active in the intranet, thus no flow is considered malicious and 
the proportion of exposed time is not applicable (NA) in this condition. At stt =  a 
malicious code is active in the internal machine and launching a malicious traffic at 
mtt = . If the communication line is kept opened, malicious traffic will successfully 
be completed at ftt = . However if the agent-module detects the running threat, 
firewall will close the canals at ctt =  to prevent any further unauthorized release of 
information. Thus the proportion of the exposed time can initially be computed as 
MF
MWET υυ
υυ
−
−=  with Mυ , Wυ  and Fυ  denote the mean average of mt∆ , wt∆  and ft∆  
respectively. Assuming that ( )smm ttt ←∀ , hence 01 ==
∑
=
n
m
n
i
i
Mυ  and 
F
WET υ
υ=  for 
cs ttt ≤≤ . However the last condition is violated when fc tt ≥ . In this case, total lost 
of information is occurred since FW υυ ≥  and %100>ET . Referring to the table of 
experimental result presented in Table 6.1, experiment shows that the active firewall 
produces ET = 24.4%. It means the internal victim machine is exposed to the external 
network for the duration of 24.4% of the total time required by the malicious 
program to launch an unauthorized information flow. 
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6.5.4 Summary 
 
The implementation of the strategy for reducing unprotected users is 
presented in this chapter. The proposed method is to develop distributed agent-based 
security module to equip the operation of active firewall. These modules monitor the 
running processes of every internal user, and compare each process against a 
reference that contains a set of permitted applications. If an unrecognised process is 
detected, the module will inform the firewall, thus firewall can take an action to drop 
the communication line by modifying the canals corresponding to the internal user 
machine where the unrecognised process has been detected. Experiment shows that 
the developed method is capable to stop the malicious information flow driven by a 
malicious program that aims to steal the information of internal host. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
RUNTIME PROCESS: 
MINIMIZING THE UNPROTECTED USERS 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
With regard to security strategy defined in Chapter 3, this chapter presents the 
implementation of the strategy for minimizing the unprotected users. The developed 
method is still intended to handle the runtime process of active firewall. Hence the 
mechanism for itt >  is discussed. As mentioned in Chapter 3, it is more applicable 
to install a distributed detector in the intranet to watch the appearance of the threats, 
rather than having all security packages in every host of internal machines. Thus the 
developed method shall be capable to reduce the unprotected users by identifying 
and isolating the compromised internal machines. The choice spans from having 
intrusion detection, antivirus software, or vulnerability assessment. Since the purpose 
is to detect the compromised users, hence intrusion detection is considered more 
appropriated to be employed in this design. Referring to the work of Li et al. (2004) 
and Bernardes and Moreira (2000), which prove the applicability of agent software to 
guard the security of internal host, an agent-based system is developed with the 
purpose is to assist firewall in detecting malicious program running in the internal 
machines. This way firewall is expected to take a quick action to stop the 
unauthorized information flow that is potentially caused by the malicious program. 
Thus the victim machine can be isolated from getting access to or be exploited by the 
external party. To implement this mechanism, a distributed agent-based method is 
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developed. The advantage is due to the capability of distributed agent to cover an 
area that is considered too large to be handled by a single centralized system (Green 
et al., 1997). Therefore the developed system is expected capable to monitor the 
running processes of all user machines in the intranet.  
 
 
 
6.2 Review of Agent to Support Firewall 
 
The notion of software agent has been around quite sometimes (White, 1996). 
Green et al. (1997) defines agent as an entity having fundamental properties of acting 
on behalf of others and enjoying a degree of autonomy. Agents also exhibit some 
level of proactivity and reactivity in its behaviour. Meanwhile Bernades and Moreira 
(2000) defines agent as a software program capable of executing a complex task on 
behalf of a user. A set of attributes, may equip the agent such as learning capabilities, 
cooperation, mobility, and adaptiveness (Green et al., 1997; He and Leung, 2002). A 
number of advantages are offered by this technology such as capability to assist users 
in understanding a complex task and holding an ongoing execution for a relatively 
long period of time. In the domain of security, software agent have been used 
extensively to develop many types of security method such as security service 
(Shakshuki et al., 2004), active security system (Zaki and Sobh, 2004), intrusion 
detection systems (Bernades and Moreira, 2000; Li et al., 2004), network security 
management (Labiod and Boutapa, 2000) and micro firewalls (Hwang and 
Gangadharan, 2001). And due to its advantage to support distributed system, the use 
of software agent to build intrusion detection is widely accepted. However in the 
field of firewall, only few research efforts are reported formulating software agent to 
support the mechanism of firewall (Hwang and Gangadharan, 2001; Xian et al., 
2002). Mostly the agents in this field hold the function of intrusion detection system. 
These researches are inline with the suggestion of Davies (2000) to combine firewall 
and intrusion detection to have active and reactive security. However real-time 
operation is loosely considered in these efforts such as reported by Xian et al. (2002) 
that produce the empirical response time in the order of minute. Therefore the 
capability of firewall to stop an on going attack is questionable using this scenario. In 
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this research real-time operation of software agent is formulated to support active 
firewall. Detail descriptions follow. 
 
 
 
6.3 Formulating Runtime Process using Agent-Based Module 
 
Active firewall formulated here collaborates with distributed agent-based 
security modules that are deployed in every internal machine. This way, any 
suspicious process running in the internal machine can quickly be identified and then 
be informed to the firewall. Upon receiving any signal of the appearance of a threat, 
active firewall changes its configuration at runtime to isolate the victim machine. Let 
active firewall controls a set of reconfigureable canals C connecting an intranet that 
consist of k internal machines to the Internet, hence a set of active canals of an 
intranet can be formulated below 
 
{ })()()2(),1( kcncccC ΛΛ=     (6.1) 
 
And let Canal Manager handles modification of canals based on the condition of 
each machine, a set of canals correspond to an n-th internal machine is denoted by 
{ }1,0)( =nc . In the normal condition, access to Internet from n-th internal machine is 
allowed to pass through the canals, thus 1)( =nc . Here normal condition is defined 
as the condition during which the internal machine has no detected threat, 0)( =nth . 
However access to Internet will be dropped if a threat is detected, 0)( >nth . This 
mechanism is formalized as: 
 
⎩⎨
⎧
>⇔
=⇔=
0)(0
0)(1
)(
nth
nth
nc     (6.2) 
 
To carry on implementing this scheme, architecture of active firewall 
utilizing agent technology is presented in Figure 6.1. Description of this architecture 
is given by modelling firewall functionalities in term of threat detection process and 
response time requirement. 
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Figure 6.1: Architecture of the proposed agent-based active firewall 
 
 
 
6.3.1 Threat Detection Process 
 
The mechanism of threat detection is handled by installing the distributed 
agent-based security modules in every internal machine. To conduct the detection 
process, each agent-based module verifies every running application in each machine 
using the function of integrity check. Based on the information of the name, location, 
and the size of the running application, comparisons against a reference of authorized 
applications-list are computed as follow. 
 
   
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )⎩⎨
⎧
≠∨≠∨≠⇔>
=∧=∧=⇔=
)()()()()()(0
)()()()()()(0
)(
refszrpszrplcrplcrefnmrpnm
refszrpszrplcrplcrefnmrpnm
nth  (6.3) 
 
with )(nth  denotes the present of the threat in the n-th internal machine. While nm, 
lc and sz represent the name, folder and size of the application respectively, here rp 
and ref denote the running process and reference respectively. The term 0)( >nth  
means there is an appearance of a threat running in the internal machine. Upon 
detecting a threat, agent-based module will quickly communicate the result to active 
firewall. 
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It is notably important to emphasize the difference between a threat and the 
attack or intrusion. Threat identified here is not necessarily an intrusion, however 
with the assumption that an unrecognised object may potentially launch an attack, 
hence any unidentified applications are considered to become a threat to the intranet. 
 
 
 
6.3.2 Response Time Requirement 
 
Formulating this model is necessary to determine the required response time 
of active firewall. When there exist a suspicious process running in any internal 
machine at time t = ts, agent-based security modules deployed in the intranet will 
sense the appearance of the threat at time t = td. Duration of sdd ttt −=∆ seconds is 
needed by agent-based security module to detect the threat. Upon completing the 
detection process, agent-based security module send the information of a threat to 
active firewall. Duration of it∆  seconds is consumed for transmitting the information 
from agent-based module to Information Collector in active firewall machine. And 
then Canal Manager processes the information in which it consumes pt∆  seconds 
before executing its final action to close the communication line of the machine 
where a threat is detected. In this scenario, reconfiguring the canals closes the 
communication line. Let canal reconfiguration is done at time tc, hence tc can be 
computed as: 
 
pidsc ttttt ∆+∆+∆+=    (6.4) 
 
Considering that time consumption of the system is the total time required by 
threat detection process, followed by the communication process between agent-
based security module and firewall, and finally the information processing by active 
firewall to execute canals, thus total time consumption of the system can be 
computed as: 
 
pidw tttt ∆+∆+∆=∆     (6.5) 
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Substituting Equation (6.5) to Equation (6.4) produces 
 
    wsc ttt ∆=−      (6.6) 
 
Since the purpose is to have real-time response to the appearance of a threat, 
thus minimum time consumption is desired, 0→∆ wt . Applying the last condition to 
Equation (6.6) delivers: 
 
0)(lim
0
=−→∆ sct ttw     (6.7) 
 
Equation (6.7) becomes the formal response time model of the proposed 
active firewall. This model presents the condition in which time consumption of the 
system shall be minimized. Therefore active firewall will be able to have real time 
operation to react to the appearance of a threat. In ideal condition when time 
consumption is zero second, the action for blocking the communication line of the 
victim machine can be executed in the same time of the appearance of the threat, i.e. 
sc tt = . If this condition is fulfilled, then it will be effective to prevent any 
unauthorized information flow to outside network.  
 
 
 
6.4 Implementation of Active Firewall with Agent-Based Module 
 
The developed runtime process is composed by two different components i.e. 
active firewall and distributed agent-based security module. The former part has a 
function to manage connection to the Internet, while the latter is to record any 
security incidents happening in every internal machine. In this case, the term incident 
refers to the action of malicious code. Detail explanations of each module follow. 
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6.4.1 Distributed Agent-Based Security Module 
 
The implemented agent-based module has a function to monitor local 
processes of the internal machines by inspecting memory utilization. To identify 
each local process, predetermined authorized-applications list is developed and 
referred. By referring to this list, unrecognised running process is considered 
malicious. In this design, fast and accurate response to the present of the attack is 
desired, and the speed for passing the information of the suspected process to active 
firewall becomes the main concern as well. Algorithm of agent-based security 
module is shown in Figure 6.2. In this scheme, agent-based security modules work 
by sharing the same knowledge of the predefined authorized-applications list that 
become the reference point for conducting comparison against the running process. 
Complete implementation of this module is given in Appendix C1. 
 
 
Procedure Agent Module 
‘REF : array of predetermined applications reference 
‘Pr : array of current process 
Begin 
 i = 0 
 While i < 1 do 
 Begin 
  Pr = GetProcessName() 
  For j = 1 to Pr.max do 
  Begin 
   threat_status = True 
   For k = 1 to REF.max do 
                                           Begin 
    If Pr(j) = REF(k) then 
    Begin 
     process_size = GetFileSize(REF(k). folder) 
     If process_size =REF(k). size then 
                                                                        Begin 
      threat_status = False 
                   Exit For 
                                                                         End 
    End 
                                            End 
   If threat_status = True then 
    SendMsgtoFirewall(IP address of local machine) 
  End 
             End 
End 
Figure 6.2: Algorithm of the agent-based security module 
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6.4.2 Agent-Based Active Firewall 
 
The task of this module is to execute the canals corresponding to the internal 
victim machine upon receiving the information sent by distributed agent-based 
security module, since the information contains a log of the suspicious running 
process. The precaution is to isolate the internal machine where the suspicious 
process is detected, in which it is done by closing the communication line to the 
outside world. This way, the malicious information flow originated from this 
machine can be stopped.  
 
Mechanism of active firewall is given in Figure 6.3. Here active firewall 
initialise communication line by executing a pre-configuration rule for opening 
communication by assuming at time t=0 there is no threat detected. This operation is 
continued by the iterative process to wait any information transferred by the 
distributed agent module. When firewall receives the information from agent-
module, it derives the identity of the victim machine in term of IP address, and based 
on this data firewall close the communication line corresponding to the victim 
machine. Complete implementation is given in Appendix C2. 
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Figure 6.3: Mechanism of agent-based active firewall 
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6.5 Experiment 
 
The purpose of the experiment is to evaluate the proposed agent-based 
method using the same set up as described in Chapter 4. The experiment was 
conducted by running a malicious program that has the mechanism to steal the 
information from the victim machine reside in the intranet. This program has a 
simple attack mechanism as shown in Figure 6.4. And then the agent-based active 
firewall is expected to detect the appearance of this threat and to stop the attack by 
closing the communication lines through modification of canals. Experimental 
results are presented in Table 6.1. To analyse these results, the speed of detecting 
malicious program and the speed to close the canals are discussed. Besides, two other 
parameters are introduced i.e. the probability to stop malicious information flow and 
the proportion of exposed time. The former parameter deals with the possibility that 
firewall capable to actively responding to the appearance of suspicious process, 
while the latter deals with the possible unauthorized release of information due to the 
action of suspicious process.  
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Figure 6.4: The created malicious program 
 
To facilitate the analysis, a timeline graph visualizing the incident caused by 
a threat and the action of firewall to deter this attack is developed as shown in Figure 
6.5. The graph contains a sequence of events occurring at time st  to ft , which can 
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be listed as follows. At st  a malicious code is active, at mt  malicious code create 
malicious information flow, at dt  agent-based module detects an active threat and 
send this information to the firewall, at ct  firewall close the corresponding canals, 
and finally ft  is the completion of information flow if canals are not disabled at ct . 
Let dt∆ , ct∆ , wt∆ , mt∆ , and ft∆  become random variable with dt∆  denote the 
service time to detect a threat, ct∆  is the service time to close the canals after a threat 
is detected, wt∆  is the total service time required by the firewall to stop the attack, 
mt∆  is the consumed time of a threat to start malicious information flow, and ft∆  is 
the total time consumption of a threat to complete its action. Referring to the graph in 
Figure 6.5, terms defined above are computed as follow. 
 
sdd ttt −=∆  
dcc ttt −=∆  
    cdtw +=∆      (6.8) 
    smm ttt −=∆  
    sff ttt −=∆  
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Figure 6.5: A timeline graph of security incident and the action of active firewall 
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Table 6.1: Experimental results of agent-based active firewall 
Threat Active Firewall 
No. 
mt∆  
(second) 
ft∆  
(second) 
dt∆  
(second) 
st∆  
(second) 
ct∆  
(second) 
wt∆  
(second)
1 0.069999993 0.460999966 0.08928 0.00237 0.22 0.31165
2 0.019999981 0.680999994 0.02711 0.001324 0.02 0.048434
3 0.050000012 0.57099998 0.03996 0.001283 0.08 0.121243
4 0.00999999 0.449999988 0.17068 0.002021 0.04 0.212701
5 0.019999981 0.511000037 0.09984 0.001303 0.11 0.211143
6 0.019999981 0.531000018 0.07188 0.001268 0.06 0.133148
7 0.00999999 0.620999992 0.03174 0.002054 0.01 0.043794
8 0.020999968 0.56099999 0.06797 0.001311 0.03 0.099281
9 0.020000041 0.641000032 0.18968 0.001323 0.03 0.221003
10 0.019999981 0.569999993 0.03311 0.001961 0.02 0.055071
11 0.019999981 0.480000019 0.0437 0.001324 0.28 0.325024
12 0.019999981 0.490999997 0.18768 0.001287 0.04 0.228967
13 0.019999981 0.870999992 0.09354 0.002068 0.05 0.145608
14 0.030000031 0.56099999 0.1428 0.00132 0.05 0.19412
15 0.019999981 0.550999999 0.04657 0.001286 0.04 0.087856
16 0.019999981 0.82099998 0.05503 0.002028 0.04 0.097058
17 0.08100003 0.611000001 0.1549 0.001386 0.04 0.196286
18 0.019999981 0.56099999 0.0627 0.001291 0.04 0.103991
19 0.019999981 0.579999983 0.12215 0.002058 0.11 0.234208
20 0.020000041 0.631000042 0.13076 0.001352 0.03 0.162112
21 0.019999981 0.601000011 0.07679 0.001319 0.06 0.138109
22 0.019999981 0.601000011 0.14363 0.001979 0.05 0.195609
23 0.020000041 0.5 0.07788 0.001292 0.09 0.169172
24 0.039999962 0.590999961 0.00019 0.0013 0.04 0.04149
25 0.019999981 3.11500001 0.09658 0.001997 0.04 0.138577
26 0.019999981 0.781000018 0.05974 0.001305 0.11 0.171045
27 0.019999981 0.640999973 0.15255 0.001302 0.04 0.193852
28 0.020000041 0.621000051 0.0777 0.001999 0.04 0.119699
29 0.01000005 0.711000025 0.0737 0.00132 0.04 0.11502
30 0.020000041 0.490999997 0.02323 0.001303 0.05 0.074533
31 0.00999999 0.651000023 0.11241 0.002062 0.15 0.264472
32 0.019999981 0.56099999 0.14446 0.001301 0.11 0.255761
33 0.019999981 0.550999999 0.19464 0.001347 0.1 0.295987
34 0.070000052 0.429999948 0.0374 0.00186 0.1 0.13926
35 0.020000041 0.641000032 0.07058 0.001304 0.04 0.111884
36 0.079999983 0.600999951 0.0677 0.001287 0.04 0.108987
37 0.00999999 0.430999994 0.04344 0.002047 0.04 0.085487
38 0.00999999 0.590999961 0.10015 0.001302 0.14 0.241452
39 0.00999999 0.591000021 0.08041 0.001273 0.09 0.171683
40 0.020000041 0.611000001 0.10758 0.001999 0.05 0.159579
41 0.020000041 0.560000002 0.02689 0.001303 0.11 0.138193
Average 0.025170732 0.649463414 0.0885056 0.001557 0.07 0.160062
Std Dev 0.018252268 0.405695892 0.0503302 0.000356 0.054037 0.07293
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6.5.1 Speed of Detecting Suspicious Process 
 
This parameter is critical to the performance of agent-based active firewall 
for protecting intranet. Referring to the timeline graph in Figure 6.5, active firewall 
needs to fulfil the following equation: 
 
)()( attackvagentv <     (6.9) 
 
with v denotes the speed of agent or attack. This requirement is necessary for active 
firewall to take action following the detection process by further executing a 
protection mechanism before the attack is completed. Referring to the experimental 
results in Table 6.1, computation to confront the speed of detection against the speed 
of attack is presented as follows. 
 
(i) Develop the function of attack thf  and function of detection speed df  from 
the collected data. Here the experimental results are grouped into some small 
groups of data, i.e. each group consists of six experimental data, in order to 
build accurate functions. Therefore, from 41 data as presented in Table 6.1, 
seven groups of data are created. With x denotes the index of experiments, 
this step produces the following functions: 
 
Group 1: 7757002572955701768001130 234 .x - . x. - x.  x. -(x) f th ++=   
5931082130386100692000420)( 234 . x . - x.  x. - x.  xfd ++=  
 
Group 2: 172519897054590118000860 234 .x + . - x. + x. - x. (x) f th =  
180303860307100817000690 234 .x + . - x. + x. - x. y = (x) f d =  
 
Group 3: 544326745221612201001370 234 .x + . - x. + x. - x. (x) f th =  
6205028581713801531001110 234 .x - . + x. - x. + x. -(x) f d =  
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Group 4: 650184015700441000380 234 .x + . - x. + x. - x. (x) f th =  
106500530046500136000130 234 .x + . + x. - x. + x.-(x) f d =  
 
Group 5: 7193977429724235986003450 234 .x + . - x. + x. - x. (x) f th =  
353204679025810054000370)( 234 .x + . - x. + x. - x.  xfd =  
 
Group 6: 2627077150492901113000820 234 .x + . + x. - x. + x. -(x) f th =  
09230286300953000880052)( 234 .x - . + x. - x. + xE- - xfd =  
 
Group 7: 34029461655201429001130 234 .x - . + x. - x. + x. -(x) f th =  
491209770567201364001160)( 234 .x - . + x. - x. + x. - xfd =  
 
(ii) Compute the area of each function produced from the previous step by 
conducting integration for both ∫= 2
1
)(
x
x
thth dxxfF  and ∫= 2
1
)(
x
x
dd dxxfF . Here 
11 =x  and 62 =x  since each group contains six data, except for the last 
group that only has five data. This step produces: 
 
Group 1: 2.746917=thF  and 0.39075=dF  
Group 2: 2.836083=thF  and 0.434458=dF  
Group 3: 3.110542=thF  and 0.548958=dF  
Group 4: 2.913292=thF  and 0.509=dF  
Group 5: 4.29975=thF  and 0.345917=dF  
Group 6: 2.772625=thF  and 0.536817=dF  
Group 7: 2.32576=thF  and 0.345653=dF  
 
(iii) Compare thF  and dF  from each group. It produces dth FF >  for all groups of 
data, thus it can be concluded that Equation (6.9) is fulfilled by the developed 
agent-based active firewall.  
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Graph presentation of the function of attacks and detection speeds from each 
group of data, together with the function of the speed to start malicious information 
flow and the speed of canals, are presented in Appendix C3. 
 
Repeating the steps above to compare the speed for starting malicious 
information flow against the speed for detecting suspicious process produces 
)()( lowmaliciousfvagentv > . Detail calculations are given in Appendix C4. This fact 
shows that malicious information flows cannot be prevented if the malicious program 
has been activated, although if we scrutinize the experimental results there are about 
10% (4 from 41 data) of the malicious flows can be prevented. Thus the action to 
prevent malicious flows shall only be held before the malicious program is activated. 
Otherwise the unauthorized release of information can only be stopped, not 
prevented. 
 
 
 
6.5.2 Speed of Closing Canals 
 
The speed of closing canals is other important factor influencing the 
performance of agent-based active firewall. This parameter show how fast canals can 
be closed relative to the appearance of malicious code as formulated in Equation 
(6.4). Firewall is effective to protect the intranet if it fulfils the equation below. 
 
)()( attackvcanalsclosingv <    (6.10) 
 
Referring to the experimental results presented in Table 6.1, and repeating the steps 
described in Section 6.5.1 to compare the speed of closing canals against the speed of 
the attacks, it produces thc FF < . Detail calculations are given in Appendix C4 with 
graph presentation in Appendix C3. This condition shows that active firewall capable 
to provide protection against malicious program launching the unauthorized 
information flows. 
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6.5.3 Proportion of Exposed Time 
 
The purpose of formulating the proportion of the exposed time is to measure 
the possibility of unauthorized release of information before the attack is stopped by 
the firewall. With the assumption that fcdms ttttt <<<< , proportion of the 
exposed time fulfils the following equation: 
 
   
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≥⇔
<≤⇔
<⇔
=
c
csFW
s
tt
ttt
ttNA
ET
0
υυ    (6.11) 
 
Proof. Malicious information flow here is defined as a flow of data from intranet to 
the Internet and/or vice versa due to the action of a threat. Referring to timeline 
graph in Figure 6.5, malicious traffic passing the firewall can be analysed as follow. 
At stt <  no threat is active in the intranet, thus no flow is considered malicious and 
the proportion of exposed time is not applicable (NA) in this condition. At stt =  a 
malicious code is active in the internal machine and launching a malicious traffic at 
mtt = . If the communication line is kept opened, malicious traffic will successfully 
be completed at ftt = . However if the agent-module detects the running threat, 
firewall will close the canals at ctt =  to prevent any further unauthorized release of 
information. Thus the proportion of the exposed time can initially be computed as 
MF
MWET υυ
υυ
−
−=  with Mυ , Wυ  and Fυ  denote the mean average of mt∆ , wt∆  and ft∆  
respectively. Assuming that ( )smm ttt ←∀ , hence 01 ==
∑
=
n
m
n
i
i
Mυ  and 
F
WET υ
υ=  for 
cs ttt ≤≤ . However the last condition is violated when fc tt ≥ . In this case, total lost 
of information is occurred since FW υυ ≥  and %100>ET . Referring to the table of 
experimental result presented in Table 6.1, experiment shows that the active firewall 
produces ET = 24.4%. It means the internal victim machine is exposed to the external 
network for the duration of 24.4% of the total time required by the malicious 
program to launch an unauthorized information flow. 
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6.5.4 Summary 
 
The implementation of the strategy for reducing unprotected users is 
presented in this chapter. The proposed method is to develop distributed agent-based 
security module to equip the operation of active firewall. These modules monitor the 
running processes of every internal user, and compare each process against a 
reference that contains a set of permitted applications. If an unrecognised process is 
detected, the module will inform the firewall, thus firewall can take an action to drop 
the communication line by modifying the canals corresponding to the internal user 
machine where the unrecognised process has been detected. Experiment shows that 
the developed method is capable to stop the malicious information flow driven by a 
malicious program that aims to steal the information of internal host. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
RUNTIME PROCESS: 
MINIMIZING THE UNTRUSTED EXTERNAL PARTIES WITH 
ZERO-BASED CONFIGURATION 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the development of runtime process using minimal 
configuration of network services. The methods proposed in this stage is still to 
follow the initialization process presented in Chapter 4. Referring to the threats 
reduction strategy developed in Chapter 3, the method introduced in this chapter 
aims to minimize the untrusted external parties by limiting the available services at 
runtime, and restricting the access only to the authorized external parties. The 
experience of Ranum and Avolio (1994) to deal with firewall and network traffic 
motivates the formulation of this method. In their report (Ranum and Avolio, 1994), 
it is stated that turning network services at minimum would make firewall harder to 
break into. Hence it discloses the fact that current firewall technology offers too 
much services, particularly with static configuration built at start up and remained 
unchanged until the firewall is shut down. It is also worth to note that any security 
holes exist in the existing static configuration would be maintained along the 
operation of firewall. Moreover, Goncalves (2000) stressed the difficulties on 
auditing and administering the overall available network services at once due to the 
possibilities of unauthorized information flow that may rise from any of the open 
services without the knowledge of the internal user. Thus the idea behind zero-based 
configuration is to offer minimum services to secure Internet access by closing all 
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open connection in the idle time. This way, there will be no flowing traffic passing 
through the firewall without being screened first. It ensures that any Internet 
transactions are done with the trusted external parties. 
 
The term “zero-based” it-self is taken from the financial sector, in which it 
has been used as the name of a budgeting method. In this field, zero-based stipulates 
the requirements that each appropriation in a budget year should justify the amount 
in excess of zero (Anthony, 2003). Therefore the basis of running this method is 
zero, and any expenditure must be rejustified during each budgeting cycle. In this 
research, the principle of zero-based approach is used to handle the runtime process 
of active firewall. Here configuration of network services at run time becomes the 
object of interest, thus minimizing this configuration become the objective of this 
method. Formulation is described in the next section. 
 
 
 
7.2 Formulation 
 
Let C become a set of reconfigureable canals establishing connection 
between intranet and the Internet. And Cmnc ∈),(  denotes a set of canals 
connecting the internal user n to the requested external parties m, hence access to 
Internet using zero-based configuration is held by holding some activities as 
described using a time line graph depicted in Figure 7.1. Referring to this figure, if 
there exist an internal user requesting access to Internet at time rtt = , the active 
firewall would establish the connection at time ett =  by activating ),( mnc , maintain 
the canals for the duration of t∆ seconds, and then drop the canals at time dtt = , 
with ttt e ∆+= . From this point, canals reconfiguration can be formulated as follows 
 
 ⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ ≤≤∧∈∈⇔=
otherwise0
)()for),((1
),(
de tttMmCmnc
mnc   (7.1) 
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with Mm∈  become a set of external parties allowed to be contacted by the internal 
users. As mentioned previously that the established canals will be dropped after the 
duration of t∆  seconds, hence t∆  is defined as the timeout of network transaction, 
and for each transaction the timeout is determined using the following equation 
 
    )(3)( mmt τυ +=∆     (7.2) 
 
with υ  and τ  denote the average mean and the standard deviation respectively of 
time consumption to conduct network transaction with the external parties 
corresponding to ),( mnc . In this method, prior measurement to empirically 
determine time consumption is required. It is worth to note that equation (7.2) 
follows the empirical rule of statistics with 99,7% approximation of time 
consumption (Triola, 2001). 
 
 
 
te
Canals are 
activated
tr
User 
request to 
access 
Internet
td
Canals are 
dropped
tf
End of 
transaction
time
Event
Internet 
transaction
t∆
tex
Timeout 
of 
external 
parties
ret
 
 
Figure 7.1: A series of events in accessing Internet using zero-based configuration 
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7.3 Implementation 
 
Active firewall running zero-based configuration is implemented by 
developing the following mechanism: 
 
(i) Running the close-condition approach for initialization process. 
 
(ii) Waiting for the access request of the internal users at runtime, and for each 
permitted request, it is followed by enforcing the security rule in term of 
modifying the configuration of canals. 
 
(iii) For each activated canal, the active firewall will monitor its lifetime. So when 
the lifetime reaches the timeout, the security rule will be dropped. Thus the 
zero-configuration of canals can be maintained along the operation of active 
firewall. 
 
To implement the first mechanism above, the close-condition method 
developed in Chapter 4 is employed. And to implement the second mechanism, real-
time traffic filtering is required to analyze every flowing packet intending to pass 
through the firewall. This mechanism is processing intensive, hence simplification of 
the analysis is necessary to achieve the real time process. Therefore only the header 
of network packet is analyzed. It is implemented by developing the foreground 
algorithm as depicted in Figure 7.2.  
 
Meanwhile, to implement the third mechanism, prior measurement of time 
consumption for communicating with the external parties is developed. This data are 
necessary to compute the timeout of each transaction, thus the live time of each 
security rule can be determined using the empirical rule as formulated in Equation 
(7.2). This mechanism is implemented by developing the background algorithm as 
shown in Figure 7.3. Here the choice to run the dropping mechanism for each life 
canal in the background is due to the operation of the third mechanism above that 
less requires real-time execution compared to the enforcing security rule included in 
the second mechanism. Complete implementations of foreground and background 
algorithm are given in Appendix D4 and D5 respectively. 
 84
Procedure Foreground Zero Configuration 
‘TBUF : array of traffic buffer 
‘C : array of canals 
‘Q : table of permitted external parties 
Begin 
     i = 1 
     While i ≤  TBUF.size do 
     Begin 
 Line_content = “” 
 j = 1 
 Do Until (TBUF(i) = EOL) Or (i = TBUF.size) 
      Line_content = Line_content + TBUF(i) 
                 If (TBUF(i) = “ “) Then 
      Begin  
  Word(j) = Line_content 
  Line_content = “” 
  j = j + 1 
      End 
      1+= ii  
         Loop 
 If Word = Packet.Header Then 
 Begin 
                  For j = 1 to Word.size do 
     Begin 
If Word(j) = External_party And External_party is new Then 
     ExternalOutsiderArraypartyExternal .__ ⇒  
      If Word(j) = Internal_user And Internal_user is new Then 
     InternalOutsiderArrayuserInternal .__ ⇒  
       If Word(j) = Protocol Then Array_Outsider.Protocol = Word(j) 
     End 
     If Array_Outsider ≠  C Then 
      If Array_Outsider.External ∈  Q Then Array_Outsider →  C 
 End 
     End 
End 
Figure 7.2: Foreground algorithm 
 
 
Procedure Background Zero Configuration 
‘C : array of canals 
‘Q : table of permitted external parties 
Begin 
     i = 1 
     While i ≤  C.size do 
     Begin 
              For j = 1 to Q.size do 
      If C(i).external = Q(j).external Then 
If  (PresentTime() - C(i).start) > (Q(j).timeout + 3* Std_dev(Q(j).timeout)) Then 
       Drop(C(i))  
1+= ii  
     End  
End 
Figure 7.3: Background algorithm 
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7.4 Experiment 
 
Evaluation on the implemented zero-based configuration was conducted on 
the same experimental set up as in Chapter 4. A set of security policies used in the 
experiment was defined in term of a table of rules that contain the list of permitted 
Internet parties. The table is presented in Appendix D1. Using this table, firewall can 
decide whether the request to access Internet is permitted or not. The table also 
supplies the firewall with the information about the timeout period of each external 
party. Experimental results are presented in Appendix D2. 
 
 
 
7.4.1 Speed to Open Canal 
 
Since the firewall has to manage real time execution of Internet access, the 
speed of opening canals becomes the important factor influencing the 
implementation of zero-based configuration. Referring to Figure 7.1, this parameter 
deals with the establishment of et  relative to rt . Thus low speed to open canals most 
probably causes denial of service. In this implementation, the speed to open canal is 
affected by the location of Internet access request in the traffic buffer. If the request 
exists in the beginning of network traffic, the speed to open canal can be computed 
using the following equation rere ttt −= . But if the request appears in the middle of 
traffic buffer, then the speed to open canal is affected by the processing time of 
foreground algorithm to analyze the contents of buffer, in which iteration to browse 
the buffer is held. Here the processing time can be measured by computing the 
number of packets contained in the buffer. By assuming that the worst-case scenario 
is met i.e. the access request is appeared at the end of traffic buffer, using the 
computation to compare the processing time and the number of packets, the 
processing time to open canal can be determined as follow. 
 
kt
s
st ref
n
ref
re +∆⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=     (7.3) 
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with n refers to the number of iteration, s is the buffer size in term of the number of 
packets, k is a constant representing the required time to complete the program 
excluding the main iteration and t∆  is the processing time. Since the foreground 
algorithm depicted in Figure 7.2 produces n=1, thus linear processing time following 
the growth of packets in the buffer can be delivered. Therefore real time Internet 
access can be handled by this method.  
 
Referring to the experimental results in Appendix D3, the graph presenting 
the increase of processing time compared to the number of packets is shown in 
Figure 7.4. It proves that Equation (7.3) is satisfied. Meanwhile, empirical 
measurement in Appendix D2 produces the average of 4.9 seconds with standard 
deviation 4.7 seconds are required by this algorithm to open canals. 
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Figure 7.4: Processing time against buffer size 
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7.4.2 Timeout 
 
Timeout is the other important factor in zero-based configuration. This 
parameter determines how long firewall need to maintain its open connections to 
particular external parties. Similarly, the appropriate time when the firewall needs to 
bring the configuration back to zero can be defined as well. Referring to Figure 7.1, 
timeout refers to ed ttt −=∆ . Inaccurate definition of timeout will lead to two 
problems. First, shorter timeout causes the firewall to abort Internet transaction since 
canals are dropped before all packets are received. This problem causes denial of 
service. And second, longer time out causes the firewall to open the canals while no 
transactions are running. The second problem causes internal users being exposed to 
the outside. These problems emphasize the importance of accurate computation to 
define the timeout. Here the strategy to employ empirical rule to define the required 
time consumption in accessing external parties as formulated in Equation (7.2), 
produces dynamic timeouts that follow the speed of Internet transaction. From totally 
148 transactions tested in this experiment, empirical measurements discover 3.38% 
of these transactions created denial of service due to shorter timeout. The 
measurements also discover the average exposed time as low as 67.1 seconds due to 
longer timeout.  
 
 
 
7.4.3 Denial of Service 
 
Denial of service becomes the critical factor in running zero-based 
configuration. In this method, denial of service can be introduced from two aspects 
i.e. shorter canals timeout and late opening canals. Since the former aspect has been 
discussed in Sub Section 7.4.2, here the discussion focuses in analyzing denial of 
service due to late opening of canals. And as has been stated in Sub Section 7.4.1, the 
speed of opening canals is influenced by existence of the transaction request in the 
traffic buffer. Meanwhile referring to Figure 7.1, the request to have Internet 
transaction is also limited by the timeout of contacting external parties ext . Hence 
denial of service is raised if exre tt > . In this case, the possible cause of this problem 
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is the existence of access request that is appeared in the middle or at the end of traffic 
buffer, thus it requires longer time to establish canals, particularly if there is a bigger 
number of flowing packets are caught by the buffer. However experimental results in 
Appendix D2 show that this problem can be avoided due to the analysis of the 
flowing packets that is held only on the header of the network packet as shown in the 
foreground algorithm given in Figure 7.2. This strategy is proven capable to fasten 
packet analysis. 
 
 
 
7.5 Summary 
 
This chapter presents the implementation of the security strategy to reduce 
untrusted external parties. It is achieved by minimizing the available services at 
runtime and permitting the access to only authorized external parties. Zero-based 
configuration is introduced from this effort. Results of the experiment show that this 
method requires time consumption as high as 4.9 seconds in the average to open 
canal, and also create 3.38% denial of service due to shorter timeout of canals 
lifetime.  
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
RUNTIME PROCESS: 
MINIMIZING THE UNTRUSTED EXTERNAL PARTIES WITH 
ZERO-BASED CONFIGURATION 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the development of runtime process using minimal 
configuration of network services. The methods proposed in this stage is still to 
follow the initialization process presented in Chapter 4. Referring to the threats 
reduction strategy developed in Chapter 3, the method introduced in this chapter 
aims to minimize the untrusted external parties by limiting the available services at 
runtime, and restricting the access only to the authorized external parties. The 
experience of Ranum and Avolio (1994) to deal with firewall and network traffic 
motivates the formulation of this method. In their report (Ranum and Avolio, 1994), 
it is stated that turning network services at minimum would make firewall harder to 
break into. Hence it discloses the fact that current firewall technology offers too 
much services, particularly with static configuration built at start up and remained 
unchanged until the firewall is shut down. It is also worth to note that any security 
holes exist in the existing static configuration would be maintained along the 
operation of firewall. Moreover, Goncalves (2000) stressed the difficulties on 
auditing and administering the overall available network services at once due to the 
possibilities of unauthorized information flow that may rise from any of the open 
services without the knowledge of the internal user. Thus the idea behind zero-based 
configuration is to offer minimum services to secure Internet access by closing all 
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open connection in the idle time. This way, there will be no flowing traffic passing 
through the firewall without being screened first. It ensures that any Internet 
transactions are done with the trusted external parties. 
 
The term “zero-based” it-self is taken from the financial sector, in which it 
has been used as the name of a budgeting method. In this field, zero-based stipulates 
the requirements that each appropriation in a budget year should justify the amount 
in excess of zero (Anthony, 2003). Therefore the basis of running this method is 
zero, and any expenditure must be rejustified during each budgeting cycle. In this 
research, the principle of zero-based approach is used to handle the runtime process 
of active firewall. Here configuration of network services at run time becomes the 
object of interest, thus minimizing this configuration become the objective of this 
method. Formulation is described in the next section. 
 
 
 
7.2 Formulation 
 
Let C become a set of reconfigureable canals establishing connection 
between intranet and the Internet. And Cmnc ∈),(  denotes a set of canals 
connecting the internal user n to the requested external parties m, hence access to 
Internet using zero-based configuration is held by holding some activities as 
described using a time line graph depicted in Figure 7.1. Referring to this figure, if 
there exist an internal user requesting access to Internet at time rtt = , the active 
firewall would establish the connection at time ett =  by activating ),( mnc , maintain 
the canals for the duration of t∆ seconds, and then drop the canals at time dtt = , 
with ttt e ∆+= . From this point, canals reconfiguration can be formulated as follows 
 
 ⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ ≤≤∧∈∈⇔=
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with Mm∈  become a set of external parties allowed to be contacted by the internal 
users. As mentioned previously that the established canals will be dropped after the 
duration of t∆  seconds, hence t∆  is defined as the timeout of network transaction, 
and for each transaction the timeout is determined using the following equation 
 
    )(3)( mmt τυ +=∆     (7.2) 
 
with υ  and τ  denote the average mean and the standard deviation respectively of 
time consumption to conduct network transaction with the external parties 
corresponding to ),( mnc . In this method, prior measurement to empirically 
determine time consumption is required. It is worth to note that equation (7.2) 
follows the empirical rule of statistics with 99,7% approximation of time 
consumption (Triola, 2001). 
 
 
 
te
Canals are 
activated
tr
User 
request to 
access 
Internet
td
Canals are 
dropped
tf
End of 
transaction
time
Event
Internet 
transaction
t∆
tex
Timeout 
of 
external 
parties
ret
 
 
Figure 7.1: A series of events in accessing Internet using zero-based configuration 
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7.3 Implementation 
 
Active firewall running zero-based configuration is implemented by 
developing the following mechanism: 
 
(i) Running the close-condition approach for initialization process. 
 
(ii) Waiting for the access request of the internal users at runtime, and for each 
permitted request, it is followed by enforcing the security rule in term of 
modifying the configuration of canals. 
 
(iii) For each activated canal, the active firewall will monitor its lifetime. So when 
the lifetime reaches the timeout, the security rule will be dropped. Thus the 
zero-configuration of canals can be maintained along the operation of active 
firewall. 
 
To implement the first mechanism above, the close-condition method 
developed in Chapter 4 is employed. And to implement the second mechanism, real-
time traffic filtering is required to analyze every flowing packet intending to pass 
through the firewall. This mechanism is processing intensive, hence simplification of 
the analysis is necessary to achieve the real time process. Therefore only the header 
of network packet is analyzed. It is implemented by developing the foreground 
algorithm as depicted in Figure 7.2.  
 
Meanwhile, to implement the third mechanism, prior measurement of time 
consumption for communicating with the external parties is developed. This data are 
necessary to compute the timeout of each transaction, thus the live time of each 
security rule can be determined using the empirical rule as formulated in Equation 
(7.2). This mechanism is implemented by developing the background algorithm as 
shown in Figure 7.3. Here the choice to run the dropping mechanism for each life 
canal in the background is due to the operation of the third mechanism above that 
less requires real-time execution compared to the enforcing security rule included in 
the second mechanism. Complete implementations of foreground and background 
algorithm are given in Appendix D4 and D5 respectively. 
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Procedure Foreground Zero Configuration 
‘TBUF : array of traffic buffer 
‘C : array of canals 
‘Q : table of permitted external parties 
Begin 
     i = 1 
     While i ≤  TBUF.size do 
     Begin 
 Line_content = “” 
 j = 1 
 Do Until (TBUF(i) = EOL) Or (i = TBUF.size) 
      Line_content = Line_content + TBUF(i) 
                 If (TBUF(i) = “ “) Then 
      Begin  
  Word(j) = Line_content 
  Line_content = “” 
  j = j + 1 
      End 
      1+= ii  
         Loop 
 If Word = Packet.Header Then 
 Begin 
                  For j = 1 to Word.size do 
     Begin 
If Word(j) = External_party And External_party is new Then 
     ExternalOutsiderArraypartyExternal .__ ⇒  
      If Word(j) = Internal_user And Internal_user is new Then 
     InternalOutsiderArrayuserInternal .__ ⇒  
       If Word(j) = Protocol Then Array_Outsider.Protocol = Word(j) 
     End 
     If Array_Outsider ≠  C Then 
      If Array_Outsider.External ∈  Q Then Array_Outsider →  C 
 End 
     End 
End 
Figure 7.2: Foreground algorithm 
 
 
Procedure Background Zero Configuration 
‘C : array of canals 
‘Q : table of permitted external parties 
Begin 
     i = 1 
     While i ≤  C.size do 
     Begin 
              For j = 1 to Q.size do 
      If C(i).external = Q(j).external Then 
If  (PresentTime() - C(i).start) > (Q(j).timeout + 3* Std_dev(Q(j).timeout)) Then 
       Drop(C(i))  
1+= ii  
     End  
End 
Figure 7.3: Background algorithm 
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7.4 Experiment 
 
Evaluation on the implemented zero-based configuration was conducted on 
the same experimental set up as in Chapter 4. A set of security policies used in the 
experiment was defined in term of a table of rules that contain the list of permitted 
Internet parties. The table is presented in Appendix D1. Using this table, firewall can 
decide whether the request to access Internet is permitted or not. The table also 
supplies the firewall with the information about the timeout period of each external 
party. Experimental results are presented in Appendix D2. 
 
 
 
7.4.1 Speed to Open Canal 
 
Since the firewall has to manage real time execution of Internet access, the 
speed of opening canals becomes the important factor influencing the 
implementation of zero-based configuration. Referring to Figure 7.1, this parameter 
deals with the establishment of et  relative to rt . Thus low speed to open canals most 
probably causes denial of service. In this implementation, the speed to open canal is 
affected by the location of Internet access request in the traffic buffer. If the request 
exists in the beginning of network traffic, the speed to open canal can be computed 
using the following equation rere ttt −= . But if the request appears in the middle of 
traffic buffer, then the speed to open canal is affected by the processing time of 
foreground algorithm to analyze the contents of buffer, in which iteration to browse 
the buffer is held. Here the processing time can be measured by computing the 
number of packets contained in the buffer. By assuming that the worst-case scenario 
is met i.e. the access request is appeared at the end of traffic buffer, using the 
computation to compare the processing time and the number of packets, the 
processing time to open canal can be determined as follow. 
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with n refers to the number of iteration, s is the buffer size in term of the number of 
packets, k is a constant representing the required time to complete the program 
excluding the main iteration and t∆  is the processing time. Since the foreground 
algorithm depicted in Figure 7.2 produces n=1, thus linear processing time following 
the growth of packets in the buffer can be delivered. Therefore real time Internet 
access can be handled by this method.  
 
Referring to the experimental results in Appendix D3, the graph presenting 
the increase of processing time compared to the number of packets is shown in 
Figure 7.4. It proves that Equation (7.3) is satisfied. Meanwhile, empirical 
measurement in Appendix D2 produces the average of 4.9 seconds with standard 
deviation 4.7 seconds are required by this algorithm to open canals. 
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Figure 7.4: Processing time against buffer size 
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7.4.2 Timeout 
 
Timeout is the other important factor in zero-based configuration. This 
parameter determines how long firewall need to maintain its open connections to 
particular external parties. Similarly, the appropriate time when the firewall needs to 
bring the configuration back to zero can be defined as well. Referring to Figure 7.1, 
timeout refers to ed ttt −=∆ . Inaccurate definition of timeout will lead to two 
problems. First, shorter timeout causes the firewall to abort Internet transaction since 
canals are dropped before all packets are received. This problem causes denial of 
service. And second, longer time out causes the firewall to open the canals while no 
transactions are running. The second problem causes internal users being exposed to 
the outside. These problems emphasize the importance of accurate computation to 
define the timeout. Here the strategy to employ empirical rule to define the required 
time consumption in accessing external parties as formulated in Equation (7.2), 
produces dynamic timeouts that follow the speed of Internet transaction. From totally 
148 transactions tested in this experiment, empirical measurements discover 3.38% 
of these transactions created denial of service due to shorter timeout. The 
measurements also discover the average exposed time as low as 67.1 seconds due to 
longer timeout.  
 
 
 
7.4.3 Denial of Service 
 
Denial of service becomes the critical factor in running zero-based 
configuration. In this method, denial of service can be introduced from two aspects 
i.e. shorter canals timeout and late opening canals. Since the former aspect has been 
discussed in Sub Section 7.4.2, here the discussion focuses in analyzing denial of 
service due to late opening of canals. And as has been stated in Sub Section 7.4.1, the 
speed of opening canals is influenced by existence of the transaction request in the 
traffic buffer. Meanwhile referring to Figure 7.1, the request to have Internet 
transaction is also limited by the timeout of contacting external parties ext . Hence 
denial of service is raised if exre tt > . In this case, the possible cause of this problem 
 88
is the existence of access request that is appeared in the middle or at the end of traffic 
buffer, thus it requires longer time to establish canals, particularly if there is a bigger 
number of flowing packets are caught by the buffer. However experimental results in 
Appendix D2 show that this problem can be avoided due to the analysis of the 
flowing packets that is held only on the header of the network packet as shown in the 
foreground algorithm given in Figure 7.2. This strategy is proven capable to fasten 
packet analysis. 
 
 
 
7.5 Summary 
 
This chapter presents the implementation of the security strategy to reduce 
untrusted external parties. It is achieved by minimizing the available services at 
runtime and permitting the access to only authorized external parties. Zero-based 
configuration is introduced from this effort. Results of the experiment show that this 
method requires time consumption as high as 4.9 seconds in the average to open 
canal, and also create 3.38% denial of service due to shorter timeout of canals 
lifetime.  
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
 
 
RESEARCH EVALUATION 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
After developing the strategies to activate the mechanism of firewall, now it 
comes to the stage of evaluating the proposed methods. This chapter presents the 
research evaluation on the developed firewall methods, in which security analysis on 
each firewall methods together with comparative study to no firewall, static rule, and 
dynamic configuration are held. To carry on running this task, the integrations 
between the initialization methods and runtime process are produced. The following 
combinations are delivered: 
 
• Open-condition + Fuzzy-based security rules update (OF) 
• Lattice-based initialization + Fuzzy-based security rules update (LF) 
• Open-condition + Agent-based suspicious program detection (OA) 
• Lattice-based initialization + Agent-based suspicious program detection (LA) 
• Close-condition + Zero-configuration (CZ) 
 
It is important to note that the combinations between the closed-conditions 
and the runtime methods other than zero-configuration cannot be produced, since the 
initialization process based on closed-condition requires a mechanism to open the 
canals for enabling Internet access. Meanwhile the combinations between the 
initialization processes other than closed-condition with zero-configuration cannot be 
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delivered as well due to the mechanism of zero-configuration to drop all available 
connections. Therefore only five listed-combinations above are evaluated. 
 
 
 
8.2 Security Analysis 
 
This study is conducted based on the requirements of firewall and its security 
considerations defined in RFC 2979 (Freed, 2000), the standard behavior of and the 
requirements for Internet firewall. As described in Section 2.4, RFC 2979 state that 
firewall must satisfy the transparency rule i.e. the introduction of firewall in a 
network environment must not cause any unintended failures nor preventing people 
from doing a useful works. The following parameters are defined to represent these 
requirements: 
 
• The probability of available network services (AS) 
• The probability of exposed line (EL) 
• The probability of denial of service (DS) 
 
Hence the combinations between the initialization and runtime process as 
listed above are investigated using these parameters. Assuming that each 
combination run in the same firewall machine with the same network environment, 
the security analysis is described as follow: 
 
 
 
8.2.1 The Probability of Available Network Services 
 
Here the availability of network services is defined as the available 
connection in responding to the request of accessing Internet. This parameter is 
computed using the following formula. 
 
)|1),(()|1),(()( runtimetioninitializa fmncPfmncPASP =∧==  (8.1) 
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To measure this parameter, basic mechanism of each method is observed as 
shown in Equation (8.1). Table 8.1 is delivered as the product of this observation. 
Detail calculation is given in Appendix E1. This table discloses the following fact. 
 
)()()()()( CZASPLAASPLFASPOFASPOAASP −≥−=−≥−=−  (8.2) 
 
Proof. Assuming that evaluation is conducted in the normal condition therefore no 
threat exist, and 1)0)(( ==nthP . And referring to the use of canals, 1),( =∀ mnc  
means all connection to the Internet are opened, thus 1)1),(( ==mncP  is produced. 
Meanwhile 1),( =∈∀ Cmnc  produces ]1,0[)1),(( ==mncP  since Cmnc ∉∃ ),( exist. 
So it can be concluded that 
 
)1),(|1),(()1),(()0)(( =∈∀=≥=== CmncmncPmncPnthP  (8.3) 
 
Thus Equation (8.3) proves Equation (8.2). Here )( CZASP −  has the lowest rank 
since )1),(|1),(( =∈∀= CmncmncP  involves time variables de ttt ≤≤  that limits 
the availability of services. 
 
Tables 8.1: Result of measuring the availability of network services 
Methods P(AS) 
Open-condition + Fuzzy-
based security rules 
update (OF) 
1 
Open-condition + Agent-
based suspicious program 
detection (OA) 
1 
Lattice-based initialization 
+ Fuzzy-based security 
rules update (LF) 
))()(1),(|1),(( mrisknprotectionCmncmncP ≥⇔=∈∀=
 
Lattice-based initialization 
+ Agent-based suspicious 
program detection (LA) 
))()(1),(|1),(( mrisknprotectionCmncmncP ≥⇔=∈∀=
 
Close-condition + Zero-
configuration (CZ) 
)1),(|1),(( de tttCmncmncP <≤⇔=∈∀=  
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8.2.2 Probability of Exposed Line 
 
Exposed line is defined as the status of firewall when the opened connection 
exist, while there is no user request to access the Internet, or there is the appearance 
of Internet threats. This parameter is computed using the following formula: 
 
))()(0)(|1),(()( de ttttmrisknprotectionnthmncPELP ≥∨<∨<∨>== (8.4) 
 
Computing the exposed line to the combination of initialization method and 
runtime process as listed in Section 8.1 produces the data as shown in Table 8.2. 
Detail calculations to obtain these data are given in Appendix E2. 
 
Table 8.2: Result of measuring the probability of exposed line 
Methods P(EL) 
Open-condition + 
Fuzzy-based 
security rules 
update (OF) 
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 1)( =−OFELP  
• For 0)( >nth , 1)( =−OFELP  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 0)( =−OFELP  
Open-condition + 
Agent-based 
suspicious 
program detection 
(OA) 
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 1)( =−OAELP  
• For 0)( >nth , 0)( =−OAELP  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 1)( =−OAELP  
Lattice-based 
initialization + 
Fuzzy-based 
security rules 
update (LF) 
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 
))()(1),(|1),(()( mrisknprotectionCmncmncPLFELP ≥⇔=∈∀==−  
• For 0)( >nth , 
))()(1),(|1),(()( mrisknprotectionCmncmncPLFELP ≥⇔=∈∀==−  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 0)( =− LFELP  
Lattice-based 
initialization + 
Agent-based 
suspicious 
program detection 
(LA) 
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 
))()(1),(|1),(()( mrisknprotectionCmncmncPLAELP ≥⇔=∈∀==−  
• For 0)( >nth , 0)( =− LAELP  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 0)( =− LAELP  
Close-condition + 
Zero-configuration 
(CZ) 
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 0)( =−CZELP  
• For 0)( >nth , 
)1),(|1),(()( de tttCmncmncPCZELP <≤⇔=∈∀==−  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 
)1),(|1),(()( de tttCmncmncPCZELP <≤⇔=∈∀==−  
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Table 8.2 show that the combination of close-condition and zero- 
configuration provides the best protection in the idle time, in which zero exposed line 
can be delivered by this method. However this method is insensitive to the 
appearance of the threat and the raising risk of external parties, which the 
combination of lattice-initialization and agent-based malicious program detection can 
be best countering these attacks although exposed-line is produced in the idle time. 
And among the combination above, the methods employing open-condition and any 
runtime process notably creates more exposed-line compared to other methods. 
These methods produce more total open connection in the idle time as well as in 
responding of the raising risk or the appearance of the threats. Thus the combinations 
of the open-condition and fuzzy-based or agent-based runtime process are considered 
delivering the worst performance in preventing the exposed-line. Based on these 
conditions, the performance for protecting intranet from exposed line can be ranked 
as follow: 
 
)()()()()( OAELPOFELPLFELPCZELPLAELP −=−≤−≤−≤−  (8.5) 
 
 
 
8.2.3 Probability of Denial of Service 
 
This parameter discloses the possibility of denial of services introduced by 
each method. It is important to note that the denial of services only takes account of 
the authorized access to external parties. Therefore the denial to unauthorized access 
due to the enforcement of security rule is excluded. This assumption eliminates three 
conditions preventing the Internet access i.e. the appearance of threats in the internal 
users ( 0)( >nth ), the increasing risk of external parties that exceeds the protection 
level of internal users ( )()( mrisknprotection < ), and the condition when there is no 
request to access Internet ( ftr tttt >∨< ). To measure the probability of denial of 
service, the following formula is computed. 
 
)|0),(()|0),(()( runtimetioninitializa fmncPfmncPDSP =∨==   (8.6) 
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Computing Equation (8.6) to the listed combination in Section 8.1 produces 
the data as shown in Table 8.3. Detail calculations to get these data are given in 
Appendix E.3. 
 
Table 8.3: Result produced by the probability of denial of service 
Methods P(DS) 
Open-condition + Fuzzy-
based security rules 
update (OF) 
0 
Open-condition + Agent-
based suspicious program 
detection (OA) 
0 
Lattice-based initialization 
+ Fuzzy-based security 
rules update (LF) 
))()(1),(|0),(( mrisknprotectionCmncmncP ≥⇔=∈∀=  
Lattice-based initialization 
+ Agent-based suspicious 
program detection (LA) 
))()(1),(|0),(( mrisknprotectionCmncmncP ≥⇔=∈∀=  
Close-condition + Zero-
configuration (CZ) 
)1),(|0),(( de tttCmncmncP <≤⇔=∈∀=  
 
 
Table 8.3 discloses the fact that the combination of close-condition and zero-
configuration most suffer from denial of service. This condition is due to the 
mechanism of this method to actively open and close canals in responding to the user 
request, thus de ttt <≤  become the dominant factor increasing denial of service. 
Therefore the speed to establish canals and accurate prediction to the lifetime of 
Internet transaction are critical. The approach to only inspect the header of network 
packet for establishing canals, and to employ empirical rules with 99.7% 
approximation to compute the timeout, seem become the correct method toward 
implementing zero configuration. This approach will not let any factor preventing 
Internet transactions. Second rank for suffering denial of service is the method 
consisting of lattice-based initialization. It is due to the factor of 1),( =∈∀ Cmnc  
that may introduce Cmnc ∉∃ ),( . However if C is large enough to hold a huge 
collection of the identities of external parties, denial of service can be minimized. 
Referring to Table 8.3, probability of denial of service can be ranked as follow. 
 
)()()()()( OFDSPOADSPLADSPLFDSPCZDSP −=−≥−=−≥−  (8.7) 
  
95
8.3 Comparative Study 
 
To further evaluate the developed active firewall systems, comparison to no 
firewall, static, and dynamic configuration are held. The choice to use these 
configurations is due to proven capabilities and reliabilities of these methods to 
provide connection to the Internet (Reumann et al., 2001; Toth and Kruegel 2002). 
For static configuration, a comprehensive firewall script developed by Bob Sully is 
used (Sully, 2005). This script was originally designed and implemented by Craig 
Zeller using ipfwadm (Zeller, 2004), but then it is translated into ipchains and 
iptables with some additions and modifications. Here the iptables version of this 
script is chosen for this study since it delivers more complete protection to the 
intranet. The script is presented in Appendix F1. Meanwhile, a concise firewall script 
developed by Robbins (2001) is used for dynamic configuration. This script as 
presented in Appendix F2, is capable to deter the flowing malicious packets. The 
results of measuring these configurations using the parameters defined in Section 8.2 
are presented in Table 8.4. Detail calculations to obtain these data are given in 
Appendix F3, F4 and F5 for no firewall, static, and dynamic firewall configuration 
respectively.  
 
Using the data in Table 8.1 to 8.4, analysis is described as follow. Probability 
of available services obtained from no firewall configuration equals to the available 
services obtained from open-condition combined with agent-based detection. While 
for static firewall configuration, the available services totally depend on the manual 
definition of the permitted Internet access. If it is assumed that static configuration is 
capable to provide appropriate connection to the Internet, hence 1)( =− SFASP . The 
same assumption can be applied to dynamic configuration as well, therefore 
1)( =− DFASP . Thus based on the probability of available services, the 
performance of each method can be ranked as follow: 
 
CZLALFOFOADFSFNF ≥=≥====   (8.8) 
 
For exposed line, the open connection produces probability of exposed line as 
big as all available services are exposed. It means the whole internal users can be 
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seen and easily compromised from outside. Meanwhile static configuration performs 
better since it is influenced by manual configuration established at start up. However 
if the same assumptions as measuring available services above are applied, then 
static configuration produces the same exposed line as no firewall configuration. It is 
due to the character of this configuration that insensitive to any changes of network 
condition, including the raising threats. And for dynamic configuration, the raising 
threats can be detected although it is very limited, thus the connections can be 
modified. Ranking each method based on the probability of exposed line produces: 
 
LACZLFDFOFOASFNF ≥≥≅≥===   (8.9) 
 
While for denial of services, no firewall configuration produces zero 
probability since it is merely an open connection. The similar probability is delivered 
by static and dynamic configurations if the assumption for defining available services 
is applied again to compute this parameter. However both methods are influenced by 
manual definition to allow or reject particular external parties built at start up. Thus 
ranking of each method based on the probability of denial of services produces: 
 
CZLALFDFSFOAOFNF ≤=≅≅≤==   (8.10) 
 
Equation (8.8) discloses the cost for establishing active firewall mechanism 
i.e. lower service availability can be provided by the proposed active firewalls 
compared to the services provided by the existing methods. Only open-condition 
combined with agent-based that is capable to compete with the existing methods. 
However for denial of services, only close-condition combined with zero 
configurations suffer from this problem worse than the existing methods as stated in 
Equation (8.10). Other active firewall methods have similar performance as no 
firewall, static or dynamic configuration. And finally equation (8.9) proves that all 
active firewall methods outperform no firewall or static firewall configuration in 
providing network security in which smaller exposed line can be delivered. While for 
the existing methods based on dynamic configuration, only active firewalls based on 
the combination involving open-condition that cannot outperform the dynamic 
configuration. 
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Table 8.4: P(AS), P(EL) and P(DS) of no firewall, static and dynamic configuration 
Methods Parameters 
1)( =− NFASP  
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 1)( =− NFELP  
• For 0)( >nth , 1)( =− NFELP  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 1)( =− NFELP  
No Firewall 
Configuration 
(NF) 
0)( =− NFDSP  
)0),(1),(|1),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPSFASP  
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 
)0),(1),(|1),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPSFELP  
• For 0)( >nth , 
)0),(1),(|1),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPSFELP  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 
)0),(1),(|1),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPSFELP  
Static Firewall 
Configuration (SF) 
)0),(1),(|0),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPSFDSP  
)0),(1),(|1),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPDFASP  
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 
)0),(1),(|1),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPDFELP  
• For 0)( >nth , 0)( =− DFELP  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 
)0),(1),(|1),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPDFELP  
Dynamic Firewall 
Configuration 
(DF) 
)0),(1),(|0),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPDFDSP  
 
 
 
Further evaluation on the results of benchmarking is held by ranking each 
method based on Equation (8.8), (8.9) and (8.10), and then give the value from zero 
to ten with zero represents the best performance while ten is the worst. The methods 
having performance in between the best and the worst are assigned values that are 
equally distributed between zero and ten. Table 8.5 shows this evaluation. The 
overall performance is obtained by summing up the values of all parameters obtained 
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by each method. Here the lower value represents better active firewall method in 
providing intranet protection. The results sorted from the best method to the worst 
are given below: 
 
(i) NF, OA, OF, LA = 10 
(ii) DF = 11,66 
(iii) SF = 15 
(iv) LF = 16.66 
(v) CZ = 23.33 
 
The list above shows that OA, OF, and LA outperform other developed active 
firewall methods. However if we refer to the probability of exposed line among these 
three methods, it shows that LA outperforms other methods. Meanwhile CZ most 
probably suffer from usability since this method perform worst in providing network 
services as well as suffering from denial of service. This condition is due to the 
mechanism of CZ to always drop any available services at runtime. 
 
 
 
Table 8.5: Ranking the performance of all methods 
Parameter 
The Best 
Performance 
(0) 
The Performance in Between 
(0 – 10) 
The Worst 
Performance 
(10) 
Available 
Service 
NF, SF, DF, 
OA, OF {LF, LA} = 5 CZ 
Exposed Line LA CZ = 3.33 {DF, LF} = 6.66 NF, SF, OA, OF 
Denial of 
Service NF, OA, OF {SF, DF, LF, LA} = 5 CZ 
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8.4 Summary 
 
Evaluations on the proposed methods for developing active firewall are 
presented in this chapter, in which it consists of two stages i.e. security analysis and 
comparative study against the known firewall methods. To evaluate the complete 
mechanisms of active firewall, the developed initialization and runtime process are 
combined. Five different active firewall methods are produced as shown in Section 
8.1. Security analysis is held based on RFC 2979 (Freed, 2000), in which three 
parameters i.e. probability of available service, probability of exposed line and 
probability of denial of service are defined to represent the transparency rule of this 
standard. And to do the comparative study, each developed active firewall method is 
compared with each other, and also to the existing methods i.e. no firewall, static, 
and dynamic configurations. This study is also held based on the parameters defined 
for security analysis. Results of this effort show that the developed active firewalls 
are capable to combat the present of Internet threats. And lattice-initialization 
combined with agent-based module (LA) is proven having better security and 
usability among other developed methods, and also outperforms the existing 
methods. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
 
 
RESEARCH EVALUATION 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
After developing the strategies to activate the mechanism of firewall, now it 
comes to the stage of evaluating the proposed methods. This chapter presents the 
research evaluation on the developed firewall methods, in which security analysis on 
each firewall methods together with comparative study to no firewall, static rule, and 
dynamic configuration are held. To carry on running this task, the integrations 
between the initialization methods and runtime process are produced. The following 
combinations are delivered: 
 
• Open-condition + Fuzzy-based security rules update (OF) 
• Lattice-based initialization + Fuzzy-based security rules update (LF) 
• Open-condition + Agent-based suspicious program detection (OA) 
• Lattice-based initialization + Agent-based suspicious program detection (LA) 
• Close-condition + Zero-configuration (CZ) 
 
It is important to note that the combinations between the closed-conditions 
and the runtime methods other than zero-configuration cannot be produced, since the 
initialization process based on closed-condition requires a mechanism to open the 
canals for enabling Internet access. Meanwhile the combinations between the 
initialization processes other than closed-condition with zero-configuration cannot be 
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delivered as well due to the mechanism of zero-configuration to drop all available 
connections. Therefore only five listed-combinations above are evaluated. 
 
 
 
8.2 Security Analysis 
 
This study is conducted based on the requirements of firewall and its security 
considerations defined in RFC 2979 (Freed, 2000), the standard behavior of and the 
requirements for Internet firewall. As described in Section 2.4, RFC 2979 state that 
firewall must satisfy the transparency rule i.e. the introduction of firewall in a 
network environment must not cause any unintended failures nor preventing people 
from doing a useful works. The following parameters are defined to represent these 
requirements: 
 
• The probability of available network services (AS) 
• The probability of exposed line (EL) 
• The probability of denial of service (DS) 
 
Hence the combinations between the initialization and runtime process as 
listed above are investigated using these parameters. Assuming that each 
combination run in the same firewall machine with the same network environment, 
the security analysis is described as follow: 
 
 
 
8.2.1 The Probability of Available Network Services 
 
Here the availability of network services is defined as the available 
connection in responding to the request of accessing Internet. This parameter is 
computed using the following formula. 
 
)|1),(()|1),(()( runtimetioninitializa fmncPfmncPASP =∧==  (8.1) 
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To measure this parameter, basic mechanism of each method is observed as 
shown in Equation (8.1). Table 8.1 is delivered as the product of this observation. 
Detail calculation is given in Appendix E1. This table discloses the following fact. 
 
)()()()()( CZASPLAASPLFASPOFASPOAASP −≥−=−≥−=−  (8.2) 
 
Proof. Assuming that evaluation is conducted in the normal condition therefore no 
threat exist, and 1)0)(( ==nthP . And referring to the use of canals, 1),( =∀ mnc  
means all connection to the Internet are opened, thus 1)1),(( ==mncP  is produced. 
Meanwhile 1),( =∈∀ Cmnc  produces ]1,0[)1),(( ==mncP  since Cmnc ∉∃ ),( exist. 
So it can be concluded that 
 
)1),(|1),(()1),(()0)(( =∈∀=≥=== CmncmncPmncPnthP  (8.3) 
 
Thus Equation (8.3) proves Equation (8.2). Here )( CZASP −  has the lowest rank 
since )1),(|1),(( =∈∀= CmncmncP  involves time variables de ttt ≤≤  that limits 
the availability of services. 
 
Tables 8.1: Result of measuring the availability of network services 
Methods P(AS) 
Open-condition + Fuzzy-
based security rules 
update (OF) 
1 
Open-condition + Agent-
based suspicious program 
detection (OA) 
1 
Lattice-based initialization 
+ Fuzzy-based security 
rules update (LF) 
))()(1),(|1),(( mrisknprotectionCmncmncP ≥⇔=∈∀=
 
Lattice-based initialization 
+ Agent-based suspicious 
program detection (LA) 
))()(1),(|1),(( mrisknprotectionCmncmncP ≥⇔=∈∀=
 
Close-condition + Zero-
configuration (CZ) 
)1),(|1),(( de tttCmncmncP <≤⇔=∈∀=  
 
 
 
  
92
8.2.2 Probability of Exposed Line 
 
Exposed line is defined as the status of firewall when the opened connection 
exist, while there is no user request to access the Internet, or there is the appearance 
of Internet threats. This parameter is computed using the following formula: 
 
))()(0)(|1),(()( de ttttmrisknprotectionnthmncPELP ≥∨<∨<∨>== (8.4) 
 
Computing the exposed line to the combination of initialization method and 
runtime process as listed in Section 8.1 produces the data as shown in Table 8.2. 
Detail calculations to obtain these data are given in Appendix E2. 
 
Table 8.2: Result of measuring the probability of exposed line 
Methods P(EL) 
Open-condition + 
Fuzzy-based 
security rules 
update (OF) 
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 1)( =−OFELP  
• For 0)( >nth , 1)( =−OFELP  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 0)( =−OFELP  
Open-condition + 
Agent-based 
suspicious 
program detection 
(OA) 
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 1)( =−OAELP  
• For 0)( >nth , 0)( =−OAELP  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 1)( =−OAELP  
Lattice-based 
initialization + 
Fuzzy-based 
security rules 
update (LF) 
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 
))()(1),(|1),(()( mrisknprotectionCmncmncPLFELP ≥⇔=∈∀==−  
• For 0)( >nth , 
))()(1),(|1),(()( mrisknprotectionCmncmncPLFELP ≥⇔=∈∀==−  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 0)( =− LFELP  
Lattice-based 
initialization + 
Agent-based 
suspicious 
program detection 
(LA) 
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 
))()(1),(|1),(()( mrisknprotectionCmncmncPLAELP ≥⇔=∈∀==−  
• For 0)( >nth , 0)( =− LAELP  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 0)( =− LAELP  
Close-condition + 
Zero-configuration 
(CZ) 
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 0)( =−CZELP  
• For 0)( >nth , 
)1),(|1),(()( de tttCmncmncPCZELP <≤⇔=∈∀==−  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 
)1),(|1),(()( de tttCmncmncPCZELP <≤⇔=∈∀==−  
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Table 8.2 show that the combination of close-condition and zero- 
configuration provides the best protection in the idle time, in which zero exposed line 
can be delivered by this method. However this method is insensitive to the 
appearance of the threat and the raising risk of external parties, which the 
combination of lattice-initialization and agent-based malicious program detection can 
be best countering these attacks although exposed-line is produced in the idle time. 
And among the combination above, the methods employing open-condition and any 
runtime process notably creates more exposed-line compared to other methods. 
These methods produce more total open connection in the idle time as well as in 
responding of the raising risk or the appearance of the threats. Thus the combinations 
of the open-condition and fuzzy-based or agent-based runtime process are considered 
delivering the worst performance in preventing the exposed-line. Based on these 
conditions, the performance for protecting intranet from exposed line can be ranked 
as follow: 
 
)()()()()( OAELPOFELPLFELPCZELPLAELP −=−≤−≤−≤−  (8.5) 
 
 
 
8.2.3 Probability of Denial of Service 
 
This parameter discloses the possibility of denial of services introduced by 
each method. It is important to note that the denial of services only takes account of 
the authorized access to external parties. Therefore the denial to unauthorized access 
due to the enforcement of security rule is excluded. This assumption eliminates three 
conditions preventing the Internet access i.e. the appearance of threats in the internal 
users ( 0)( >nth ), the increasing risk of external parties that exceeds the protection 
level of internal users ( )()( mrisknprotection < ), and the condition when there is no 
request to access Internet ( ftr tttt >∨< ). To measure the probability of denial of 
service, the following formula is computed. 
 
)|0),(()|0),(()( runtimetioninitializa fmncPfmncPDSP =∨==   (8.6) 
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Computing Equation (8.6) to the listed combination in Section 8.1 produces 
the data as shown in Table 8.3. Detail calculations to get these data are given in 
Appendix E.3. 
 
Table 8.3: Result produced by the probability of denial of service 
Methods P(DS) 
Open-condition + Fuzzy-
based security rules 
update (OF) 
0 
Open-condition + Agent-
based suspicious program 
detection (OA) 
0 
Lattice-based initialization 
+ Fuzzy-based security 
rules update (LF) 
))()(1),(|0),(( mrisknprotectionCmncmncP ≥⇔=∈∀=  
Lattice-based initialization 
+ Agent-based suspicious 
program detection (LA) 
))()(1),(|0),(( mrisknprotectionCmncmncP ≥⇔=∈∀=  
Close-condition + Zero-
configuration (CZ) 
)1),(|0),(( de tttCmncmncP <≤⇔=∈∀=  
 
 
Table 8.3 discloses the fact that the combination of close-condition and zero-
configuration most suffer from denial of service. This condition is due to the 
mechanism of this method to actively open and close canals in responding to the user 
request, thus de ttt <≤  become the dominant factor increasing denial of service. 
Therefore the speed to establish canals and accurate prediction to the lifetime of 
Internet transaction are critical. The approach to only inspect the header of network 
packet for establishing canals, and to employ empirical rules with 99.7% 
approximation to compute the timeout, seem become the correct method toward 
implementing zero configuration. This approach will not let any factor preventing 
Internet transactions. Second rank for suffering denial of service is the method 
consisting of lattice-based initialization. It is due to the factor of 1),( =∈∀ Cmnc  
that may introduce Cmnc ∉∃ ),( . However if C is large enough to hold a huge 
collection of the identities of external parties, denial of service can be minimized. 
Referring to Table 8.3, probability of denial of service can be ranked as follow. 
 
)()()()()( OFDSPOADSPLADSPLFDSPCZDSP −=−≥−=−≥−  (8.7) 
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8.3 Comparative Study 
 
To further evaluate the developed active firewall systems, comparison to no 
firewall, static, and dynamic configuration are held. The choice to use these 
configurations is due to proven capabilities and reliabilities of these methods to 
provide connection to the Internet (Reumann et al., 2001; Toth and Kruegel 2002). 
For static configuration, a comprehensive firewall script developed by Bob Sully is 
used (Sully, 2005). This script was originally designed and implemented by Craig 
Zeller using ipfwadm (Zeller, 2004), but then it is translated into ipchains and 
iptables with some additions and modifications. Here the iptables version of this 
script is chosen for this study since it delivers more complete protection to the 
intranet. The script is presented in Appendix F1. Meanwhile, a concise firewall script 
developed by Robbins (2001) is used for dynamic configuration. This script as 
presented in Appendix F2, is capable to deter the flowing malicious packets. The 
results of measuring these configurations using the parameters defined in Section 8.2 
are presented in Table 8.4. Detail calculations to obtain these data are given in 
Appendix F3, F4 and F5 for no firewall, static, and dynamic firewall configuration 
respectively.  
 
Using the data in Table 8.1 to 8.4, analysis is described as follow. Probability 
of available services obtained from no firewall configuration equals to the available 
services obtained from open-condition combined with agent-based detection. While 
for static firewall configuration, the available services totally depend on the manual 
definition of the permitted Internet access. If it is assumed that static configuration is 
capable to provide appropriate connection to the Internet, hence 1)( =− SFASP . The 
same assumption can be applied to dynamic configuration as well, therefore 
1)( =− DFASP . Thus based on the probability of available services, the 
performance of each method can be ranked as follow: 
 
CZLALFOFOADFSFNF ≥=≥====   (8.8) 
 
For exposed line, the open connection produces probability of exposed line as 
big as all available services are exposed. It means the whole internal users can be 
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seen and easily compromised from outside. Meanwhile static configuration performs 
better since it is influenced by manual configuration established at start up. However 
if the same assumptions as measuring available services above are applied, then 
static configuration produces the same exposed line as no firewall configuration. It is 
due to the character of this configuration that insensitive to any changes of network 
condition, including the raising threats. And for dynamic configuration, the raising 
threats can be detected although it is very limited, thus the connections can be 
modified. Ranking each method based on the probability of exposed line produces: 
 
LACZLFDFOFOASFNF ≥≥≅≥===   (8.9) 
 
While for denial of services, no firewall configuration produces zero 
probability since it is merely an open connection. The similar probability is delivered 
by static and dynamic configurations if the assumption for defining available services 
is applied again to compute this parameter. However both methods are influenced by 
manual definition to allow or reject particular external parties built at start up. Thus 
ranking of each method based on the probability of denial of services produces: 
 
CZLALFDFSFOAOFNF ≤=≅≅≤==   (8.10) 
 
Equation (8.8) discloses the cost for establishing active firewall mechanism 
i.e. lower service availability can be provided by the proposed active firewalls 
compared to the services provided by the existing methods. Only open-condition 
combined with agent-based that is capable to compete with the existing methods. 
However for denial of services, only close-condition combined with zero 
configurations suffer from this problem worse than the existing methods as stated in 
Equation (8.10). Other active firewall methods have similar performance as no 
firewall, static or dynamic configuration. And finally equation (8.9) proves that all 
active firewall methods outperform no firewall or static firewall configuration in 
providing network security in which smaller exposed line can be delivered. While for 
the existing methods based on dynamic configuration, only active firewalls based on 
the combination involving open-condition that cannot outperform the dynamic 
configuration. 
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Table 8.4: P(AS), P(EL) and P(DS) of no firewall, static and dynamic configuration 
Methods Parameters 
1)( =− NFASP  
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 1)( =− NFELP  
• For 0)( >nth , 1)( =− NFELP  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 1)( =− NFELP  
No Firewall 
Configuration 
(NF) 
0)( =− NFDSP  
)0),(1),(|1),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPSFASP  
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 
)0),(1),(|1),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPSFELP  
• For 0)( >nth , 
)0),(1),(|1),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPSFELP  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 
)0),(1),(|1),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPSFELP  
Static Firewall 
Configuration (SF) 
)0),(1),(|0),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPSFDSP  
)0),(1),(|1),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPDFASP  
• For rtt <  or fttt > , 
)0),(1),(|1),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPDFELP  
• For 0)( >nth , 0)( =− DFELP  
• For )()( mrisknprotection < , 
)0),(1),(|1),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPDFELP  
Dynamic Firewall 
Configuration 
(DF) 
)0),(1),(|0),(()( =∃+=∃==− mncmncmncPDFDSP  
 
 
 
Further evaluation on the results of benchmarking is held by ranking each 
method based on Equation (8.8), (8.9) and (8.10), and then give the value from zero 
to ten with zero represents the best performance while ten is the worst. The methods 
having performance in between the best and the worst are assigned values that are 
equally distributed between zero and ten. Table 8.5 shows this evaluation. The 
overall performance is obtained by summing up the values of all parameters obtained 
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by each method. Here the lower value represents better active firewall method in 
providing intranet protection. The results sorted from the best method to the worst 
are given below: 
 
(i) NF, OA, OF, LA = 10 
(ii) DF = 11,66 
(iii) SF = 15 
(iv) LF = 16.66 
(v) CZ = 23.33 
 
The list above shows that OA, OF, and LA outperform other developed active 
firewall methods. However if we refer to the probability of exposed line among these 
three methods, it shows that LA outperforms other methods. Meanwhile CZ most 
probably suffer from usability since this method perform worst in providing network 
services as well as suffering from denial of service. This condition is due to the 
mechanism of CZ to always drop any available services at runtime. 
 
 
 
Table 8.5: Ranking the performance of all methods 
Parameter 
The Best 
Performance 
(0) 
The Performance in Between 
(0 – 10) 
The Worst 
Performance 
(10) 
Available 
Service 
NF, SF, DF, 
OA, OF {LF, LA} = 5 CZ 
Exposed Line LA CZ = 3.33 {DF, LF} = 6.66 NF, SF, OA, OF 
Denial of 
Service NF, OA, OF {SF, DF, LF, LA} = 5 CZ 
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8.4 Summary 
 
Evaluations on the proposed methods for developing active firewall are 
presented in this chapter, in which it consists of two stages i.e. security analysis and 
comparative study against the known firewall methods. To evaluate the complete 
mechanisms of active firewall, the developed initialization and runtime process are 
combined. Five different active firewall methods are produced as shown in Section 
8.1. Security analysis is held based on RFC 2979 (Freed, 2000), in which three 
parameters i.e. probability of available service, probability of exposed line and 
probability of denial of service are defined to represent the transparency rule of this 
standard. And to do the comparative study, each developed active firewall method is 
compared with each other, and also to the existing methods i.e. no firewall, static, 
and dynamic configurations. This study is also held based on the parameters defined 
for security analysis. Results of this effort show that the developed active firewalls 
are capable to combat the present of Internet threats. And lattice-initialization 
combined with agent-based module (LA) is proven having better security and 
usability among other developed methods, and also outperforms the existing 
methods. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 9 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
An effort to combat Internet threats has been presented, with the purpose is to 
provide intranet protection in accessing Internet. It is achieved by activating the 
mechanism of firewall, the most deployed security tool for securing information 
systems (CERT, 2004). In this study, the security strategies to eliminate Internet 
threats are developed, and then are used as the foundation for activating the 
mechanism of network firewall. Meanwhile, the model of active firewall is 
formulated with the concept of canalisation to represent the connections of internal 
users to external parties. And the operation of active firewall is formulated into two 
main stages i.e. initialisation and runtime process. To handle the initialisation, three 
methods are developed i.e. close-condition, open-condition, and lattice-based. While 
for the runtime process, three methods are also developed i.e. adaptive security rules 
update using fuzzy reasoning, suspicious process detection using distributed agent-
based module, and zero-configuration for minimizing available security services. 
Combinations of both initialisation methods and runtime processes produce five 
firewall methods, as listed in Section 8.1. Security analysis and comparative study 
are conducted to evaluate the proposed methods. Referring to the works above, some 
points can be drawn to conclude this study as follows: 
 
(i) Each combinations of initialisation and runtime process produced from this 
research represent the employed strategy for reducing Internet threat. It is 
shown in Table 9.1. Thus the performance of each combination of 
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initialisation and runtime process for activating firewall determines the 
performance of each security strategy for reducing Internet threats. 
 
Table 9.1: The correlation between the developed methods and the 
applied security strategy 
Methods 
Strategy to Reduce 
Internet Threats 
Open-condition + Fuzzy-based security 
rules update (OF) 
Minimizing utup OU ∩  
Open-condition + Agent-based 
suspicious program detection (OA) 
Minimizing upU  
Lattice-based initialization + Fuzzy-
based security rules update (LF) 
Minimizing utup OU ∩  
Lattice-based initialization + Agent-
based suspicious program detection (LA)
Minimizing utup OU ∩  + 
Minimizing upU  
Close-condition + Zero-configuration 
(CZ) 
Minimizing utO  
 
 
(ii) Research evaluation proves that lattice-based initialisation combined with 
agent-based module (LA) delivers the best performance both for providing 
Internet protection and facilitating the Internet access. Referring to Table 9.1, 
it shows that successful intranet protection is driven by the strategy for 
minimizing unprotected users combined with the strategy for minimizing the 
interaction between unprotected users and untrusted external parties. This 
strategy is definitely more complete compared to other combinations since 
the method for handling initialisation and runtime process works on different 
approach for intranet protection, thus minimal exposed line can be delivered 
by this method. Moreover, this approach is also sensitive to the appearance of 
threat or the raising risk of external parties. Meanwhile, the Internet access is 
facilitated by this method due to moderate approach of lattice-based 
initialisation to keep the open access to the trusted external parties at anytime 
during the runtime process. Referring to the evaluation results, moderate 
probability of available services and probability of denial of service are 
delivered by this method. 
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(iii) Second best performance for activating firewall is delivered by open 
condition combined with agent-based module (OA) and open condition 
combined with fuzzy reasoning (OF). The performance of both methods is 
driven by the power to facilitate Internet access. It is due to the opened-
condition that is employed to handle the initialisation. Thus maximum 
available of service and minimum denial of service can be produced. 
However both methods produce a weak protection since maximum exposed 
line is produced. This evidence shows that the strategy to minimize 
unprotected users and the strategy to minimize the interaction between 
unprotected users and untrusted external parties are compromised by the 
open-condition, thus it can be concluded that these methods loosely influence 
to strengthen the intranet protection. 
 
(iv) The third performance for activating firewall is delivered by the combination 
between lattice-based initialisation and fuzzy reasoning (LF). Although this 
effort only applies a strategy to minimize the interaction between unprotected 
users and untrusted external parties, however this strategy is employed by 
both initialisation and runtime process, therefore the intranet protection is 
enforced since the first time the firewall is started up to the end of its 
operation. However only moderate performance can be delivered by this 
method both for protecting intranet and facilitating Internet connection. Thus 
it can be concluded that the strategy to minimize the interaction between 
unprotected users and untrusted external parties only produce moderate 
performance in activating firewall. 
 
(v) The worst performance produced from this effort is delivered by the 
combination between close-condition and zero-configuration (CZ). This 
method applies a strategy to minimize the untrusted external parties, 
Although this approach is proved capable to maintain minimal services at 
runtime in order to have a hard secure system (Ranum and Avolio, 1994), 
however it still produces more exposed line compared to the combination of 
lattice-based initialisation and agent-based (LA). This condition is due to the 
insensitive mechanism of zero-configuration to the presents of Internet 
threats. Meanwhile Internet connection is greatly compromised by this 
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method since it consistently maintains the close-condition along the operation 
of firewall by computing the timeout of and dropping each opened canal. This 
mechanism reduces the availability of services and increases denial of 
services. The speeds for opening canals become the critical parameters in 
running this method, particularly to deal with real-time Internet access.  
 
The points above disclose the advantages and weaknesses of the strategies to 
activate firewall mechanism. Although it has been proved that these approaches are 
capable to solve the problems of the existing firewall technology, further work on 
improving the performance of active firewall is still necessary. Therefore some 
points can be highlighted to become the object of further study as follows: 
 
(i) The experiment of agent-based module shows that active firewall is capable 
to only stop the action of malicious information flow. This condition is due to 
the detection process that comes later after the malicious flow has been 
started. Thus current achievement of active firewall still cannot prevent the 
appearance of malicious information flow before it is started, although 10% 
of the experimental results fulfilled this condition. An effort to improve the 
speed of the detection process and closing canals would significantly deliver 
a more powerful approach in protecting intranet.  
 
(ii) The close condition and zero-based configuration has been proved capable to 
provide hard protection to the intranet. It is achieved by minimizing the 
available services at runtime. This method however introduces denial of 
services. Thus the effort to improve the speed for opening canals as well as to 
accurately compute the timeout for each external party would significantly 
increase the performance of this system. The work would also increase the 
applicability of zero-configuration to deal with real time operation of active 
firewall. 
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provide intranet protection in accessing Internet. It is achieved by activating the 
mechanism of firewall, the most deployed security tool for securing information 
systems (CERT, 2004). In this study, the security strategies to eliminate Internet 
threats are developed, and then are used as the foundation for activating the 
mechanism of network firewall. Meanwhile, the model of active firewall is 
formulated with the concept of canalisation to represent the connections of internal 
users to external parties. And the operation of active firewall is formulated into two 
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methods are developed i.e. close-condition, open-condition, and lattice-based. While 
for the runtime process, three methods are also developed i.e. adaptive security rules 
update using fuzzy reasoning, suspicious process detection using distributed agent-
based module, and zero-configuration for minimizing available security services. 
Combinations of both initialisation methods and runtime processes produce five 
firewall methods, as listed in Section 8.1. Security analysis and comparative study 
are conducted to evaluate the proposed methods. Referring to the works above, some 
points can be drawn to conclude this study as follows: 
 
(i) Each combinations of initialisation and runtime process produced from this 
research represent the employed strategy for reducing Internet threat. It is 
shown in Table 9.1. Thus the performance of each combination of 
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initialisation and runtime process for activating firewall determines the 
performance of each security strategy for reducing Internet threats. 
 
Table 9.1: The correlation between the developed methods and the 
applied security strategy 
Methods 
Strategy to Reduce 
Internet Threats 
Open-condition + Fuzzy-based security 
rules update (OF) 
Minimizing utup OU ∩  
Open-condition + Agent-based 
suspicious program detection (OA) 
Minimizing upU  
Lattice-based initialization + Fuzzy-
based security rules update (LF) 
Minimizing utup OU ∩  
Lattice-based initialization + Agent-
based suspicious program detection (LA)
Minimizing utup OU ∩  + 
Minimizing upU  
Close-condition + Zero-configuration 
(CZ) 
Minimizing utO  
 
 
(ii) Research evaluation proves that lattice-based initialisation combined with 
agent-based module (LA) delivers the best performance both for providing 
Internet protection and facilitating the Internet access. Referring to Table 9.1, 
it shows that successful intranet protection is driven by the strategy for 
minimizing unprotected users combined with the strategy for minimizing the 
interaction between unprotected users and untrusted external parties. This 
strategy is definitely more complete compared to other combinations since 
the method for handling initialisation and runtime process works on different 
approach for intranet protection, thus minimal exposed line can be delivered 
by this method. Moreover, this approach is also sensitive to the appearance of 
threat or the raising risk of external parties. Meanwhile, the Internet access is 
facilitated by this method due to moderate approach of lattice-based 
initialisation to keep the open access to the trusted external parties at anytime 
during the runtime process. Referring to the evaluation results, moderate 
probability of available services and probability of denial of service are 
delivered by this method. 
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(iii) Second best performance for activating firewall is delivered by open 
condition combined with agent-based module (OA) and open condition 
combined with fuzzy reasoning (OF). The performance of both methods is 
driven by the power to facilitate Internet access. It is due to the opened-
condition that is employed to handle the initialisation. Thus maximum 
available of service and minimum denial of service can be produced. 
However both methods produce a weak protection since maximum exposed 
line is produced. This evidence shows that the strategy to minimize 
unprotected users and the strategy to minimize the interaction between 
unprotected users and untrusted external parties are compromised by the 
open-condition, thus it can be concluded that these methods loosely influence 
to strengthen the intranet protection. 
 
(iv) The third performance for activating firewall is delivered by the combination 
between lattice-based initialisation and fuzzy reasoning (LF). Although this 
effort only applies a strategy to minimize the interaction between unprotected 
users and untrusted external parties, however this strategy is employed by 
both initialisation and runtime process, therefore the intranet protection is 
enforced since the first time the firewall is started up to the end of its 
operation. However only moderate performance can be delivered by this 
method both for protecting intranet and facilitating Internet connection. Thus 
it can be concluded that the strategy to minimize the interaction between 
unprotected users and untrusted external parties only produce moderate 
performance in activating firewall. 
 
(v) The worst performance produced from this effort is delivered by the 
combination between close-condition and zero-configuration (CZ). This 
method applies a strategy to minimize the untrusted external parties, 
Although this approach is proved capable to maintain minimal services at 
runtime in order to have a hard secure system (Ranum and Avolio, 1994), 
however it still produces more exposed line compared to the combination of 
lattice-based initialisation and agent-based (LA). This condition is due to the 
insensitive mechanism of zero-configuration to the presents of Internet 
threats. Meanwhile Internet connection is greatly compromised by this 
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method since it consistently maintains the close-condition along the operation 
of firewall by computing the timeout of and dropping each opened canal. This 
mechanism reduces the availability of services and increases denial of 
services. The speeds for opening canals become the critical parameters in 
running this method, particularly to deal with real-time Internet access.  
 
The points above disclose the advantages and weaknesses of the strategies to 
activate firewall mechanism. Although it has been proved that these approaches are 
capable to solve the problems of the existing firewall technology, further work on 
improving the performance of active firewall is still necessary. Therefore some 
points can be highlighted to become the object of further study as follows: 
 
(i) The experiment of agent-based module shows that active firewall is capable 
to only stop the action of malicious information flow. This condition is due to 
the detection process that comes later after the malicious flow has been 
started. Thus current achievement of active firewall still cannot prevent the 
appearance of malicious information flow before it is started, although 10% 
of the experimental results fulfilled this condition. An effort to improve the 
speed of the detection process and closing canals would significantly deliver 
a more powerful approach in protecting intranet.  
 
(ii) The close condition and zero-based configuration has been proved capable to 
provide hard protection to the intranet. It is achieved by minimizing the 
available services at runtime. This method however introduces denial of 
services. Thus the effort to improve the speed for opening canals as well as to 
accurately compute the timeout for each external party would significantly 
increase the performance of this system. The work would also increase the 
applicability of zero-configuration to deal with real time operation of active 
firewall. 
 
 
 104
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
 
Alexander, D.S., Anagnostaskis, K.G., Arbaugh, W.A., Keromytis, A.D. and Smith, 
M.S. (1999). The Price of Safety in an Active Network. Journal of 
Communications and Networks (JCN), special issue on Programmable Switches 
and Routers. March 2001. 3(1): 4-18. 
Anagnostaskis, K.G., Greenwald, M.B., Ionnidis, S., Keromytis, A.D., and Li, D. 
(2003). A Cooperative Immunization System for an Untrusting Internet. 2003. 
11th IEEE International Conference on Networks (ICON). September/October 
2003. Sydney, Australia: IEEE, 403-408. 
Anthony, R.N. (2003). Management Accounting: A Personal History. Journal of 
Management Accounting Research. ABI/INFORM Global.15: 249-253. 
Arbaugh, W.A. (2002). Active Systems Management: The Evolution of Firewalls. 
Invited paper to the 3rd International Workshop on Information Security 
Applications. August 2002. Cheju Island, Korea, 19-30. 
Arbaugh, W.A. (2003). Firewalls: An Outdated Defense. In IEEE Computer. June 
2003. 36(6): 112-113. 
Associated Press. (2003). Spammers Steal E-mail Address from Orbitz. Weekly 
Magazine InformationWeek. 29 October 2003. http://www.informationweek.com 
Associated Press. (2004a). Hackers Crack Purdue’s Computer System. CNN 
Technology. 22 October 2004. http://www.cnn.com 
Associated Press. (2004b). CoolWebSearch A Spyware Mystery: Who’s Behind it?. 
CNN Technology. 2 November 2004. http://www.cnn.com 
 105
Bellovin, S.M. (1999). Distributed Firewalls. In ;login, The USENIX Magazine. 
November 1999. 37-39. 
Bernades, M.C. and Moreira, E.D.S. (2000). Implementation of an Intrusion 
Detection System Based on Mobile Agents. International Symposium on Software 
engineering for Parallel and Distributed Systems. June 2000. Limerick, Ireland: 
IEEE, 158-164. 
Castano, S., Fugini, M., Martella, G., and Samarati, P. (1995). Database Security. 
Great Britain: ACM (Association for Computing Machinery) Inc Press. 
CERT. (2002). CERT Coordination Center 2002 Annual Report. CERT Coordination 
Center Annual Report. http://www.cert.org 
CERT. (2003). CERT Coordination Center 2003 Annual Report. CERT 
Coordination Center Annual Report. http://www.cert.org 
CERT. (2004). 2004 E-Crime Watch SurveyTM: Summary of Findings. CERT 
Coordination Center. http://www.cert.org 
Cherry, S.M. (2002). All the Ills that Flesh is Heir To: Internet Viruses Can Get 
Worse-Much Worse. IEEE Spectrum. November 2002. IEEE, 52. 
Christodorescu, M., and Jha, S. (2003). Static Analysis of Executable to Detect 
Malicious Patterns. In 12th USENIX Security Symposium. August 2003. 
Washington DC, USA: USENIX, 169-186. 
Davies, R.M. (2002). Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems and Vulnerability 
Assessment: A Superior Conjunction?. Network Security. 2002(9): 8-11. 
Denning, D.E. (1976). A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow. 
Communications of ACM, 1976. 19(5): 236-243. 
Eschelbeck, G. (2000). Active Security: A Proactive Approach for Computer Security 
Systems. Journal of Network and Computer Applications. April 2000. 23(2): 109-
130. 
 106
Freed, N. (2000). RFC 2979 – Behavior and Requirements for Internet Firewalls. 
Internet RFC/STD/FYI/BCP Archives. October 2000. Network Working Group, 
Request for Comments: 2979. 
Garkinfel, S., and Spafford, G. (1997). Web Security and Commerce. USA: O’Reilly 
and Associates. 
Goncalves, M. (2000). Firewalls: A Complete Guide. USA: McGraw Hill Osborne 
Media. 
Green, S., Hurst, L., Nangle, B., Cunningham, P., Somers, F., and Evans, R. (1997). 
Software Agents: A Review. A Trinity College Dublin: Technical Report. 
Guan, J., Liu, D.X. and Wang, T. (2004). Applications of Fuzzy Data Mining 
Methods for Intrusion Detection Systems. ICCSA 2004, Lecturer Notes on 
Computer Science 3035. Springer 2004: 706-714. 
Haixin, D., Jianping, W., and Xing, L. (2000). Policy-Based Access Control 
Framework for Large Networks. Proceedings of IEEE International Conference 
on Network (ICON 2000). 5-8 September 2000. Singapore: IEEE, 267-272. 
He, M., and Leung, H. (2002). Agents in E-Commerce: State of the Art. Knowledge 
and Information Systems. July 2002. 4(3): 257-282. 
Hernandez, J.C., Sierra, J.M. and Ramos, B. (2001). Search Engines as a Security 
Threat. IEEE Computer. October 2001. 34(10): 25-30. 
Hickman, B., Newman, D., Tadjudin, S., Martin, T. (2003). RFC 3511 - 
Benchmarking Methodology for Firewall Performance. Internet 
RFC/STD/FYI/BCP Archives. April 2003. Network Working Group, Request for 
Comments: 3511. 
Hicks, M., Keromytis, A.D. and Smith, J.M. (2003). A Secure PLAN. IEEE 
Transactions on System, Man, and Cybernetics-Part C: Applications and Review, 
August 2003. 33(3): 413-426. 
 107
Huang, Y.W., Yu, F., Hang, C., Tsai, C.H., Lee, D.T., and Kuo, S.Y. (2004). 
Securing Web Application Code by Static Analysis and Runtime Protection. 
World Wide Web 2004. May 17-22, 2004. New York, USA: ACM, 40-51. 
Hunt, R., and Verwoerd, T. (2003). Reactive Firewalls: A New Technique. Elsevier 
Journal on Computer Communications. July 2003. 26(12): 1302-1317. 
Hwang, K. and Gangadharan, M. (2001). Micro-Firewalls for Dynamic Network 
Security with Distributed Intrusion Detection. IEEE International Symposium on 
Network Computing and Applications. October 2001.Cambridge, MA, USA: 
IEEE, 68-79. 
Ioannidis, S., Keromytis, D., Bellovin, S.M., and Smith, J.M. (2000). Implementing a 
Distributed Firewall. 7th ACM Conference on Computer and Communication 
Security. 1-4 November 2000.Athens, Greece. 
Kamara, S., Fahmy, S., Schultz, E., Kreschbaum, F., and Frantzen, M. (2003). 
Analysis of Vulnerabilities in Internet Firewalls. Elsevier Computer and Security 
2003. 22(3): 214-232. 
Kayssi, A., Harik, L., Ferzli, R. and Fawaz, M. (2000). FPGA-Based Internet 
Protocol Firewall Chip. The 7th IEEE International Conference on Electronics, 
Circuits and Systems (ICECS 2000). December 2000. Kaslik, Lebanon: IEEE, 
316 -319. 
Kienzle, D.M., and Elder, M.C. (2003). Recent Worms: A Survey and Trends. 
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM Workshop on Rapid Malcode. 27 October 2003. 
Washington DC, USA: ACM, 1-10. 
Kim. J.S., Kim, M.S. and Noh, B.N. (2004). A Fuzzy Expert System for Network 
Forensics. ICCSA 2004, Lecturer Notes in Computer Science 3034. Springer 
2004: 175-182. 
Klir, G.J. and Yuan, B. (1995). Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic: Theory and Application. 
USA: Prentice Hall Inc. 
 108
Labiod, K.B.H., Boutaba, R. and Guessoum, Z. (2000). Network Security 
Management with Intelligent Agents. IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and 
Managements Symposium. September 2000. Hawaii, USA: IEEE, 579-592. 
Labuschagne, L. and Eloff, J.H.P. (1998). The Use of Real-Time Risk Analysis to 
Enable Dynamic Activation of Countermeasures. Elsevier Journal of Computer 
and Security. 17(4): 347-357. 
Lai, S.C., Kuo, W.C., and Hsieh, M.C. (2004). Defending Against Internet Worm-
Like Infestations. Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Advanced 
Information Networking and Application (AINA ’04). March 2004. Fukuoka, 
Japan: IEEE, 152-157. 
Li, J., Zhang, G.Y. and Gu, G.C. (2004). A Multi-Agent-Based Architecture for 
Network Attack Resistant System. GCC 2003, Part I, Lecturer Notes in Computer 
Science 3032. Springer 2004: 980-983. 
Lee, T.K., Yusuf, S., Luk, W., Sloman, M., Lupu, E. and Dulay, N. (2002). 
Development Framework for Firewall Processors. Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE 
International Conference on Field Programmable Technology. December 2002. 
Hongkong, China: IEEE, 352-355. 
Lehtonen, S., Ahola, K., Koskinen, T., Lyijynen, M. and Pesole, J. (2003). Roaming 
Active Filtering Firewall. Proceedings of Smart Objects Conference (SOC’2003). 
15-17 May 2003. Grenoble, France. 
Lockwood, J.W., Neely, C., Zuver, C., Moscola, J., Dharmapurikar, S. and Lim, D. 
(2003). An Extensible, System-On-Programmable-Chip, Content-Aware Internet 
Firewall. FPL 2003, Lecturer Notes on Computer Science 2778. Springer 2003: 
859-868. 
Negnevitsky, M. (2002). Artificial Intelligence: A Guide to Intelligent Systems. 
England: Pearson Education Limited. 
Newman, D. (1999). RFC 2647 – Benchmarking Terminology for Firewall 
Performance. Internet RFC/STD/FYI/BCP Archives. August 1999. Network 
Working Group, Request for Comments: 2647. 
 109
Ogletree, T.W. (2000). Practical Firewalls. USA: Que Corporation. June 2000. 
Payne, C. and Markham, T. (2001). Architecture and Applications for a Distributed 
Embedded Firewall. In 17th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. 
December 2001. New Orleans, LA, USA: IEEE, 329-338. 
Power, R. (2002). CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey. Computer Security 
Issues and Trends. 2002. 8(1): 1-24. 
Pruitt, S. (2004). Web Attack Aims to Steal Surfers’ Financial Details. 
ComputerWorld. 25 June 2004. http://computerworld.com/securitytopics/security 
Ranum, M.J. and Avolio, F.M. (1994). A Toolkit and Methods for Internet Firewalls. 
In the Proceedings of the Summer USENIX Conference. June 1994. Boston, 
Massachusetts, USA: USENIX, 37-44. 
Ren, Y, Buskens, R. and Gonzales, O. (2004). Dependable Initialization on Large-
Scale Distributed Software. Proceedings of the 2004 International Conference on 
Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN ’04), IEEE Computer Society. 
Reumann, J., Jamjoom, H. and Shin, K. (2001). Adaptive Packet Filters. In the 
Proceedings of IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference. November 2001. 
San Antonio, Texas, USA: IEEE, 25-29. 
Robbins, D. (2001). Common threads - Dynamic iptables firewalls. From IBM 
website, updated 1 April 2001. http://www-136.ibm.com/developerworks/linux. 
Ru, W.G. and Eloff, H.P. (1996). Risk Analysis Modelling with the Use of Fuzzy 
Logic. Elsevier Journal of Computer & Security. 15(3): 239-248. 
Sandhu, R.S. (1993). Lattice-Based Access Control Models. IEEE Transactions on 
Computer, November 1993. 26(11): 9-19. 
Seo, J., Kim, H.S., Cho, S. and Cha, S. (2004). Web Server Attack Categorization 
Based on Root Causes and Their Locations. Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Information Technology Coding and Computing (ITCC ’04). 
April 2004. Las Vegas, Nevada, USA: IEEE, 90-96. 
 110
Shakshuki, E., Luo, Z. and Gong, J. (2004). An Agent-Based Approach to Security 
Service. Elsevier Journal of Network and Computer Applications, Article In 
Press. 
Silva, S.D., Yemini, Y. and Florissi, D. (2001). The NetScript Active Network 
System. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2001. 19(3): 538-
551. 
Sully, B. (2005). IPTables Firewall Script and Configuration Files for Linux 2.4.x-
2.6.x. In Malibyte website, updated 8 April 2005. 
http://www.malibyte.net/iptables/scripts/fwscripts.html. 
Toth, T., and Kruegel, C. (2002). Evaluating the Impact of Automated Intrusion 
Response Mechanism. Proceedings of the 18th Annual Computer Security 
Applications Conference (ACSAC ’02). December 2002. Las Vegas, Nevada, 
USA: IEEE, 301-310. 
Triola, M.F. (2001). Elementary Statistics. Eighth Edition. USA: Addison Wesley 
Longman. 
Venkatesan, R.M. and Bhattacharya, S. (1997). Threat-Adaptive Security Policy. 
1997. In the International Conference for High Performance, Computing and 
Communications. February 1997. San Jose, CA, USA: IEEE, 525-531. 
Verwoerd, T., and Hunt, R. (2002). Policy and Implementation of an Adaptive 
Firewall. Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Networks. 
August 2002. Singapore: IEEE, 434-439. 
White, J.E. (1996). Telescript Technology: Mobile Agents. In BradShaw, J. (ed): 
Software Agents. AAI Press/MIT Press. 
Whitman, M.E. (2003). Enemy at the Gate: Threats to Information Security. 
Communications of the ACM. August 2003. 46(8): 91-95. 
Wired News. (2004). New Virus May Steal Data. Wired News. 25 June 2004. 
http://www.wired.com/news/infostructure 
 111
Xian, Z., Jin, H., Liu, K., and Han, Z. (2002). A Mobile-Agent Based Distributed 
Dynamic µFirewall Architecture. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference 
on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS ’02). December 2002. Taiwan: 
IEEE, 431-436. 
Yen , J., Langari, R., and Zadeh, L.A. (1995). Industrial Applications of Fuzzy Logic 
and Intelligent Systems. New York, USA: IEEE Press. 
Zadeh, L. (1965). Fuzzy Sets. Information and Control. 8(3): 338-353. 
Zaki, M. and Sobh, T.S. (2004). A Cooperative Agent-Based Model for Active 
Security Systems. Elsevier Journal of  Network and Computer Applications. 27 
(2004): 201-220.  
Zeller, C. (2004). Craig Zeller's Firewall Scripts. From ZDI website, updated 17 
June 2004. http://www.zdi.net/Linux/firewalls.html. 
Zetter, K. (2004). Information Security News: Kazza Delivers More Than Tunes. 
InfoSec News. 12 January 2004. http://www.weird.com/news/business 
Zou, J., Lu, K. and Jin, Z. (2002). Architecture and Fuzzy Adaptive Security 
Algorithm in Intelligent Firewall. In the Proceedings of Military 
Communications Conference. October 2002. California, USA: IEEE, 1145-1149. 
 104
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
 
Alexander, D.S., Anagnostaskis, K.G., Arbaugh, W.A., Keromytis, A.D. and Smith, 
M.S. (1999). The Price of Safety in an Active Network. Journal of 
Communications and Networks (JCN), special issue on Programmable Switches 
and Routers. March 2001. 3(1): 4-18. 
Anagnostaskis, K.G., Greenwald, M.B., Ionnidis, S., Keromytis, A.D., and Li, D. 
(2003). A Cooperative Immunization System for an Untrusting Internet. 2003. 
11th IEEE International Conference on Networks (ICON). September/October 
2003. Sydney, Australia: IEEE, 403-408. 
Anthony, R.N. (2003). Management Accounting: A Personal History. Journal of 
Management Accounting Research. ABI/INFORM Global.15: 249-253. 
Arbaugh, W.A. (2002). Active Systems Management: The Evolution of Firewalls. 
Invited paper to the 3rd International Workshop on Information Security 
Applications. August 2002. Cheju Island, Korea, 19-30. 
Arbaugh, W.A. (2003). Firewalls: An Outdated Defense. In IEEE Computer. June 
2003. 36(6): 112-113. 
Associated Press. (2003). Spammers Steal E-mail Address from Orbitz. Weekly 
Magazine InformationWeek. 29 October 2003. http://www.informationweek.com 
Associated Press. (2004a). Hackers Crack Purdue’s Computer System. CNN 
Technology. 22 October 2004. http://www.cnn.com 
Associated Press. (2004b). CoolWebSearch A Spyware Mystery: Who’s Behind it?. 
CNN Technology. 2 November 2004. http://www.cnn.com 
 105
Bellovin, S.M. (1999). Distributed Firewalls. In ;login, The USENIX Magazine. 
November 1999. 37-39. 
Bernades, M.C. and Moreira, E.D.S. (2000). Implementation of an Intrusion 
Detection System Based on Mobile Agents. International Symposium on Software 
engineering for Parallel and Distributed Systems. June 2000. Limerick, Ireland: 
IEEE, 158-164. 
Castano, S., Fugini, M., Martella, G., and Samarati, P. (1995). Database Security. 
Great Britain: ACM (Association for Computing Machinery) Inc Press. 
CERT. (2002). CERT Coordination Center 2002 Annual Report. CERT Coordination 
Center Annual Report. http://www.cert.org 
CERT. (2003). CERT Coordination Center 2003 Annual Report. CERT 
Coordination Center Annual Report. http://www.cert.org 
CERT. (2004). 2004 E-Crime Watch SurveyTM: Summary of Findings. CERT 
Coordination Center. http://www.cert.org 
Cherry, S.M. (2002). All the Ills that Flesh is Heir To: Internet Viruses Can Get 
Worse-Much Worse. IEEE Spectrum. November 2002. IEEE, 52. 
Christodorescu, M., and Jha, S. (2003). Static Analysis of Executable to Detect 
Malicious Patterns. In 12th USENIX Security Symposium. August 2003. 
Washington DC, USA: USENIX, 169-186. 
Davies, R.M. (2002). Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems and Vulnerability 
Assessment: A Superior Conjunction?. Network Security. 2002(9): 8-11. 
Denning, D.E. (1976). A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow. 
Communications of ACM, 1976. 19(5): 236-243. 
Eschelbeck, G. (2000). Active Security: A Proactive Approach for Computer Security 
Systems. Journal of Network and Computer Applications. April 2000. 23(2): 109-
130. 
 106
Freed, N. (2000). RFC 2979 – Behavior and Requirements for Internet Firewalls. 
Internet RFC/STD/FYI/BCP Archives. October 2000. Network Working Group, 
Request for Comments: 2979. 
Garkinfel, S., and Spafford, G. (1997). Web Security and Commerce. USA: O’Reilly 
and Associates. 
Goncalves, M. (2000). Firewalls: A Complete Guide. USA: McGraw Hill Osborne 
Media. 
Green, S., Hurst, L., Nangle, B., Cunningham, P., Somers, F., and Evans, R. (1997). 
Software Agents: A Review. A Trinity College Dublin: Technical Report. 
Guan, J., Liu, D.X. and Wang, T. (2004). Applications of Fuzzy Data Mining 
Methods for Intrusion Detection Systems. ICCSA 2004, Lecturer Notes on 
Computer Science 3035. Springer 2004: 706-714. 
Haixin, D., Jianping, W., and Xing, L. (2000). Policy-Based Access Control 
Framework for Large Networks. Proceedings of IEEE International Conference 
on Network (ICON 2000). 5-8 September 2000. Singapore: IEEE, 267-272. 
He, M., and Leung, H. (2002). Agents in E-Commerce: State of the Art. Knowledge 
and Information Systems. July 2002. 4(3): 257-282. 
Hernandez, J.C., Sierra, J.M. and Ramos, B. (2001). Search Engines as a Security 
Threat. IEEE Computer. October 2001. 34(10): 25-30. 
Hickman, B., Newman, D., Tadjudin, S., Martin, T. (2003). RFC 3511 - 
Benchmarking Methodology for Firewall Performance. Internet 
RFC/STD/FYI/BCP Archives. April 2003. Network Working Group, Request for 
Comments: 3511. 
Hicks, M., Keromytis, A.D. and Smith, J.M. (2003). A Secure PLAN. IEEE 
Transactions on System, Man, and Cybernetics-Part C: Applications and Review, 
August 2003. 33(3): 413-426. 
 107
Huang, Y.W., Yu, F., Hang, C., Tsai, C.H., Lee, D.T., and Kuo, S.Y. (2004). 
Securing Web Application Code by Static Analysis and Runtime Protection. 
World Wide Web 2004. May 17-22, 2004. New York, USA: ACM, 40-51. 
Hunt, R., and Verwoerd, T. (2003). Reactive Firewalls: A New Technique. Elsevier 
Journal on Computer Communications. July 2003. 26(12): 1302-1317. 
Hwang, K. and Gangadharan, M. (2001). Micro-Firewalls for Dynamic Network 
Security with Distributed Intrusion Detection. IEEE International Symposium on 
Network Computing and Applications. October 2001.Cambridge, MA, USA: 
IEEE, 68-79. 
Ioannidis, S., Keromytis, D., Bellovin, S.M., and Smith, J.M. (2000). Implementing a 
Distributed Firewall. 7th ACM Conference on Computer and Communication 
Security. 1-4 November 2000.Athens, Greece. 
Kamara, S., Fahmy, S., Schultz, E., Kreschbaum, F., and Frantzen, M. (2003). 
Analysis of Vulnerabilities in Internet Firewalls. Elsevier Computer and Security 
2003. 22(3): 214-232. 
Kayssi, A., Harik, L., Ferzli, R. and Fawaz, M. (2000). FPGA-Based Internet 
Protocol Firewall Chip. The 7th IEEE International Conference on Electronics, 
Circuits and Systems (ICECS 2000). December 2000. Kaslik, Lebanon: IEEE, 
316 -319. 
Kienzle, D.M., and Elder, M.C. (2003). Recent Worms: A Survey and Trends. 
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM Workshop on Rapid Malcode. 27 October 2003. 
Washington DC, USA: ACM, 1-10. 
Kim. J.S., Kim, M.S. and Noh, B.N. (2004). A Fuzzy Expert System for Network 
Forensics. ICCSA 2004, Lecturer Notes in Computer Science 3034. Springer 
2004: 175-182. 
Klir, G.J. and Yuan, B. (1995). Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic: Theory and Application. 
USA: Prentice Hall Inc. 
 108
Labiod, K.B.H., Boutaba, R. and Guessoum, Z. (2000). Network Security 
Management with Intelligent Agents. IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and 
Managements Symposium. September 2000. Hawaii, USA: IEEE, 579-592. 
Labuschagne, L. and Eloff, J.H.P. (1998). The Use of Real-Time Risk Analysis to 
Enable Dynamic Activation of Countermeasures. Elsevier Journal of Computer 
and Security. 17(4): 347-357. 
Lai, S.C., Kuo, W.C., and Hsieh, M.C. (2004). Defending Against Internet Worm-
Like Infestations. Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Advanced 
Information Networking and Application (AINA ’04). March 2004. Fukuoka, 
Japan: IEEE, 152-157. 
Li, J., Zhang, G.Y. and Gu, G.C. (2004). A Multi-Agent-Based Architecture for 
Network Attack Resistant System. GCC 2003, Part I, Lecturer Notes in Computer 
Science 3032. Springer 2004: 980-983. 
Lee, T.K., Yusuf, S., Luk, W., Sloman, M., Lupu, E. and Dulay, N. (2002). 
Development Framework for Firewall Processors. Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE 
International Conference on Field Programmable Technology. December 2002. 
Hongkong, China: IEEE, 352-355. 
Lehtonen, S., Ahola, K., Koskinen, T., Lyijynen, M. and Pesole, J. (2003). Roaming 
Active Filtering Firewall. Proceedings of Smart Objects Conference (SOC’2003). 
15-17 May 2003. Grenoble, France. 
Lockwood, J.W., Neely, C., Zuver, C., Moscola, J., Dharmapurikar, S. and Lim, D. 
(2003). An Extensible, System-On-Programmable-Chip, Content-Aware Internet 
Firewall. FPL 2003, Lecturer Notes on Computer Science 2778. Springer 2003: 
859-868. 
Negnevitsky, M. (2002). Artificial Intelligence: A Guide to Intelligent Systems. 
England: Pearson Education Limited. 
Newman, D. (1999). RFC 2647 – Benchmarking Terminology for Firewall 
Performance. Internet RFC/STD/FYI/BCP Archives. August 1999. Network 
Working Group, Request for Comments: 2647. 
 109
Ogletree, T.W. (2000). Practical Firewalls. USA: Que Corporation. June 2000. 
Payne, C. and Markham, T. (2001). Architecture and Applications for a Distributed 
Embedded Firewall. In 17th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. 
December 2001. New Orleans, LA, USA: IEEE, 329-338. 
Power, R. (2002). CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey. Computer Security 
Issues and Trends. 2002. 8(1): 1-24. 
Pruitt, S. (2004). Web Attack Aims to Steal Surfers’ Financial Details. 
ComputerWorld. 25 June 2004. http://computerworld.com/securitytopics/security 
Ranum, M.J. and Avolio, F.M. (1994). A Toolkit and Methods for Internet Firewalls. 
In the Proceedings of the Summer USENIX Conference. June 1994. Boston, 
Massachusetts, USA: USENIX, 37-44. 
Ren, Y, Buskens, R. and Gonzales, O. (2004). Dependable Initialization on Large-
Scale Distributed Software. Proceedings of the 2004 International Conference on 
Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN ’04), IEEE Computer Society. 
Reumann, J., Jamjoom, H. and Shin, K. (2001). Adaptive Packet Filters. In the 
Proceedings of IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference. November 2001. 
San Antonio, Texas, USA: IEEE, 25-29. 
Robbins, D. (2001). Common threads - Dynamic iptables firewalls. From IBM 
website, updated 1 April 2001. http://www-136.ibm.com/developerworks/linux. 
Ru, W.G. and Eloff, H.P. (1996). Risk Analysis Modelling with the Use of Fuzzy 
Logic. Elsevier Journal of Computer & Security. 15(3): 239-248. 
Sandhu, R.S. (1993). Lattice-Based Access Control Models. IEEE Transactions on 
Computer, November 1993. 26(11): 9-19. 
Seo, J., Kim, H.S., Cho, S. and Cha, S. (2004). Web Server Attack Categorization 
Based on Root Causes and Their Locations. Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Information Technology Coding and Computing (ITCC ’04). 
April 2004. Las Vegas, Nevada, USA: IEEE, 90-96. 
 110
Shakshuki, E., Luo, Z. and Gong, J. (2004). An Agent-Based Approach to Security 
Service. Elsevier Journal of Network and Computer Applications, Article In 
Press. 
Silva, S.D., Yemini, Y. and Florissi, D. (2001). The NetScript Active Network 
System. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2001. 19(3): 538-
551. 
Sully, B. (2005). IPTables Firewall Script and Configuration Files for Linux 2.4.x-
2.6.x. In Malibyte website, updated 8 April 2005. 
http://www.malibyte.net/iptables/scripts/fwscripts.html. 
Toth, T., and Kruegel, C. (2002). Evaluating the Impact of Automated Intrusion 
Response Mechanism. Proceedings of the 18th Annual Computer Security 
Applications Conference (ACSAC ’02). December 2002. Las Vegas, Nevada, 
USA: IEEE, 301-310. 
Triola, M.F. (2001). Elementary Statistics. Eighth Edition. USA: Addison Wesley 
Longman. 
Venkatesan, R.M. and Bhattacharya, S. (1997). Threat-Adaptive Security Policy. 
1997. In the International Conference for High Performance, Computing and 
Communications. February 1997. San Jose, CA, USA: IEEE, 525-531. 
Verwoerd, T., and Hunt, R. (2002). Policy and Implementation of an Adaptive 
Firewall. Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Networks. 
August 2002. Singapore: IEEE, 434-439. 
White, J.E. (1996). Telescript Technology: Mobile Agents. In BradShaw, J. (ed): 
Software Agents. AAI Press/MIT Press. 
Whitman, M.E. (2003). Enemy at the Gate: Threats to Information Security. 
Communications of the ACM. August 2003. 46(8): 91-95. 
Wired News. (2004). New Virus May Steal Data. Wired News. 25 June 2004. 
http://www.wired.com/news/infostructure 
 111
Xian, Z., Jin, H., Liu, K., and Han, Z. (2002). A Mobile-Agent Based Distributed 
Dynamic µFirewall Architecture. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference 
on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS ’02). December 2002. Taiwan: 
IEEE, 431-436. 
Yen , J., Langari, R., and Zadeh, L.A. (1995). Industrial Applications of Fuzzy Logic 
and Intelligent Systems. New York, USA: IEEE Press. 
Zadeh, L. (1965). Fuzzy Sets. Information and Control. 8(3): 338-353. 
Zaki, M. and Sobh, T.S. (2004). A Cooperative Agent-Based Model for Active 
Security Systems. Elsevier Journal of  Network and Computer Applications. 27 
(2004): 201-220.  
Zeller, C. (2004). Craig Zeller's Firewall Scripts. From ZDI website, updated 17 
June 2004. http://www.zdi.net/Linux/firewalls.html. 
Zetter, K. (2004). Information Security News: Kazza Delivers More Than Tunes. 
InfoSec News. 12 January 2004. http://www.weird.com/news/business 
Zou, J., Lu, K. and Jin, Z. (2002). Architecture and Fuzzy Adaptive Security 
Algorithm in Intelligent Firewall. In the Proceedings of Military 
Communications Conference. October 2002. California, USA: IEEE, 1145-1149. 
APPENDIX A1 
The Script of Lattice-Based Initialization Process 
112
 
 
#!/bin/sh 
 
echo =========================================================== 
echo LATTICE-BASED FIREWALL : which is not stated is prohibited 
echo =========================================================== 
 
start=`cat /PROJECT/TEMP/TIMESTAMP` 
 
# Implementation of Lattice is conducted on initialization 
# eth0 = EXTERNAL NETWORK 
# eth1 = INTERNAL NETWORK 
 
# ------------------ 
# 1. Initialization 
# ------------------ 
 
# INTERNAL_SUBNET="24.4.74" 
 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT 
 
# > /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_EXT 
 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_SENDER 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_SENDER 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_RECEIVER 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/TABLEIP 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY 
 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# > /PROJECT/TEMP/DELTATIME 
# > /PROJECT/TEMP/TIMEOUTPUT 
 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/LOG 
 
cd /PROJECT/FIREWALL 
# To preconfigure firewall machine 
 
echo "0" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
 
#### Setting up firewall_rule configuration file 
## --------------------------------------------- 
 
echo "## Preconfiguration"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## ================"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# Default policy (Recording process) 
# ---------------------------------- 
echo "iptables -P INPUT DROP"    >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -P FORWARD DROP"  >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# Flushing the existing rule (Recording process) 
# ---------------------------------------------- 
echo "iptables --flush" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables --table nat --flush" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables --delete-chain" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables --table nat --delete-chain" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule
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# Setting up Protection Level 
# ---------------------------- 
protection_level1="24.4.74.0/24" # full-protected 
protection_level2="24.4.75.0/24" 
protection_level3="24.4.76.0/24" # unprotected 
 
# Setting up Safety Level 
# ------------------------ 
safety_level1="table1"   # un-trusted 
safety_level2="table2" 
safety_level3="table3"   # full- trusted 
 
##================================================================## 
##================================================================## 
 
###### Process Protection Level 1 
###### -------------------------- 
echo . 
echo PROTECTION LEVEL 1 
 
echo "## ==================" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## Protection Level 1" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## ==================" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
insider_ip=$protection_level1  # Protection level 1 
 
### Process safety level 1 
### ----------------------- 
 
echo . 
echo Safety Level 1 
 
echo "# safety level 1" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "# --------------" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# to get jml baris of table 
# -------------------------- 
baris_table=`wc -l /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level1 | awk '{print $1}'`  
echo size table linewise "$[baris_table]" 
 
## Process every data in table line-wise 
## -------------------------------------- 
j=1 
while [[ $j -le $baris_table ]] 
do 
 echo . 
 echo . 
 echo $j 
protocol=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level1 | tail -n 1 
| awk -F, '{print $1}'` 
outsider_name=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level1 | tail 
-n 1 | awk -F, '{print $2}'` 
 
 # Finding IP address of outsider and insider machine 
 # --------------------------------------------------- 
 # insider_ip=$protection_level1  # Protection level 1 
outsider_ip_addr=`grep $outsider_name /PROJECT/TABLE/host_list 
| awk '{print $2}'` 
  
outsider_number_of_ip=`grep -c $outsider_name 
/PROJECT/TABLE/host_list` 
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 # If host list contain more than one IP addresses 
# ----------------------------------------------- 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -gt 1 ]                             
      then 
  echo $outsider_ip_addr > /PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR 
  i=1 
  while [[ $i -le $outsider_number_of_ip ]] 
  do 
outsider_ip_addr=`cut -d' ' -f$i 
/PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR` 
   # echo outsider_ip_addr = $outsider_ip_addr 
   i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- 
$outsider_ip_addr -- $insider_ip 
 
   # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
   # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
  done 
 fi 
 
 # If host list contain only single IP address of Internet side 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -eq 1 ]                                  
      then 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- $outsider_ip_addr -- 
$insider_ip 
 
  # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
  # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 fi           
 j=`expr ${j} + 1`      
done 
 
### Process safety level 2 
### ----------------------- 
 
echo . 
echo Safety Level 2 
 
echo "# safety level 2"  >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "# --------------"  >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# to get jml baris of table 
# -------------------------- 
baris_table=`wc -l /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level2 | awk '{print $1}'`  
echo size table linewise "$[baris_table]" 
 
## Process every data in table line-wise 
## -------------------------------------- 
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j=1 
while [[ $j -le $baris_table ]] 
do 
 echo . 
 echo . 
 echo $j 
protocol=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level2 | tail -n 1 
| awk -F, '{print $1}'` 
outsider_name=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level2 | tail 
-n 1 | awk -F, '{print $2}'` 
 
 # Finding IP address of outsider and insider machine 
 # --------------------------------------------------- 
 # insider_ip=$protection_level1  # Protection level 1 
outsider_ip_addr=`grep $outsider_name /PROJECT/TABLE/host_list 
| awk '{print $2}'` 
  
outsider_number_of_ip=`grep -c $outsider_name 
/PROJECT/TABLE/host_list` 
 
 # If host list contain more than one IP addresses  
 # ----------------------------------------------- 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -gt 1 ]                             
      then 
  echo $outsider_ip_addr > /PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR 
  i=1 
  while [[ $i -le $outsider_number_of_ip ]] 
  do 
outsider_ip_addr=`cut -d' ' -f$i 
/PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR` 
   # echo outsider_ip_addr = $outsider_ip_addr 
 
   i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
    
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- 
$outsider_ip_addr -- $insider_ip 
 
   # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
   # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
  done 
 fi 
 
 # If host list contain only single IP address of Internet side 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -eq 1 ]                                  
      then 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- $outsider_ip_addr -- 
$insider_ip 
 
  # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
  # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
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echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 fi           
 j=`expr ${j} + 1`      
done 
 
### Process safety level 3 
### ----------------------- 
 
echo . 
echo Safety Level 3 
 
echo "# safety level 3"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "# --------------"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# to get jml baris of table 
# -------------------------- 
baris_table=`wc -l /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | awk '{print $1}'`  
echo size table linewise "$[baris_table]" 
 
## Process every data in table line-wise 
## -------------------------------------- 
j=1 
while [[ $j -le $baris_table ]] 
do 
 echo . 
 echo . 
 echo $j 
protocol=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | tail -n 1 
| awk -F, '{print $1}'` 
outsider_name=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | tail 
-n 1 | awk -F, '{print $2}'` 
 
 # Finding IP address of outsider and insider machine 
 # --------------------------------------------------- 
 # insider_ip=$protection_level1  # Protection level 1 
outsider_ip_addr=`grep $outsider_name /PROJECT/TABLE/host_list 
| awk '{print $2}'` 
  
outsider_number_of_ip=`grep -c $outsider_name 
/PROJECT/TABLE/host_list` 
 
 # If host list contain more than one IP addresses  
 # ----------------------------------------------- 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -gt 1 ]                             
      then 
  echo $outsider_ip_addr > /PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR 
  i=1 
  while [[ $i -le $outsider_number_of_ip ]] 
  do 
outsider_ip_addr=`cut -d' ' -f$i 
/PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR` 
   # echo outsider_ip_addr = $outsider_ip_addr 
   i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- 
$outsider_ip_addr -- $insider_ip 
 
   # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
   # ------------------------------------ 
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echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
  done 
 fi 
 
 # If host list contain only single IP address of Internet side 
# ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -eq 1 ]                                  
      then 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- $outsider_ip_addr -- 
$insider_ip 
 
  # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
  # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 fi           
 j=`expr ${j} + 1`      
done 
 
##============================================================## 
##============================================================## 
 
###### Process Protection Level 2 
###### -------------------------- 
echo . 
echo PROTECTION LEVEL 2 
 
echo "## =================="   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## Protection Level 2"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## =================="   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
insider_ip=$protection_level2  # Protection level 2 
 
### Process safety level 2 
### ----------------------- 
 
echo . 
echo Safety Level 2 
 
echo "# safety level 2"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "# --------------"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# to get jml baris of table 
# -------------------------- 
baris_table=`wc -l /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level2 | awk '{print $1}'`  
echo size table linewise "$[baris_table]" 
 
## Process every data in table line-wise 
## -------------------------------------- 
j=1 
while [[ $j -le $baris_table ]] 
do 
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 echo . 
 echo . 
 echo $j 
protocol=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level2 | tail -n 1 
| awk -F, '{print $1}'` 
outsider_name=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level2 | tail 
-n 1 | awk -F, '{print $2}'` 
 
 # Finding IP address of outsider and insider machine 
 # --------------------------------------------------- 
 # insider_ip=$protection_level2  # Protection level 2 
outsider_ip_addr=`grep $outsider_name /PROJECT/TABLE/host_list 
| awk '{print $2}'` 
  
outsider_number_of_ip=`grep -c $outsider_name 
/PROJECT/TABLE/host_list` 
 
 # If host list contain more than one IP addresses  
 # ------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -gt 1 ]                             
      then 
  echo $outsider_ip_addr > /PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR 
  i=1 
  while [[ $i -le $outsider_number_of_ip ]] 
  do 
outsider_ip_addr=`cut -d' ' -f$i 
/PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR` 
   # echo outsider_ip_addr = $outsider_ip_addr 
 
   i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
    
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- 
$outsider_ip_addr -- $insider_ip 
 
   # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
   # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
  done 
 fi 
 
 # If host list contain only single IP address of Internet side 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -eq 1 ]                                  
      then 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- $outsider_ip_addr -- 
$insider_ip 
 
  # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
  # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 fi           
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 j=`expr ${j} + 1`      
done 
 
 
### Process safety level 3 
### ----------------------- 
 
echo . 
echo Safety Level 3 
 
echo "# safety level 3"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "# --------------"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# to get jml baris of table 
# -------------------------- 
baris_table=`wc -l /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | awk '{print $1}'`  
echo size table linewise "$[baris_table]" 
 
## Process every data in table line-wise 
## -------------------------------------- 
j=1 
while [[ $j -le $baris_table ]] 
do 
 echo . 
 echo . 
 echo $j 
protocol=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | tail -n 1 
| awk -F, '{print $1}'` 
outsider_name=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | tail 
-n 1 | awk -F, '{print $2}'` 
 
 # Finding IP address of outsider and insider machine 
 # --------------------------------------------------- 
 # insider_ip=$protection_level2  # Protection level 2 
outsider_ip_addr=`grep $outsider_name /PROJECT/TABLE/host_list 
| awk '{print $2}'` 
  
outsider_number_of_ip=`grep -c $outsider_name 
/PROJECT/TABLE/host_list` 
 
 # If host list contain more than one IP addresses  
 # ------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -gt 1 ]                             
      then 
  echo $outsider_ip_addr > /PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR 
  i=1 
  while [[ $i -le $outsider_number_of_ip ]] 
  do 
outsider_ip_addr=`cut -d' ' -f$i 
/PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR` 
   # echo outsider_ip_addr = $outsider_ip_addr 
 
   i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
    
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- 
$outsider_ip_addr -- $insider_ip 
 
   # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
   # ------------------------------------ 
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echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
  done 
 fi 
 
 # If host list contain only single IP address of Internet side 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -eq 1 ]                                  
      then 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- $outsider_ip_addr -- 
$insider_ip 
 
  # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
  # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 fi           
 j=`expr ${j} + 1`      
done 
 
 
##============================================================## 
##============================================================## 
 
###### Process Protection Level 3 
###### -------------------------- 
echo . 
echo PROTECTION LEVEL 3 
 
echo "## =================="   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## Protection Level 3"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## =================="   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
insider_ip=$protection_level3  # Protection level 3 
 
### Process safety level 3 
### ----------------------- 
 
echo . 
echo Safety Level 3 
 
echo "# safety level 3"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "# --------------"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# to get jml baris of table 
# -------------------------- 
baris_table=`wc -l /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | awk '{print $1}'`  
echo size table linewise "$[baris_table]" 
 
## Process every data in table line-wise 
## -------------------------------------- 
j=1 
while [[ $j -le $baris_table ]] 
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do 
 echo . 
 echo . 
 echo $j 
protocol=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | tail -n 1 
| awk -F, '{print $1}'` 
outsider_name=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | tail 
-n 1 | awk -F, '{print $2}'` 
 
 # Finding IP address of outsider and insider machine 
 # --------------------------------------------------- 
 # insider_ip=$protection_level3  # Protection level 3 
outsider_ip_addr=`grep $outsider_name /PROJECT/TABLE/host_list 
| awk '{print $2}'` 
  
outsider_number_of_ip=`grep -c $outsider_name 
/PROJECT/TABLE/host_list` 
 
 # If host list contain more than one IP addresses  
 # ------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -gt 1 ]                             
      then 
  echo $outsider_ip_addr > /PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR 
  i=1 
  while [[ $i -le $outsider_number_of_ip ]] 
  do 
outsider_ip_addr=`cut -d' ' -f$i 
/PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR` 
   # echo outsider_ip_addr = $outsider_ip_addr 
 
   i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
    
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- 
$outsider_ip_addr -- $insider_ip 
 
   # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
   # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
  done 
 fi 
 
 # If host list contain only single IP address of Internet side 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -eq 1 ]                                  
      then 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- $outsider_ip_addr -- 
$insider_ip 
 
  # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
  # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
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 fi           
 
 j=`expr ${j} + 1`      
done 
 
##============================================================## 
##============================================================## 
 
 
## Setting up the ending of firewall_rule configuration file 
(Recording process) 
## ---------------------------------------------------------- 
echo "## End of configuration"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## ===================="   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "echo Finish Running FIREWALL CONFIGURATION" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
## Execute firewall_rule file 
## -------------------------- 
chmod u+x /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
cd /PROJECT/TEMP 
./firewall_rule 
 
 
# ngrep -d eth1 -e -t > /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT &   
# To catch any incoming data from internal network and put it in 
PROXY_BUFF using background process 
 
echo "Finish" 
echo . 
echo . 
echo . 
echo FOR EXPERIMENT PURPOSES ================================ 
echo Start at $start 
echo Finish at ... 
cat /PROJECT/TEMP/TIMESTAMP 
# cat /PROJECT/TEMP/MAXCOUNTER 
 
waktu1=`date` 
 waktu2=`date` 
 #echo $waktu1 
 #echo $waktu2 
 while [[ $waktu1 = $waktu2 ]] 
 do 
  cat /PROJECT/TEMP/MAXCOUNTER 
  waktu2=`date` 
 done 
 #echo $waktu2 
 hitung=0 
 while [ $hitung -le 100 ] 
 do 
  hitung=`expr ${hitung} + 1` 
 done 
cat /PROJECT/TEMP/MAXCOUNTER 
 
APPENDIX A2 
Security Policy Produced by Initialization Process 
123
 
 
A2.1 Lattice-Based One Rule 
PROTECTION LEVEL 3 
Trusted Level 3 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 63.150.131.40 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 64.233.189.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 64.233.161.147 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 64.233.161.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.94.229.254 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.7.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.11.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.11.99 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.9.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.9.99 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
Trusted Level 2 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.93 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.52 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
Trusted Level 1 
tcp -- www.elsevier.com -- 129.35.76.177 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
. 
PROTECTION LEVEL 2 
Trusted Level 2 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.93 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.52 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
Trusted Level 1 
tcp -- www.elsevier.com -- 129.35.76.177 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
. 
PROTECTION LEVEL 1 
Trusted Level 1 
tcp -- www.elsevier.com -- 129.35.76.177 -- 24.4.76.0/24 
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A2.2 Two Rules 
PROTECTION LEVEL 1 
Trusted Level 3 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 63.150.131.40 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 64.233.189.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 64.233.161.147 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 64.233.161.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.94.229.254 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.7.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.11.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.11.99 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.9.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.9.99 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.altavista.com -- 66.94.229.254 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.altavista.com -- 66.94.230.163 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.altavista.com -- 63.150.131.40 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.altavista.com -- 63.150.131.24 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
Trusted Level 2 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.93 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.52 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.kompas.com -- 64.203.71.11 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.kompas.com -- 64.203.71.51 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
Trusted Level 1 
tcp -- www.elsevier.com -- 129.35.76.177 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.acm.org -- 199.222.69.251 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
. 
PROTECTION LEVEL 2 
Trusted Level 2 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.93 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.52 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
tcp -- www.kompas.com -- 64.203.71.11 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
tcp -- www.kompas.com -- 64.203.71.51 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
Trusted Level 1 
tcp -- www.elsevier.com -- 129.35.76.177 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
tcp -- www.acm.org -- 199.222.69.251 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
. 
PROTECTION LEVEL 3 
Trusted Level 1 
tcp -- www.elsevier.com -- 129.35.76.177 -- 24.4.76.0/24 
tcp -- www.acm.org -- 199.222.69.251 -- 24.4.76.0/24 
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#!/bin/sh 
 
echo =========================================================== 
echo LATTICE-BASED FIREWALL : which is not stated is prohibited 
echo =========================================================== 
 
start=`cat /PROJECT/TEMP/TIMESTAMP` 
 
# Implementation of Lattice is conducted on initialization 
# eth0 = EXTERNAL NETWORK 
# eth1 = INTERNAL NETWORK 
 
# ------------------ 
# 1. Initialization 
# ------------------ 
 
# INTERNAL_SUBNET="24.4.74" 
 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT 
 
# > /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_EXT 
 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_SENDER 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_SENDER 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_RECEIVER 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/TABLEIP 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY 
 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# > /PROJECT/TEMP/DELTATIME 
# > /PROJECT/TEMP/TIMEOUTPUT 
 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/LOG 
 
cd /PROJECT/FIREWALL 
# To preconfigure firewall machine 
 
echo "0" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
 
#### Setting up firewall_rule configuration file 
## --------------------------------------------- 
 
echo "## Preconfiguration"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## ================"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# Default policy (Recording process) 
# ---------------------------------- 
echo "iptables -P INPUT DROP"    >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -P FORWARD DROP"  >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# Flushing the existing rule (Recording process) 
# ---------------------------------------------- 
echo "iptables --flush" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables --table nat --flush" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables --delete-chain" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables --table nat --delete-chain" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule
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# Setting up Protection Level 
# ---------------------------- 
protection_level1="24.4.74.0/24" # full-protected 
protection_level2="24.4.75.0/24" 
protection_level3="24.4.76.0/24" # unprotected 
 
# Setting up Safety Level 
# ------------------------ 
safety_level1="table1"   # un-trusted 
safety_level2="table2" 
safety_level3="table3"   # full- trusted 
 
##================================================================## 
##================================================================## 
 
###### Process Protection Level 1 
###### -------------------------- 
echo . 
echo PROTECTION LEVEL 1 
 
echo "## ==================" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## Protection Level 1" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## ==================" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
insider_ip=$protection_level1  # Protection level 1 
 
### Process safety level 1 
### ----------------------- 
 
echo . 
echo Safety Level 1 
 
echo "# safety level 1" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "# --------------" >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# to get jml baris of table 
# -------------------------- 
baris_table=`wc -l /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level1 | awk '{print $1}'`  
echo size table linewise "$[baris_table]" 
 
## Process every data in table line-wise 
## -------------------------------------- 
j=1 
while [[ $j -le $baris_table ]] 
do 
 echo . 
 echo . 
 echo $j 
protocol=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level1 | tail -n 1 
| awk -F, '{print $1}'` 
outsider_name=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level1 | tail 
-n 1 | awk -F, '{print $2}'` 
 
 # Finding IP address of outsider and insider machine 
 # --------------------------------------------------- 
 # insider_ip=$protection_level1  # Protection level 1 
outsider_ip_addr=`grep $outsider_name /PROJECT/TABLE/host_list 
| awk '{print $2}'` 
  
outsider_number_of_ip=`grep -c $outsider_name 
/PROJECT/TABLE/host_list` 
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 # If host list contain more than one IP addresses 
# ----------------------------------------------- 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -gt 1 ]                             
      then 
  echo $outsider_ip_addr > /PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR 
  i=1 
  while [[ $i -le $outsider_number_of_ip ]] 
  do 
outsider_ip_addr=`cut -d' ' -f$i 
/PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR` 
   # echo outsider_ip_addr = $outsider_ip_addr 
   i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- 
$outsider_ip_addr -- $insider_ip 
 
   # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
   # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
  done 
 fi 
 
 # If host list contain only single IP address of Internet side 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -eq 1 ]                                  
      then 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- $outsider_ip_addr -- 
$insider_ip 
 
  # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
  # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 fi           
 j=`expr ${j} + 1`      
done 
 
### Process safety level 2 
### ----------------------- 
 
echo . 
echo Safety Level 2 
 
echo "# safety level 2"  >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "# --------------"  >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# to get jml baris of table 
# -------------------------- 
baris_table=`wc -l /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level2 | awk '{print $1}'`  
echo size table linewise "$[baris_table]" 
 
## Process every data in table line-wise 
## -------------------------------------- 
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j=1 
while [[ $j -le $baris_table ]] 
do 
 echo . 
 echo . 
 echo $j 
protocol=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level2 | tail -n 1 
| awk -F, '{print $1}'` 
outsider_name=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level2 | tail 
-n 1 | awk -F, '{print $2}'` 
 
 # Finding IP address of outsider and insider machine 
 # --------------------------------------------------- 
 # insider_ip=$protection_level1  # Protection level 1 
outsider_ip_addr=`grep $outsider_name /PROJECT/TABLE/host_list 
| awk '{print $2}'` 
  
outsider_number_of_ip=`grep -c $outsider_name 
/PROJECT/TABLE/host_list` 
 
 # If host list contain more than one IP addresses  
 # ----------------------------------------------- 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -gt 1 ]                             
      then 
  echo $outsider_ip_addr > /PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR 
  i=1 
  while [[ $i -le $outsider_number_of_ip ]] 
  do 
outsider_ip_addr=`cut -d' ' -f$i 
/PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR` 
   # echo outsider_ip_addr = $outsider_ip_addr 
 
   i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
    
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- 
$outsider_ip_addr -- $insider_ip 
 
   # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
   # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
  done 
 fi 
 
 # If host list contain only single IP address of Internet side 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -eq 1 ]                                  
      then 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- $outsider_ip_addr -- 
$insider_ip 
 
  # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
  # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
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echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 fi           
 j=`expr ${j} + 1`      
done 
 
### Process safety level 3 
### ----------------------- 
 
echo . 
echo Safety Level 3 
 
echo "# safety level 3"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "# --------------"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# to get jml baris of table 
# -------------------------- 
baris_table=`wc -l /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | awk '{print $1}'`  
echo size table linewise "$[baris_table]" 
 
## Process every data in table line-wise 
## -------------------------------------- 
j=1 
while [[ $j -le $baris_table ]] 
do 
 echo . 
 echo . 
 echo $j 
protocol=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | tail -n 1 
| awk -F, '{print $1}'` 
outsider_name=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | tail 
-n 1 | awk -F, '{print $2}'` 
 
 # Finding IP address of outsider and insider machine 
 # --------------------------------------------------- 
 # insider_ip=$protection_level1  # Protection level 1 
outsider_ip_addr=`grep $outsider_name /PROJECT/TABLE/host_list 
| awk '{print $2}'` 
  
outsider_number_of_ip=`grep -c $outsider_name 
/PROJECT/TABLE/host_list` 
 
 # If host list contain more than one IP addresses  
 # ----------------------------------------------- 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -gt 1 ]                             
      then 
  echo $outsider_ip_addr > /PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR 
  i=1 
  while [[ $i -le $outsider_number_of_ip ]] 
  do 
outsider_ip_addr=`cut -d' ' -f$i 
/PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR` 
   # echo outsider_ip_addr = $outsider_ip_addr 
   i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- 
$outsider_ip_addr -- $insider_ip 
 
   # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
   # ------------------------------------ 
 117
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
  done 
 fi 
 
 # If host list contain only single IP address of Internet side 
# ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -eq 1 ]                                  
      then 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- $outsider_ip_addr -- 
$insider_ip 
 
  # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
  # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 fi           
 j=`expr ${j} + 1`      
done 
 
##============================================================## 
##============================================================## 
 
###### Process Protection Level 2 
###### -------------------------- 
echo . 
echo PROTECTION LEVEL 2 
 
echo "## =================="   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## Protection Level 2"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## =================="   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
insider_ip=$protection_level2  # Protection level 2 
 
### Process safety level 2 
### ----------------------- 
 
echo . 
echo Safety Level 2 
 
echo "# safety level 2"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "# --------------"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# to get jml baris of table 
# -------------------------- 
baris_table=`wc -l /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level2 | awk '{print $1}'`  
echo size table linewise "$[baris_table]" 
 
## Process every data in table line-wise 
## -------------------------------------- 
j=1 
while [[ $j -le $baris_table ]] 
do 
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 echo . 
 echo . 
 echo $j 
protocol=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level2 | tail -n 1 
| awk -F, '{print $1}'` 
outsider_name=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level2 | tail 
-n 1 | awk -F, '{print $2}'` 
 
 # Finding IP address of outsider and insider machine 
 # --------------------------------------------------- 
 # insider_ip=$protection_level2  # Protection level 2 
outsider_ip_addr=`grep $outsider_name /PROJECT/TABLE/host_list 
| awk '{print $2}'` 
  
outsider_number_of_ip=`grep -c $outsider_name 
/PROJECT/TABLE/host_list` 
 
 # If host list contain more than one IP addresses  
 # ------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -gt 1 ]                             
      then 
  echo $outsider_ip_addr > /PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR 
  i=1 
  while [[ $i -le $outsider_number_of_ip ]] 
  do 
outsider_ip_addr=`cut -d' ' -f$i 
/PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR` 
   # echo outsider_ip_addr = $outsider_ip_addr 
 
   i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
    
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- 
$outsider_ip_addr -- $insider_ip 
 
   # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
   # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
  done 
 fi 
 
 # If host list contain only single IP address of Internet side 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -eq 1 ]                                  
      then 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- $outsider_ip_addr -- 
$insider_ip 
 
  # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
  # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 fi           
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 j=`expr ${j} + 1`      
done 
 
 
### Process safety level 3 
### ----------------------- 
 
echo . 
echo Safety Level 3 
 
echo "# safety level 3"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "# --------------"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# to get jml baris of table 
# -------------------------- 
baris_table=`wc -l /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | awk '{print $1}'`  
echo size table linewise "$[baris_table]" 
 
## Process every data in table line-wise 
## -------------------------------------- 
j=1 
while [[ $j -le $baris_table ]] 
do 
 echo . 
 echo . 
 echo $j 
protocol=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | tail -n 1 
| awk -F, '{print $1}'` 
outsider_name=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | tail 
-n 1 | awk -F, '{print $2}'` 
 
 # Finding IP address of outsider and insider machine 
 # --------------------------------------------------- 
 # insider_ip=$protection_level2  # Protection level 2 
outsider_ip_addr=`grep $outsider_name /PROJECT/TABLE/host_list 
| awk '{print $2}'` 
  
outsider_number_of_ip=`grep -c $outsider_name 
/PROJECT/TABLE/host_list` 
 
 # If host list contain more than one IP addresses  
 # ------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -gt 1 ]                             
      then 
  echo $outsider_ip_addr > /PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR 
  i=1 
  while [[ $i -le $outsider_number_of_ip ]] 
  do 
outsider_ip_addr=`cut -d' ' -f$i 
/PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR` 
   # echo outsider_ip_addr = $outsider_ip_addr 
 
   i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
    
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- 
$outsider_ip_addr -- $insider_ip 
 
   # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
   # ------------------------------------ 
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echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
  done 
 fi 
 
 # If host list contain only single IP address of Internet side 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -eq 1 ]                                  
      then 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- $outsider_ip_addr -- 
$insider_ip 
 
  # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
  # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 fi           
 j=`expr ${j} + 1`      
done 
 
 
##============================================================## 
##============================================================## 
 
###### Process Protection Level 3 
###### -------------------------- 
echo . 
echo PROTECTION LEVEL 3 
 
echo "## =================="   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## Protection Level 3"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## =================="   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
insider_ip=$protection_level3  # Protection level 3 
 
### Process safety level 3 
### ----------------------- 
 
echo . 
echo Safety Level 3 
 
echo "# safety level 3"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "# --------------"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
# to get jml baris of table 
# -------------------------- 
baris_table=`wc -l /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | awk '{print $1}'`  
echo size table linewise "$[baris_table]" 
 
## Process every data in table line-wise 
## -------------------------------------- 
j=1 
while [[ $j -le $baris_table ]] 
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do 
 echo . 
 echo . 
 echo $j 
protocol=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | tail -n 1 
| awk -F, '{print $1}'` 
outsider_name=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TABLE/$safety_level3 | tail 
-n 1 | awk -F, '{print $2}'` 
 
 # Finding IP address of outsider and insider machine 
 # --------------------------------------------------- 
 # insider_ip=$protection_level3  # Protection level 3 
outsider_ip_addr=`grep $outsider_name /PROJECT/TABLE/host_list 
| awk '{print $2}'` 
  
outsider_number_of_ip=`grep -c $outsider_name 
/PROJECT/TABLE/host_list` 
 
 # If host list contain more than one IP addresses  
 # ------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -gt 1 ]                             
      then 
  echo $outsider_ip_addr > /PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR 
  i=1 
  while [[ $i -le $outsider_number_of_ip ]] 
  do 
outsider_ip_addr=`cut -d' ' -f$i 
/PROJECT/TEMP/OUTSIDER_IP_ADDR` 
   # echo outsider_ip_addr = $outsider_ip_addr 
 
   i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
    
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- 
$outsider_ip_addr -- $insider_ip 
 
   # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
   # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
  done 
 fi 
 
 # If host list contain only single IP address of Internet side 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 if [ $outsider_number_of_ip  -eq 1 ]                                  
      then 
echo $protocol -- $outsider_name -- $outsider_ip_addr -- 
$insider_ip 
 
  # Execute iptables (Recording process) 
  # ------------------------------------ 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s 
$insider_ip -d $outsider_ip_addr -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s 
$outsider_ip_addr -d $insider_ip -j ACCEPT" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
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 fi           
 
 j=`expr ${j} + 1`      
done 
 
##============================================================## 
##============================================================## 
 
 
## Setting up the ending of firewall_rule configuration file 
(Recording process) 
## ---------------------------------------------------------- 
echo "## End of configuration"   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "## ===================="   >> /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
echo "echo Finish Running FIREWALL CONFIGURATION" >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
 
## Execute firewall_rule file 
## -------------------------- 
chmod u+x /PROJECT/TEMP/firewall_rule 
cd /PROJECT/TEMP 
./firewall_rule 
 
 
# ngrep -d eth1 -e -t > /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT &   
# To catch any incoming data from internal network and put it in 
PROXY_BUFF using background process 
 
echo "Finish" 
echo . 
echo . 
echo . 
echo FOR EXPERIMENT PURPOSES ================================ 
echo Start at $start 
echo Finish at ... 
cat /PROJECT/TEMP/TIMESTAMP 
# cat /PROJECT/TEMP/MAXCOUNTER 
 
waktu1=`date` 
 waktu2=`date` 
 #echo $waktu1 
 #echo $waktu2 
 while [[ $waktu1 = $waktu2 ]] 
 do 
  cat /PROJECT/TEMP/MAXCOUNTER 
  waktu2=`date` 
 done 
 #echo $waktu2 
 hitung=0 
 while [ $hitung -le 100 ] 
 do 
  hitung=`expr ${hitung} + 1` 
 done 
cat /PROJECT/TEMP/MAXCOUNTER 
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A2.1 Lattice-Based One Rule 
PROTECTION LEVEL 3 
Trusted Level 3 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 63.150.131.40 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 64.233.189.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 64.233.161.147 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 64.233.161.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.94.229.254 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.7.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.11.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.11.99 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.9.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.9.99 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
Trusted Level 2 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.93 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.52 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
Trusted Level 1 
tcp -- www.elsevier.com -- 129.35.76.177 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
. 
PROTECTION LEVEL 2 
Trusted Level 2 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.93 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.52 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
Trusted Level 1 
tcp -- www.elsevier.com -- 129.35.76.177 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
. 
PROTECTION LEVEL 1 
Trusted Level 1 
tcp -- www.elsevier.com -- 129.35.76.177 -- 24.4.76.0/24 
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A2.2 Two Rules 
PROTECTION LEVEL 1 
Trusted Level 3 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 63.150.131.40 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 64.233.189.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 64.233.161.147 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 64.233.161.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.94.229.254 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.7.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.11.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.11.99 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.9.104 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.google.com -- 66.102.9.99 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.altavista.com -- 66.94.229.254 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.altavista.com -- 66.94.230.163 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.altavista.com -- 63.150.131.40 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.altavista.com -- 63.150.131.24 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
Trusted Level 2 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.93 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.52 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.kompas.com -- 64.203.71.11 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.kompas.com -- 64.203.71.51 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
Trusted Level 1 
tcp -- www.elsevier.com -- 129.35.76.177 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
tcp -- www.acm.org -- 199.222.69.251 -- 24.4.74.0/24 
. 
PROTECTION LEVEL 2 
Trusted Level 2 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.93 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
tcp -- www.rd.com -- 164.109.22.52 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
tcp -- www.kompas.com -- 64.203.71.11 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
tcp -- www.kompas.com -- 64.203.71.51 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
Trusted Level 1 
tcp -- www.elsevier.com -- 129.35.76.177 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
tcp -- www.acm.org -- 199.222.69.251 -- 24.4.75.0/24 
. 
PROTECTION LEVEL 3 
Trusted Level 1 
tcp -- www.elsevier.com -- 129.35.76.177 -- 24.4.76.0/24 
tcp -- www.acm.org -- 199.222.69.251 -- 24.4.76.0/24 
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Function DeltaTime(Waktu1 As String, Waktu2 As String) As Double 
    Dim detik1, detik2 As Double 
    Dim hasil_split() As String 
    hasil_split() = Split(Waktu1, ":") 
    detik1 = CDbl(hasil_split(0)) * 3600 + CDbl(hasil_split(0)) * 60 + CDbl(hasil_split(2)) 
    hasil_split() = Split(Waktu2, ":") 
    detik2 = CDbl(hasil_split(0)) * 3600 + CDbl(hasil_split(0)) * 60 + CDbl(hasil_split(2)) 
    DeltaTime = Abs(detik1 - detik2) 
End Function 
 
Function ReadTextFileContents(filename As String) As String 
    Dim fnum As Integer, isOpen As Boolean 
    On Error GoTo Error_Handler 
    ' Get the next free file number. 
    fnum = FreeFile() 
    Open filename For Input As #fnum 
    ' If execution flow got here, the file has been open without error. 
    isOpen = True 
    ' Read the entire contents in one single operation. 
    ReadTextFileContents = Input(LOF(fnum), fnum) 
    ' Intentionally flow into the error handler to close the file. 
Error_Handler: 
    ' Raise the error (if any), but first close the file. 
    If isOpen Then Close #fnum 
    'If Err Then Err.Raise Err.Number, , Err.Description 
End Function 
Sub WriteTextFileContents(Text As String, filename As String, Optional AppendMode As Boolean) 
    Dim fnum As Integer, isOpen As Boolean 
    On Error GoTo Error_Handler 
    ' Get the next free file number. 
    fnum = FreeFile() 
    If AppendMode Then 
         Open filename For Append As #fnum 
     Else 
         Open filename For Output As #fnum 
     End If 
     ' If execution flow gets here, the file has been opened correctly. 
     isOpen = True 
     ' Print to the file in one single operation. 
     Print #fnum, Text 
     ' Intentionally flow into the error handler to close the file. 
Error_Handler: 
    ' Raise the error (if any), but first close the file. 
    If isOpen Then Close #fnum 
    'If Err Then Err.Raise Err.Number, , Err.Description 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub End_Click() 
 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub EndAnalysis_Click() 
    Timer1.Enabled = False 
    Run.Enabled = True 
    EndAnalysis.Enabled = False 
End Sub 
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Private Sub Form_Load() 
    Timer1.Enabled = False 
    EndAnalysis.Enabled = False 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Run_Click() 
    EndAnalysis.Enabled = True 
    Run.Enabled = False 
    Timer1.Enabled = True 
    Timer1.Interval = 3000 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Timer1_Timer() 
    Dim Nama_Traffic_Buffer As String 
    Dim Kumpulan_Kata(1 To 1000000) As String 
    Dim List_Outsider(1 To 1000) As String 
    Dim List_Internal(1 To 1000) As String 
    Dim List_AccessTime(1 To 1000) As String 
    'Dim List_Kalimat(1 To 1000) As String 
    Dim List_Bahaya1(1 To 1000) As Integer 
    Dim List_Bahaya2(1 To 1000) As Integer 
    Dim List_Bahaya3(1 To 1000) As Integer 
    Dim List_Bahaya4(1 To 1000) As Integer 
    Dim List_Bahaya5(1 To 1000) As Integer 
    Dim List_Bahaya6(1 To 1000) As Integer 
    Dim List_Risk(1 To 1000) As Double 
    Dim List_Table(1 To 1000) As String 
    Dim Table1_array(1 To 100) As String 
    Dim Table2_array(1 To 100) As String 
    Dim Table3_array(1 To 100) As String 
    Dim Suspicious(1 To 100) As String 
    Dim Temporary_array(1 To 100) As String 
    Dim Traffic_Buffer, Huruf, Kalimat, Kata As String 
    Dim Table1_Buffer, Table2_Buffer, Table3_Buffer As String 
    Dim Batas_Table1, Batas_Table2, Batas_Table3 As Long 
    Dim fnum1 As Integer 
    Dim i, j, k, l, m, Batas_buffer, Batas_kalimat, Batas_kumpulan_kata As Long 
    Dim filter_result As String 
    Dim hasil_split() As String 
    Dim Intranet As String, Outside_Party As String, Internal_Party As String 
    Dim Bahaya, batas_index_outsider As Long 
    Dim status_exist As Boolean 
    Dim status_Threat As Boolean 
    Dim Report_File As String 
    Dim Table1 As String 
    Dim Table2 As String 
    Dim Table3 As String 
    Dim Total_Outsider, Total_Bahaya1, Total_Bahaya2, Total_Bahaya3, Total_Bahaya5, 
Total_Bahaya6 As Long 
    Dim Waktu_access1 As String, Waktu_access2 As String 
    Dim BedaWaktu As Double 
    Dim Forced_Information As Integer 
    Dim Risk_Bahaya1, Risk_Bahaya2, Risk_Bahaya3, Risk_Bahaya4, Risk_Bahaya5, Risk_Bahaya6, 
Total_Risk As Double 
     
    'If Text3.Text = "" Then 
    '    Exit Sub 
    'End If 
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    Text1.Text = "Start at " & Now 
    Text2.Text = "In progress ... " 
    Text1.Refresh 
    Text2.Refresh 
    List1.Clear 
    List1.Refresh 
     
     
    'ANALYZING TRAFFIC BUFFER 
    '======================== 
     
    Intranet = "24.4.74" 
    'Suspicious(1) = "script src" 
    'Suspicious(2) = "Set-Cookie:" 
    'Suspicious(3) = "<script language=" 
    'Suspicious(2) = ".js""" 
    'Suspicious(3) = ".js>" 
    'Suspicious(2) = "<script language =" 
    'Suspicious(3) = "<script language=" 
     
    Suspicious(1) = ".exe"""            'EXE 
    Suspicious(2) = ".exe>"             'EXE 
    Suspicious(3) = "</script>"         'active script 
    Suspicious(4) = "Set-Cookie"        'cookie 
    Suspicious(5) = "Set Cookie"        'cookie 
    Suspicious(6) = "SetCookie"         'cookie 
    Suspicious(7) = ".exe "             'EXE 
    Suspicious(8) = ".exe|"             'EXE 
    Suspicious(9) = "window.open"       'advertisement 
    Suspicious(10) = "popup("           'advertisement 
    Suspicious(11) = "if (exit)"        'forced info 
    Suspicious(12) = "exit=false"       'forced info 
    Suspicious(13) = "exit=true"        'forced info 
    Suspicious(14) = "checkexit"        'forced info 
    Suspicious(15) = "ControlExit"      'forced info 
     
    'Nama_Traffic_Buffer = "D:\Project\Traffic Analyzer\Data\" + Text3.Text 
    'Nama_Traffic_Buffer = "D:\Project\Data\Threat\" + Text3.Text 
    Nama_Traffic_Buffer = "D:\Project\Ngrep\fuzzy_buffer" 
    Traffic_Buffer = ReadTextFileContents(Nama_Traffic_Buffer) 'Copy is traffic buffer 
    WriteTextFileContents (""), Nama_Traffic_Buffer, False 'Reset traffic buffer 
    Batas_buffer = Len(Traffic_Buffer) 
         
    'Start analyzing buffer file 
    Outside_Party = "" 
    batas_index_outsider = 0 
    i = 1 
    Do Until i >= Batas_buffer 
        StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Browsing buffer at " & i & " round" 
        'StatusBar1.Refresh 
        Do Until (Huruf = Chr(10)) Or (i >= Batas_buffer) 
            Huruf = Mid$(Traffic_Buffer, i, 1) 
            If (Huruf = Chr(13)) Or (Huruf = "#") Or (Huruf = Chr(10)) Then 
            Else 
                Kalimat = Kalimat + Huruf 
            End If 
            i = i + 1 
        Loop 'result is kalimat (character before enter) 
         
        'Start analyzing sentence (character before enter) 
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        Batas_kalimat = Len(Kalimat) 
        j = 1 
        k = 1 
        Do Until j > Batas_kalimat 
            Do Until (Huruf = " ") Or (j > Batas_buffer) 
                'StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Converting sentences into array of words at " & i & " round" 
                Huruf = Mid$(Kalimat, j, 1) 
                If Huruf = " " Then 
                Else 
                    Kata = Kata + Huruf 
                End If 
                j = j + 1 
            Loop 'result is kata (character before spasi) 
            Kumpulan_Kata(k) = Kata 
             
            Huruf = "" 
            Kata = "" 
            k = k + 1 
        Loop 
        Batas_kumpulan_kata = k - 1 
         
        'analyzing kalimat in term of kumpulan_kata array 
        If (Kumpulan_Kata(1) = "T" And Batas_kumpulan_kata = 7) Then ' Or (Kumpulan_Kata(1) = 
"I" And Batas_kumpulan_kata = 7) Or (Kumpulan_Kata(1) = "U" And Batas_kumpulan_kata = 6) 
Then 
            'to find out the address of outside party 
            'StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Finding outsiders at " & i & " round" 
            filter_result = Left$(Kumpulan_Kata(4), 7) 
            If filter_result = Intranet Then 
                Internal_Party = Kumpulan_Kata(4)   'data leaving intranet 
                Outside_Party = Kumpulan_Kata(6) 
            Else 
                Outside_Party = Kumpulan_Kata(4)    'data coming from outside 
                Internal_Party = Kumpulan_Kata(6) 
            End If 
            'to remove the port number and leave IP address only 
            hasil_split() = Split(Outside_Party, ":") 
            Outside_Party = hasil_split(0) 
            hasil_split() = Split(Internal_Party, ":") 
            Internal_Party = hasil_split(0) 
            'List1.AddItem Outside_Party 
            'Listing the outside party to an array 
            filter_result = Left$(Outside_Party, 7) 
            If (Outside_Party <> "") And (filter_result <> Intranet) Then 'avoid blank space or internal to 
internal communication 
                If batas_index_outsider = 0 Then 'list of outsider still empty 
                    'List1.AddItem Outside_Party 
                    batas_index_outsider = batas_index_outsider + 1 'because it's started from index 0 
                    List_Outsider(batas_index_outsider) = Outside_Party 
                    List_Internal(batas_index_outsider) = Internal_Party 
                    List_AccessTime(batas_index_outsider) = Kumpulan_Kata(3) 
                    batas_index_outsider = batas_index_outsider + 1 
                Else 
                    status_exist = False 'check whether outsider has included in the list 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            status_exist = True 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
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                    If status_exist = False Then 'it's a new outsider 
                        List_Outsider(batas_index_outsider) = Outside_Party 
                        List_Internal(batas_index_outsider) = Internal_Party 
                        List_AccessTime(batas_index_outsider) = Kumpulan_Kata(3) 
                        batas_index_outsider = batas_index_outsider + 1 
                        'List_Kalimat(batas_index_outsider) = Kalimat 
                    End If 
                End If 
            End If 
        Else 
            'StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Searching suspicious traffic at " & i & " round" 
            If Outside_Party <> "" Then 
                'checking the threat in the traffic buffer 
                 
                'EXE file 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(1), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya1(m) = List_Bahaya1(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(2), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya1(m) = List_Bahaya1(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(7), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya1(m) = List_Bahaya1(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(8), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya1(m) = List_Bahaya1(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                 
                'Active script 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(3), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya2(m) = List_Bahaya2(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
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                    Next 
                End If 
                 
                'Cookies 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(4), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya3(m) = List_Bahaya3(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(5), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya3(m) = List_Bahaya3(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(6), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya3(m) = List_Bahaya3(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                 
                'Add 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(9), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya5(m) = List_Bahaya5(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(10), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya5(m) = List_Bahaya5(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                 
                'Forced Information 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(11), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya6(m) = List_Bahaya6(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
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                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(12), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya6(m) = List_Bahaya6(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(13), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya6(m) = List_Bahaya6(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(14), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya6(m) = List_Bahaya6(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(15), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya6(m) = List_Bahaya6(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                 
            End If 
        End If 
         
        'Text1.Text = Kalimat 
        Huruf = "" 
        Kata = "" 
        Kalimat = "" 
    Loop 'end of loop for analyzing buffer file 
     
    Total_Outsider = batas_index_outsider - 1 
    Total_Bahaya1 = 0 
    Total_Bahaya2 = 0 
    Total_Bahaya3 = 0 
    Total_Bahaya5 = 0 
    Total_Bahaya6 = 0 
    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
        Total_Bahaya1 = Total_Bahaya1 + List_Bahaya1(m) 
        Total_Bahaya2 = Total_Bahaya2 + List_Bahaya2(m) 
        Total_Bahaya3 = Total_Bahaya3 + List_Bahaya3(m) 
        Total_Bahaya5 = Total_Bahaya5 + List_Bahaya5(m) 
        Total_Bahaya6 = Total_Bahaya6 + List_Bahaya6(m) 
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    Next 
     
     
    'Writing the report to a text file 
    'Report_File = "D:\Project\Traffic Analyzer\Report.txt" 
    'WriteTextFileContents ("Buffer name: " + Nama_Traffic_Buffer + ":"), Report_File, False 
    'For m = 1 To ((batas_index_outsider - 1) * 7) + 5 
    '    WriteTextFileContents (List1.List(m - 1)), Report_File, True 
    'Next 
     
     
    'COMPUTING THE TABLE OF SECURITY 
    '=============================== 
     
    Table1 = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table1" 
    Table2 = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table2" 
    Table3 = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table3" 
    Table1_Buffer = ReadTextFileContents(Table1) 
    Table2_Buffer = ReadTextFileContents(Table2) 
    Table3_Buffer = ReadTextFileContents(Table3) 
     
    'creating the array of Table1 
    Batas_Table1 = 0 
    i = 1 
    Do Until i >= Len(Table1_Buffer) 
        StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Browsing Table1 at " & i & " round" 
        'StatusBar1.Refresh 
        Huruf = "" 
        Kalimat = "" 
        Do Until (Huruf = Chr(10)) Or (i >= Len(Table1_Buffer)) 
            Huruf = Mid$(Table1_Buffer, i, 1) 
            If (Huruf = Chr(13)) Or (Huruf = " ") Or (Huruf = Chr(10)) Then 
            Else 
                Kalimat = Kalimat + Huruf 
            End If 
            i = i + 1 
        Loop 'result is kalimat (character before enter) 
         
        If Kalimat <> "" Then 
            Batas_Table1 = Batas_Table1 + 1 
            Table1_array(Batas_Table1) = Kalimat 
        End If 
    Loop        'result is Table1_array 
     
    'creating the array of Table2 
    'List2.AddItem "TABLE2" 
    'List2.AddItem Len(Table2_Buffer) 
    Batas_Table2 = 0 
    i = 1 
    Do Until i >= Len(Table2_Buffer) 
        StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Browsing Table2 at " & i & " round" 
        'StatusBar1.Refresh 
        Huruf = "" 
        Kalimat = "" 
        Do Until (Huruf = Chr(10)) Or (i >= Len(Table2_Buffer)) 
            Huruf = Mid$(Table2_Buffer, i, 1) 
            If (Huruf = Chr(13)) Or (Huruf = " ") Or (Huruf = Chr(10)) Then 
            Else 
                Kalimat = Kalimat + Huruf 
            End If 
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            i = i + 1 
        Loop 'result is kalimat (character before enter) 
         
        If Kalimat <> "" Then 
            Batas_Table2 = Batas_Table2 + 1 
            Table2_array(Batas_Table2) = Kalimat 
        End If 
    Loop        'result is Table2_array 
     
    'creating the array of Table3 
    'List2.AddItem "TABLE3" 
    'List2.AddItem Len(Table3_Buffer) 
    Batas_Table3 = 0 
    i = 1 
    Do Until i >= Len(Table3_Buffer) 
        StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Browsing Table3 at " & i & " round" 
        'StatusBar1.Refresh 
        Huruf = "" 
        Kalimat = "" 
        Do Until (Huruf = Chr(10)) Or (i >= Len(Table3_Buffer)) 
            Huruf = Mid$(Table3_Buffer, i, 1) 
            If (Huruf = Chr(13)) Or (Huruf = " ") Or (Huruf = Chr(10)) Then 
            Else 
                Kalimat = Kalimat + Huruf 
            End If 
            i = i + 1 
        Loop 'result is kalimat (character before enter) 
         
        If Kalimat <> "" Then 
            Batas_Table3 = Batas_Table3 + 1 
            Table3_array(Batas_Table3) = Kalimat 
        End If 
    Loop        'result is Table3_array 
     
    'Browsing array of outsider created from the buffer 
    'in order to get any pattern of threat 
    For i = 1 To Total_Outsider 
        'status_Threat = False 
         
        'Is there any effort to force user to read too much information 
        'by flooding user with adds from many external servers? 
        '--------------------------------------------------------------- 
        'If (status_Threat = False) Then 
        Outside_Party = List_Outsider(i) 
        Internal_Party = List_Internal(i) 
        Waktu_access1 = List_AccessTime(i) 
        Forced_Information = 0 
        List_Bahaya4(i) = 0 
        For j = 1 To Total_Outsider 
            If (Outside_Party <> List_Outsider(j)) And (Internal_Party = List_Internal(j)) Then 
                Waktu_access2 = List_AccessTime(j) 
                BedaWaktu = DeltaTime(Waktu_access1, Waktu_access2) 
                If BedaWaktu < 60 Then  'identifying the servers from the same site 
                    Forced_Information = Forced_Information + 1 
                    List_Bahaya4(i) = Forced_Information 
                End If 
            End If 
        Next 
         
        Risk_Bahaya1 = 0 
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        Risk_Bahaya2 = 0 
        Risk_Bahaya3 = 0 
        Risk_Bahaya4 = 0 
        Risk_Bahaya5 = 0 
        Risk_Bahaya6 = 0 
         
        'EXE file 
        If List_Bahaya1(i) > 0 Then 
            Risk_Bahaya1 = 1 
        Else 
            Risk_Bahaya1 = 0 
        End If 
         
        'Number of active script -> not significant to detect the threat 
        'example: elsevier has 43 scripts, ieee has 15 
        'If List_Bahaya2(i) > 0 Then 
        '    'Risk_Bahaya2 = 1 / (1 + (1 / List_Bahaya2(i)) ^ (1/1.5)) 
        '    Risk_Bahaya2 = 1 - (1 / List_Bahaya2(i) ^ (1 / 1.5)) 
        'End If 
         
        'Number of Cookies -> less influence to the threat 
        'example: cisco has 8 cookies, psz and science direct have 4 cookies 
        If List_Bahaya3(i) > 0 Then 
            'Risk_Bahaya3 = 1 / (1 + (1 / List_Bahaya3(i))) 
            Risk_Bahaya3 = 1 - (1 / List_Bahaya3(i) ^ (1 / 2)) 
        End If 
         
        'Number of external machines -> less influence to the threat 
        'example: ieee has 7 machines 
        If List_Bahaya4(i) > 0 Then 
            'Risk_Bahaya4 = 1 / (1 + (1 / List_Bahaya4(i))) 
            Risk_Bahaya4 = 1 - (1 / List_Bahaya4(i) ^ (1 / 2)) 
        End If 
         
        'Add -> slightly influence the threat 
        If List_Bahaya5(i) > 0 Then 
            Risk_Bahaya5 = 1 - (1 / List_Bahaya5(i) ^ (1.7)) 
        End If 
         
        'Number of Forced Info -> extremely influence the threat 
        If List_Bahaya6(i) > 0 Then 
            Risk_Bahaya6 = 1 - (1 / List_Bahaya6(i) ^ (3)) 
        End If 
               
         
        'Computing total risk 
        If (Risk_Bahaya4 - Risk_Bahaya1) >= 0 Then 
            Total_Risk = Risk_Bahaya4 
        Else 
            Total_Risk = Risk_Bahaya1 
        End If 
        If (Total_Risk - Risk_Bahaya2) < 0 Then 
            Total_Risk = Risk_Bahaya2 
        End If 
        If (Total_Risk - Risk_Bahaya3) < 0 Then 
            Total_Risk = Risk_Bahaya3 
        End If 
        If (Total_Risk - Risk_Bahaya5) < 0 Then 
            Total_Risk = Risk_Bahaya5 
        End If 
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        If (Total_Risk - Risk_Bahaya6) < 0 Then 
            Total_Risk = Risk_Bahaya6 
        End If 
        List_Risk(i) = Total_Risk 
         
        Select Case List_Risk(i) 
            Case Is < 0.25 
                List_Table(i) = "Table1" 
                'Table1 Registration 
                status_exist = False 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table1 
                    If Table1_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                        status_exist = True 
                    End If 
                Next 
                If status_exist = False Then 
                    Batas_Table1 = Batas_Table1 + 1 
                    Table1_array(Batas_Table1) = List_Outsider(i) 
                End If 
             
                'delete the membership from other table 
                k = 0 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table2       'Table2 
                    If Table2_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                    Else 
                        k = k + 1 
                        Temporary_array(k) = Table2_array(j) 
                    End If 
                Next 
                Batas_Table2 = k 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table2 
                    Table2_array(j) = Temporary_array(j) 
                Next 
             
                k = 0 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table3       'Table3 
                    If Table3_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                    Else 
                        k = k + 1 
                        Temporary_array(k) = Table3_array(j) 
                    End If 
                Next 
                Batas_Table3 = k 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table3 
                    Table3_array(j) = Temporary_array(j) 
                Next 
                 
            Case 0.25 To 0.75 
                List_Table(i) = "Table2" 
                'Table2 Registration 
                status_exist = False 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table2 
                    If Table2_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                        status_exist = True 
                    End If 
                Next 
                If status_exist = False Then 
                    Batas_Table2 = Batas_Table2 + 1 
                    Table2_array(Batas_Table2) = List_Outsider(i) 
                End If 
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                'delete the membership from other table 
                k = 0 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table1       'Table1 
                    If Table1_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                    Else 
                        k = k + 1 
                        Temporary_array(k) = Table1_array(j) 
                    End If 
                Next 
                Batas_Table1 = k 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table1 
                    Table1_array(j) = Temporary_array(j) 
                Next 
             
                k = 0 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table3       'Table3 
                    If Table3_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                    Else 
                        k = k + 1 
                        Temporary_array(k) = Table3_array(j) 
                    End If 
                Next 
                Batas_Table3 = k 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table3 
                    Table3_array(j) = Temporary_array(j) 
                Next 
                 
            Case Is > 0.75 
                List_Table(i) = "Table3" 
                'Table3 Registration 
                status_exist = False 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table3 
                    If Table3_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                        status_exist = True 
                    End If 
                Next 
                If status_exist = False Then 
                    Batas_Table3 = Batas_Table3 + 1 
                    Table3_array(Batas_Table3) = List_Outsider(i) 
                End If 
             
                'delete the membership from other table 
                k = 0 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table1       'Table1 
                    If Table1_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                    Else 
                        k = k + 1 
                        Temporary_array(k) = Table1_array(j) 
                    End If 
                Next 
                Batas_Table1 = k 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table1 
                    Table1_array(j) = Temporary_array(j) 
                Next 
             
                k = 0 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table2       'Table2 
                    If Table2_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                    Else 
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                        k = k + 1 
                        Temporary_array(k) = Table2_array(j) 
                    End If 
                Next 
                Batas_Table2 = k 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table2 
                    Table2_array(j) = Temporary_array(j) 
                Next 
             
        End Select 
    Next 
     
    'Send the result to Table files 
    Report_File = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table1" 
    WriteTextFileContents (""), Report_File, False 
    For m = 1 To Batas_Table1 
        WriteTextFileContents (Table1_array(m) + " "), Report_File, True 
    Next 
    Report_File = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table2" 
    WriteTextFileContents (""), Report_File, False 
    For m = 1 To Batas_Table2 
        WriteTextFileContents (Table2_array(m) + " "), Report_File, True 
    Next 
    Report_File = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table3" 
    WriteTextFileContents (""), Report_File, False 
    For m = 1 To Batas_Table3 
        WriteTextFileContents (Table3_array(m) + " "), Report_File, True 
    Next 
     
    'Send the results to firewall 
    FileCopy "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table1", "Z:\fuzzy_table1" 
    FileCopy "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table2", "Z:\fuzzy_table2" 
    FileCopy "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table3", "Z:\fuzzy_table3" 
     
    'Presenting the result 
    List1.AddItem "Summary:" 
    List1.AddItem "Number of external server machine: " & Total_Outsider 
    List1.AddItem "Number of EXE file: " & Total_Bahaya1 
    List1.AddItem "Number of active script: " & Total_Bahaya2 
    List1.AddItem "Number of cookies: " & Total_Bahaya3 
    List1.AddItem "Number of add: " & Total_Bahaya5 
    List1.AddItem "Number of forced info: " & Total_Bahaya6 
     
    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
        List1.AddItem " " 
        List1.AddItem List_Outsider(m) 
        List1.AddItem "Internal user            " & List_Internal(m) 
        List1.AddItem "First access             " & List_AccessTime(m) 
        'List1.AddItem List_Kalimat(m) 
        List1.AddItem "Risk Value               " & List_Risk(m) 
        List1.AddItem List_Table(m) 
        List1.AddItem "EXE Files                " & List_Bahaya1(m) 
        List1.AddItem "Other involved machines  " & List_Bahaya4(m) 
        List1.AddItem "Active Scripts           " & List_Bahaya2(m) 
        List1.AddItem "Cookies                  " & List_Bahaya3(m) 
        List1.AddItem "Adds                     " & List_Bahaya5(m) 
        List1.AddItem "Forced Info              " & List_Bahaya6(m) 
    Next 
     
    'Writing the report to a text file 
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    'Report_File = "D:\Project\Fuzzy Traffic Analyzer\Report\" + File1.filename 
    Report_File = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_report" 
    WriteTextFileContents ("Buffer name: " + Nama_Traffic_Buffer), Report_File, False 
    For m = 1 To ((batas_index_outsider - 1) * 12) + 7 
        WriteTextFileContents (List1.List(m - 1)), Report_File, True 
    Next 
     
    'testing only 
    List2.Clear 
    List2.AddItem "TABLE1" 
    For i = 1 To Batas_Table1 
        List2.AddItem Table1_array(i) 
    Next 
    List2.AddItem " " 
    List2.AddItem "TABLE2" 
    For i = 1 To Batas_Table2 
        List2.AddItem Table2_array(i) 
    Next 
    List2.AddItem " " 
    List2.AddItem "TABLE3" 
    For i = 1 To Batas_Table3 
        List2.AddItem Table3_array(i) 
    Next 
             
    'closing the process 
    Erase Kumpulan_Kata 
    Erase List_Outsider 
    'Erase List_Kalimat 
    Erase List_Bahaya1 
    Erase List_Bahaya2 
    Erase List_Bahaya3 
    Erase List_Bahaya4 
    Erase List_Bahaya5 
    Erase List_Bahaya6 
    Erase List_Risk 
    Erase List_Table 
    Erase Suspicious 
    Erase Table1_array 
    Erase Table2_array 
    Erase Table3_array 
    Erase Temporary_array 
     
    Text2.Text = "End at " & Now 
     
    ' End reporting 
    Report_File = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_report" 
    WriteTextFileContents (" "), Report_File, True 
    WriteTextFileContents (Text1.Text), Report_File, True 
    WriteTextFileContents (Text2.Text), Report_File, True 
    WriteTextFileContents ("File size " & FileLen(Nama_Traffic_Buffer) & " Bytes"), Report_File, 
True 
 
End Sub 
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Function DeltaTime(Waktu1 As String, Waktu2 As String) As Double 
    Dim detik1, detik2 As Double 
    Dim hasil_split() As String 
    hasil_split() = Split(Waktu1, ":") 
    detik1 = CDbl(hasil_split(0)) * 3600 + CDbl(hasil_split(0)) * 60 + CDbl(hasil_split(2)) 
    hasil_split() = Split(Waktu2, ":") 
    detik2 = CDbl(hasil_split(0)) * 3600 + CDbl(hasil_split(0)) * 60 + CDbl(hasil_split(2)) 
    DeltaTime = Abs(detik1 - detik2) 
End Function 
 
Function ReadTextFileContents(filename As String) As String 
    Dim fnum As Integer, isOpen As Boolean 
    On Error GoTo Error_Handler 
    ' Get the next free file number. 
    fnum = FreeFile() 
    Open filename For Input As #fnum 
    ' If execution flow got here, the file has been open without error. 
    isOpen = True 
    ' Read the entire contents in one single operation. 
    ReadTextFileContents = Input(LOF(fnum), fnum) 
    ' Intentionally flow into the error handler to close the file. 
Error_Handler: 
    ' Raise the error (if any), but first close the file. 
    If isOpen Then Close #fnum 
    'If Err Then Err.Raise Err.Number, , Err.Description 
End Function 
Sub WriteTextFileContents(Text As String, filename As String, Optional AppendMode As Boolean) 
    Dim fnum As Integer, isOpen As Boolean 
    On Error GoTo Error_Handler 
    ' Get the next free file number. 
    fnum = FreeFile() 
    If AppendMode Then 
         Open filename For Append As #fnum 
     Else 
         Open filename For Output As #fnum 
     End If 
     ' If execution flow gets here, the file has been opened correctly. 
     isOpen = True 
     ' Print to the file in one single operation. 
     Print #fnum, Text 
     ' Intentionally flow into the error handler to close the file. 
Error_Handler: 
    ' Raise the error (if any), but first close the file. 
    If isOpen Then Close #fnum 
    'If Err Then Err.Raise Err.Number, , Err.Description 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub End_Click() 
 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub EndAnalysis_Click() 
    Timer1.Enabled = False 
    Run.Enabled = True 
    EndAnalysis.Enabled = False 
End Sub 
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Private Sub Form_Load() 
    Timer1.Enabled = False 
    EndAnalysis.Enabled = False 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Run_Click() 
    EndAnalysis.Enabled = True 
    Run.Enabled = False 
    Timer1.Enabled = True 
    Timer1.Interval = 3000 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Timer1_Timer() 
    Dim Nama_Traffic_Buffer As String 
    Dim Kumpulan_Kata(1 To 1000000) As String 
    Dim List_Outsider(1 To 1000) As String 
    Dim List_Internal(1 To 1000) As String 
    Dim List_AccessTime(1 To 1000) As String 
    'Dim List_Kalimat(1 To 1000) As String 
    Dim List_Bahaya1(1 To 1000) As Integer 
    Dim List_Bahaya2(1 To 1000) As Integer 
    Dim List_Bahaya3(1 To 1000) As Integer 
    Dim List_Bahaya4(1 To 1000) As Integer 
    Dim List_Bahaya5(1 To 1000) As Integer 
    Dim List_Bahaya6(1 To 1000) As Integer 
    Dim List_Risk(1 To 1000) As Double 
    Dim List_Table(1 To 1000) As String 
    Dim Table1_array(1 To 100) As String 
    Dim Table2_array(1 To 100) As String 
    Dim Table3_array(1 To 100) As String 
    Dim Suspicious(1 To 100) As String 
    Dim Temporary_array(1 To 100) As String 
    Dim Traffic_Buffer, Huruf, Kalimat, Kata As String 
    Dim Table1_Buffer, Table2_Buffer, Table3_Buffer As String 
    Dim Batas_Table1, Batas_Table2, Batas_Table3 As Long 
    Dim fnum1 As Integer 
    Dim i, j, k, l, m, Batas_buffer, Batas_kalimat, Batas_kumpulan_kata As Long 
    Dim filter_result As String 
    Dim hasil_split() As String 
    Dim Intranet As String, Outside_Party As String, Internal_Party As String 
    Dim Bahaya, batas_index_outsider As Long 
    Dim status_exist As Boolean 
    Dim status_Threat As Boolean 
    Dim Report_File As String 
    Dim Table1 As String 
    Dim Table2 As String 
    Dim Table3 As String 
    Dim Total_Outsider, Total_Bahaya1, Total_Bahaya2, Total_Bahaya3, Total_Bahaya5, 
Total_Bahaya6 As Long 
    Dim Waktu_access1 As String, Waktu_access2 As String 
    Dim BedaWaktu As Double 
    Dim Forced_Information As Integer 
    Dim Risk_Bahaya1, Risk_Bahaya2, Risk_Bahaya3, Risk_Bahaya4, Risk_Bahaya5, Risk_Bahaya6, 
Total_Risk As Double 
     
    'If Text3.Text = "" Then 
    '    Exit Sub 
    'End If 
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    Text1.Text = "Start at " & Now 
    Text2.Text = "In progress ... " 
    Text1.Refresh 
    Text2.Refresh 
    List1.Clear 
    List1.Refresh 
     
     
    'ANALYZING TRAFFIC BUFFER 
    '======================== 
     
    Intranet = "24.4.74" 
    'Suspicious(1) = "script src" 
    'Suspicious(2) = "Set-Cookie:" 
    'Suspicious(3) = "<script language=" 
    'Suspicious(2) = ".js""" 
    'Suspicious(3) = ".js>" 
    'Suspicious(2) = "<script language =" 
    'Suspicious(3) = "<script language=" 
     
    Suspicious(1) = ".exe"""            'EXE 
    Suspicious(2) = ".exe>"             'EXE 
    Suspicious(3) = "</script>"         'active script 
    Suspicious(4) = "Set-Cookie"        'cookie 
    Suspicious(5) = "Set Cookie"        'cookie 
    Suspicious(6) = "SetCookie"         'cookie 
    Suspicious(7) = ".exe "             'EXE 
    Suspicious(8) = ".exe|"             'EXE 
    Suspicious(9) = "window.open"       'advertisement 
    Suspicious(10) = "popup("           'advertisement 
    Suspicious(11) = "if (exit)"        'forced info 
    Suspicious(12) = "exit=false"       'forced info 
    Suspicious(13) = "exit=true"        'forced info 
    Suspicious(14) = "checkexit"        'forced info 
    Suspicious(15) = "ControlExit"      'forced info 
     
    'Nama_Traffic_Buffer = "D:\Project\Traffic Analyzer\Data\" + Text3.Text 
    'Nama_Traffic_Buffer = "D:\Project\Data\Threat\" + Text3.Text 
    Nama_Traffic_Buffer = "D:\Project\Ngrep\fuzzy_buffer" 
    Traffic_Buffer = ReadTextFileContents(Nama_Traffic_Buffer) 'Copy is traffic buffer 
    WriteTextFileContents (""), Nama_Traffic_Buffer, False 'Reset traffic buffer 
    Batas_buffer = Len(Traffic_Buffer) 
         
    'Start analyzing buffer file 
    Outside_Party = "" 
    batas_index_outsider = 0 
    i = 1 
    Do Until i >= Batas_buffer 
        StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Browsing buffer at " & i & " round" 
        'StatusBar1.Refresh 
        Do Until (Huruf = Chr(10)) Or (i >= Batas_buffer) 
            Huruf = Mid$(Traffic_Buffer, i, 1) 
            If (Huruf = Chr(13)) Or (Huruf = "#") Or (Huruf = Chr(10)) Then 
            Else 
                Kalimat = Kalimat + Huruf 
            End If 
            i = i + 1 
        Loop 'result is kalimat (character before enter) 
         
        'Start analyzing sentence (character before enter) 
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        Batas_kalimat = Len(Kalimat) 
        j = 1 
        k = 1 
        Do Until j > Batas_kalimat 
            Do Until (Huruf = " ") Or (j > Batas_buffer) 
                'StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Converting sentences into array of words at " & i & " round" 
                Huruf = Mid$(Kalimat, j, 1) 
                If Huruf = " " Then 
                Else 
                    Kata = Kata + Huruf 
                End If 
                j = j + 1 
            Loop 'result is kata (character before spasi) 
            Kumpulan_Kata(k) = Kata 
             
            Huruf = "" 
            Kata = "" 
            k = k + 1 
        Loop 
        Batas_kumpulan_kata = k - 1 
         
        'analyzing kalimat in term of kumpulan_kata array 
        If (Kumpulan_Kata(1) = "T" And Batas_kumpulan_kata = 7) Then ' Or (Kumpulan_Kata(1) = 
"I" And Batas_kumpulan_kata = 7) Or (Kumpulan_Kata(1) = "U" And Batas_kumpulan_kata = 6) 
Then 
            'to find out the address of outside party 
            'StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Finding outsiders at " & i & " round" 
            filter_result = Left$(Kumpulan_Kata(4), 7) 
            If filter_result = Intranet Then 
                Internal_Party = Kumpulan_Kata(4)   'data leaving intranet 
                Outside_Party = Kumpulan_Kata(6) 
            Else 
                Outside_Party = Kumpulan_Kata(4)    'data coming from outside 
                Internal_Party = Kumpulan_Kata(6) 
            End If 
            'to remove the port number and leave IP address only 
            hasil_split() = Split(Outside_Party, ":") 
            Outside_Party = hasil_split(0) 
            hasil_split() = Split(Internal_Party, ":") 
            Internal_Party = hasil_split(0) 
            'List1.AddItem Outside_Party 
            'Listing the outside party to an array 
            filter_result = Left$(Outside_Party, 7) 
            If (Outside_Party <> "") And (filter_result <> Intranet) Then 'avoid blank space or internal to 
internal communication 
                If batas_index_outsider = 0 Then 'list of outsider still empty 
                    'List1.AddItem Outside_Party 
                    batas_index_outsider = batas_index_outsider + 1 'because it's started from index 0 
                    List_Outsider(batas_index_outsider) = Outside_Party 
                    List_Internal(batas_index_outsider) = Internal_Party 
                    List_AccessTime(batas_index_outsider) = Kumpulan_Kata(3) 
                    batas_index_outsider = batas_index_outsider + 1 
                Else 
                    status_exist = False 'check whether outsider has included in the list 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            status_exist = True 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
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                    If status_exist = False Then 'it's a new outsider 
                        List_Outsider(batas_index_outsider) = Outside_Party 
                        List_Internal(batas_index_outsider) = Internal_Party 
                        List_AccessTime(batas_index_outsider) = Kumpulan_Kata(3) 
                        batas_index_outsider = batas_index_outsider + 1 
                        'List_Kalimat(batas_index_outsider) = Kalimat 
                    End If 
                End If 
            End If 
        Else 
            'StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Searching suspicious traffic at " & i & " round" 
            If Outside_Party <> "" Then 
                'checking the threat in the traffic buffer 
                 
                'EXE file 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(1), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya1(m) = List_Bahaya1(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(2), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya1(m) = List_Bahaya1(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(7), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya1(m) = List_Bahaya1(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(8), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya1(m) = List_Bahaya1(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                 
                'Active script 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(3), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya2(m) = List_Bahaya2(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
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                    Next 
                End If 
                 
                'Cookies 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(4), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya3(m) = List_Bahaya3(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(5), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya3(m) = List_Bahaya3(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(6), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya3(m) = List_Bahaya3(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                 
                'Add 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(9), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya5(m) = List_Bahaya5(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(10), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya5(m) = List_Bahaya5(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                 
                'Forced Information 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(11), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya6(m) = List_Bahaya6(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
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                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(12), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya6(m) = List_Bahaya6(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(13), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya6(m) = List_Bahaya6(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(14), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya6(m) = List_Bahaya6(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                Bahaya = InStr(1, Kalimat, Suspicious(15), vbTextCompare) 
                If Bahaya > 0 Then 'if threat is discovered 
                    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
                        If Outside_Party = List_Outsider(m) Then 
                            List_Bahaya6(m) = List_Bahaya6(m) + 1 
                            Exit For 
                        End If 
                    Next 
                End If 
                 
            End If 
        End If 
         
        'Text1.Text = Kalimat 
        Huruf = "" 
        Kata = "" 
        Kalimat = "" 
    Loop 'end of loop for analyzing buffer file 
     
    Total_Outsider = batas_index_outsider - 1 
    Total_Bahaya1 = 0 
    Total_Bahaya2 = 0 
    Total_Bahaya3 = 0 
    Total_Bahaya5 = 0 
    Total_Bahaya6 = 0 
    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
        Total_Bahaya1 = Total_Bahaya1 + List_Bahaya1(m) 
        Total_Bahaya2 = Total_Bahaya2 + List_Bahaya2(m) 
        Total_Bahaya3 = Total_Bahaya3 + List_Bahaya3(m) 
        Total_Bahaya5 = Total_Bahaya5 + List_Bahaya5(m) 
        Total_Bahaya6 = Total_Bahaya6 + List_Bahaya6(m) 
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    Next 
     
     
    'Writing the report to a text file 
    'Report_File = "D:\Project\Traffic Analyzer\Report.txt" 
    'WriteTextFileContents ("Buffer name: " + Nama_Traffic_Buffer + ":"), Report_File, False 
    'For m = 1 To ((batas_index_outsider - 1) * 7) + 5 
    '    WriteTextFileContents (List1.List(m - 1)), Report_File, True 
    'Next 
     
     
    'COMPUTING THE TABLE OF SECURITY 
    '=============================== 
     
    Table1 = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table1" 
    Table2 = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table2" 
    Table3 = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table3" 
    Table1_Buffer = ReadTextFileContents(Table1) 
    Table2_Buffer = ReadTextFileContents(Table2) 
    Table3_Buffer = ReadTextFileContents(Table3) 
     
    'creating the array of Table1 
    Batas_Table1 = 0 
    i = 1 
    Do Until i >= Len(Table1_Buffer) 
        StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Browsing Table1 at " & i & " round" 
        'StatusBar1.Refresh 
        Huruf = "" 
        Kalimat = "" 
        Do Until (Huruf = Chr(10)) Or (i >= Len(Table1_Buffer)) 
            Huruf = Mid$(Table1_Buffer, i, 1) 
            If (Huruf = Chr(13)) Or (Huruf = " ") Or (Huruf = Chr(10)) Then 
            Else 
                Kalimat = Kalimat + Huruf 
            End If 
            i = i + 1 
        Loop 'result is kalimat (character before enter) 
         
        If Kalimat <> "" Then 
            Batas_Table1 = Batas_Table1 + 1 
            Table1_array(Batas_Table1) = Kalimat 
        End If 
    Loop        'result is Table1_array 
     
    'creating the array of Table2 
    'List2.AddItem "TABLE2" 
    'List2.AddItem Len(Table2_Buffer) 
    Batas_Table2 = 0 
    i = 1 
    Do Until i >= Len(Table2_Buffer) 
        StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Browsing Table2 at " & i & " round" 
        'StatusBar1.Refresh 
        Huruf = "" 
        Kalimat = "" 
        Do Until (Huruf = Chr(10)) Or (i >= Len(Table2_Buffer)) 
            Huruf = Mid$(Table2_Buffer, i, 1) 
            If (Huruf = Chr(13)) Or (Huruf = " ") Or (Huruf = Chr(10)) Then 
            Else 
                Kalimat = Kalimat + Huruf 
            End If 
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            i = i + 1 
        Loop 'result is kalimat (character before enter) 
         
        If Kalimat <> "" Then 
            Batas_Table2 = Batas_Table2 + 1 
            Table2_array(Batas_Table2) = Kalimat 
        End If 
    Loop        'result is Table2_array 
     
    'creating the array of Table3 
    'List2.AddItem "TABLE3" 
    'List2.AddItem Len(Table3_Buffer) 
    Batas_Table3 = 0 
    i = 1 
    Do Until i >= Len(Table3_Buffer) 
        StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Browsing Table3 at " & i & " round" 
        'StatusBar1.Refresh 
        Huruf = "" 
        Kalimat = "" 
        Do Until (Huruf = Chr(10)) Or (i >= Len(Table3_Buffer)) 
            Huruf = Mid$(Table3_Buffer, i, 1) 
            If (Huruf = Chr(13)) Or (Huruf = " ") Or (Huruf = Chr(10)) Then 
            Else 
                Kalimat = Kalimat + Huruf 
            End If 
            i = i + 1 
        Loop 'result is kalimat (character before enter) 
         
        If Kalimat <> "" Then 
            Batas_Table3 = Batas_Table3 + 1 
            Table3_array(Batas_Table3) = Kalimat 
        End If 
    Loop        'result is Table3_array 
     
    'Browsing array of outsider created from the buffer 
    'in order to get any pattern of threat 
    For i = 1 To Total_Outsider 
        'status_Threat = False 
         
        'Is there any effort to force user to read too much information 
        'by flooding user with adds from many external servers? 
        '--------------------------------------------------------------- 
        'If (status_Threat = False) Then 
        Outside_Party = List_Outsider(i) 
        Internal_Party = List_Internal(i) 
        Waktu_access1 = List_AccessTime(i) 
        Forced_Information = 0 
        List_Bahaya4(i) = 0 
        For j = 1 To Total_Outsider 
            If (Outside_Party <> List_Outsider(j)) And (Internal_Party = List_Internal(j)) Then 
                Waktu_access2 = List_AccessTime(j) 
                BedaWaktu = DeltaTime(Waktu_access1, Waktu_access2) 
                If BedaWaktu < 60 Then  'identifying the servers from the same site 
                    Forced_Information = Forced_Information + 1 
                    List_Bahaya4(i) = Forced_Information 
                End If 
            End If 
        Next 
         
        Risk_Bahaya1 = 0 
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        Risk_Bahaya2 = 0 
        Risk_Bahaya3 = 0 
        Risk_Bahaya4 = 0 
        Risk_Bahaya5 = 0 
        Risk_Bahaya6 = 0 
         
        'EXE file 
        If List_Bahaya1(i) > 0 Then 
            Risk_Bahaya1 = 1 
        Else 
            Risk_Bahaya1 = 0 
        End If 
         
        'Number of active script -> not significant to detect the threat 
        'example: elsevier has 43 scripts, ieee has 15 
        'If List_Bahaya2(i) > 0 Then 
        '    'Risk_Bahaya2 = 1 / (1 + (1 / List_Bahaya2(i)) ^ (1/1.5)) 
        '    Risk_Bahaya2 = 1 - (1 / List_Bahaya2(i) ^ (1 / 1.5)) 
        'End If 
         
        'Number of Cookies -> less influence to the threat 
        'example: cisco has 8 cookies, psz and science direct have 4 cookies 
        If List_Bahaya3(i) > 0 Then 
            'Risk_Bahaya3 = 1 / (1 + (1 / List_Bahaya3(i))) 
            Risk_Bahaya3 = 1 - (1 / List_Bahaya3(i) ^ (1 / 2)) 
        End If 
         
        'Number of external machines -> less influence to the threat 
        'example: ieee has 7 machines 
        If List_Bahaya4(i) > 0 Then 
            'Risk_Bahaya4 = 1 / (1 + (1 / List_Bahaya4(i))) 
            Risk_Bahaya4 = 1 - (1 / List_Bahaya4(i) ^ (1 / 2)) 
        End If 
         
        'Add -> slightly influence the threat 
        If List_Bahaya5(i) > 0 Then 
            Risk_Bahaya5 = 1 - (1 / List_Bahaya5(i) ^ (1.7)) 
        End If 
         
        'Number of Forced Info -> extremely influence the threat 
        If List_Bahaya6(i) > 0 Then 
            Risk_Bahaya6 = 1 - (1 / List_Bahaya6(i) ^ (3)) 
        End If 
               
         
        'Computing total risk 
        If (Risk_Bahaya4 - Risk_Bahaya1) >= 0 Then 
            Total_Risk = Risk_Bahaya4 
        Else 
            Total_Risk = Risk_Bahaya1 
        End If 
        If (Total_Risk - Risk_Bahaya2) < 0 Then 
            Total_Risk = Risk_Bahaya2 
        End If 
        If (Total_Risk - Risk_Bahaya3) < 0 Then 
            Total_Risk = Risk_Bahaya3 
        End If 
        If (Total_Risk - Risk_Bahaya5) < 0 Then 
            Total_Risk = Risk_Bahaya5 
        End If 
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        If (Total_Risk - Risk_Bahaya6) < 0 Then 
            Total_Risk = Risk_Bahaya6 
        End If 
        List_Risk(i) = Total_Risk 
         
        Select Case List_Risk(i) 
            Case Is < 0.25 
                List_Table(i) = "Table1" 
                'Table1 Registration 
                status_exist = False 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table1 
                    If Table1_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                        status_exist = True 
                    End If 
                Next 
                If status_exist = False Then 
                    Batas_Table1 = Batas_Table1 + 1 
                    Table1_array(Batas_Table1) = List_Outsider(i) 
                End If 
             
                'delete the membership from other table 
                k = 0 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table2       'Table2 
                    If Table2_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                    Else 
                        k = k + 1 
                        Temporary_array(k) = Table2_array(j) 
                    End If 
                Next 
                Batas_Table2 = k 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table2 
                    Table2_array(j) = Temporary_array(j) 
                Next 
             
                k = 0 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table3       'Table3 
                    If Table3_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                    Else 
                        k = k + 1 
                        Temporary_array(k) = Table3_array(j) 
                    End If 
                Next 
                Batas_Table3 = k 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table3 
                    Table3_array(j) = Temporary_array(j) 
                Next 
                 
            Case 0.25 To 0.75 
                List_Table(i) = "Table2" 
                'Table2 Registration 
                status_exist = False 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table2 
                    If Table2_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                        status_exist = True 
                    End If 
                Next 
                If status_exist = False Then 
                    Batas_Table2 = Batas_Table2 + 1 
                    Table2_array(Batas_Table2) = List_Outsider(i) 
                End If 
 136
             
                'delete the membership from other table 
                k = 0 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table1       'Table1 
                    If Table1_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                    Else 
                        k = k + 1 
                        Temporary_array(k) = Table1_array(j) 
                    End If 
                Next 
                Batas_Table1 = k 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table1 
                    Table1_array(j) = Temporary_array(j) 
                Next 
             
                k = 0 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table3       'Table3 
                    If Table3_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                    Else 
                        k = k + 1 
                        Temporary_array(k) = Table3_array(j) 
                    End If 
                Next 
                Batas_Table3 = k 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table3 
                    Table3_array(j) = Temporary_array(j) 
                Next 
                 
            Case Is > 0.75 
                List_Table(i) = "Table3" 
                'Table3 Registration 
                status_exist = False 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table3 
                    If Table3_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                        status_exist = True 
                    End If 
                Next 
                If status_exist = False Then 
                    Batas_Table3 = Batas_Table3 + 1 
                    Table3_array(Batas_Table3) = List_Outsider(i) 
                End If 
             
                'delete the membership from other table 
                k = 0 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table1       'Table1 
                    If Table1_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                    Else 
                        k = k + 1 
                        Temporary_array(k) = Table1_array(j) 
                    End If 
                Next 
                Batas_Table1 = k 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table1 
                    Table1_array(j) = Temporary_array(j) 
                Next 
             
                k = 0 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table2       'Table2 
                    If Table2_array(j) = List_Outsider(i) Then 
                    Else 
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                        k = k + 1 
                        Temporary_array(k) = Table2_array(j) 
                    End If 
                Next 
                Batas_Table2 = k 
                For j = 1 To Batas_Table2 
                    Table2_array(j) = Temporary_array(j) 
                Next 
             
        End Select 
    Next 
     
    'Send the result to Table files 
    Report_File = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table1" 
    WriteTextFileContents (""), Report_File, False 
    For m = 1 To Batas_Table1 
        WriteTextFileContents (Table1_array(m) + " "), Report_File, True 
    Next 
    Report_File = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table2" 
    WriteTextFileContents (""), Report_File, False 
    For m = 1 To Batas_Table2 
        WriteTextFileContents (Table2_array(m) + " "), Report_File, True 
    Next 
    Report_File = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table3" 
    WriteTextFileContents (""), Report_File, False 
    For m = 1 To Batas_Table3 
        WriteTextFileContents (Table3_array(m) + " "), Report_File, True 
    Next 
     
    'Send the results to firewall 
    FileCopy "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table1", "Z:\fuzzy_table1" 
    FileCopy "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table2", "Z:\fuzzy_table2" 
    FileCopy "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_table3", "Z:\fuzzy_table3" 
     
    'Presenting the result 
    List1.AddItem "Summary:" 
    List1.AddItem "Number of external server machine: " & Total_Outsider 
    List1.AddItem "Number of EXE file: " & Total_Bahaya1 
    List1.AddItem "Number of active script: " & Total_Bahaya2 
    List1.AddItem "Number of cookies: " & Total_Bahaya3 
    List1.AddItem "Number of add: " & Total_Bahaya5 
    List1.AddItem "Number of forced info: " & Total_Bahaya6 
     
    For m = 1 To (batas_index_outsider - 1) 
        List1.AddItem " " 
        List1.AddItem List_Outsider(m) 
        List1.AddItem "Internal user            " & List_Internal(m) 
        List1.AddItem "First access             " & List_AccessTime(m) 
        'List1.AddItem List_Kalimat(m) 
        List1.AddItem "Risk Value               " & List_Risk(m) 
        List1.AddItem List_Table(m) 
        List1.AddItem "EXE Files                " & List_Bahaya1(m) 
        List1.AddItem "Other involved machines  " & List_Bahaya4(m) 
        List1.AddItem "Active Scripts           " & List_Bahaya2(m) 
        List1.AddItem "Cookies                  " & List_Bahaya3(m) 
        List1.AddItem "Adds                     " & List_Bahaya5(m) 
        List1.AddItem "Forced Info              " & List_Bahaya6(m) 
    Next 
     
    'Writing the report to a text file 
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    'Report_File = "D:\Project\Fuzzy Traffic Analyzer\Report\" + File1.filename 
    Report_File = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_report" 
    WriteTextFileContents ("Buffer name: " + Nama_Traffic_Buffer), Report_File, False 
    For m = 1 To ((batas_index_outsider - 1) * 12) + 7 
        WriteTextFileContents (List1.List(m - 1)), Report_File, True 
    Next 
     
    'testing only 
    List2.Clear 
    List2.AddItem "TABLE1" 
    For i = 1 To Batas_Table1 
        List2.AddItem Table1_array(i) 
    Next 
    List2.AddItem " " 
    List2.AddItem "TABLE2" 
    For i = 1 To Batas_Table2 
        List2.AddItem Table2_array(i) 
    Next 
    List2.AddItem " " 
    List2.AddItem "TABLE3" 
    For i = 1 To Batas_Table3 
        List2.AddItem Table3_array(i) 
    Next 
             
    'closing the process 
    Erase Kumpulan_Kata 
    Erase List_Outsider 
    'Erase List_Kalimat 
    Erase List_Bahaya1 
    Erase List_Bahaya2 
    Erase List_Bahaya3 
    Erase List_Bahaya4 
    Erase List_Bahaya5 
    Erase List_Bahaya6 
    Erase List_Risk 
    Erase List_Table 
    Erase Suspicious 
    Erase Table1_array 
    Erase Table2_array 
    Erase Table3_array 
    Erase Temporary_array 
     
    Text2.Text = "End at " & Now 
     
    ' End reporting 
    Report_File = "D:\Project\Fuzzy-based\Table\fuzzy_report" 
    WriteTextFileContents (" "), Report_File, True 
    WriteTextFileContents (Text1.Text), Report_File, True 
    WriteTextFileContents (Text2.Text), Report_File, True 
    WriteTextFileContents ("File size " & FileLen(Nama_Traffic_Buffer) & " Bytes"), Report_File, 
True 
 
End Sub 
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Option Explicit 
Public wS_FileName          As New Class1 
Public wSuspendMode         As Boolean 
Dim milidetik As Double 
Dim waktu_skr_ref As Long 
Public wkt_skr_real As Double 
Public wkt_skr_string As String 
 
Private Sub Clear_Click() 
    List1.Clear 
    Text1.Text = "" 
    Text2.Text = "" 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Form_Activate() 
 
    Dim Number_processes 
         
    milidetik = 0 
    waktu_skr_ref = Second(Time) + 60 * Minute(Time) + 3600 * Hour(Time) 
     
    Timer1.Interval = 500 'approx 500 equal to 1 sec based on E-book 
    'Timer2.Interval = 5000 
    Timer2.Enabled = False 
    Timer3.Interval = 1 
     
    Start.Enabled = True 
    Stop1.Enabled = False 
     
    Number_processes = Module2.List_ActiveProcess(TreeView1) 
    Module2.List_ActiveModules TreeView1 
    'Text1.Text = ReadTextFileContents("D:\\Project\Memory Inspector\Virus_list.txt") 
     
    Label29.Caption = Number_processes 
    Label30.Caption = TreeView1.Nodes(1).FirstSibling.Text 
    Label31.Caption = TreeView1.Nodes(1).LastSibling.Text 
    Label32.Caption = TreeView1.Nodes(1).LastSibling.Children 
     
    Dim hi As SYSTEMINFO 
        GetSystemInfo hi 
        Label12.Caption = hi.dwNumberOfProcessors 
        Label11.Caption = hi.dwProcessorType 
        Label10.Caption = Hex$(hi.lpMinimumApplicationAddress) & "H" 
        Label9.Caption = Hex$(hi.lpMaximumApplicationAddress) & "H" 
         
    Dim si& 
    #If Win32 Then 
        myVer.dwOSVersionInfoSize = 148 
        si& = GetVersionEx&(myVer) 
        If myVer.dwPlatformId <= 4 Then 
            Label21.Caption = "Windows NT" 
        ElseIf myVer.dwPlatformId = 5 Then 
            Label21.Caption = "Windows 2000" 
        End If 
        Label22.Caption = myVer.dwPlatformId 
        Label23.Caption = myVer.szCSDVersion 
        'Label24.Caption = myVer.dwBuildNumber 
    #End If
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    Label24.Caption = Winsock1.LocalIP 'For software info 
      
    'Dim vernum& 
        'vernum& = GetVersion&() 
        'Print vernum& 
     
    'Print Second(Time) 
    'Print Time 
     
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Form_Click() 
    'Dim ms As MEMORYSTATUS 
        'ms.dwLength = Len(ms) 
        'GlobalMemoryStatus ms 
        'Print "Total physical memory: "; ms.dwTotalPhys 
        'Print "Available physical memory: "; ms.dwAvailPhys 
        'Label5.Caption = ms.dwTotalPhys 
        'Label6.Caption = ms.dwTotalPageFile 
        'Label7.Caption = ms.dwAvailPhys 
        'Label8.Caption = ms.dwLength 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Start_Click() 
    'Dim i As Integer 
    Start.Enabled = False 
    Stop1.Enabled = True 
    Timer2.Interval = 500 
    Timer2.Enabled = True 
     
    'i = 0 
    'Do Until i = 1000000 
    '    Module8.Timer_Action 
    '    Form1.Refresh 
    '    If Stop1.Value = True Then 
    '        Exit Do 
    '    End If 
    'Loop 
     
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Stop1_Click() 
    'Dim taskID As Long 
    Start.Enabled = True 
    Stop1.Enabled = False 
    Timer2.Enabled = False 
    'taskID = ExecuteTask("C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office\Winword.exe") 
     
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Timer1_Timer() 
    On Error Resume Next 
    Dim ms As MEMORYSTATUS 'For physical memory info 
        ms.dwLength = Len(ms) 
        GlobalMemoryStatus ms 
        Label5.Caption = (ms.dwTotalPhys \ 1000) 
        Label6.Caption = ((ms.dwTotalPhys - ms.dwAvailPhys) \ 1000) 
        Label7.Caption = (ms.dwAvailPhys \ 1000) 
        Label8.Caption = ms.dwMemoryLoad 
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End Sub 
 
Private Sub Timer2_Timer() 
    'On Error Resume Next 
    Module9.Timer_Action   'written in module8.bas 
End Sub 
Function ReadTextFileContents(filename As String) As String 
    Dim fnum As Integer, isOpen As Boolean 
    On Error GoTo Error_Handler 
    ' Get the next free file number. 
    fnum = FreeFile() 
    Open filename For Input As #fnum 
    ' If execution flow got here, the file has been open without error. 
    isOpen = True 
    ' Read the entire contents in one single operation. 
    ReadTextFileContents = Input(LOF(fnum), fnum) 
    ' Intentionally flow into the error handler to close the file. 
Error_Handler: 
    ' Raise the error (if any), but first close the file. 
    If isOpen Then Close #fnum 
    'If Err Then Err.Raise Err.Number, , Err.Description 
End Function 
Sub WriteTextFileContents(Text As String, filename As String, Optional AppendMode As Boolean) 
    Dim fnum As Integer, isOpen As Boolean 
    On Error GoTo Error_Handler 
    ' Get the next free file number. 
    fnum = FreeFile() 
    If AppendMode Then 
         Open filename For Append As #fnum 
     Else 
         Open filename For Output As #fnum 
     End If 
     ' If execution flow gets here, the file has been opened correctly. 
     isOpen = True 
     ' Print to the file in one single operation. 
     Print #fnum, Text 
     ' Intentionally flow into the error handler to close the file. 
Error_Handler: 
    ' Raise the error (if any), but first close the file. 
    If isOpen Then Close #fnum 
    'If Err Then Err.Raise Err.Number, , Err.Description 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Timer3_Timer() 
    Dim wkt_skr As Long 
    Dim detik, menit, jam As Long 
     
    detik = Second(Time) 
    menit = Minute(Time) 
    jam = Hour(Time) 
    wkt_skr = detik + 60 * menit + 3600 * jam 
    If wkt_skr = waktu_skr_ref Then 
        milidetik = milidetik + 1.587 
    Else 
        'Text2.Text = milidetik 
        waktu_skr_ref = wkt_skr 
        milidetik = 0 
    End If 
     
    wkt_skr_real = wkt_skr + milidetik / 100 
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    wkt_skr_string = jam & ":" & menit & ":" & detik & "." & milidetik '/ 100 
End Sub 
 
Option Compare Text 
Option Explicit 
Dim ukuran_aplikasi_lg_jalan As Long 
Public Sub Timer_Action() 
    Dim Number_processes 
    Dim i, j As Integer 
    Dim application_list As String 
    Dim number_application_match As Integer 
    Dim running_application As String 
    Dim running_application_list As String 
    Dim data_running As String 
    Dim data_secure As String 
    Dim index_applikasi_lgjln As Integer 
    Dim wkt_mulai As Date 
    Dim elapsed_time As Integer 
     
    wkt_mulai = Time 
    Form1.Stop1.Enabled = False 
     
    Number_processes = Module2.List_ActiveProcess(Form1.TreeView1) 
    'Module2.List_ActiveModules Form1.TreeView1 
     
    Form1.Label29.Caption = Number_processes 
    Form1.Label30.Caption = Form1.TreeView1.Nodes(1).FirstSibling.Text 
    Form1.Label31.Caption = Form1.TreeView1.Nodes(1).LastSibling.Text 
    Form1.Label32.Caption = Form1.TreeView1.Nodes(1).LastSibling.Children 
     
    'Creating the database of running application using array 
    Dim aplikasi_lg_jalan(1 To 1000) As String 
    For i = 3 To Number_processes 'i=3 for avoiding the content of [System Process] written in the file 
         aplikasi_lg_jalan(i - 2) = Form1.TreeView1.Nodes(i).Text 
    Next 
    'Getting the file size of running applications by calling Delphi application 
    'Dim taskID As Long 'the product is result_carifile.txt 
    'taskID = ExecuteTask("D:\Project\Finding_file\Project1.exe") 
    'Getting the file size of running applications by calling FindFilesandSize procedure 
    For i = 1 To Number_processes - 2 
        elapsed_time = (Time - wkt_mulai) * 100000 
        Form1.StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Analyzing " + aplikasi_lg_jalan(i) + " with elapsed time " & 
elapsed_time & " seconds" 
        ukuran_aplikasi_lg_jalan = FindFileSizefromDB(aplikasi_lg_jalan(i)) 
        'FindFilesandSize "c:", aplikasi_lg_jalan(i) 
        aplikasi_lg_jalan(i) = aplikasi_lg_jalan(i) + " " & ukuran_aplikasi_lg_jalan 'modifying array 
running appl 
    Next i 
    'only for documentation 
    Dim doc_applikasi_lg_jln As String 
    doc_applikasi_lg_jln = "D:\Project\Active Program Inspector\doc_applikasi_lg_jln.txt" 
    Kill (doc_applikasi_lg_jln) 
    For i = 1 To Number_processes - 2 
        Form1.WriteTextFileContents (aplikasi_lg_jalan(i)), doc_applikasi_lg_jln, True 
    Next i 
    'Reading the database of secure application (consist of appl name and size) 
    application_list = "D:\Project\Building_Application_DB\ApplicationDBNS.txt" 
    'running_application_list = "D:\Project\Finding_file\result_carifile.txt" 
    'Comparing the list of running application and the reference (available application software) 
    Dim fnum1, fnum2 As Integer 
 143
    fnum1 = FreeFile() 
    Open application_list For Input As #fnum1 
    'fnum2 = FreeFile() 
    'Open running_application_list For Input As #fnum2 
    Dim Isi_applList, Isi_runningAppl As String 
    Dim status As Boolean 
    Dim MgknVirus(1 To 1000) As String 
    Dim MgknNormal(1 To 1000) As String 
    Dim isi_reference(1 To 100000) As String 
    Dim hitung As Integer 
    Dim ngitung As Integer 
    Dim index_ref, jml_ref As Integer 
    index_ref = 1 
    Do Until EOF(fnum1) 
        Line Input #fnum1, isi_reference(index_ref) 
        index_ref = index_ref + 1 
    Loop 
    jml_ref = index_ref - 1 
    hitung = 1 
    ngitung = 1 
    'Do Until EOF(fnum2) 
    index_applikasi_lgjln = 1 
    Do Until index_applikasi_lgjln = (Number_processes - 1) 
        status = False 
        Isi_runningAppl = aplikasi_lg_jalan(index_applikasi_lgjln) 
        index_applikasi_lgjln = index_applikasi_lgjln + 1 
        For index_ref = 1 To jml_ref 
            Isi_applList = isi_reference(index_ref) 
            If Isi_runningAppl = Isi_applList Then 
                status = True 
            End If 
            If status = True Then          'file is matched with reference 
                MgknNormal(ngitung) = Isi_runningAppl + " " + Isi_applList 'list of ok appl 
                ngitung = ngitung + 1 
                Exit For 
            End If 
        Next 
        If status = False Then               'MALICIOUS PROGRAM - running file is not matched with 
reference 
            'Text1.Text = "virus" + " " + Isi_applList + " " + Isi_runningAppl 
            'MgknVirus(hitung) = Isi_runningAppl     'suspected as virus 
            MgknVirus(hitung) = Isi_runningAppl      'list of suspected virus 
            Form1.List1.AddItem (Isi_runningAppl + " at " & Form1.wkt_skr_real) 
            hitung = hitung + 1 
        End If 
    Loop 
    Dim suspected_virus_list As String          'Reporting suspicious process 
    Dim agent_report As String 
    suspected_virus_list = "D:\Project\Active Program Inspector\suspected_virus_list.txt" 
    agent_report = "Z:\agent_report" 
    'Kill (suspected_virus_list) 'reset/rewrite mode 
    If hitung > 1 Then 
        Form1.Text1.Text = "threat" + " " & Now 
        For i = 1 To (hitung - 1) 
            Form1.WriteTextFileContents (Form1.Label24.Caption + " " + MgknVirus(i)), 
suspected_virus_list, True 'append mode 
            Form1.WriteTextFileContents (Form1.Label24.Caption + " " + MgknVirus(i)), agent_report, 
True 'append mode 
            'MgknVirus(i) is suspicious process and Label24 is IPaddr of the machine 
        Next 
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    Else 
        'Form1.Text1.Text = "secure" 
    End If 
    Dim normal_appl_list As String              'Reporting normal application 
    normal_appl_list = "D:\Project\Active Program Inspector\normal_appl_list.txt" 
    Kill (normal_appl_list) 'reset/rewrite mode 
    If ngitung > 1 Then 
        For i = 1 To (ngitung - 1) 
            Form1.WriteTextFileContents (MgknNormal(i)), normal_appl_list, True 'append mode 
        Next 
    End If 
    Close #fnum1 
    Erase MgknVirus 
    Erase MgknNormal 
    Erase isi_reference 
    Erase aplikasi_lg_jalan 
    Form1.Stop1.Enabled = True 
End Sub 
 
Private Function FindFileSizefromDB(nama_file As String) As Long 
    Dim statuscari As Boolean 
    Dim fnum1, fnum2 As Integer 
    Dim namafilename, namafilepath As String 
    Dim filename, filepath As String 
    Dim filesize As Long 
    namafilename = "D:\Project\Building_Application_DB\ApplicationDBN.txt" 
    namafilepath = "D:\Project\Building_Application_DB\ApplicationDBP.txt" 
    fnum1 = FreeFile() 
    Open namafilename For Input As #fnum1 
    fnum2 = FreeFile() 
    Open namafilepath For Input As #fnum2 
    statuscari = False 
    Do Until EOF(fnum1) 
        Line Input #fnum1, filename 
        Line Input #fnum2, filepath 
        If filename = nama_file Then                   'folder of the file has been found 
            filesize = FileLen(filepath + nama_file)   'file size is obtained 
            statuscari = True 
            Exit Do 
        End If 
    Loop 
    Close #fnum1 
    Close #fnum2 
    If statuscari = True Then 
        FindFileSizefromDB = filesize 'file size is obtained 
    Else 
        FindFileSizefromDB = 0 
    End If 
End Function
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#!/bin/sh 
 
i=1 
while [ $i -lt 4 ] 
do 
 echo "" 
 i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
done 
 
echo "#################################################" 
echo "#                                                        #" 
echo "#  ACTIVE FIREWALL                                     #" 
echo "#  Mode of operation: DISTRIBUTED AGENT-BASED     #" 
echo "#                                                       #" 
echo "#################################################" 
 
i=1 
while [ $i -lt 2 ] 
do 
 echo "" 
 i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
done 
 
# eth0 = EXTERNAL NETWORK 
# eth1 = INTERNAL NETWORK 
# Need to run ./PROJECT/FIREWALL/timestamp in other console to get the timing of the firewall 
# To simulate communication, pls run ./PROJECT/FIREWALL/Agent_FW_communication 
 
# ------------------ 
# 1. Initialization 
# ------------------ 
 
INTERNAL_SUBNET="24.4.74" 
 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/AGENT_HISTORY 
 
cd /PROJECT/FIREWALL 
./agent_based_preconfiguration     
# To preconfigure firewall machine, default open for start up 
 
echo "Security Status  : Secure" 
echo "Firewall Status  : Running Normally" 
i=1 
while [ $i -lt 3 ] 
do 
 echo "" 
 i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
done 
 
 
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
# 2. Monitoring the result of Distributed Agent-Based Security Modules 
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
while [ 1 ] 
do 
 # Checking intrusion 
 # ------------------- 
 # cp -f /UMUM/NEWS/report.txt /PROJECT/TEMP/report.txt 
 # > /UMUM/NEWS/report.txt
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 cp -f /UMUM/NEWS/agent_report /PROJECT/TEMP/agent_report 
 > /UMUM/NEWS/agent_report 
 
 JUMLAH_BARIS=`wc -l /PROJECT/TEMP/agent_report | awk '{print $1}'` 
 #echo "$JUMLAH_BARIS" 
 
 # There is/are intrusions if (JUMLAH_BARIS = > 1) 
 if [[ $JUMLAH_BARIS -ge 1 ]] 
 then 
  # Get the computer being attacked and close communication line of this machine 
   
  echo "#################################################" 
  echo "#                                                       #" 
  echo "#  ACTIVE FIREWALL                                     #" 
  echo "#  Mode of operation: DISTRIBUTED AGENT-BASED     #" 
  echo "#                                                       #" 
  echo "#################################################" 
   
  echo "" 
 
  # date 
  # cat /PROJECT/TEMP/TIMESTAMP #for experiment 
  # echo doing action ----- 
  # echo . 
  # echo . 
  i=1 
  while [[ ${i:=1} -le $JUMLAH_BARIS ]] 
  do 
victim_PC=`head -n $i /PROJECT/TEMP/agent_report > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/agentreportTEMP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/agentreportTEMP | awk '{print $1}'` 
program_name=`head -n $i /PROJECT/TEMP/agent_report > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/agentreportTEMP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/agentreportTEMP | awk '{print $2}'` 
 
   echo "Suspicious program $i $program_name running in $victim_PC" 
     
   status_victim="" 
status_victim=`cat /PROJECT/TEMP/AGENT_HISTORY | grep 
$victim_PC` 
   if [ "$status_victim" = "" ] 
   then 
    echo "Communication is closed for $victim_PC" 
    echo $victim_PC >> /PROJECT/TEMP/AGENT_HISTORY 
iptables -I FORWARD 1 -i eth1 -p tcp -s $victim_PC -d 0/0 -j 
DROP 
iptables -I FORWARD 1 -i eth0 -p tcp -s 0/0 -d $victim_PC -j 
DROP 
    date 
   fi 
   i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
   # echo $i 
  done 
  echo "=====> Action to isolate victim machine has been accomplished" 
  > /PROJECT/TEMP/agent_report 
 fi 
done 
 
echo "Finish" 
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GROUP 4: Experiment 19 – 24 
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GROUP 7: Experiment 37 – 41 
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Table C2: Function of experimental results 
Experiment 
Index 
)(xf  ∫= dxxfF )(
Group 1 
ff(x) = -0.0113x4 + 0.1768x3 - 0.9557x2 + 2.0257x - 0.7757 
R2 = 0.9907 
fw(x)  = 0.007x4 - 0.1196x3 + 0.7085x2 - 1.6539x + 1.3694 
R2 = 0.9994 
fd(x)  = 0.0042x4 - 0.0692x3 + 0.3861x2 - 0.8213x + 0.5931 
R2 = 0.7404 
fm(x)  = 0.0019x4 - 0.0271x3 + 0.1369x2 - 0.2885x + 0.245 
R2 = 0.7005 
2.746917 
 
0.844083 
 
0.39075 
 
0.168292 
Group 2 
ff(x) = 0.0086x4 - 0.118x3 + 0.5459x2 - 0.9897x + 1.1725 
R2 = 0.9651 
fw(x) = -0.0093x4 + 0.1308x3 - 0.6265x2 + 1.2218x - 0.6832 
R2 = 0.5792 
fd(x) = 0.0069x4 - 0.0817x3 + 0.3071x2 - 0.386x + 0.1803 
R2 = 0.7705 
fm(x) = -0.0003x4 + 0.0043x3 - 0.0245x2 + 0.058x - 0.0275 
R2 = 0.9898 
2.836083 
 
0.951333 
 
0.434458 
 
0.047292 
Group 3 
ff(x) = 0.0137x4 - 0.2201x3 + 1.216x2 - 2.6745x + 2.5443 
R2 = 0.8257 
fw(x) = -0.0115x4 + 0.1585x3 - 0.7395x2 + 1.3289x - 0.5906 
R2 = 0.9995 
fd(x) = -0.0111x4 + 0.1531x3 - 0.7138x2 + 1.2858x - 0.6205 
R2 = 1 
fm(x) = -0.0044x4 + 0.0588x3 - 0.2626x2 + 0.4587x - 0.2315 
R2 = 0.9134 
3.110542 
 
0.737125 
 
0.548958 
 
0.244583 
Group 4 
ff(x) = 0.0038x4 - 0.0441x3 + 0.157x2 - 0.184x + 0.65 
R2 = 0.8224 
fw(x)= -0.0011x4 + 0.0033x3 + 0.0452x2 - 0.2231x + 0.4113 
R2 = 0.9776 
fd(x) = -0.0013x4 + 0.0136x3 - 0.0465x2 + 0.053x + 0.1065 
R2 = 0.8128 
fm(x) = 0.0004x4 - 0.0049x3 + 0.0199x2 - 0.032x + 0.0367 
R2 = 0.9952 
2.913292 
 
0.749458 
 
0.509 
 
0.085292 
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Table C2: cont. 
 
Group 5 
ff(x)  = 0.0345x4 - 0.5986x3 + 3.7242x2 - 9.7742x + 9.7193 
R2 = 0.9953 
fw(x)= -0.0004x4 + 0.0087x3 - 0.0693x2 + 0.1979x - 0.0004 
R2 = 0.8791 
fd(x) = 0.0037x4 - 0.054x3 + 0.2581x2 - 0.4679x + 0.3532 
R2 = 0.6576 
fm(x) = 0.0006x4 - 0.0081x3 + 0.0351x2 - 0.0591x + 0.0517 
R2 = 0.8809 
4.29975 
 
0.689375 
 
0.345917 
 
0.050375 
Group 6 
ff(x) = -0.0082x4 + 0.1113x3 - 0.4929x2 + 0.7715x + 0.2627 
R2 = 0.6642 
fw(x)= 0.0029x4 - 0.0332x3 + 0.1084x2 - 0.1217x + 0.3041 
R2 = 0.8894 
fd(x) = -2E-05x4 + 0.0088x3 - 0.0953x2 + 0.2863x - 0.0923 
R2 = 0.6321 
fm(x) = 0.0031x4 - 0.0424x3 + 0.1948x2 - 0.3383x + 0.195 
R2 = 0.7156 
2.772625 
 
0.920417 
 
0.536817 
 
0.108917 
Group 7 
ff(x)  = -0.0113x4 + 0.1429x3 - 0.6552x2 + 1.2946x - 0.34 
R2 = 1 
fw(x)= -0.0146x4 + 0.1932x3 - 0.9072x2 + 1.744x - 0.93 
R2 = 1 
fd(x) = -0.0116x4 + 0.1364x3 - 0.5672x2 + 0.977x - 0.4912 
R2 = 1 
fm(x) = -0.0013x4 + 0.0142x3 - 0.0538x2 + 0.0808x - 0.03 
R2 = 1 
2.32576 
 
0.72752 
 
0.345653 
 
0.028827 
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Option Explicit 
Public wS_FileName          As New Class1 
Public wSuspendMode         As Boolean 
Dim milidetik As Double 
Dim waktu_skr_ref As Long 
Public wkt_skr_real As Double 
Public wkt_skr_string As String 
 
Private Sub Clear_Click() 
    List1.Clear 
    Text1.Text = "" 
    Text2.Text = "" 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Form_Activate() 
 
    Dim Number_processes 
         
    milidetik = 0 
    waktu_skr_ref = Second(Time) + 60 * Minute(Time) + 3600 * Hour(Time) 
     
    Timer1.Interval = 500 'approx 500 equal to 1 sec based on E-book 
    'Timer2.Interval = 5000 
    Timer2.Enabled = False 
    Timer3.Interval = 1 
     
    Start.Enabled = True 
    Stop1.Enabled = False 
     
    Number_processes = Module2.List_ActiveProcess(TreeView1) 
    Module2.List_ActiveModules TreeView1 
    'Text1.Text = ReadTextFileContents("D:\\Project\Memory Inspector\Virus_list.txt") 
     
    Label29.Caption = Number_processes 
    Label30.Caption = TreeView1.Nodes(1).FirstSibling.Text 
    Label31.Caption = TreeView1.Nodes(1).LastSibling.Text 
    Label32.Caption = TreeView1.Nodes(1).LastSibling.Children 
     
    Dim hi As SYSTEMINFO 
        GetSystemInfo hi 
        Label12.Caption = hi.dwNumberOfProcessors 
        Label11.Caption = hi.dwProcessorType 
        Label10.Caption = Hex$(hi.lpMinimumApplicationAddress) & "H" 
        Label9.Caption = Hex$(hi.lpMaximumApplicationAddress) & "H" 
         
    Dim si& 
    #If Win32 Then 
        myVer.dwOSVersionInfoSize = 148 
        si& = GetVersionEx&(myVer) 
        If myVer.dwPlatformId <= 4 Then 
            Label21.Caption = "Windows NT" 
        ElseIf myVer.dwPlatformId = 5 Then 
            Label21.Caption = "Windows 2000" 
        End If 
        Label22.Caption = myVer.dwPlatformId 
        Label23.Caption = myVer.szCSDVersion 
        'Label24.Caption = myVer.dwBuildNumber 
    #End If
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    Label24.Caption = Winsock1.LocalIP 'For software info 
      
    'Dim vernum& 
        'vernum& = GetVersion&() 
        'Print vernum& 
     
    'Print Second(Time) 
    'Print Time 
     
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Form_Click() 
    'Dim ms As MEMORYSTATUS 
        'ms.dwLength = Len(ms) 
        'GlobalMemoryStatus ms 
        'Print "Total physical memory: "; ms.dwTotalPhys 
        'Print "Available physical memory: "; ms.dwAvailPhys 
        'Label5.Caption = ms.dwTotalPhys 
        'Label6.Caption = ms.dwTotalPageFile 
        'Label7.Caption = ms.dwAvailPhys 
        'Label8.Caption = ms.dwLength 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Start_Click() 
    'Dim i As Integer 
    Start.Enabled = False 
    Stop1.Enabled = True 
    Timer2.Interval = 500 
    Timer2.Enabled = True 
     
    'i = 0 
    'Do Until i = 1000000 
    '    Module8.Timer_Action 
    '    Form1.Refresh 
    '    If Stop1.Value = True Then 
    '        Exit Do 
    '    End If 
    'Loop 
     
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Stop1_Click() 
    'Dim taskID As Long 
    Start.Enabled = True 
    Stop1.Enabled = False 
    Timer2.Enabled = False 
    'taskID = ExecuteTask("C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office\Winword.exe") 
     
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Timer1_Timer() 
    On Error Resume Next 
    Dim ms As MEMORYSTATUS 'For physical memory info 
        ms.dwLength = Len(ms) 
        GlobalMemoryStatus ms 
        Label5.Caption = (ms.dwTotalPhys \ 1000) 
        Label6.Caption = ((ms.dwTotalPhys - ms.dwAvailPhys) \ 1000) 
        Label7.Caption = (ms.dwAvailPhys \ 1000) 
        Label8.Caption = ms.dwMemoryLoad 
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End Sub 
 
Private Sub Timer2_Timer() 
    'On Error Resume Next 
    Module9.Timer_Action   'written in module8.bas 
End Sub 
Function ReadTextFileContents(filename As String) As String 
    Dim fnum As Integer, isOpen As Boolean 
    On Error GoTo Error_Handler 
    ' Get the next free file number. 
    fnum = FreeFile() 
    Open filename For Input As #fnum 
    ' If execution flow got here, the file has been open without error. 
    isOpen = True 
    ' Read the entire contents in one single operation. 
    ReadTextFileContents = Input(LOF(fnum), fnum) 
    ' Intentionally flow into the error handler to close the file. 
Error_Handler: 
    ' Raise the error (if any), but first close the file. 
    If isOpen Then Close #fnum 
    'If Err Then Err.Raise Err.Number, , Err.Description 
End Function 
Sub WriteTextFileContents(Text As String, filename As String, Optional AppendMode As Boolean) 
    Dim fnum As Integer, isOpen As Boolean 
    On Error GoTo Error_Handler 
    ' Get the next free file number. 
    fnum = FreeFile() 
    If AppendMode Then 
         Open filename For Append As #fnum 
     Else 
         Open filename For Output As #fnum 
     End If 
     ' If execution flow gets here, the file has been opened correctly. 
     isOpen = True 
     ' Print to the file in one single operation. 
     Print #fnum, Text 
     ' Intentionally flow into the error handler to close the file. 
Error_Handler: 
    ' Raise the error (if any), but first close the file. 
    If isOpen Then Close #fnum 
    'If Err Then Err.Raise Err.Number, , Err.Description 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Timer3_Timer() 
    Dim wkt_skr As Long 
    Dim detik, menit, jam As Long 
     
    detik = Second(Time) 
    menit = Minute(Time) 
    jam = Hour(Time) 
    wkt_skr = detik + 60 * menit + 3600 * jam 
    If wkt_skr = waktu_skr_ref Then 
        milidetik = milidetik + 1.587 
    Else 
        'Text2.Text = milidetik 
        waktu_skr_ref = wkt_skr 
        milidetik = 0 
    End If 
     
    wkt_skr_real = wkt_skr + milidetik / 100 
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    wkt_skr_string = jam & ":" & menit & ":" & detik & "." & milidetik '/ 100 
End Sub 
 
Option Compare Text 
Option Explicit 
Dim ukuran_aplikasi_lg_jalan As Long 
Public Sub Timer_Action() 
    Dim Number_processes 
    Dim i, j As Integer 
    Dim application_list As String 
    Dim number_application_match As Integer 
    Dim running_application As String 
    Dim running_application_list As String 
    Dim data_running As String 
    Dim data_secure As String 
    Dim index_applikasi_lgjln As Integer 
    Dim wkt_mulai As Date 
    Dim elapsed_time As Integer 
     
    wkt_mulai = Time 
    Form1.Stop1.Enabled = False 
     
    Number_processes = Module2.List_ActiveProcess(Form1.TreeView1) 
    'Module2.List_ActiveModules Form1.TreeView1 
     
    Form1.Label29.Caption = Number_processes 
    Form1.Label30.Caption = Form1.TreeView1.Nodes(1).FirstSibling.Text 
    Form1.Label31.Caption = Form1.TreeView1.Nodes(1).LastSibling.Text 
    Form1.Label32.Caption = Form1.TreeView1.Nodes(1).LastSibling.Children 
     
    'Creating the database of running application using array 
    Dim aplikasi_lg_jalan(1 To 1000) As String 
    For i = 3 To Number_processes 'i=3 for avoiding the content of [System Process] written in the file 
         aplikasi_lg_jalan(i - 2) = Form1.TreeView1.Nodes(i).Text 
    Next 
    'Getting the file size of running applications by calling Delphi application 
    'Dim taskID As Long 'the product is result_carifile.txt 
    'taskID = ExecuteTask("D:\Project\Finding_file\Project1.exe") 
    'Getting the file size of running applications by calling FindFilesandSize procedure 
    For i = 1 To Number_processes - 2 
        elapsed_time = (Time - wkt_mulai) * 100000 
        Form1.StatusBar1.SimpleText = "Analyzing " + aplikasi_lg_jalan(i) + " with elapsed time " & 
elapsed_time & " seconds" 
        ukuran_aplikasi_lg_jalan = FindFileSizefromDB(aplikasi_lg_jalan(i)) 
        'FindFilesandSize "c:", aplikasi_lg_jalan(i) 
        aplikasi_lg_jalan(i) = aplikasi_lg_jalan(i) + " " & ukuran_aplikasi_lg_jalan 'modifying array 
running appl 
    Next i 
    'only for documentation 
    Dim doc_applikasi_lg_jln As String 
    doc_applikasi_lg_jln = "D:\Project\Active Program Inspector\doc_applikasi_lg_jln.txt" 
    Kill (doc_applikasi_lg_jln) 
    For i = 1 To Number_processes - 2 
        Form1.WriteTextFileContents (aplikasi_lg_jalan(i)), doc_applikasi_lg_jln, True 
    Next i 
    'Reading the database of secure application (consist of appl name and size) 
    application_list = "D:\Project\Building_Application_DB\ApplicationDBNS.txt" 
    'running_application_list = "D:\Project\Finding_file\result_carifile.txt" 
    'Comparing the list of running application and the reference (available application software) 
    Dim fnum1, fnum2 As Integer 
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    fnum1 = FreeFile() 
    Open application_list For Input As #fnum1 
    'fnum2 = FreeFile() 
    'Open running_application_list For Input As #fnum2 
    Dim Isi_applList, Isi_runningAppl As String 
    Dim status As Boolean 
    Dim MgknVirus(1 To 1000) As String 
    Dim MgknNormal(1 To 1000) As String 
    Dim isi_reference(1 To 100000) As String 
    Dim hitung As Integer 
    Dim ngitung As Integer 
    Dim index_ref, jml_ref As Integer 
    index_ref = 1 
    Do Until EOF(fnum1) 
        Line Input #fnum1, isi_reference(index_ref) 
        index_ref = index_ref + 1 
    Loop 
    jml_ref = index_ref - 1 
    hitung = 1 
    ngitung = 1 
    'Do Until EOF(fnum2) 
    index_applikasi_lgjln = 1 
    Do Until index_applikasi_lgjln = (Number_processes - 1) 
        status = False 
        Isi_runningAppl = aplikasi_lg_jalan(index_applikasi_lgjln) 
        index_applikasi_lgjln = index_applikasi_lgjln + 1 
        For index_ref = 1 To jml_ref 
            Isi_applList = isi_reference(index_ref) 
            If Isi_runningAppl = Isi_applList Then 
                status = True 
            End If 
            If status = True Then          'file is matched with reference 
                MgknNormal(ngitung) = Isi_runningAppl + " " + Isi_applList 'list of ok appl 
                ngitung = ngitung + 1 
                Exit For 
            End If 
        Next 
        If status = False Then               'MALICIOUS PROGRAM - running file is not matched with 
reference 
            'Text1.Text = "virus" + " " + Isi_applList + " " + Isi_runningAppl 
            'MgknVirus(hitung) = Isi_runningAppl     'suspected as virus 
            MgknVirus(hitung) = Isi_runningAppl      'list of suspected virus 
            Form1.List1.AddItem (Isi_runningAppl + " at " & Form1.wkt_skr_real) 
            hitung = hitung + 1 
        End If 
    Loop 
    Dim suspected_virus_list As String          'Reporting suspicious process 
    Dim agent_report As String 
    suspected_virus_list = "D:\Project\Active Program Inspector\suspected_virus_list.txt" 
    agent_report = "Z:\agent_report" 
    'Kill (suspected_virus_list) 'reset/rewrite mode 
    If hitung > 1 Then 
        Form1.Text1.Text = "threat" + " " & Now 
        For i = 1 To (hitung - 1) 
            Form1.WriteTextFileContents (Form1.Label24.Caption + " " + MgknVirus(i)), 
suspected_virus_list, True 'append mode 
            Form1.WriteTextFileContents (Form1.Label24.Caption + " " + MgknVirus(i)), agent_report, 
True 'append mode 
            'MgknVirus(i) is suspicious process and Label24 is IPaddr of the machine 
        Next 
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    Else 
        'Form1.Text1.Text = "secure" 
    End If 
    Dim normal_appl_list As String              'Reporting normal application 
    normal_appl_list = "D:\Project\Active Program Inspector\normal_appl_list.txt" 
    Kill (normal_appl_list) 'reset/rewrite mode 
    If ngitung > 1 Then 
        For i = 1 To (ngitung - 1) 
            Form1.WriteTextFileContents (MgknNormal(i)), normal_appl_list, True 'append mode 
        Next 
    End If 
    Close #fnum1 
    Erase MgknVirus 
    Erase MgknNormal 
    Erase isi_reference 
    Erase aplikasi_lg_jalan 
    Form1.Stop1.Enabled = True 
End Sub 
 
Private Function FindFileSizefromDB(nama_file As String) As Long 
    Dim statuscari As Boolean 
    Dim fnum1, fnum2 As Integer 
    Dim namafilename, namafilepath As String 
    Dim filename, filepath As String 
    Dim filesize As Long 
    namafilename = "D:\Project\Building_Application_DB\ApplicationDBN.txt" 
    namafilepath = "D:\Project\Building_Application_DB\ApplicationDBP.txt" 
    fnum1 = FreeFile() 
    Open namafilename For Input As #fnum1 
    fnum2 = FreeFile() 
    Open namafilepath For Input As #fnum2 
    statuscari = False 
    Do Until EOF(fnum1) 
        Line Input #fnum1, filename 
        Line Input #fnum2, filepath 
        If filename = nama_file Then                   'folder of the file has been found 
            filesize = FileLen(filepath + nama_file)   'file size is obtained 
            statuscari = True 
            Exit Do 
        End If 
    Loop 
    Close #fnum1 
    Close #fnum2 
    If statuscari = True Then 
        FindFileSizefromDB = filesize 'file size is obtained 
    Else 
        FindFileSizefromDB = 0 
    End If 
End Function
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#!/bin/sh 
 
i=1 
while [ $i -lt 4 ] 
do 
 echo "" 
 i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
done 
 
echo "#################################################" 
echo "#                                                        #" 
echo "#  ACTIVE FIREWALL                                     #" 
echo "#  Mode of operation: DISTRIBUTED AGENT-BASED     #" 
echo "#                                                       #" 
echo "#################################################" 
 
i=1 
while [ $i -lt 2 ] 
do 
 echo "" 
 i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
done 
 
# eth0 = EXTERNAL NETWORK 
# eth1 = INTERNAL NETWORK 
# Need to run ./PROJECT/FIREWALL/timestamp in other console to get the timing of the firewall 
# To simulate communication, pls run ./PROJECT/FIREWALL/Agent_FW_communication 
 
# ------------------ 
# 1. Initialization 
# ------------------ 
 
INTERNAL_SUBNET="24.4.74" 
 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/AGENT_HISTORY 
 
cd /PROJECT/FIREWALL 
./agent_based_preconfiguration     
# To preconfigure firewall machine, default open for start up 
 
echo "Security Status  : Secure" 
echo "Firewall Status  : Running Normally" 
i=1 
while [ $i -lt 3 ] 
do 
 echo "" 
 i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
done 
 
 
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
# 2. Monitoring the result of Distributed Agent-Based Security Modules 
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
while [ 1 ] 
do 
 # Checking intrusion 
 # ------------------- 
 # cp -f /UMUM/NEWS/report.txt /PROJECT/TEMP/report.txt 
 # > /UMUM/NEWS/report.txt
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 cp -f /UMUM/NEWS/agent_report /PROJECT/TEMP/agent_report 
 > /UMUM/NEWS/agent_report 
 
 JUMLAH_BARIS=`wc -l /PROJECT/TEMP/agent_report | awk '{print $1}'` 
 #echo "$JUMLAH_BARIS" 
 
 # There is/are intrusions if (JUMLAH_BARIS = > 1) 
 if [[ $JUMLAH_BARIS -ge 1 ]] 
 then 
  # Get the computer being attacked and close communication line of this machine 
   
  echo "#################################################" 
  echo "#                                                       #" 
  echo "#  ACTIVE FIREWALL                                     #" 
  echo "#  Mode of operation: DISTRIBUTED AGENT-BASED     #" 
  echo "#                                                       #" 
  echo "#################################################" 
   
  echo "" 
 
  # date 
  # cat /PROJECT/TEMP/TIMESTAMP #for experiment 
  # echo doing action ----- 
  # echo . 
  # echo . 
  i=1 
  while [[ ${i:=1} -le $JUMLAH_BARIS ]] 
  do 
victim_PC=`head -n $i /PROJECT/TEMP/agent_report > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/agentreportTEMP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/agentreportTEMP | awk '{print $1}'` 
program_name=`head -n $i /PROJECT/TEMP/agent_report > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/agentreportTEMP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/agentreportTEMP | awk '{print $2}'` 
 
   echo "Suspicious program $i $program_name running in $victim_PC" 
     
   status_victim="" 
status_victim=`cat /PROJECT/TEMP/AGENT_HISTORY | grep 
$victim_PC` 
   if [ "$status_victim" = "" ] 
   then 
    echo "Communication is closed for $victim_PC" 
    echo $victim_PC >> /PROJECT/TEMP/AGENT_HISTORY 
iptables -I FORWARD 1 -i eth1 -p tcp -s $victim_PC -d 0/0 -j 
DROP 
iptables -I FORWARD 1 -i eth0 -p tcp -s 0/0 -d $victim_PC -j 
DROP 
    date 
   fi 
   i=`expr ${i} + 1` 
   # echo $i 
  done 
  echo "=====> Action to isolate victim machine has been accomplished" 
  > /PROJECT/TEMP/agent_report 
 fi 
done 
 
echo "Finish" 
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GROUP 4: Experiment 19 – 24 
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GROUP 7: Experiment 37 – 41 
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Table C2: Function of experimental results 
Experiment 
Index 
)(xf  ∫= dxxfF )(
Group 1 
ff(x) = -0.0113x4 + 0.1768x3 - 0.9557x2 + 2.0257x - 0.7757 
R2 = 0.9907 
fw(x)  = 0.007x4 - 0.1196x3 + 0.7085x2 - 1.6539x + 1.3694 
R2 = 0.9994 
fd(x)  = 0.0042x4 - 0.0692x3 + 0.3861x2 - 0.8213x + 0.5931 
R2 = 0.7404 
fm(x)  = 0.0019x4 - 0.0271x3 + 0.1369x2 - 0.2885x + 0.245 
R2 = 0.7005 
2.746917 
 
0.844083 
 
0.39075 
 
0.168292 
Group 2 
ff(x) = 0.0086x4 - 0.118x3 + 0.5459x2 - 0.9897x + 1.1725 
R2 = 0.9651 
fw(x) = -0.0093x4 + 0.1308x3 - 0.6265x2 + 1.2218x - 0.6832 
R2 = 0.5792 
fd(x) = 0.0069x4 - 0.0817x3 + 0.3071x2 - 0.386x + 0.1803 
R2 = 0.7705 
fm(x) = -0.0003x4 + 0.0043x3 - 0.0245x2 + 0.058x - 0.0275 
R2 = 0.9898 
2.836083 
 
0.951333 
 
0.434458 
 
0.047292 
Group 3 
ff(x) = 0.0137x4 - 0.2201x3 + 1.216x2 - 2.6745x + 2.5443 
R2 = 0.8257 
fw(x) = -0.0115x4 + 0.1585x3 - 0.7395x2 + 1.3289x - 0.5906 
R2 = 0.9995 
fd(x) = -0.0111x4 + 0.1531x3 - 0.7138x2 + 1.2858x - 0.6205 
R2 = 1 
fm(x) = -0.0044x4 + 0.0588x3 - 0.2626x2 + 0.4587x - 0.2315 
R2 = 0.9134 
3.110542 
 
0.737125 
 
0.548958 
 
0.244583 
Group 4 
ff(x) = 0.0038x4 - 0.0441x3 + 0.157x2 - 0.184x + 0.65 
R2 = 0.8224 
fw(x)= -0.0011x4 + 0.0033x3 + 0.0452x2 - 0.2231x + 0.4113 
R2 = 0.9776 
fd(x) = -0.0013x4 + 0.0136x3 - 0.0465x2 + 0.053x + 0.1065 
R2 = 0.8128 
fm(x) = 0.0004x4 - 0.0049x3 + 0.0199x2 - 0.032x + 0.0367 
R2 = 0.9952 
2.913292 
 
0.749458 
 
0.509 
 
0.085292 
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Table C2: cont. 
 
Group 5 
ff(x)  = 0.0345x4 - 0.5986x3 + 3.7242x2 - 9.7742x + 9.7193 
R2 = 0.9953 
fw(x)= -0.0004x4 + 0.0087x3 - 0.0693x2 + 0.1979x - 0.0004 
R2 = 0.8791 
fd(x) = 0.0037x4 - 0.054x3 + 0.2581x2 - 0.4679x + 0.3532 
R2 = 0.6576 
fm(x) = 0.0006x4 - 0.0081x3 + 0.0351x2 - 0.0591x + 0.0517 
R2 = 0.8809 
4.29975 
 
0.689375 
 
0.345917 
 
0.050375 
Group 6 
ff(x) = -0.0082x4 + 0.1113x3 - 0.4929x2 + 0.7715x + 0.2627 
R2 = 0.6642 
fw(x)= 0.0029x4 - 0.0332x3 + 0.1084x2 - 0.1217x + 0.3041 
R2 = 0.8894 
fd(x) = -2E-05x4 + 0.0088x3 - 0.0953x2 + 0.2863x - 0.0923 
R2 = 0.6321 
fm(x) = 0.0031x4 - 0.0424x3 + 0.1948x2 - 0.3383x + 0.195 
R2 = 0.7156 
2.772625 
 
0.920417 
 
0.536817 
 
0.108917 
Group 7 
ff(x)  = -0.0113x4 + 0.1429x3 - 0.6552x2 + 1.2946x - 0.34 
R2 = 1 
fw(x)= -0.0146x4 + 0.1932x3 - 0.9072x2 + 1.744x - 0.93 
R2 = 1 
fd(x) = -0.0116x4 + 0.1364x3 - 0.5672x2 + 0.977x - 0.4912 
R2 = 1 
fm(x) = -0.0013x4 + 0.0142x3 - 0.0538x2 + 0.0808x - 0.03 
R2 = 1 
2.32576 
 
0.72752 
 
0.345653 
 
0.028827 
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Table D1: List of external parties 
fsksm.utm.my 161.139.68.251 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 161.139.250.2 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 161.139.68.247 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 216.239.57.103 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 216.239.57.104 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 216.239.57.99 02:30.2 
 
web.utm.my 161.139.18.91 02:40.1 
www.utm.my 161.139.18.99 02:40.1 
 
www.ukm.my 202.185.33.79 00:17.9 
 
www.elsevier.com 129.35.76.177 01:15.5 
 
www.gatra.com 64.156.138.148 02:56.8 
 
www.google.com 63.150.131.40 00:30.1 
www.google.com 64.233.189.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 64.233.161.147 00:30.1 
www.google.com 64.233.161.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.94.229.254 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.7.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.9.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.9.99 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.11.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.11.99 00:30.1 
 
www.kompas.com 64.203.71.11 02:20.6 
www.kompas.com 64.203.71.51 02:20.6 
 
www.rd.com 164.109.22.52 03:03.0 
www.rd.com 164.109.22.155 03:03.0 
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Table D2: Experimental result for opening www.fsksm.utm.my 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆  
Cumul
ative 
Mean 
Cumul
ative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time of 
canals ntransactio
t
Size
∆
 
Access 
Results 
00:02.4 00:22.4 00:22.4 00:22.4 01:29.6 8.64468 Success
00:02.7 00:30.1 00:26.3 00:05.4 00:42.6 11.61574 Success
00:00.7 00:30.7 00:27.7 00:04.6 00:41.6 11.84992 Success
00:01.7 00:13.3 00:24.1 00:08.2 00:48.6 5.11420 Success
00:09.1 00:31.3 00:25.5 00:07.8 00:48.8 12.05748 Success
00:36.0 01:55.8 00:40.6 00:37.5 02:33.1 44.69444 Denied
00:01.5 00:09.7 00:36.2 00:36.2 02:24.7 3.74576 Success
00:09.4 00:35.3 00:36.1 00:33.5 02:16.6 13.61111 Success
00:37.5 01:34.4 00:42.6 00:36.9 02:33.2 36.43248 Success
00:03.3 00:05.9 00:38.9 00:36.7 02:28.8 2.28665 Success
00:04.7 00:23.7 00:37.5 00:35.1 02:22.7 9.13002 Success
00:18.8 01:07.1 00:40.0 00:34.5 02:23.5 25.90316 Success
01:16.1 01:56.4 00:45.9 00:39.3 02:43.7 44.91898 Success
00:02.4 00:09.9 00:43.3 00:38.9 02:40.1 3.82986 Success
00:09.1 00:36.7 00:42.9 00:37.6 02:35.5 14.15123 Success
00:36.7 01:35.0 00:46.1 00:38.5 02:41.8 36.64853 Success
00:01.7 00:09.4 00:44.0 00:38.4 02:39.1 3.62461 Success
00:09.2 00:36.8 00:43.6 00:37.3 02:35.3 14.19252 Success
00:02.3 00:10.5 00:41.8 00:37.0 02:32.8 4.05748 Success
00:08.5 00:31.4 00:41.3 00:36.1 02:29.6 12.09992 Success
00:02.4 00:24.6 00:40.5 00:35.4 02:26.6 9.49306 Success
00:02.2 00:24.6 00:39.8 00:34.7 02:23.8 9.48225 Success
00:01.8 00:10.5 00:38.5 00:34.4 02:21.8 4.05517 Success
00:08.6 00:31.3 00:38.2 00:33.7 02:19.3 12.07446 Success
00:36.8 02:00.0 00:41.5 00:36.8 02:32.0 46.31289 Success
00:34.2 01:44.7 00:43.9 00:38.2 02:38.4 40.40085 Success
00:02.6 00:24.7 00:43.2 00:37.6 02:36.0 9.51003 Success
00:01.5 00:10.4 00:42.0 00:37.4 02:34.3 4.02855 Success
00:02.4 00:12.9 00:41.0 00:37.1 02:32.4 4.99074 Success
00:17.6 00:59.0 00:41.6 00:36.6 02:31.5 22.74460 Success
www.fsksm.utm.my  
(Size 30 Kbytes) 
00:00.3 00:06.9 00:40.5 00:36.6 02:30.2 2.66898 Success
Average 00:12.4 00:40.5 - - - 15.62485 - 
Standard Deviation 00:17.2 00:36.6 - - - 14.10173 - 
Denial of Service 1 of 31 transactions 
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Table D3: Experimental result for opening www.utm.my 
Name of 
External Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆  
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
ntransactiot
Size
∆  
Access 
Results 
00:02.2 00:18.7 00:18.7 00:18.7 01:14.8 24.04064 Success
00:02.2 00:10.5 00:14.6 00:05.8 00:32.0 13.47608 Success
00:08.9 00:28.9 00:19.4 00:09.3 00:47.1 37.22094 Success
00:36.3 01:54.5 00:43.2 00:48.2 03:07.6 147.25309 Denied
00:02.3 00:10.5 00:36.6 00:44.2 02:49.2 13.49537 Success
00:08.5 00:34.0 00:36.2 00:39.5 02:34.8 43.71914 Success
00:36.4 01:53.6 00:47.2 00:46.5 03:06.6 146.05838 Success
00:35.7 01:31.9 00:52.8 00:45.8 03:10.3 118.22402 Success
00:03.0 00:15.8 00:48.7 00:44.6 03:02.5 20.28035 Success
00:00.5 00:11.3 00:45.0 00:43.7 02:56.0 14.56147 Success
00:09.2 00:28.2 00:43.4 00:41.8 02:48.7 36.28601 Success
00:24.0 01:10.7 00:45.7 00:40.6 02:47.5 90.96836 Success
01:13.5 01:54.5 00:51.0 00:43.3 03:00.8 147.19264 Success
00:09.0 00:23.9 00:49.1 00:42.2 02:55.7 30.73174 Success
00:05.2 00:12.8 00:46.7 00:41.7 02:51.9 16.48405 Success
00:05.4 00:28.1 00:45.5 00:40.6 02:47.3 36.08410 Success
00:35.9 01:53.5 00:49.5 00:42.6 02:57.4 145.98637 Success
00:18.4 01:04.8 00:50.3 00:41.5 02:54.9 83.36034 Success
00:01.2 00:09.6 00:48.2 00:41.4 02:52.4 12.40612 Success
00:04.1 00:18.1 00:46.7 00:40.9 02:49.3 23.28061 Success
00:02.8 00:18.7 00:45.4 00:40.3 02:46.2 24.03164 Success
00:01.6 00:10.6 00:43.8 00:40.0 02:43.8 13.59825 Success
00:00.6 00:46.2 00:43.9 00:39.1 02:41.2 59.43287 Success
00:02.0 00:16.0 00:42.7 00:38.7 02:38.7 20.61214 Success
00:01.9 00:10.4 00:41.4 00:38.4 02:36.6 13.35520 Success
00:09.1 00:43.7 00:41.5 00:37.6 02:34.4 56.21271 Success
00:10.0 00:40.3 00:41.5 00:36.9 02:32.1 51.87114 Success
00:03.6 02:17.1 00:44.9 00:40.5 02:46.3 176.35031 Success
00:02.5 00:18.5 00:44.0 00:40.0 02:44.1 23.83102 Success
00:02.3 00:10.6 00:42.9 00:39.8 02:42.3 13.59439 Success
www.utm.my  
(Size 9 Kbytes) 
00:08.5 00:31.2 00:42.5 00:39.2 02:40.1 40.11960 Success
Average 00:11.8 00:42.5 - - - 54.64900 - 
Std Deviation 0.000188 00:39.2 - - - 50.40374 - 
Denial of Service 1 of 31 transactions 
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Table D4: Experimental result for opening www.ukm.my 
Name of 
External Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆  
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
ntransactiot
Size
∆  
Access 
Results 
00:00.5 00:04.6 00:04.6 00:04.6 00:18.2 2.02947 Success
00:00.9 00:10.8 00:07.7 00:04.4 00:21.0 4.82906 Success
00:00.8 00:10.3 00:08.6 00:03.5 00:19.0 4.56998 Success
00:00.7 00:04.6 00:07.6 00:03.5 00:18.0 2.03036 Success
00:02.6 00:12.7 00:08.6 00:03.8 00:19.9 5.63925 Success
00:03.0 00:19.0 00:10.3 00:05.4 00:26.6 8.43616 Success
00:00.2 00:04.5 00:09.5 00:05.4 00:25.7 2.00855 Success
00:00.9 00:04.2 00:08.8 00:05.3 00:24.9 1.86254 Success
00:00.7 00:04.5 00:08.3 00:05.2 00:23.9 2.00009 Success
00:00.7 00:10.6 00:08.6 00:05.0 00:23.4 4.70397 Success
00:00.2 00:10.9 00:08.8 00:04.8 00:23.0 4.87135 Success
00:00.6 00:04.5 00:08.4 00:04.7 00:22.5 2.02235 Success
00:00.7 00:04.5 00:08.1 00:04.6 00:22.0 2.02324 Success
00:00.5 00:04.5 00:07.9 00:04.5 00:21.5 2.00276 Success
00:01.0 00:11.0 00:08.1 00:04.5 00:21.4 4.90518 Success
00:00.2 00:04.5 00:07.9 00:04.4 00:21.0 2.01300 Success
00:00.5 00:05.0 00:07.7 00:04.3 00:20.6 2.23736 Success
00:00.3 00:10.5 00:07.8 00:04.2 00:20.5 4.66569 Success
00:00.9 00:07.9 00:07.8 00:04.1 00:20.2 3.51407 Success
00:00.7 00:04.5 00:07.7 00:04.1 00:19.9 2.01077 Success
00:00.7 00:04.5 00:07.5 00:04.0 00:19.6 2.00677 Success
00:00.3 00:04.5 00:07.4 00:04.0 00:19.3 2.01790 Success
00:00.8 00:04.6 00:07.3 00:03.9 00:19.1 2.03659 Success
00:00.6 00:04.8 00:07.2 00:03.9 00:18.8 2.14432 Success
00:00.7 00:06.0 00:07.1 00:03.8 00:18.5 2.69186 Success
00:00.0 00:04.6 00:07.0 00:03.8 00:18.3 2.03259 Success
00:00.1 00:04.1 00:06.9 00:03.7 00:18.1 1.84295 Success
00:00.5 00:04.2 00:06.8 00:03.7 00:17.9 1.85452 Success
00:00.4 00:10.5 00:06.9 00:03.7 00:18.0 4.68705 Success
00:00.7 00:04.1 00:06.9 00:03.7 00:17.9 1.83093 Success
www.ukm.my  
(Size 26 Kbytes) 
00:00.4 00:10.3 00:07.0 00:03.7 00:17.9 4.57131 Success
Average 00:00.7 00:07.0 - - - 3.09974 - 
Std Deviation 7.13E-06 00:03.7 - - - 1.62958 - 
Denial of Service 0 of 31 transactions 
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Table D5: Experimental result for opening www.elsevier.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
ntransactiot
Size
∆  
Access 
Results 
00:00.3 00:46.5 00:46.5 00:46.5 03:06.1 3.68817 Success
00:00.2 00:44.8 00:45.7 00:01.2 00:49.3 3.55411 Success
00:01.5 00:49.8 00:47.1 00:02.5 00:54.7 3.94938 Denied
00:00.2 00:46.2 00:46.8 00:02.1 00:53.2 3.66042 Success
00:02.6 01:12.5 00:52.0 00:11.6 01:26.8 5.74526 Denied
00:00.4 00:47.8 00:51.3 00:10.5 01:22.8 3.78924 Success
00:03.1 00:59.2 00:52.4 00:10.1 01:22.6 4.69408 Success
00:00.9 00:44.7 00:51.4 00:09.7 01:20.6 3.54270 Success
00:00.6 00:46.7 00:50.9 00:09.2 01:18.6 3.70410 Success
00:00.3 00:44.6 00:50.3 00:08.9 01:17.0 3.53374 Success
www.elsevier.com  
(Size 146 Kbytes) 
00:00.6 00:48.0 00:50.1 00:08.5 01:15.5 3.80858 Success
Average 00:01.0 00:50.1 - - - 3.96998 - 
Std Deviation 1.18E-05 00:08.5 - - - 0.67282 - 
Denial of Service 2 of 11 transactions 
 
 
 
 
Table D6: Experimental result for opening www.gatra.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
ntransactiot
Size
∆  
Access 
Results 
00:02.9 00:33.5 00:33.5 00:33.5 02:14.0 6.05650 Success
00:00.5 00:40.8 00:37.2 00:05.2 00:52.7 7.38263 Success
00:00.4 00:43.1 00:39.1 00:05.0 00:54.2 7.78863 Success
00:00.7 01:32.4 00:52.5 00:27.0 02:13.4 16.71893 Denied
00:02.0 00:46.7 00:51.3 00:23.5 02:01.8 8.43660 Success
00:02.9 01:52.7 01:01.5 00:32.7 02:39.7 20.38610 Success
00:02.4 01:57.3 01:09.5 00:36.6 02:59.2 21.21944 Success
00:02.7 00:33.4 01:05.0 00:36.2 02:53.6 6.03172 Success
00:00.1 01:32.6 01:08.1 00:35.1 02:53.3 16.74226 Success
00:02.5 01:57.4 01:13.0 00:36.6 03:02.7 21.22667 Success
www.gatra.com  
(Size 64 Kbytes) 
00:02.5 00:52.5 01:11.1 00:35.2 02:56.8 9.49797 Success
Average 00:01.8 01:11.1 - - - 12.86250 - 
Std Deviation 1.29E-05 00:35.2 - - - 6.37173 - 
Denial of Service 1 of 11 transactions 
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Table D7: Experimental result for opening www.google.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
ntransactiot
Size
∆  
Access 
Results 
00:00.1 00:12.4 00:12.4 00:12.4 00:49.7 14.37500 Success
00:02.3 00:19.3 00:15.8 00:04.8 00:30.4 22.29398 Success
00:02.4 00:25.1 00:18.9 00:06.4 00:38.0 29.07292 Success
00:02.7 00:19.3 00:19.0 00:05.2 00:34.6 22.34722 Success
00:03.1 00:19.2 00:19.1 00:04.5 00:32.6 22.27431 Success
00:02.2 00:19.2 00:19.1 00:04.0 00:31.2 22.27199 Success
00:02.7 00:19.1 00:19.1 00:03.7 00:30.1 22.16319 Success
00:02.7 00:19.2 00:19.1 00:03.4 00:29.3 22.24421 Success
00:02.7 00:19.3 00:19.1 00:03.2 00:28.7 22.36111 Success
00:02.8 00:25.6 00:19.8 00:03.6 00:30.7 29.67824 Success
www.google.com  
(Size 10 Kbytes) 
00:02.7 00:19.2 00:19.7 00:03.5 00:30.1 22.26389 Success
Average 00:02.4 00:12.4 - - - 22.84964 - 
Std Deviation 9.14E-06 00:19.3 - - - 3.99780 - 
Denial of Service 0 of 11 transactions 
 
 
 
 
Table D8: Experimental result for opening www.kompas.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
ntransactiot
Size
∆  
Access 
Results 
00:06.6 01:30.0 01:30.0 01:30.0 06:00.1 24.23342 Success
00:11.1 00:54.0 01:12.0 00:25.4 02:28.4 14.54753 Success
00:01.1 00:27.1 00:57.1 00:31.6 02:31.8 7.30163 Success
00:01.0 00:34.4 00:51.4 00:28.1 02:15.8 9.26814 Success
00:01.0 00:30.1 00:47.1 00:26.2 02:05.7 8.09566 Success
00:10.9 01:42.7 00:56.4 00:32.6 02:34.2 27.64185 Success
00:02.9 01:36.3 01:02.1 00:33.4 02:42.2 25.91301 Success
00:03.0 00:33.8 00:58.6 00:32.5 02:35.9 9.10557 Success
00:01.0 00:28.8 00:55.3 00:31.9 02:31.1 7.75086 Success
00:02.4 00:33.9 00:53.1 00:30.9 02:25.7 9.11445 Success
www.kompas.com  
(Size 43 Kbytes) 
00:02.4 00:40.3 00:52.0 00:29.5 02:20.6 10.85164 Success
Average 00:03.9 00:52.0 - - - 13.98398 - 
Std Deviation 4.44E-05 00:29.5 - - - 7.94951 - 
Denial of Service 0 of 11 transactions 
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Table D7: Experimental result for opening www.rd.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
ntransactiot
Size
∆  
Access 
Results 
00:20.6 01:42.1 01:42.1 01:42.1 06:48.3 8.56104 Success
00:02.4 00:41.5 01:11.8 00:42.8 03:20.2 3.48422 Success
00:00.7 00:24.8 00:56.1 00:40.6 02:58.1 2.08090 Success
00:09.3 00:44.1 00:53.1 00:33.7 02:34.3 3.69951 Success
00:09.7 00:58.5 00:54.2 00:29.3 02:22.1 4.90296 Success
00:01.2 01:25.3 00:59.4 00:29.1 02:26.8 7.15269 Success
00:02.6 01:23.9 01:02.9 00:28.2 02:27.4 7.03897 Success
00:02.5 02:02.9 01:10.4 00:33.6 02:51.3 10.31015 Success
00:02.8 02:02.2 01:16.1 00:35.9 03:03.8 10.24666 Success
00:01.2 01:57.5 01:20.3 00:36.3 03:09.1 9.85390 Success
www.rd.com  
(Size 138 Kbytes) 
00:02.7 01:08.0 01:19.2 00:34.6 03:03.0 5.70535 Success
Average 00:05.1 01:19.2 - - - 6.63967 - 
Std Deviation 6.95E-05 00:34.6 - - - 2.90175 - 
Denial of Service 0 of 11 transactions 
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Table D1: List of external parties 
fsksm.utm.my 161.139.68.251 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 161.139.250.2 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 161.139.68.247 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 216.239.57.103 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 216.239.57.104 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 216.239.57.99 02:30.2 
 
web.utm.my 161.139.18.91 02:40.1 
www.utm.my 161.139.18.99 02:40.1 
 
www.ukm.my 202.185.33.79 00:17.9 
 
www.elsevier.com 129.35.76.177 01:15.5 
 
www.gatra.com 64.156.138.148 02:56.8 
 
www.google.com 63.150.131.40 00:30.1 
www.google.com 64.233.189.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 64.233.161.147 00:30.1 
www.google.com 64.233.161.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.94.229.254 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.7.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.9.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.9.99 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.11.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.11.99 00:30.1 
 
www.kompas.com 64.203.71.11 02:20.6 
www.kompas.com 64.203.71.51 02:20.6 
 
www.rd.com 164.109.22.52 03:03.0 
www.rd.com 164.109.22.155 03:03.0 
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Table D2: Experimental result for opening www.fsksm.utm.my 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆  
Cumul
ative 
Mean 
Cumul
ative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:02.4 00:22.4 00:22.4 00:22.4 01:29.6 Success 
00:02.7 00:30.1 00:26.3 00:05.4 00:42.6 Success 
00:00.7 00:30.7 00:27.7 00:04.6 00:41.6 Success 
00:01.7 00:13.3 00:24.1 00:08.2 00:48.6 Success 
00:09.1 00:31.3 00:25.5 00:07.8 00:48.8 Success 
00:36.0 01:55.8 00:40.6 00:37.5 02:33.1 Denied 
00:01.5 00:09.7 00:36.2 00:36.2 02:24.7 Success 
00:09.4 00:35.3 00:36.1 00:33.5 02:16.6 Success 
00:37.5 01:34.4 00:42.6 00:36.9 02:33.2 Success 
00:03.3 00:05.9 00:38.9 00:36.7 02:28.8 Success 
00:04.7 00:23.7 00:37.5 00:35.1 02:22.7 Success 
00:18.8 01:07.1 00:40.0 00:34.5 02:23.5 Success 
01:16.1 01:56.4 00:45.9 00:39.3 02:43.7 Success 
00:02.4 00:09.9 00:43.3 00:38.9 02:40.1 Success 
00:09.1 00:36.7 00:42.9 00:37.6 02:35.5 Success 
00:36.7 01:35.0 00:46.1 00:38.5 02:41.8 Success 
00:01.7 00:09.4 00:44.0 00:38.4 02:39.1 Success 
00:09.2 00:36.8 00:43.6 00:37.3 02:35.3 Success 
00:02.3 00:10.5 00:41.8 00:37.0 02:32.8 Success 
00:08.5 00:31.4 00:41.3 00:36.1 02:29.6 Success 
00:02.4 00:24.6 00:40.5 00:35.4 02:26.6 Success 
00:02.2 00:24.6 00:39.8 00:34.7 02:23.8 Success 
00:01.8 00:10.5 00:38.5 00:34.4 02:21.8 Success 
00:08.6 00:31.3 00:38.2 00:33.7 02:19.3 Success 
00:36.8 02:00.0 00:41.5 00:36.8 02:32.0 Success 
00:34.2 01:44.7 00:43.9 00:38.2 02:38.4 Success 
00:02.6 00:24.7 00:43.2 00:37.6 02:36.0 Success 
00:01.5 00:10.4 00:42.0 00:37.4 02:34.3 Success 
00:02.4 00:12.9 00:41.0 00:37.1 02:32.4 Success 
00:17.6 00:59.0 00:41.6 00:36.6 02:31.5 Success 
www.fsksm.utm.my  
 
00:00.3 00:06.9 00:40.5 00:36.6 02:30.2 Success 
Average 00:12.4 00:40.5 - - - - 
Standard Deviation 00:17.2 00:36.6 - - - - 
Denial of Service 1 of 31 transactions 
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Table D3: Experimental result for opening www.utm.my 
Name of 
External Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆  
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:02.2 00:18.7 00:18.7 00:18.7 01:14.8 Success 
00:02.2 00:10.5 00:14.6 00:05.8 00:32.0 Success 
00:08.9 00:28.9 00:19.4 00:09.3 00:47.1 Success 
00:36.3 01:54.5 00:43.2 00:48.2 03:07.6 Denied 
00:02.3 00:10.5 00:36.6 00:44.2 02:49.2 Success 
00:08.5 00:34.0 00:36.2 00:39.5 02:34.8 Success 
00:36.4 01:53.6 00:47.2 00:46.5 03:06.6 Success 
00:35.7 01:31.9 00:52.8 00:45.8 03:10.3 Success 
00:03.0 00:15.8 00:48.7 00:44.6 03:02.5 Success 
00:00.5 00:11.3 00:45.0 00:43.7 02:56.0 Success 
00:09.2 00:28.2 00:43.4 00:41.8 02:48.7 Success 
00:24.0 01:10.7 00:45.7 00:40.6 02:47.5 Success 
01:13.5 01:54.5 00:51.0 00:43.3 03:00.8 Success 
00:09.0 00:23.9 00:49.1 00:42.2 02:55.7 Success 
00:05.2 00:12.8 00:46.7 00:41.7 02:51.9 Success 
00:05.4 00:28.1 00:45.5 00:40.6 02:47.3 Success 
00:35.9 01:53.5 00:49.5 00:42.6 02:57.4 Success 
00:18.4 01:04.8 00:50.3 00:41.5 02:54.9 Success 
00:01.2 00:09.6 00:48.2 00:41.4 02:52.4 Success 
00:04.1 00:18.1 00:46.7 00:40.9 02:49.3 Success 
00:02.8 00:18.7 00:45.4 00:40.3 02:46.2 Success 
00:01.6 00:10.6 00:43.8 00:40.0 02:43.8 Success 
00:00.6 00:46.2 00:43.9 00:39.1 02:41.2 Success 
00:02.0 00:16.0 00:42.7 00:38.7 02:38.7 Success 
00:01.9 00:10.4 00:41.4 00:38.4 02:36.6 Success 
00:09.1 00:43.7 00:41.5 00:37.6 02:34.4 Success 
00:10.0 00:40.3 00:41.5 00:36.9 02:32.1 Success 
00:03.6 02:17.1 00:44.9 00:40.5 02:46.3 Success 
00:02.5 00:18.5 00:44.0 00:40.0 02:44.1 Success 
00:02.3 00:10.6 00:42.9 00:39.8 02:42.3 Success 
www.utm.my  
 
00:08.5 00:31.2 00:42.5 00:39.2 02:40.1 Success 
Average 00:11.8 00:42.5 - - - - 
Std Deviation 0.000188 00:39.2 - - - - 
Denial of Service 1 of 31 transactions 
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Table D4: Experimental result for opening www.ukm.my 
Name of 
External Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆  
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:00.5 00:04.6 00:04.6 00:04.6 00:18.2 Success 
00:00.9 00:10.8 00:07.7 00:04.4 00:21.0 Success 
00:00.8 00:10.3 00:08.6 00:03.5 00:19.0 Success 
00:00.7 00:04.6 00:07.6 00:03.5 00:18.0 Success 
00:02.6 00:12.7 00:08.6 00:03.8 00:19.9 Success 
00:03.0 00:19.0 00:10.3 00:05.4 00:26.6 Success 
00:00.2 00:04.5 00:09.5 00:05.4 00:25.7 Success 
00:00.9 00:04.2 00:08.8 00:05.3 00:24.9 Success 
00:00.7 00:04.5 00:08.3 00:05.2 00:23.9 Success 
00:00.7 00:10.6 00:08.6 00:05.0 00:23.4 Success 
00:00.2 00:10.9 00:08.8 00:04.8 00:23.0 Success 
00:00.6 00:04.5 00:08.4 00:04.7 00:22.5 Success 
00:00.7 00:04.5 00:08.1 00:04.6 00:22.0 Success 
00:00.5 00:04.5 00:07.9 00:04.5 00:21.5 Success 
00:01.0 00:11.0 00:08.1 00:04.5 00:21.4 Success 
00:00.2 00:04.5 00:07.9 00:04.4 00:21.0 Success 
00:00.5 00:05.0 00:07.7 00:04.3 00:20.6 Success 
00:00.3 00:10.5 00:07.8 00:04.2 00:20.5 Success 
00:00.9 00:07.9 00:07.8 00:04.1 00:20.2 Success 
00:00.7 00:04.5 00:07.7 00:04.1 00:19.9 Success 
00:00.7 00:04.5 00:07.5 00:04.0 00:19.6 Success 
00:00.3 00:04.5 00:07.4 00:04.0 00:19.3 Success 
00:00.8 00:04.6 00:07.3 00:03.9 00:19.1 Success 
00:00.6 00:04.8 00:07.2 00:03.9 00:18.8 Success 
00:00.7 00:06.0 00:07.1 00:03.8 00:18.5 Success 
00:00.0 00:04.6 00:07.0 00:03.8 00:18.3 Success 
00:00.1 00:04.1 00:06.9 00:03.7 00:18.1 Success 
00:00.5 00:04.2 00:06.8 00:03.7 00:17.9 Success 
00:00.4 00:10.5 00:06.9 00:03.7 00:18.0 Success 
00:00.7 00:04.1 00:06.9 00:03.7 00:17.9 Success 
www.ukm.my  
 
00:00.4 00:10.3 00:07.0 00:03.7 00:17.9 Success 
Average 00:00.7 00:07.0 - - - - 
Std Deviation 7.13E-06 00:03.7 - - - - 
Denial of Service 0 of 31 transactions 
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Table D5: Experimental result for opening www.elsevier.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:00.3 00:46.5 00:46.5 00:46.5 03:06.1 Success
00:00.2 00:44.8 00:45.7 00:01.2 00:49.3 Success
00:01.5 00:49.8 00:47.1 00:02.5 00:54.7 Denied
00:00.2 00:46.2 00:46.8 00:02.1 00:53.2 Success
00:02.6 01:12.5 00:52.0 00:11.6 01:26.8 Denied
00:00.4 00:47.8 00:51.3 00:10.5 01:22.8 Success
00:03.1 00:59.2 00:52.4 00:10.1 01:22.6 Success
00:00.9 00:44.7 00:51.4 00:09.7 01:20.6 Success
00:00.6 00:46.7 00:50.9 00:09.2 01:18.6 Success
00:00.3 00:44.6 00:50.3 00:08.9 01:17.0 Success
www.elsevier.com  
 
00:00.6 00:48.0 00:50.1 00:08.5 01:15.5 Success
Average 00:01.0 00:50.1 - - - - 
Std Deviation 1.18E-05 00:08.5 - - - - 
Denial of Service 2 of 11 transactions 
 
 
 
 
Table D6: Experimental result for opening www.gatra.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:02.9 00:33.5 00:33.5 00:33.5 02:14.0 Success
00:00.5 00:40.8 00:37.2 00:05.2 00:52.7 Success
00:00.4 00:43.1 00:39.1 00:05.0 00:54.2 Success
00:00.7 01:32.4 00:52.5 00:27.0 02:13.4 Denied
00:02.0 00:46.7 00:51.3 00:23.5 02:01.8 Success
00:02.9 01:52.7 01:01.5 00:32.7 02:39.7 Success
00:02.4 01:57.3 01:09.5 00:36.6 02:59.2 Success
00:02.7 00:33.4 01:05.0 00:36.2 02:53.6 Success
00:00.1 01:32.6 01:08.1 00:35.1 02:53.3 Success
00:02.5 01:57.4 01:13.0 00:36.6 03:02.7 Success
www.gatra.com  
 
00:02.5 00:52.5 01:11.1 00:35.2 02:56.8 Success
Average 00:01.8 01:11.1 - - - - 
Std Deviation 1.29E-05 00:35.2 - - - - 
Denial of Service 1 of 11 transactions 
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Table D7: Experimental result for opening www.google.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:00.1 00:12.4 00:12.4 00:12.4 00:49.7 Success
00:02.3 00:19.3 00:15.8 00:04.8 00:30.4 Success
00:02.4 00:25.1 00:18.9 00:06.4 00:38.0 Success
00:02.7 00:19.3 00:19.0 00:05.2 00:34.6 Success
00:03.1 00:19.2 00:19.1 00:04.5 00:32.6 Success
00:02.2 00:19.2 00:19.1 00:04.0 00:31.2 Success
00:02.7 00:19.1 00:19.1 00:03.7 00:30.1 Success
00:02.7 00:19.2 00:19.1 00:03.4 00:29.3 Success
00:02.7 00:19.3 00:19.1 00:03.2 00:28.7 Success
00:02.8 00:25.6 00:19.8 00:03.6 00:30.7 Success
www.google.com  
 
00:02.7 00:19.2 00:19.7 00:03.5 00:30.1 Success
Average 00:02.4 00:12.4 - - - - 
Std Deviation 9.14E-06 00:19.3 - - - - 
Denial of Service 0 of 11 transactions 
 
 
 
 
Table D8: Experimental result for opening www.kompas.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:06.6 01:30.0 01:30.0 01:30.0 06:00.1 Success
00:11.1 00:54.0 01:12.0 00:25.4 02:28.4 Success
00:01.1 00:27.1 00:57.1 00:31.6 02:31.8 Success
00:01.0 00:34.4 00:51.4 00:28.1 02:15.8 Success
00:01.0 00:30.1 00:47.1 00:26.2 02:05.7 Success
00:10.9 01:42.7 00:56.4 00:32.6 02:34.2 Success
00:02.9 01:36.3 01:02.1 00:33.4 02:42.2 Success
00:03.0 00:33.8 00:58.6 00:32.5 02:35.9 Success
00:01.0 00:28.8 00:55.3 00:31.9 02:31.1 Success
00:02.4 00:33.9 00:53.1 00:30.9 02:25.7 Success
www.kompas.com  
 
00:02.4 00:40.3 00:52.0 00:29.5 02:20.6 Success
Average 00:03.9 00:52.0 - - - - 
Std Deviation 4.44E-05 00:29.5 - - - - 
Denial of Service 0 of 11 transactions 
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Table D7: Experimental result for opening www.rd.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:20.6 01:42.1 01:42.1 01:42.1 06:48.3 Success
00:02.4 00:41.5 01:11.8 00:42.8 03:20.2 Success
00:00.7 00:24.8 00:56.1 00:40.6 02:58.1 Success
00:09.3 00:44.1 00:53.1 00:33.7 02:34.3 Success
00:09.7 00:58.5 00:54.2 00:29.3 02:22.1 Success
00:01.2 01:25.3 00:59.4 00:29.1 02:26.8 Success
00:02.6 01:23.9 01:02.9 00:28.2 02:27.4 Success
00:02.5 02:02.9 01:10.4 00:33.6 02:51.3 Success
00:02.8 02:02.2 01:16.1 00:35.9 03:03.8 Success
00:01.2 01:57.5 01:20.3 00:36.3 03:09.1 Success
www.rd.com  
 
00:02.7 01:08.0 01:19.2 00:34.6 03:03.0 Success
Average 00:05.1 01:19.2 - - - - 
Std Deviation 6.95E-05 00:34.6 - - - - 
Denial of Service 0 of 11 transactions 
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Table D8: Processing time versus number of packets 
No. Number of packets 
t∆  
(min: seconds) No. 
Number of 
packets 
t∆  
(min: seconds)
1 1 00:00.0 31 137 00:09.0 
2 2 00:00.0 32 166 00:11.0 
3 2 00:01.0 33 176 00:09.0 
4 3 00:00.0 34 178 00:09.0 
5 3 00:00.0 35 194 00:13.0 
6 3 00:00.0 36 205 00:12.0 
7 6 00:01.0 37 232 00:13.0 
8 8 00:00.0 38 249 00:18.0 
9 8 00:01.0 39 293 00:17.0 
10 8 00:01.0 40 308 00:20.0 
11 9 00:00.0 41 313 00:20.0 
12 14 00:01.0 42 321 00:23.0 
13 16 00:01.0 43 329 00:18.0 
14 18 00:01.0 44 335 00:18.0 
15 19 00:02.0 45 349 00:18.0 
16 19 00:03.0 46 418 00:30.0 
17 20 00:02.0 47 455 00:27.0 
18 22 00:01.0 48 484 00:29.0 
19 29 00:02.0 49 487 00:29.0 
20 35 00:02.0 50 524 00:28.0 
21 43 00:03.0 51 561 00:38.0 
22 43 00:03.0 52 569 00:40.0 
23 45 00:03.0 53 618 00:39.0 
24 66 00:05.0 54 651 00:38.0 
25 71 00:05.0 55 730 00:35.0 
26 83 00:06.0 56 887 01:03.0 
27 94 00:07.0 57 942 01:10.0 
28 107 00:06.0 58 1065 01:03.0 
29 121 00:06.0 59 1072 01:07.0 
30 123 00:07.0 60 1326 01:23.0 
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#!/bin/sh 
# FIREWALL BASED ON ZERO CONFIGURATION # 
# eth0 = EXTERNAL NETWORK 
# eth1 = INTERNAL NETWORK 
# ------------------ 
# 1. Initialization 
# ------------------ 
INTERNAL_SUBNET="24.4.74" 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_EXT 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_SENDER 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_SENDER 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_RECEIVER 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/TABLEIP 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/DELTATIME 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/TIMEOUTPUT 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/LOG 
cd /PROJECT/FIREWALL 
./firewall_preconfiguration     
# To preconfigure firewall machine 
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
ngrep -d eth1 -t -e > /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT &  # To catch any 
incoming data from internal network and put it in PROXY_BUFF using background process 
# ngrep -d eth0 -t > /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_EXT & # To catch any incoming data 
from outside and put it in PROXY_BUFF using background process 
 
# --------------------- 
# 2. Packet monitoring 
# --------------------- 
 
while [ 1 ] 
do 
        #### HANDLING PACKET FROM INTERNAL NETWORK #### 
        #### ------------------------------------- #### 
  
        SIZE_BUFF_INT=`wc -c /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT | awk '{print $1}'`  
        # echo size buffer "$[SIZE_BUFF_INT]" 
        if [ "$SIZE_BUFF_INT"  != "0" ]                                  
        then 
cat /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW 
  > /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT 
   
  # to get jml baris of buffer 
  # -------------------------- 
BUFF_baris=`wc -l /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW | awk '{print 
$1}'` 
SIZE_BUFF_INT=`wc -c /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW | awk 
'{print $1}'`  
  #echo size buffer bytewise "$[SIZE_BUFF_INT]" 
  #echo size buffer linewise "$[BUFF_baris]" 
  j=1 
  ### 1 ### 
  ######### 
  ## Process every data in buffer line-wise 
  ## -------------------------------------- 
  while [[ $j -le $BUFF_baris ]]   # &&[[ $j -le 10 ]]  
  do
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   TRANSACTION_CODE="" 
   DELTA_TIME="" 
   ## To identify the type of network transaction 
   ## ------------------------------------------- 
TRANSACTION_CODE=`head -n $j 
/PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | awk '{print $1}'` 
SENDER=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | awk '{print $4}'| awk -F: 
'{print $1}'` 
RECEIVER=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | awk '{print $6}'| awk -F: 
'{print $1}'` 
 
#DELTA_TIME=`head -n 2 
/PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | awk '{print $3}'` 
#ACCESS_CODE=`head -n 2 
/PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | awk '{print $7}'` 
    
   ### 2 ### 
   ######### 
    
if [[ $TRANSACTION_CODE = U ]] || [[ $TRANSACTION_CODE = T 
]] || [[ $TRANSACTION_CODE = I ]]  
   then 
      if [[ $SENDER != "" ]] && [[ $RECEIVER != "" ]] 
      then 
# echo $j - $TRANSACTION_CODE - $SENDER - 
$RECEIVER 
 
    # Define the protocol 
    if [[ $TRANSACTION_CODE = U ]]  
    then 
     TRANSACTION_CODE=udp 
    fi 
    if [[ $TRANSACTION_CODE = T ]]  
    then 
     TRANSACTION_CODE=tcp 
    fi 
    if [[ $TRANSACTION_CODE = I ]] 
    then 
     TRANSACTION_CODE=icmp 
    fi 
 
    # Define the subnet (IP Mask) of the sender  
    echo $SENDER > /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_SENDER           
first_digit=`head -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_SENDER | 
awk -F. '{print $1}'` 
second_digit=`head -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_SENDER 
| awk -F. '{print $2}'` 
third_digit=`head -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_SENDER | 
awk -F. '{print $3}'` 
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SENDER_SUBNET=`echo 
"$first_digit.$second_digit.$third_digit"` 
    # echo $SENDER_SUBNET 
 
# To define which part is outsider, whether it's the sender or 
receiver 
    # --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    if [[ "$SENDER_SUBNET" = "$INTERNAL_SUBNET" ]] 
    then 
     OUTSIDER=$RECEIVER 
     INSIDER=$SENDER 
    else 
     OUTSIDER=$SENDER 
     INSIDER=$RECEIVER 
    fi 
    # wkt_skrg=`date | awk '{print $4}'` 
# echo $j - $TRANSACTION_CODE - $INSIDER - 
$OUTSIDER     
 
AUTHENTICATED=`grep $OUTSIDER 
/PROJECT/TABLE/zero_table` 
    if [ "$AUTHENTICATED" != "" ] 
    then 
     # echo ACCESS IS PERMITTED 
     wkt_skrg=`date | awk '{print $4}'` 
echo $j - $TRANSACTION_CODE - $SENDER - 
$RECEIVER $wkt_skrg PERMITTED 
 
ALREADY_INSERTED=`grep 
$TRANSACTION_CODE 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | grep 
$OUTSIDER | grep $INSIDER` 
 
# ALREADY_INSERTED=`grep $OUTSIDER 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | grep $INSIDER` 
     if [ "$ALREADY_INSERTED" = "" ]  
     #New access 
     then 
      # echo CANAL IS OPENED 
      wkt_skrg=`date | awk '{print $4}'` 
    echo 
$TRANSACTION_CODE $INSIDER 
$OUTSIDER $wkt_skrg >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO 
      echo CANAL IS OPENED $wkt_skrg 
 
      # Rebuild the canals 
      iptables-save > /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptables 
      > /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopy 
Canal_baris=`wc -l 
/PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptables | awk '{print 
$1}'` 
      k=1 
      while [[ $k -le $Canal_baris ]] 
      do 
isikanal=`head -n $k 
/PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptables > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONT
EMP | tail -n 1 
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/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONT
EMP` 
       #echo $isikanal 
if [[ $isikanal = "-A FORWARD -i eth1 -j DROP " ]] 
 then 
echo -A FORWARD -s $INSIDER -d $OUTSIDER -p $TRANSACTION_CODE -j 
ACCEPT >> /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopy 
echo -A FORWARD -s $OUTSIDER -d $INSIDER -p $TRANSACTION_CODE -j 
ACCEPT >> /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopy 
echo -A FORWARD -i eth1 -j DROP >> /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopy 
 else 
  echo $isikanal >> /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopy 
 fi 
 k=`expr ${k} + 1` 
done 
cat /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopy | iptables-restore 
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE 
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
 
#./zero_preconfiguration 
#Canal_baris=`wc -l /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | awk '{print $1}'` 
#k=1 
#while [[ $k -le $Canal_baris ]] 
#do 
# TRANS=`head -n $k /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | 
awk '{print $1}'` 
# IN=`head -n $k /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | 
awk '{print $2}'` 
# OUT=`head -n $k /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | 
awk '{print $3}'` 
fi 
else 
echo $j - $TRANSACTION_CODE - $SENDER - $RECEIVER $wkt_skrg DENIED 
fi 
fi 
fi 
j=`expr ${j} + 1`      
done 
 
fi 
         
done 
 
echo "Finish" 
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#!/bin/sh 
 
# PROCEDURE FOR DELETING CANAL 
# RUNNING IN PARALLEL WITH FIREWALL_MAIN 
# eth0 = EXTERNAL NETWORK 
# eth1 = INTERNAL NETWORK 
 
# ------------------ 
# 1. Initialization 
# ------------------ 
 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_DELETE 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_TEMP_DELETE 
 
# --------------------- 
# 2. Start processing 
# --------------------- 
while [ 1 ] 
do 
 # Identification of new canal through the addition of line 
 # -------------------------------------------------------- 
 jumlah_baris_history=`wc -l /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | awk '{print $1}'` 
  
 if [ $jumlah_baris_history -gt 0 ] 
 then 
  echo . 
  echo . 
# Processing canal by processing the first line of HISTORY_ZERO file for each 
canal 
  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
analyzed_transaction=`head -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | awk '{print 
$1}'` 
analyzed_internal=`head -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | awk '{print 
$2}'` 
analyzed_external=`head -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | awk '{print 
$3}'` 
analyzed_starttime=`head -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | awk '{print 
$4}'` 
 
  # To obtain time duration of network transaction  
  # ---------------------------------------------- 
  life_time="" 
life_time=`grep $analyzed_external /PROJECT/TABLE/zero_table | awk '{print 
$3}'` 
  #if [[ $life_time = "" ]] 
  #then 
  # life_time=60 
  #fi 
  echo life_time $life_time 
   
  # To get detail on the canal hour, minute and second 
  # --------------------------------------------------   
  echo $analyzed_starttime > /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP 
  analyzed_starttime_jam=`awk -F: '{print $1}' /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP` 
     
  analyzed_starttime_jam=`expr ${analyzed_starttime_jam} \* 3600` 
  analyzed_starttime_menit=`awk -F: '{print $2}' /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP` 
  analyzed_starttime_menit=`expr ${analyzed_starttime_menit} \* 60` 
  analyzed_starttime_detik=`awk -F: '{print $3}' /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP`
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analyzed_starttime_integer=`expr ${analyzed_starttime_jam} + 
${analyzed_starttime_menit} + ${analyzed_starttime_detik}` 
  echo analyzed_starttime is $analyzed_starttime_integer 
 
  # To get current time 
  # ------------------- 
  wkt_skrg=`date | awk '{print $4}'` 
  echo $wkt_skrg > /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP 
  wkt_skrg_jam=`awk -F: '{print $1}' /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP` 
  wkt_skrg_jam=`expr ${wkt_skrg_jam} \* 3600` 
  wkt_skrg_menit=`awk -F: '{print $2}' /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP` 
  wkt_skrg_menit=`expr ${wkt_skrg_menit} \* 60` 
  wkt_skrg_detik=`awk -F: '{print $3}' /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP` 
wkt_skrg_integer=`expr ${wkt_skrg_jam} + ${wkt_skrg_menit} + 
${wkt_skrg_detik}` 
  echo wkt skrg is $wkt_skrg_integer 
 
# To calculate how long an OLD CANAL has been listed in the Filter Table (the 
value of b ($b) points to the rule being monitored) 
  # --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  if [[ $analyzed_starttime_integer -gt $wkt_skrg_integer ]] 
  then 
   lama_hidup_canal=`expr $analyzed_starttime_integer - $wkt_skrg_integer` 
  else 
   lama_hidup_canal=`expr $wkt_skrg_integer - $analyzed_starttime_integer` 
  fi 
  echo "Lamanya rule hidup adalah" $lama_hidup_canal 
 
  # Comparing the canal life time and the time duration of living canal 
  # ------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  if [ $lama_hidup_canal -gt $life_time ] 
  then 
# Delete data in the first line of HISTORY_ZERO file (Process each canal 
in the first line, remember ...) 
   # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
jumlah_baris_history=`wc -l /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | awk 
'{print $1}'` 
   a=2 
   while [[ $a -le $jumlah_baris_history ]] 
   do 
head -n $a /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_TEMP_DELETE | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_TEMP_DELETE >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_DELETE 
   a=`expr ${a} + 1` 
   echo $a 
   done 
 
   # To return the sec rule from the temporary file to the RULE_CACHE back 
   # --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
jumlah_baris_history_delete=`wc -l 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_DELETE | awk '{print $1}'` 
head -n $jumlah_baris_history_delete 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_DELETE > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO 
 
   # Determining transaction protocol 
   # -------------------------------- 
   protocol="" 
   if [[ $analyzed_transaction = udp ]] 
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   then 
    protocol="udp" 
   fi 
   if [[ $analyzed_transaction = icmp ]] 
   then 
    protocol="icmp" 
   fi 
   if [[ $analyzed_transaction = tcp ]] 
   then 
    protocol="tcp" 
   fi 
   # Real action for dropping canal in the Filter Table 
   # -------------------------------------------------- 
   iptables-save > /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablesdrop 
   > /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopydrop 
   Canal_baris=`wc -l /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablesdrop | awk '{print $1}'` 
   k=1 
   while [[ $k -le $Canal_baris ]] 
   do 
isikanal=`head -n $k /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablesdrop > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMPDROP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMPDROP` 
   echo $isikanal > /PROJECT/TEMP/ISIKANALDROP 
get_isikanal1=`grep $analyzed_external 
/PROJECT/TEMP/ISIKANALDROP | awk '{print $4}'` 
get_isikanal2=`grep $analyzed_external 
/PROJECT/TEMP/ISIKANALDROP | awk '{print $6}'` 
get_isikanal3=`grep $analyzed_external 
/PROJECT/TEMP/ISIKANALDROP | awk '{print $8}'` 
if [[ $get_isikanal1 = $analyzed_external ]] && [[ $get_isikanal2 = 
$analyzed_internal ]] && [[ $get_isikanal3 = $protocol ]] 
   then 
   echo DROP $protocol $analyzed_external $analyzed_internal 
   else 
if [[ $get_isikanal1 = $analyzed_internal ]] && [[ $get_isikanal2 = 
$analyzed_external ]] && [[ $get_isikanal3 = $protocol ]] 
   then 
   echo DROP $protocol $analyzed_internal $analyzed_external 
   else 
   echo $isikanal >> /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopydrop 
   fi 
   fi 
   k=`expr ${k} + 1` 
   done 
   cat /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopydrop | iptables-restore 
   iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE 
   echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
#iptables -D FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s $analyzed_internal -d 
$analyzed_external -j ACCEPT 
#iptables -D FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s $analyzed_external -d 
$analyzed_internal -j ACCEPT 
   > /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_DELETE 
   > /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_TEMP_DELETE 
   # echo DELETE $protocol $analyzed_internal $analyzed_external 
  fi 
  echo . 
  echo . 
 fi 
done 
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Table D1: List of external parties 
fsksm.utm.my 161.139.68.251 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 161.139.250.2 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 161.139.68.247 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 216.239.57.103 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 216.239.57.104 02:30.2 
fsksm.utm.my 216.239.57.99 02:30.2 
 
web.utm.my 161.139.18.91 02:40.1 
www.utm.my 161.139.18.99 02:40.1 
 
www.ukm.my 202.185.33.79 00:17.9 
 
www.elsevier.com 129.35.76.177 01:15.5 
 
www.gatra.com 64.156.138.148 02:56.8 
 
www.google.com 63.150.131.40 00:30.1 
www.google.com 64.233.189.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 64.233.161.147 00:30.1 
www.google.com 64.233.161.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.94.229.254 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.7.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.9.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.9.99 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.11.104 00:30.1 
www.google.com 66.102.11.99 00:30.1 
 
www.kompas.com 64.203.71.11 02:20.6 
www.kompas.com 64.203.71.51 02:20.6 
 
www.rd.com 164.109.22.52 03:03.0 
www.rd.com 164.109.22.155 03:03.0 
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Table D2: Experimental result for opening www.fsksm.utm.my 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆  
Cumul
ative 
Mean 
Cumul
ative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:02.4 00:22.4 00:22.4 00:22.4 01:29.6 Success 
00:02.7 00:30.1 00:26.3 00:05.4 00:42.6 Success 
00:00.7 00:30.7 00:27.7 00:04.6 00:41.6 Success 
00:01.7 00:13.3 00:24.1 00:08.2 00:48.6 Success 
00:09.1 00:31.3 00:25.5 00:07.8 00:48.8 Success 
00:36.0 01:55.8 00:40.6 00:37.5 02:33.1 Denied 
00:01.5 00:09.7 00:36.2 00:36.2 02:24.7 Success 
00:09.4 00:35.3 00:36.1 00:33.5 02:16.6 Success 
00:37.5 01:34.4 00:42.6 00:36.9 02:33.2 Success 
00:03.3 00:05.9 00:38.9 00:36.7 02:28.8 Success 
00:04.7 00:23.7 00:37.5 00:35.1 02:22.7 Success 
00:18.8 01:07.1 00:40.0 00:34.5 02:23.5 Success 
01:16.1 01:56.4 00:45.9 00:39.3 02:43.7 Success 
00:02.4 00:09.9 00:43.3 00:38.9 02:40.1 Success 
00:09.1 00:36.7 00:42.9 00:37.6 02:35.5 Success 
00:36.7 01:35.0 00:46.1 00:38.5 02:41.8 Success 
00:01.7 00:09.4 00:44.0 00:38.4 02:39.1 Success 
00:09.2 00:36.8 00:43.6 00:37.3 02:35.3 Success 
00:02.3 00:10.5 00:41.8 00:37.0 02:32.8 Success 
00:08.5 00:31.4 00:41.3 00:36.1 02:29.6 Success 
00:02.4 00:24.6 00:40.5 00:35.4 02:26.6 Success 
00:02.2 00:24.6 00:39.8 00:34.7 02:23.8 Success 
00:01.8 00:10.5 00:38.5 00:34.4 02:21.8 Success 
00:08.6 00:31.3 00:38.2 00:33.7 02:19.3 Success 
00:36.8 02:00.0 00:41.5 00:36.8 02:32.0 Success 
00:34.2 01:44.7 00:43.9 00:38.2 02:38.4 Success 
00:02.6 00:24.7 00:43.2 00:37.6 02:36.0 Success 
00:01.5 00:10.4 00:42.0 00:37.4 02:34.3 Success 
00:02.4 00:12.9 00:41.0 00:37.1 02:32.4 Success 
00:17.6 00:59.0 00:41.6 00:36.6 02:31.5 Success 
www.fsksm.utm.my  
 
00:00.3 00:06.9 00:40.5 00:36.6 02:30.2 Success 
Average 00:12.4 00:40.5 - - - - 
Standard Deviation 00:17.2 00:36.6 - - - - 
Denial of Service 1 of 31 transactions 
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Table D3: Experimental result for opening www.utm.my 
Name of 
External Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆  
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:02.2 00:18.7 00:18.7 00:18.7 01:14.8 Success 
00:02.2 00:10.5 00:14.6 00:05.8 00:32.0 Success 
00:08.9 00:28.9 00:19.4 00:09.3 00:47.1 Success 
00:36.3 01:54.5 00:43.2 00:48.2 03:07.6 Denied 
00:02.3 00:10.5 00:36.6 00:44.2 02:49.2 Success 
00:08.5 00:34.0 00:36.2 00:39.5 02:34.8 Success 
00:36.4 01:53.6 00:47.2 00:46.5 03:06.6 Success 
00:35.7 01:31.9 00:52.8 00:45.8 03:10.3 Success 
00:03.0 00:15.8 00:48.7 00:44.6 03:02.5 Success 
00:00.5 00:11.3 00:45.0 00:43.7 02:56.0 Success 
00:09.2 00:28.2 00:43.4 00:41.8 02:48.7 Success 
00:24.0 01:10.7 00:45.7 00:40.6 02:47.5 Success 
01:13.5 01:54.5 00:51.0 00:43.3 03:00.8 Success 
00:09.0 00:23.9 00:49.1 00:42.2 02:55.7 Success 
00:05.2 00:12.8 00:46.7 00:41.7 02:51.9 Success 
00:05.4 00:28.1 00:45.5 00:40.6 02:47.3 Success 
00:35.9 01:53.5 00:49.5 00:42.6 02:57.4 Success 
00:18.4 01:04.8 00:50.3 00:41.5 02:54.9 Success 
00:01.2 00:09.6 00:48.2 00:41.4 02:52.4 Success 
00:04.1 00:18.1 00:46.7 00:40.9 02:49.3 Success 
00:02.8 00:18.7 00:45.4 00:40.3 02:46.2 Success 
00:01.6 00:10.6 00:43.8 00:40.0 02:43.8 Success 
00:00.6 00:46.2 00:43.9 00:39.1 02:41.2 Success 
00:02.0 00:16.0 00:42.7 00:38.7 02:38.7 Success 
00:01.9 00:10.4 00:41.4 00:38.4 02:36.6 Success 
00:09.1 00:43.7 00:41.5 00:37.6 02:34.4 Success 
00:10.0 00:40.3 00:41.5 00:36.9 02:32.1 Success 
00:03.6 02:17.1 00:44.9 00:40.5 02:46.3 Success 
00:02.5 00:18.5 00:44.0 00:40.0 02:44.1 Success 
00:02.3 00:10.6 00:42.9 00:39.8 02:42.3 Success 
www.utm.my  
 
00:08.5 00:31.2 00:42.5 00:39.2 02:40.1 Success 
Average 00:11.8 00:42.5 - - - - 
Std Deviation 0.000188 00:39.2 - - - - 
Denial of Service 1 of 31 transactions 
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Table D4: Experimental result for opening www.ukm.my 
Name of 
External Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆  
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:00.5 00:04.6 00:04.6 00:04.6 00:18.2 Success 
00:00.9 00:10.8 00:07.7 00:04.4 00:21.0 Success 
00:00.8 00:10.3 00:08.6 00:03.5 00:19.0 Success 
00:00.7 00:04.6 00:07.6 00:03.5 00:18.0 Success 
00:02.6 00:12.7 00:08.6 00:03.8 00:19.9 Success 
00:03.0 00:19.0 00:10.3 00:05.4 00:26.6 Success 
00:00.2 00:04.5 00:09.5 00:05.4 00:25.7 Success 
00:00.9 00:04.2 00:08.8 00:05.3 00:24.9 Success 
00:00.7 00:04.5 00:08.3 00:05.2 00:23.9 Success 
00:00.7 00:10.6 00:08.6 00:05.0 00:23.4 Success 
00:00.2 00:10.9 00:08.8 00:04.8 00:23.0 Success 
00:00.6 00:04.5 00:08.4 00:04.7 00:22.5 Success 
00:00.7 00:04.5 00:08.1 00:04.6 00:22.0 Success 
00:00.5 00:04.5 00:07.9 00:04.5 00:21.5 Success 
00:01.0 00:11.0 00:08.1 00:04.5 00:21.4 Success 
00:00.2 00:04.5 00:07.9 00:04.4 00:21.0 Success 
00:00.5 00:05.0 00:07.7 00:04.3 00:20.6 Success 
00:00.3 00:10.5 00:07.8 00:04.2 00:20.5 Success 
00:00.9 00:07.9 00:07.8 00:04.1 00:20.2 Success 
00:00.7 00:04.5 00:07.7 00:04.1 00:19.9 Success 
00:00.7 00:04.5 00:07.5 00:04.0 00:19.6 Success 
00:00.3 00:04.5 00:07.4 00:04.0 00:19.3 Success 
00:00.8 00:04.6 00:07.3 00:03.9 00:19.1 Success 
00:00.6 00:04.8 00:07.2 00:03.9 00:18.8 Success 
00:00.7 00:06.0 00:07.1 00:03.8 00:18.5 Success 
00:00.0 00:04.6 00:07.0 00:03.8 00:18.3 Success 
00:00.1 00:04.1 00:06.9 00:03.7 00:18.1 Success 
00:00.5 00:04.2 00:06.8 00:03.7 00:17.9 Success 
00:00.4 00:10.5 00:06.9 00:03.7 00:18.0 Success 
00:00.7 00:04.1 00:06.9 00:03.7 00:17.9 Success 
www.ukm.my  
 
00:00.4 00:10.3 00:07.0 00:03.7 00:17.9 Success 
Average 00:00.7 00:07.0 - - - - 
Std Deviation 7.13E-06 00:03.7 - - - - 
Denial of Service 0 of 31 transactions 
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Table D5: Experimental result for opening www.elsevier.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:00.3 00:46.5 00:46.5 00:46.5 03:06.1 Success
00:00.2 00:44.8 00:45.7 00:01.2 00:49.3 Success
00:01.5 00:49.8 00:47.1 00:02.5 00:54.7 Denied
00:00.2 00:46.2 00:46.8 00:02.1 00:53.2 Success
00:02.6 01:12.5 00:52.0 00:11.6 01:26.8 Denied
00:00.4 00:47.8 00:51.3 00:10.5 01:22.8 Success
00:03.1 00:59.2 00:52.4 00:10.1 01:22.6 Success
00:00.9 00:44.7 00:51.4 00:09.7 01:20.6 Success
00:00.6 00:46.7 00:50.9 00:09.2 01:18.6 Success
00:00.3 00:44.6 00:50.3 00:08.9 01:17.0 Success
www.elsevier.com  
 
00:00.6 00:48.0 00:50.1 00:08.5 01:15.5 Success
Average 00:01.0 00:50.1 - - - - 
Std Deviation 1.18E-05 00:08.5 - - - - 
Denial of Service 2 of 11 transactions 
 
 
 
 
Table D6: Experimental result for opening www.gatra.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:02.9 00:33.5 00:33.5 00:33.5 02:14.0 Success
00:00.5 00:40.8 00:37.2 00:05.2 00:52.7 Success
00:00.4 00:43.1 00:39.1 00:05.0 00:54.2 Success
00:00.7 01:32.4 00:52.5 00:27.0 02:13.4 Denied
00:02.0 00:46.7 00:51.3 00:23.5 02:01.8 Success
00:02.9 01:52.7 01:01.5 00:32.7 02:39.7 Success
00:02.4 01:57.3 01:09.5 00:36.6 02:59.2 Success
00:02.7 00:33.4 01:05.0 00:36.2 02:53.6 Success
00:00.1 01:32.6 01:08.1 00:35.1 02:53.3 Success
00:02.5 01:57.4 01:13.0 00:36.6 03:02.7 Success
www.gatra.com  
 
00:02.5 00:52.5 01:11.1 00:35.2 02:56.8 Success
Average 00:01.8 01:11.1 - - - - 
Std Deviation 1.29E-05 00:35.2 - - - - 
Denial of Service 1 of 11 transactions 
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Table D7: Experimental result for opening www.google.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:00.1 00:12.4 00:12.4 00:12.4 00:49.7 Success
00:02.3 00:19.3 00:15.8 00:04.8 00:30.4 Success
00:02.4 00:25.1 00:18.9 00:06.4 00:38.0 Success
00:02.7 00:19.3 00:19.0 00:05.2 00:34.6 Success
00:03.1 00:19.2 00:19.1 00:04.5 00:32.6 Success
00:02.2 00:19.2 00:19.1 00:04.0 00:31.2 Success
00:02.7 00:19.1 00:19.1 00:03.7 00:30.1 Success
00:02.7 00:19.2 00:19.1 00:03.4 00:29.3 Success
00:02.7 00:19.3 00:19.1 00:03.2 00:28.7 Success
00:02.8 00:25.6 00:19.8 00:03.6 00:30.7 Success
www.google.com  
 
00:02.7 00:19.2 00:19.7 00:03.5 00:30.1 Success
Average 00:02.4 00:12.4 - - - - 
Std Deviation 9.14E-06 00:19.3 - - - - 
Denial of Service 0 of 11 transactions 
 
 
 
 
Table D8: Experimental result for opening www.kompas.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:06.6 01:30.0 01:30.0 01:30.0 06:00.1 Success
00:11.1 00:54.0 01:12.0 00:25.4 02:28.4 Success
00:01.1 00:27.1 00:57.1 00:31.6 02:31.8 Success
00:01.0 00:34.4 00:51.4 00:28.1 02:15.8 Success
00:01.0 00:30.1 00:47.1 00:26.2 02:05.7 Success
00:10.9 01:42.7 00:56.4 00:32.6 02:34.2 Success
00:02.9 01:36.3 01:02.1 00:33.4 02:42.2 Success
00:03.0 00:33.8 00:58.6 00:32.5 02:35.9 Success
00:01.0 00:28.8 00:55.3 00:31.9 02:31.1 Success
00:02.4 00:33.9 00:53.1 00:30.9 02:25.7 Success
www.kompas.com  
 
00:02.4 00:40.3 00:52.0 00:29.5 02:20.6 Success
Average 00:03.9 00:52.0 - - - - 
Std Deviation 4.44E-05 00:29.5 - - - - 
Denial of Service 0 of 11 transactions 
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Table D7: Experimental result for opening www.rd.com 
Name of External 
Party oc
t∆  ntransactiot∆
 
Cumula
tive 
Mean 
Cumu
lative 
Std 
Dev 
Life- 
time 
of 
canals 
Access 
Results 
00:20.6 01:42.1 01:42.1 01:42.1 06:48.3 Success
00:02.4 00:41.5 01:11.8 00:42.8 03:20.2 Success
00:00.7 00:24.8 00:56.1 00:40.6 02:58.1 Success
00:09.3 00:44.1 00:53.1 00:33.7 02:34.3 Success
00:09.7 00:58.5 00:54.2 00:29.3 02:22.1 Success
00:01.2 01:25.3 00:59.4 00:29.1 02:26.8 Success
00:02.6 01:23.9 01:02.9 00:28.2 02:27.4 Success
00:02.5 02:02.9 01:10.4 00:33.6 02:51.3 Success
00:02.8 02:02.2 01:16.1 00:35.9 03:03.8 Success
00:01.2 01:57.5 01:20.3 00:36.3 03:09.1 Success
www.rd.com  
 
00:02.7 01:08.0 01:19.2 00:34.6 03:03.0 Success
Average 00:05.1 01:19.2 - - - - 
Std Deviation 6.95E-05 00:34.6 - - - - 
Denial of Service 0 of 11 transactions 
 
APPENDIX D3 
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Table D8: Processing time versus number of packets 
No. Number of packets 
t∆  
(min: seconds) No. 
Number of 
packets 
t∆  
(min: seconds)
1 1 00:00.0 31 137 00:09.0 
2 2 00:00.0 32 166 00:11.0 
3 2 00:01.0 33 176 00:09.0 
4 3 00:00.0 34 178 00:09.0 
5 3 00:00.0 35 194 00:13.0 
6 3 00:00.0 36 205 00:12.0 
7 6 00:01.0 37 232 00:13.0 
8 8 00:00.0 38 249 00:18.0 
9 8 00:01.0 39 293 00:17.0 
10 8 00:01.0 40 308 00:20.0 
11 9 00:00.0 41 313 00:20.0 
12 14 00:01.0 42 321 00:23.0 
13 16 00:01.0 43 329 00:18.0 
14 18 00:01.0 44 335 00:18.0 
15 19 00:02.0 45 349 00:18.0 
16 19 00:03.0 46 418 00:30.0 
17 20 00:02.0 47 455 00:27.0 
18 22 00:01.0 48 484 00:29.0 
19 29 00:02.0 49 487 00:29.0 
20 35 00:02.0 50 524 00:28.0 
21 43 00:03.0 51 561 00:38.0 
22 43 00:03.0 52 569 00:40.0 
23 45 00:03.0 53 618 00:39.0 
24 66 00:05.0 54 651 00:38.0 
25 71 00:05.0 55 730 00:35.0 
26 83 00:06.0 56 887 01:03.0 
27 94 00:07.0 57 942 01:10.0 
28 107 00:06.0 58 1065 01:03.0 
29 121 00:06.0 59 1072 01:07.0 
30 123 00:07.0 60 1326 01:23.0 
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#!/bin/sh 
# FIREWALL BASED ON ZERO CONFIGURATION # 
# eth0 = EXTERNAL NETWORK 
# eth1 = INTERNAL NETWORK 
# ------------------ 
# 1. Initialization 
# ------------------ 
INTERNAL_SUBNET="24.4.74" 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_EXT 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_SENDER 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_SENDER 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_RECEIVER 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/TABLEIP 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/DELTATIME 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/TIMEOUTPUT 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/LOG 
cd /PROJECT/FIREWALL 
./firewall_preconfiguration     
# To preconfigure firewall machine 
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
ngrep -d eth1 -t -e > /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT &  # To catch any 
incoming data from internal network and put it in PROXY_BUFF using background process 
# ngrep -d eth0 -t > /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_EXT & # To catch any incoming data 
from outside and put it in PROXY_BUFF using background process 
 
# --------------------- 
# 2. Packet monitoring 
# --------------------- 
 
while [ 1 ] 
do 
        #### HANDLING PACKET FROM INTERNAL NETWORK #### 
        #### ------------------------------------- #### 
  
        SIZE_BUFF_INT=`wc -c /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT | awk '{print $1}'`  
        # echo size buffer "$[SIZE_BUFF_INT]" 
        if [ "$SIZE_BUFF_INT"  != "0" ]                                  
        then 
cat /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW 
  > /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT 
   
  # to get jml baris of buffer 
  # -------------------------- 
BUFF_baris=`wc -l /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW | awk '{print 
$1}'` 
SIZE_BUFF_INT=`wc -c /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW | awk 
'{print $1}'`  
  #echo size buffer bytewise "$[SIZE_BUFF_INT]" 
  #echo size buffer linewise "$[BUFF_baris]" 
  j=1 
  ### 1 ### 
  ######### 
  ## Process every data in buffer line-wise 
  ## -------------------------------------- 
  while [[ $j -le $BUFF_baris ]]   # &&[[ $j -le 10 ]]  
  do
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   TRANSACTION_CODE="" 
   DELTA_TIME="" 
   ## To identify the type of network transaction 
   ## ------------------------------------------- 
TRANSACTION_CODE=`head -n $j 
/PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | awk '{print $1}'` 
SENDER=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | awk '{print $4}'| awk -F: 
'{print $1}'` 
RECEIVER=`head -n $j /PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | awk '{print $6}'| awk -F: 
'{print $1}'` 
 
#DELTA_TIME=`head -n 2 
/PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | awk '{print $3}'` 
#ACCESS_CODE=`head -n 2 
/PROJECT/TEMP/PROXY_BUFF_INT_RAW > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | awk '{print $7}'` 
    
   ### 2 ### 
   ######### 
    
if [[ $TRANSACTION_CODE = U ]] || [[ $TRANSACTION_CODE = T 
]] || [[ $TRANSACTION_CODE = I ]]  
   then 
      if [[ $SENDER != "" ]] && [[ $RECEIVER != "" ]] 
      then 
# echo $j - $TRANSACTION_CODE - $SENDER - 
$RECEIVER 
 
    # Define the protocol 
    if [[ $TRANSACTION_CODE = U ]]  
    then 
     TRANSACTION_CODE=udp 
    fi 
    if [[ $TRANSACTION_CODE = T ]]  
    then 
     TRANSACTION_CODE=tcp 
    fi 
    if [[ $TRANSACTION_CODE = I ]] 
    then 
     TRANSACTION_CODE=icmp 
    fi 
 
    # Define the subnet (IP Mask) of the sender  
    echo $SENDER > /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_SENDER           
first_digit=`head -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_SENDER | 
awk -F. '{print $1}'` 
second_digit=`head -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_SENDER 
| awk -F. '{print $2}'` 
third_digit=`head -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/IP_ADDR_SENDER | 
awk -F. '{print $3}'` 
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SENDER_SUBNET=`echo 
"$first_digit.$second_digit.$third_digit"` 
    # echo $SENDER_SUBNET 
 
# To define which part is outsider, whether it's the sender or 
receiver 
    # --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    if [[ "$SENDER_SUBNET" = "$INTERNAL_SUBNET" ]] 
    then 
     OUTSIDER=$RECEIVER 
     INSIDER=$SENDER 
    else 
     OUTSIDER=$SENDER 
     INSIDER=$RECEIVER 
    fi 
    # wkt_skrg=`date | awk '{print $4}'` 
# echo $j - $TRANSACTION_CODE - $INSIDER - 
$OUTSIDER     
 
AUTHENTICATED=`grep $OUTSIDER 
/PROJECT/TABLE/zero_table` 
    if [ "$AUTHENTICATED" != "" ] 
    then 
     # echo ACCESS IS PERMITTED 
     wkt_skrg=`date | awk '{print $4}'` 
echo $j - $TRANSACTION_CODE - $SENDER - 
$RECEIVER $wkt_skrg PERMITTED 
 
ALREADY_INSERTED=`grep 
$TRANSACTION_CODE 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | grep 
$OUTSIDER | grep $INSIDER` 
 
# ALREADY_INSERTED=`grep $OUTSIDER 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | grep $INSIDER` 
     if [ "$ALREADY_INSERTED" = "" ]  
     #New access 
     then 
      # echo CANAL IS OPENED 
      wkt_skrg=`date | awk '{print $4}'` 
    echo 
$TRANSACTION_CODE $INSIDER 
$OUTSIDER $wkt_skrg >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO 
      echo CANAL IS OPENED $wkt_skrg 
 
      # Rebuild the canals 
      iptables-save > /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptables 
      > /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopy 
Canal_baris=`wc -l 
/PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptables | awk '{print 
$1}'` 
      k=1 
      while [[ $k -le $Canal_baris ]] 
      do 
isikanal=`head -n $k 
/PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptables > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONT
EMP | tail -n 1 
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/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONT
EMP` 
       #echo $isikanal 
if [[ $isikanal = "-A FORWARD -i eth1 -j DROP " ]] 
 then 
echo -A FORWARD -s $INSIDER -d $OUTSIDER -p $TRANSACTION_CODE -j 
ACCEPT >> /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopy 
echo -A FORWARD -s $OUTSIDER -d $INSIDER -p $TRANSACTION_CODE -j 
ACCEPT >> /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopy 
echo -A FORWARD -i eth1 -j DROP >> /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopy 
 else 
  echo $isikanal >> /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopy 
 fi 
 k=`expr ${k} + 1` 
done 
cat /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopy | iptables-restore 
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE 
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
 
#./zero_preconfiguration 
#Canal_baris=`wc -l /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | awk '{print $1}'` 
#k=1 
#while [[ $k -le $Canal_baris ]] 
#do 
# TRANS=`head -n $k /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | 
awk '{print $1}'` 
# IN=`head -n $k /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | 
awk '{print $2}'` 
# OUT=`head -n $k /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | tail -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMP | 
awk '{print $3}'` 
fi 
else 
echo $j - $TRANSACTION_CODE - $SENDER - $RECEIVER $wkt_skrg DENIED 
fi 
fi 
fi 
j=`expr ${j} + 1`      
done 
 
fi 
         
done 
 
echo "Finish" 
 
 
APPENDIX D5 
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#!/bin/sh 
 
# PROCEDURE FOR DELETING CANAL 
# RUNNING IN PARALLEL WITH FIREWALL_MAIN 
# eth0 = EXTERNAL NETWORK 
# eth1 = INTERNAL NETWORK 
 
# ------------------ 
# 1. Initialization 
# ------------------ 
 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_DELETE 
> /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_TEMP_DELETE 
 
# --------------------- 
# 2. Start processing 
# --------------------- 
while [ 1 ] 
do 
 # Identification of new canal through the addition of line 
 # -------------------------------------------------------- 
 jumlah_baris_history=`wc -l /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | awk '{print $1}'` 
  
 if [ $jumlah_baris_history -gt 0 ] 
 then 
  echo . 
  echo . 
# Processing canal by processing the first line of HISTORY_ZERO file for each 
canal 
  # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
analyzed_transaction=`head -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | awk '{print 
$1}'` 
analyzed_internal=`head -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | awk '{print 
$2}'` 
analyzed_external=`head -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | awk '{print 
$3}'` 
analyzed_starttime=`head -n 1 /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | awk '{print 
$4}'` 
 
  # To obtain time duration of network transaction  
  # ---------------------------------------------- 
  life_time="" 
life_time=`grep $analyzed_external /PROJECT/TABLE/zero_table | awk '{print 
$3}'` 
  #if [[ $life_time = "" ]] 
  #then 
  # life_time=60 
  #fi 
  echo life_time $life_time 
   
  # To get detail on the canal hour, minute and second 
  # --------------------------------------------------   
  echo $analyzed_starttime > /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP 
  analyzed_starttime_jam=`awk -F: '{print $1}' /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP` 
     
  analyzed_starttime_jam=`expr ${analyzed_starttime_jam} \* 3600` 
  analyzed_starttime_menit=`awk -F: '{print $2}' /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP` 
  analyzed_starttime_menit=`expr ${analyzed_starttime_menit} \* 60` 
  analyzed_starttime_detik=`awk -F: '{print $3}' /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP`
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analyzed_starttime_integer=`expr ${analyzed_starttime_jam} + 
${analyzed_starttime_menit} + ${analyzed_starttime_detik}` 
  echo analyzed_starttime is $analyzed_starttime_integer 
 
  # To get current time 
  # ------------------- 
  wkt_skrg=`date | awk '{print $4}'` 
  echo $wkt_skrg > /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP 
  wkt_skrg_jam=`awk -F: '{print $1}' /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP` 
  wkt_skrg_jam=`expr ${wkt_skrg_jam} \* 3600` 
  wkt_skrg_menit=`awk -F: '{print $2}' /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP` 
  wkt_skrg_menit=`expr ${wkt_skrg_menit} \* 60` 
  wkt_skrg_detik=`awk -F: '{print $3}' /PROJECT/TEMP/WKT_TEMP` 
wkt_skrg_integer=`expr ${wkt_skrg_jam} + ${wkt_skrg_menit} + 
${wkt_skrg_detik}` 
  echo wkt skrg is $wkt_skrg_integer 
 
# To calculate how long an OLD CANAL has been listed in the Filter Table (the 
value of b ($b) points to the rule being monitored) 
  # --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  if [[ $analyzed_starttime_integer -gt $wkt_skrg_integer ]] 
  then 
   lama_hidup_canal=`expr $analyzed_starttime_integer - $wkt_skrg_integer` 
  else 
   lama_hidup_canal=`expr $wkt_skrg_integer - $analyzed_starttime_integer` 
  fi 
  echo "Lamanya rule hidup adalah" $lama_hidup_canal 
 
  # Comparing the canal life time and the time duration of living canal 
  # ------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  if [ $lama_hidup_canal -gt $life_time ] 
  then 
# Delete data in the first line of HISTORY_ZERO file (Process each canal 
in the first line, remember ...) 
   # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
jumlah_baris_history=`wc -l /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO | awk 
'{print $1}'` 
   a=2 
   while [[ $a -le $jumlah_baris_history ]] 
   do 
head -n $a /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_TEMP_DELETE | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_TEMP_DELETE >> 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_DELETE 
   a=`expr ${a} + 1` 
   echo $a 
   done 
 
   # To return the sec rule from the temporary file to the RULE_CACHE back 
   # --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
jumlah_baris_history_delete=`wc -l 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_DELETE | awk '{print $1}'` 
head -n $jumlah_baris_history_delete 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_DELETE > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_ZERO 
 
   # Determining transaction protocol 
   # -------------------------------- 
   protocol="" 
   if [[ $analyzed_transaction = udp ]] 
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   then 
    protocol="udp" 
   fi 
   if [[ $analyzed_transaction = icmp ]] 
   then 
    protocol="icmp" 
   fi 
   if [[ $analyzed_transaction = tcp ]] 
   then 
    protocol="tcp" 
   fi 
   # Real action for dropping canal in the Filter Table 
   # -------------------------------------------------- 
   iptables-save > /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablesdrop 
   > /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopydrop 
   Canal_baris=`wc -l /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablesdrop | awk '{print $1}'` 
   k=1 
   while [[ $k -le $Canal_baris ]] 
   do 
isikanal=`head -n $k /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablesdrop > 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMPDROP | tail -n 1 
/PROJECT/TEMP/TRANSACTIONTEMPDROP` 
   echo $isikanal > /PROJECT/TEMP/ISIKANALDROP 
get_isikanal1=`grep $analyzed_external 
/PROJECT/TEMP/ISIKANALDROP | awk '{print $4}'` 
get_isikanal2=`grep $analyzed_external 
/PROJECT/TEMP/ISIKANALDROP | awk '{print $6}'` 
get_isikanal3=`grep $analyzed_external 
/PROJECT/TEMP/ISIKANALDROP | awk '{print $8}'` 
if [[ $get_isikanal1 = $analyzed_external ]] && [[ $get_isikanal2 = 
$analyzed_internal ]] && [[ $get_isikanal3 = $protocol ]] 
   then 
   echo DROP $protocol $analyzed_external $analyzed_internal 
   else 
if [[ $get_isikanal1 = $analyzed_internal ]] && [[ $get_isikanal2 = 
$analyzed_external ]] && [[ $get_isikanal3 = $protocol ]] 
   then 
   echo DROP $protocol $analyzed_internal $analyzed_external 
   else 
   echo $isikanal >> /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopydrop 
   fi 
   fi 
   k=`expr ${k} + 1` 
   done 
   cat /PROJECT/TEMP/saveiptablescopydrop | iptables-restore 
   iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE 
   echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
#iptables -D FORWARD -i eth1 -p $protocol -s $analyzed_internal -d 
$analyzed_external -j ACCEPT 
#iptables -D FORWARD -i eth0 -p $protocol -s $analyzed_external -d 
$analyzed_internal -j ACCEPT 
   > /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_DELETE 
   > /PROJECT/TEMP/HISTORY_TEMP_DELETE 
   # echo DELETE $protocol $analyzed_internal $analyzed_external 
  fi 
  echo . 
  echo . 
 fi 
done 
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Since this method employs a mechanism to establish canals for the request of 
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#!/bin/sh 
# 
# firewall      Firewall startup/shutdown script 
# 
# Version:      @(#) /etc/rc.d/init.d/firewall.iptables  08-April-2005 
# 
# 
# Translated to iptables format, with several additions and modifications, 
# from Craig Zeller's (zeller@fatpenguin.com) ipchains-based firewall script, by 
# Bob Sully (rcs@malibyte.net) 
# 
# Thanks to Jeff Carlson (jeff@ultimateevil.org) for his assistance re: DHCP and several other issues,  
# Rohan Amin (rohan@rohanamin.com) and Erik Wasser (erik.wasser@iquer.com) for help with the port-forwarding  
# routine, and Nate Waddoups for his quick PPTP hack. 
# 
# Latest revision: 08-Apr-2005 
# 
# chkconfig: 345 11 91 
# 
# description: IP Firewall startup/shutdown script for iptables 
# 
# probe: true 
# 
# 
# CONSTANTS - Do not edit 
# 
ANYWHERE="0.0.0.0/0"   # Match any IP address 
BROADCAST_SRC="0.0.0.0"   # Broadcast Source Address 
BROADCAST_DEST="255.255.255.255" # Broadcast Destination Address 
CLASS_A="10.0.0.0/8"   # Class-A Private (RFC-1918) Networks 
CLASS_B="172.16.0.0/12"   # Class-B Private (RFC-1918) Networks 
CLASS_C="192.168.0.0/16"  # Class-C Private (RFC-1918) Networks 
CLASS_D_MULTICAST="224.0.0.0/4"  # Class-D Multicast Addresses 
CLASS_E_RESERVED_NET="240.0.0.0/5" # Class-E Reserved Addresses 
PRIVPORTS="0:1023"   # Well-Known, Privileged Port Range 
UNPRIVPORTS="1024:65535"  # Unprivileged Port Range 
TRACEROUTE_SRC_PORTS="32769:65535" # Traceroute Source Ports 
TRACEROUTE_DEST_PORTS="33434:33523" # Traceroute Destination Ports 
# 
# The Loopback interface defines should not be 
# edited unless your Linux distribution defines 
# these differently. 
# 
LOOPBACK_INTERFACE="lo"   # The loopback interface 
LOOPBACK_NETWORK="127.0.0.0/8"  # Reserved Loopback Address Range 
# 
# Source function library. 
# 
. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions 
# 
# See how we were called. 
# 
case "$1" in 
  start) 
        echo "Starting Firewall services" 
 echo "firewall: Configuring Firewall Rules using iptables" 
  # Remove any existing rules from all chains 
     iptables -F 
     iptables -F -t nat 
     iptables -F -t mangle 
     # Set the default policy to drop 
     iptables -P INPUT   DROP 
     iptables -P OUTPUT  DROP 
     iptables -P FORWARD DROP 
 # Allow unlimited traffic on the loopback interface 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $LOOPBACK_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $LOOPBACK_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
 # A bug that showed up as of the Red Hat 7.2 release results in 
     # the following 5 default policies breaking the firewall 
     # initialization: 
 #     fgrep -q '7.2' /etc/redhat-release 
 #     if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then 
 #       iptables -t nat    -P PREROUTING  DROP
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 #       iptables -t nat    -P OUTPUT      DROP  
 #       iptables -t nat    -P POSTROUTING DROP 
 #       iptables -t mangle -P PREROUTING  DROP 
 #       iptables -t mangle -P OUTPUT      DROP 
 #     fi 
     # Remove any pre-existing user-defined chains 
     iptables -X 
     iptables -X -t nat 
     iptables -X -t mangle 
 # Zero counts 
 iptables -Z 
 # Open the configuration file 
 if [ -f /etc/firewall/firewall.conf.iptables ]; then 
     . /etc/firewall/firewall.conf.iptables 
 else 
     # Turn off IP Forwarding & Masquerading 
     echo 0 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward  
     # Turn off dynamic IP hacking 
            echo "0" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr 
  
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        # Allow unlimited local traffic on the internal interface 
        iptables -A INPUT -i $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A OUTPUT -o $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     echo "firewall: No configuration file found at /etc/firewall/firewall.conf.iptables; " 
     echo "firewall: default policies set to DROP on INPUT/OUTPUT/FORWARD chains." 
     exit 1 
 fi 
        # 
        # If your IP address is dynamically assigned by a DHCP server, 
        # your DHCP server's IP address and this machine's IP address are 
        # obtained from /etc/dhcpc/hostinfo-$EXTERNAL_INTERFACE or 
        # /etc/dhcpc/dhcpcd-$EXTERNAL_INTERFACE.info. 
        # 
        if [ $DHCP -gt 0 ]; then 
   # Grab external IP address if already assigned 
          EXTERNAL_IP=$( ifconfig $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE | grep 'inet[^6]' | sed 's/[a-zA-Z:]//g' | awk '{print $1}' ) 
   if [ -n $EXTERNAL_IP ]; then 
            EXT_NETMASK=$( ifconfig $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE | grep 'inet[^6]' | sed 's/[a-zA-Z:]//g' | awk '{print $3}' ) 
            EXTERNAL_NETWORK=$( ipcalc -n $EXTERNAL_IP $EXT_NETMASK | cut -d\= -f2 ) 
            BROADCAST_NET=$( ipcalc -b $EXTERNAL_IP $EXT_NETMASK | cut -d\= -f2 ) 
   fi  
          # Turn on dynamic IP hacking 
          echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr 
          # Incoming DHCPOFFER from available DHCP servers 
          iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp \ 
                   -s 0.0.0.0         --sport 67 \ 
                   -d 255.255.255.255 --dport 68 -j ACCEPT 
          # Initialization of rebinding: No lease or Lease time expired. 
          iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp   \ 
                   -s 0.0.0.0         --sport 68 \ 
                   -d 255.255.255.255 --dport 67 -j ACCEPT 
          # Fall back to initialization 
          # The client knows its server, but has either lost its 
          # lease, or else needs to reconfirm the IP address after 
          # rebooting. 
          iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp \ 
                   -s $DHCP_SERVER_IP --sport 67     \ 
                   -d 255.255.255.255 --dport 68 -j ACCEPT 
          iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp \ 
                   -s 255.255.255.255 --sport 68 \ 
                   -d $DHCP_SERVER_IP --dport 67 -j ACCEPT 
          # As a result of the above, we're supposed to change our IP 
          # address with this message, which is addressed to our new 
          # address before the dhcp client has received the update. 
          # Depending on the server implementation, the destination 
          # address can be the new IP address, the subnet address, or 
          # the limited broadcast address. 
          # If the network subnet address is used as the destination, 
          # the next rule must allow incoming packets destined to the 
          # subnet address, and the rule must preceed any general rules 
          # that block such incoming broadcast packets. 
          iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp \ 
                   -s $DHCP_SERVER_IP --sport 67     \ 
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                   --dport 68 -j ACCEPT 
          # Lease renewal 
          iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp \ 
                   -s $DHCP_SERVER_IP --sport 67     \ 
                   -d $EXTERNAL_IP --dport 68 -j ACCEPT 
          iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp \ 
                   -s $EXTERNAL_IP --sport 68       \ 
                   -d $DHCP_SERVER_IP --dport 67 -j ACCEPT 
          echo "firewall: DHCP Client configured"   
   else 
     # External IP assigned without DHCP (i.e. static); get some more info 
            EXT_NETMASK=$( ifconfig $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE | grep 'inet[^6]' | sed 's/[a-zA-Z:]//g' | awk '{print $3}' ) 
            EXTERNAL_NETWORK=$( ipcalc -n $EXTERNAL_IP $EXT_NETMASK | cut -d\= -f2 ) 
            BROADCAST_NET=$( ipcalc -b $EXTERNAL_IP $EXT_NETMASK | cut -d\= -f2 )    
        fi 
 # 
   # Refuse directed broadcasts; you may choose not to log these, as they can fill up your logs quickly 
 # 
#    iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $EXTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
#             -m limit --limit 1/s            \ 
#             -j LOG --log-prefix "[Directed Broadcast] " 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $EXTERNAL_NETWORK -j DROP 
#  iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $BROADCAST_NET \ 
#             -m limit --limit 1/s            \ 
#             -j LOG --log-prefix "[Directed Broadcast] " 
 iptables -A INPUT  -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $BROADCAST_NET -j DROP 
 # Refuse limited broadcasts 
#     iptables -A INPUT  -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d 255.255.255.255 \ 
#             -m limit --limit 1/s                    \ 
#             -j LOG --log-prefix "[Limited Broadcast] " 
     iptables -A INPUT  -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d 255.255.255.255 -j DROP 
 # 
 # Edit these to match the number of servers or connections 
 # you support. 
 # 
 # X Window port allocation begins at 6000 and increments 
 # for each additional server running from 6000 to 6063. 
 XWINDOW_PORTS="6000:6063"  # (TCP) X Windows 
 # SSH starts at 1023 and works down to 513 for each additional 
 # simultaneous incoming connection. 
 SSH_HI_PORTS="513:1023"   # SSH Simultaneous Connections 
 # 
 # Iptables allows creation of customized chains.  The -l (log) flag no longer 
 # exists.  This is a custom chain which allows logging of DROPped packets. 
 # 
 iptables -N LnD   # Define custom DROP chain 
 iptables -A LnD -p tcp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[TCP drop] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A LnD -p udp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[UDP drop] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A LnD -p icmp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[ICMP drop] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A LnD -f -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[FRAG drop] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A LnD -j DROP 
 # 
 # This custom chain logs, then REJECTs packets. 
 # 
 iptables -N LnR   # Define custom REJECT chain 
 iptables -A LnR -p tcp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[TCP reject] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A LnR -p udp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[UDP reject] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A LnR -p icmp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[ICMP reject] " --log-level=info 
  iptables -A LnR -f -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[FRAG reject] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A LnR -j REJECT 
 # 
 # This chain logs, then DROPs "Xmas" and Null packets which might indicate a port-scan attempt 
 # 
 iptables -N ScanD  # Define custom chain for possible port-scans 
 iptables -A ScanD -p tcp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[TCP Scan?] " 
 iptables -A ScanD -p udp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[UDP Scan?] " 
 iptables -A ScanD -p icmp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[ICMP Scan?] " 
 iptables -A ScanD -f -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[FRAG Scan?] " 
 iptables -A ScanD -j DROP 
 # 
        # This chain limits the number of new incoming connections to preventing DDoS attacks 
        #                                                                                                            
        iptables -N DDoS                # Define custom chain for possible DDoS attacks                                                                                                              
        iptables -A DDoS -m limit --limit 12/s --limit-burst 24 -j RETURN 
 iptables -A DDoS -j LOG --log-prefix "[DDos Attack?] " 
 iptables -A DDoS -j DROP 
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 # 
        # This chain drops connections from IANA reserved IP blocks 
        # 
 iptables -N IANA  
 iptables -A IANA -p tcp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[IANA Reserved - TCP] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A IANA -p udp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[IANA Reserved - UDP] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A IANA -p icmp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[IANA Reserved - ICMP] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A IANA -f -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[IANA Reserved - FRAG] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A IANA -j DROP 
 # 
        # This chain drops connections from IPs in the firewall.banned file 
        # 
 iptables -N Banned  
 iptables -A Banned -p tcp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[TCP Banned] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A Banned -p udp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[UDP Banned] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A Banned -p icmp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[ICMP Banned] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A Banned -f -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[FRAG Banned] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A Banned -j DROP 
        # 
        # Disallow packets frequently used by port-scanners 
        #  
 # All of the bits are cleared 
     iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL NONE -j ScanD 
     # SYN and FIN are both set 
     iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,FIN SYN,FIN -j ScanD 
     # SYN and RST are both set 
     iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -j ScanD 
     # FIN and RST are both set 
     iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags FIN,RST FIN,RST -j ScanD 
     # FIN is the only bit set, without the expected accompanying ACK 
     iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags ACK,FIN FIN -j ScanD 
     # PSH is the only bit set, without the expected accompanying ACK 
     iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags ACK,PSH PSH -j ScanD 
     # URG is the only bit set, without the expected accompanying ACK 
     iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags ACK,URG URG -j ScanD 
 # SYN-Flood  
 # (Request for new connection; large number indicate possible DDoS-type attack;  
 #  same as --syn) 
 iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j DDoS 
 # Enable broadcast echo Protection 
 echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts 
 # Disable Source Routed Packets 
 for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/accept_source_route; do 
        echo 0 > $f 
 done 
 # Enable TCP SYN Cookie Protection 
 echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies 
 # Disable ICMP Redirect Acceptance 
 for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/accept_redirects; do 
       echo 0 > $f 
 done 
 # Don't send Redirect Messages 
 for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/send_redirects; do 
       echo 0 > $f 
 done 
 # Disable ICMP Redirect Acceptance 
 for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/accept_redirects; do 
     echo 0 > $f 
 done 
 # Drop Spoofed Packets coming in on an interface, which if replied to, 
 # would result in the reply going out a different interface. 
 for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/rp_filter; do 
      echo 1 > $f 
 done 
 # Log packets with impossible addresses. 
 for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/log_martians; do 
      echo 1 > $f 
 done 
 # Disallow fragmented packets.  This may not be as necessary as it once was. 
 # Comment it out with # if desired. 
# iptables -A INPUT -f -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -j LnD 
# iptables -A INPUT -f -i $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -j LnD 
 # 
 # Loopback 
 # 
 # Unlimited traffic on the loopback interface (lo) 
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 iptables -A INPUT -i $LOOPBACK_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $LOOPBACK_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
 # 
 # Refuse any connections to/from problem sites. 
 # 
 # /etc/firewall/firewall.banned contains a list of IPs 
 # to block all access, both inbound and outbound. 
 # The file should contain IP addresses with CIDR 
 # netmask, one per line: 
 # 
 # NOTE: No comments are allowed in the file. 
 # 
 # 111.222.333.444/32  - To block a single IP address 
 # 111.222.333.444/8  - To block a Class-A network 
 # 111.222.333.444/16  - To block a Class-B network 
 # 111.222.333.444/24  - To block a Class-C network 
 # 
 # The CIDR netmask number describes the number of bits 
 # in the network portion of the address, and may be on 
 # any boundary. 
 # 
 if [ -f /etc/firewall/firewall.banned ]; then 
     while read BANNED; do 
  iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $BANNED -j Banned 
  iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $BANNED -j Banned 
  iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $BANNED -j Banned 
  iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $BANNED -j Banned 
  iptables -A FORWARD -d $BANNED -j Banned 
                iptables -A FORWARD -s $BANNED -j Banned 
     done < /etc/firewall/firewall.banned 
     echo "firewall: Banned addresses added to rule set" 
 else 
     echo "firewall: Banned address/network file not found." 
 fi 
 # 
 # Refuse connections from IANA-reserved blocks 
 # 
 if [ -f /etc/firewall/firewall.iana-reserved ]; then 
     while read RESERVED; do 
  iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $RESERVED -j IANA 
  iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $RESERVED -j IANA 
  iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $RESERVED -j IANA 
  iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $RESERVED -j IANA 
     done < /etc/firewall/firewall.iana-reserved 
     echo "firewall: Connections from IANA-reserved addresses blocked" 
 else 
     echo "firewall: IANA-reserved address/network file not found." 
 fi 
 # 
 # Localizations 
 # 
 # The /etc/firewall/firewall.local file should contain rules in 
 # standard 'iptables' format. 
 # 
 if [ -f /etc/firewall/firewall.local.iptables ]; then 
     . /etc/firewall/firewall.local.iptables 
     echo "firewall: Local rules added" 
 else 
     echo "firewall: Local rules file not found." 
 fi 
 # 
 # ICMP 
 # 
 # (4) Source Quench. 
 # Incoming & outgoing requests to slow down (flow control) 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 4 \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE  -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 4 \ 
     -s $EXTERNAL_IP  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A FORWARD -p ICMP --icmp-type 4 -j ACCEPT 
 fi 
 # (12) Parameter Problem. 
 # Incoming & outgoing error messages 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 12 \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE  -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
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 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 12 \ 
     -s $EXTERNAL_IP  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A FORWARD -p ICMP --icmp-type 12 -j ACCEPT 
 fi 
 # (3) Destination Unreachable, Service Unavailable. 
 # Incoming & outgoing size negotiation, service or 
 # destination unavailability, final traceroute response 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 3 \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE  -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 3 \ 
     -s $EXTERNAL_IP  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type \ 
     fragmentation-needed -s $EXTERNAL_IP  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A FORWARD -p ICMP --icmp-type 3 -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A FORWARD -p ICMP --icmp-type fragmentation-needed -j ACCEPT 
 fi 
 # (11) Time Exceeded. 
 # Incoming & outgoing timeout conditions, 
 # also intermediate TTL response to traceroutes 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 11 \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE  -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 11 \ 
     -s $EXTERNAL_IP  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A FORWARD -p ICMP --icmp-type 11 -j ACCEPT 
 fi 
 # (0 | 8) Allow OUTPUT pings to anywhere. 
 if [ $OUTBOUND_PING -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 8 \ 
  -s $EXTERNAL_IP  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 0 \ 
  -s $ANYWHERE  -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p ICMP --icmp-type 8 -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p ICMP --icmp-type 0 -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Outbound ping enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # (0 | 8) Allow incoming pings from anywhere 
 #       (stops at firewall). 
 if [ $INBOUND_PING -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 8 \ 
  -s $ANYWHERE  -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 0 \ 
  -s $EXTERNAL_IP  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Inbound ping enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # Unprivileged Ports 
 # Avoid ports subject to protocol and system administration problems. 
 # 
 
 NFS_PORT="2049"    # (TCP/UDP) NFS 
 OPENWINDOWS_PORT="2000"   # (TCP) Openwindows 
 SOCKS_PORT="1080"   # (TCP) Socks 
 # Openwindows: establishing a connection 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $OPENWINDOWS_PORT -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j LnR 
 # Openwindows: incoming connection 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $OPENWINDOWS_PORT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j LnD 
 # X Window: establishing a remote connection 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $XWINDOW_PORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j LnR 
 # X Window: incoming connection attempt 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $XWINDOW_PORTS -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j LnD 
 # SOCKS: establishing a connection 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $SOCKS_PORT -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE  -j LnR 
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 # SOCKS: incoming connection 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $SOCKS_PORT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j LnD 
 # NFS: TCP connections 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $NFS_PORT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $NFS_PORT -d $ANYWHERE -j LnR 
 # NFS: UDP connections 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --dport $NFS_PORT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j LnD 
 # NFS: incoming request (normal UDP mode) 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --dport $NFS_PORT -d $ANYWHERE -j LnR 
        # 
        # DNAT/SNAT Port Forwarding 
        #  
  if [ $PORT_FORWARD -gt 0 ]; then  
           if [ -f /etc/firewall/firewall.nat ]; then 
             while read IP_PORT; do 
               # extract the protocols, IPs and ports 
        NAT_TYPE=$(echo "$IP_PORT" | awk '{print $1}') 
               NAT_EXT_PORT=$(echo "$IP_PORT" | awk '{print $2}') 
               NAT_INT_IP=$(echo "$IP_PORT" | awk '{print $3}') 
               NAT_INT_PORT=$(echo "$IP_PORT" | awk '{print $4}') 
               # write the rules! 
               # this is the prerouting dnat 
               iptables -A PREROUTING -t nat -p $NAT_TYPE -d $EXTERNAL_IP --dport $NAT_EXT_PORT -j DNAT \ 
                --to-destination $NAT_INT_IP:$NAT_INT_PORT 
               # This allows packets from external->internal 
               iptables -A FORWARD -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -o $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -p $NAT_TYPE  \ 
                -d $NAT_INT_IP --dport $NAT_INT_PORT -m state \ 
                --state NEW,ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT 
               # This allows packets from internal->external 
               iptables -A FORWARD -i $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p $NAT_TYPE  \ 
                -s $NAT_INT_IP --sport $NAT_INT_PORT -m state \ 
                --state NEW,ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT 
               # This enables access to the 'public' server from the internal network 
               iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -d $NAT_INT_IP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
                -p $NAT_TYPE --dport $NAT_INT_PORT -j SNAT --to $INTERNAL_IP 
               echo firewall: dnat: $NAT_TYPE:$EXTERNAL_IP:$NAT_EXT_PORT - $NAT_INT_IP:$NAT_INT_PORT 
             done < /etc/firewall/firewall.nat 
            # unset some variables 
              unset IP_PORT 
       unset NAT_TYPE 
              unset NAT_EXT_PORT 
              unset NAT_INT_IP 
              unset NAT_INT_PORT 
    else 
              echo "firewall.nat (port-forwarding table) not found!  Port-forwarding not enabled." 
    fi 
        fi 
 # 
 # NOTE: 
 #     The symbolic names used in /etc/services for the port numbers 
 #     vary by supplier. 
 # 
 # Required Services 
 # 
 # DNS client modes (53) 
 # 
 if [ $DNS_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
  --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 53 -s $EXTERNAL_IP \ 
  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p UDP --
sport 53 \ 
  --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 53 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 53 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j 
ACCEPT 
     fi 
     # TCP client-to-server requests are allowed by the protocol 
     # if UDP requests fail. This is rarely seen. Usually, clients 
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     # use TCP as a secondary name server for zone transfers from 
     # their primary name servers, and as hackers. 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP --sport \ 
  $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 53 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
  --sport 53 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 53 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 53 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: DNS client enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # DNS server modes (53) 
 # 
 # 
 # DNS caching & forwarding name server 
 # 
 if [ $DNS_CACHING_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
     # Server-to-server query or response 
     # Caching only name server uses UDP, not TCP 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport 53 --dport 53 -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport 53 --dport 53 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: DNS Caching server enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # DNS full name server 
 # 
 if [ $DNS_FULL_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
     # Client-to-server DNS transaction. 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 53 -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport 53 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     # Zone Transfers. 
     # Due to the potential danger of zone transfers, 
     # allow TCP traffic to only specific secondaries. 
            # /etc/firewall/firewall.dns contains a list of 
            # secondary, tertiary, etc. domain name servers with which 
            # zone transfers are allowed.  The file should contain IP 
            # addresses with CIDR netmask, one per line: 
        if [ -f /etc/firewall/firewall.dns ]; then 
                while read DNS_SECONDARY; do 
            iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
                --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 53 -s $DNS_SECONDARY -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
                --sport 53 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $DNS_SECONDARY -j ACCEPT 
            done < /etc/firewall/firewall.dns 
        else 
            echo "firewall: ** No secondary DNS configured **" 
        fi 
            if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
                echo "firewall: DNS Full server enabled" 
            fi 
        fi 
 # 
 # AUTH (113) - Allowing your outgoing AUTH requests as a client 
 # 
 if [ $AUTH_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 113 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 113 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 113 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 113 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
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     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Auth client enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # AUTH server (113) 
 if [ $AUTH_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
     # Accepting incoming AUTH requests 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 113 -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 113 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Auth server enabled" 
     fi 
 else 
     # Rejecting incoming AUTH requests 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
  --dport 113 -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j LnR 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Auth server requests will be rejected" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # TCP Services on selected ports. 
 # 
 # 
 # Sending Mail through a remote SMTP server (25) 
 # 
 if [ $SMTP_REMOTE_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    # SMTP client to an ISP account without a local server 
    for SMTP_SRVR in ${SMTP_SERVER}; do 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 25 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $SMTP_SRVR -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 25 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $SMTP_SRVR -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
       if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
          iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -d $SMTP_SRVR --sport $UNPRIVPORTS 
--dport 25 -j ACCEPT 
          iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -s $SMTP_SRVR -d 
$INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
    --sport 25 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
       fi 
       if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
     echo "firewall: Clients may access remote SMTP server: ${SMTP_SRVR}" 
       fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # Sending Mail through a local SMTP server (25) 
 # 
 if [ $SMTP_LOCAL_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 25 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 25 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     # Receiving Mail as a Local SMTP server (25) 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 25 -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 25 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: SMTP Local server enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # POP3 (110) - Retrieving Mail as a POP3 client 
 # 
 if [ $POP3_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
    for POP_SRVR in ${POP_SERVER}; do    
        iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 110 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $POP_SRVR -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 110 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $POP_SRVR -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
        if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
 182
           iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -d $POP_SRVR --sport $UNPRIVPORTS -
-dport 110 -j ACCEPT 
           iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -s $POP_SRVR -d 
$INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
     --sport 110 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
        fi 
        if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
     echo "firewall: Clients may access remote POP-3 server: ${POP_SRVR}" 
        fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # POP3 (110) - Hosting a POP3 server for remote clients 
 # 
 if [ $POP3_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for MY_POP3_CLIENT in ${MY_POP3_CLIENTS}; do 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 110 -s $MY_POP3_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 110 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_POP3_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
        if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
           echo "firewall: Remote site ${MY_POP3_CLIENT} may access local POP-3 server" 
        fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # IMAP (143) - Retrieving Mail as an IMAP client 
 # 
 if [ $IMAP_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
    for IMAP_SRVR in ${MY_IMAP_SERVER}; do 
        iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 143 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $IMAP_SRVR -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 143 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $IMAP_SRVR -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
        if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
           iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -d $IMAP_SRVR --sport $UNPRIVPORTS 
--dport 143 -j ACCEPT 
           iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -s $IMAP_SRVR -d 
$INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
     --sport 143 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
        fi 
        if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
    echo "firewall: Clients may access remote IMAP server: ${IMAP_SRVR}" 
        fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # IMAP (143) - Hosting an IMAP server for remote clients 
 # 
 if [ $IMAP_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for MY_IMAP_CLIENT in ${MY_IMAP_CLIENTS}; do 
        iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 143 -s $MY_IMAP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
          iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 143 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_IMAP_CLIENTS -j ACCEPT 
      if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
    echo "firewall: Remote site ${MY_IMAP_CLIENT} may access local IMAP server" 
      fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # IMAPS (993) - Retrieving Mail as an Secure IMAP client 
 # 
 if [ $IMAPS_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
    for IMAPS_SRVR in ${MY_IMAPS_SERVER}; do 
        iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 993 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $IMAPS_SRVR -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 993 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $IMAPS_SRVR -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
        if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
           iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -d $IMAP_SRVR --sport $UNPRIVPORTS 
--dport 993 -j ACCEPT 
           iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -s $IMAPS_SRVR -d 
$INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
     --sport 993 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
        fi 
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        if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
    echo "firewall: Clients may access remote Secure IMAP server: ${IMAPS_SRVR}" 
        fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # IMAPS (993) - Hosting a Secure IMAP server for remote clients 
 # 
 if [ $IMAPS_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for MY_IMAPS_CLIENT in ${MY_IMAPS_CLIENTS}; do 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 993 -s $MY_IMAP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 993 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_IMAP_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
        if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
      echo "firewall: Remote site ${MY_IMAPS_CLIENT} may access local Secure IMAP server" 
        fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # NNTP (119) - Reading and posting news as a Usenet client 
 # 
 if [ $NNTP_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
    for NEWS_SRVR in ${NEWS_SERVER}; do 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 119 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $NEWS_SRVR -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 119 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $NEWS_SRVR -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
        if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
           iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -d $NEWS_SRVR --sport 
$UNPRIVPORTS --dport 119 -j ACCEPT 
           iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -s $NEWS_SRVR -d 
$INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
     --sport 119 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
        fi 
        if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
    echo "firewall: Clients may access remote NNTP server: ${NEWS_SRVR}" 
        fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # NNTP (119) - Hosting a Usenet news server for remote clients 
 # 
 if [ $NNTP_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for NNTP_CLIENT in ${MY_NNTP_CLIENTS}; do 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 119 -s $NNTP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 119 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $NNTP_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
 
       if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
   echo "firewall: Remote client ${NNTP_CLIENT} may access local NNTP server" 
       fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # NNTP (119) - Allowing peer news feeds for a local Usenet server 
 # 
 if [ $NNTP_NEWS_FEED -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 119 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_NEWS_FEED -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 119 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $MY_NEWS_FEED -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: External NNTP News feed access enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
        # Secure NNTP (563) - Reading and posting news as a Usenet client over SSL 
        # Submitted by Renaud Colinet 
 # 
        if [ $NNTPS_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
    for SNEWS_SRVR in ${SNEWS_SERVER}; do  
              iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
           --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 563 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $SNEWS_SRVR -j ACCEPT 
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              iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
           --sport 563 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $SNEWS_SERVER -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
              if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
                 iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -d $SNEWS_SRVR --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 
563 -j ACCEPT 
                 iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -s $SNEWS_SRVR -d 
$INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
                  --sport 563 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
              fi 
              if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
                 echo "firewall: Clients may access remote secure NNTP server: ${SNEWS_SRVR}" 
              fi 
    done 
        fi 
 # 
 # TELNET (23) - Allowing outgoing client access to remote sites 
 # 
 if [ $TELNET_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 23 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 23 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 23 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 23 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote TELNET servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # TELNET (23) - Allowing incoming access to your local server 
 # Note:  Not recommended! Suggest SSH instead! 
 # 
 if [ $TELNET_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for MY_TELNET_CLIENT in ${MY_TELNET_CLIENTS}; do 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 23 -s $MY_TELNET_CLIENTS -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 23 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_TELNET_CLIENTS -j ACCEPT 
        if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
    echo "firewall: Remote site ${MY_TELNET_CLIENT} may access local TELNET server" 
        fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # SSH Client (22) - Allowing client access to remote SSH servers 
 # 
 if [ $SSH_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 22 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 22 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $SSH_HI_PORTS --dport 22 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 22 --dport $SSH_HI_PORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 22 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
 --sport 22 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $SSH_HI_PORTS --dport 22 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 22 --dport $SSH_HI_PORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote SSH servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 185
 # SSH (see config) - Allowing remote client access to your local SSH server 
 # 
 if [ $SSH_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for MY_SSH_CLIENT in ${MY_SSH_CLIENTS}; do 
        iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport $SSH_PORT -s $MY_SSH_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
        iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport $SSH_PORT --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_SSH_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
 
        iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $SSH_HI_PORTS --dport $SSH_PORT -s $MY_SSH_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
        iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
     --sport $SSH_PORT --dport $SSH_HI_PORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_SSH_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Remote site ${MY_SSH_CLIENT} may access local SSH server" 
     fi 
 done 
 fi 
 # 
 # FTP (20, 21) - Allowing outgoing client access to remote FTP servers 
 # 
 if [ $FTP_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     # Outgoing request 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 21 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 21 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     # Normal Port mode FTP data channels 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --sport 20 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 20 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     # Passive mode FTP data channels 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEP 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 20:21 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 20:21 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 
$UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 
$UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote FTP servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # FTP (20, 21) - Allowing incoming access to your local FTP server 
 # 
      if [ $FTP_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
         for MY_FTP_CLIENT in ${MY_FTP_CLIENTS}; do 
            # Incoming request 
               iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED \ 
           --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 21 -s $MY_FTP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
              iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
           --sport 21 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_FTP_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
            # Normal Port mode FTP data channel responses 
               iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
           --sport 20 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_FTP_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
               iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
           --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 20 -s $MY_FTP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
            # Passive mode FTP data channel responses 
               iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED \ 
           --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $MY_FTP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
               iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
           --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_FTP_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
             if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
                echo "firewall: Remote site ${MY_FTP_CLIENT} may access local FTP server" 
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             fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # HTTP (80) - Accessing remote web sites as a client 
 # 
 if [ $HTTP_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 80 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 80 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 80 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 80 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j 
ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote HTTP servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # HTTP (80) - Allowing remote access to a local web server 
 # 
 if [ $HTTP_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for HTTP_CLIENT in ${MY_HTTP_CLIENTS}; do 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 80 -s $HTTP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 80 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $HTTP_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 8080 -s $HTTP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 8080 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $HTTP_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
 
       if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
   echo "firewall: Remote client ${HTTP_CLIENT} may access local HTTP server" 
       fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # HTTPS (443) - Accessing remote web sites over SSL as a client 
 # 
 if [ $HTTPS_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then  
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 443 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 443 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 443 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 443 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote HTTPS servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # HTTPS (443) - Allowing remote access to a local SSL web server 
 # 
 if [ $HTTPS_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for HTTPS_CLIENT in ${MY_HTTPS_CLIENTS}; do 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 443 -s $HTTPS_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 443 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $HTTPS_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
       if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
   echo "firewall: Remote client ${HTTPS_CLIENT} may access local HTTPS server" 
       fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # HTTP Proxy Client (8008/8080) 
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 # 
 if [ $HTTP_PROXY -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport $WEB_PROXY_PORT -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $WEB_PROXY_SERVER -j 
ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport $WEB_PROXY_PORT --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $WEB_PROXY_SERVER -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j 
ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 
$WEB_PROXY_PORT -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport $WEB_PROXY_PORT --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote sites via HTTP Proxy Server" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # FINGER (79) - Accessing remote finger servers as a client 
 # 
 if [ $FINGER_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 79 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 79 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 79 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 79 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote FINGER servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # FINGER (79) - Allowing remote client access to a local finger server (dangerous!) 
 # 
 if [ $FINGER_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for FINGER_CLIENT in $MY_FINGER_CLIENTS}; do 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 79 -s $FINGER_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 79 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $FINGER_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
       if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
   echo "firewall: Remote client ${FINGER_CLIENT} may access local FINGER server" 
       fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # WHOIS (43) - Accessing a remote WHOIS server as a client 
 # 
 if [ $WHOIS_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 43 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 43 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 43 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 43 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote WHOIS servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # GOPHER (70) - Accessing a remote GOPHER server as a client 
 # 
 if [ $GOPHER_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 70 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
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 --sport 70 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 70 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 70 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote GOPHER servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # WAIS (210) - Accessing a remote WAIS server as a client 
 # 
 if [ $WAIS_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 210 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 210 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 210 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 210 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote WAIS servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
        # Real Video (554) - Real Video Client 
        # 
        if [ $RV_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
            iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
               --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 554 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
               --sport 554 -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 554 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 554 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
            if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
                echo "firewall: Real Video client enabled" 
            fi 
        fi 
        # 
        # PPTP (1723) - Accessing PPTP servers as a client 
        # 
        if [ $PPTP_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
            iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
                --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 1723 \ 
                -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP  \ 
                --sport 1723 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS \ 
                -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP \ 
                -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p 47 -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p 47 -j ACCEPT 
            if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
               iptables -A INPUT -i $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -p 47 -j ACCEPT 
               iptables -A OUTPUT -o $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -p 47 -j ACCEPT 
               iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
                  --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 1723 -j ACCEPT 
               iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
                  -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
                  --sport 1723 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
               iptables -A FORWARD -p 47 -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -j ACCEPT 
               iptables -A FORWARD -p 47 -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK -j ACCEPT 
            fi 
            if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
                echo "firewall: Clients may access remote PPTP servers" 
            fi 
        fi 
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 # 
 # UDP - Accept only on selected ports 
 # 
 # 
 # TRACEROUTE 
 # 
 # Traceroute usually uses -s 32769:65535 -d 33434:33523 
 # 
 if [ $OUTBOUND_TRACEROUTE -gt 0 ]; then 
     # Enable outgoing TRACEROUTE requests 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport $TRACEROUTE_SRC_PORTS --dport $TRACEROUTE_DEST_PORTS \ 
 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $TRACEROUTE_SRC_PORTS \ 
  --dport $TRACEROUTE_DEST_PORTS -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $TRACEROUTE_DEST_PORTS \ 
  --dport $TRACEROUTE_SRC_PORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Outbound TRACEROUTE enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 if [ $INBOUND_TRACEROUTE -gt 0 ]; then 
     # Enable incoming TRACEROUTE query 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport $TRACEROUTE_SRC_PORTS --dport $TRACEROUTE_DEST_PORTS \ 
 -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $TRACEROUTE_SRC_PORTS \ 
  --dport $TRACEROUTE_DEST_PORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Inbound TRACEROUTE enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
        # 
        # DHCP Server 
 # 
        # This assumes that you're running a DHCP server on your firewall to 
        # supply IP addresses to your internal network using dhcpd.  See any 
        # of several DHCP HowTo sites for the actual server setup. 
        # 
        if [ $DHCP_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
            iptables -A INPUT -i $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp -s $BROADCAST_SRC \ 
        -d $BROADCAST_DEST --sport 67:68 --dport 67:68 -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A OUTPUT -o $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp -s $INTERNAL_IP \ 
        --sport 67:68 --dport 67:68 -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 67:68 --dport 67:68 -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 67:68 --dport 67:68 -j ACCEPT 
 
           if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
                echo "firewall: DHCP Server enabled" 
           fi 
        fi 
        # 
        # NTP (123) - Accessing remote Network Time Servers 
        # 
        if [ $NTP_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
            iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
        --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 123 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
        --sport 123 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
        --sport 123 --dport 123 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
        --sport 123 --dport 123 -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 123 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 123 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 123 --dport 123 -j ACCEPT 
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        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 123 --dport 123 -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
            if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
                echo "firewall: NTP Client enabled" 
            fi 
        fi 
 # 
 # ICQ (4000) - The Miribilis ICQ Client 
 # 
 if [ $ICQ_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 4000 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport 4000 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 4000 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 4000 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j 
ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
         echo "firewall: ICQ Client enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # GAMES 
 # Half-Life/CounterStrike 
 # 
 if [ $HALF_LIFE -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport 27000:27050 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED,NEW --dport 27000:27050 -s $ANYWHERE \ 
 -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 27000:27050 --dport 
$UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK -m state --state 
RELATED,ESTABLISHED,NEW --dport 27000:27050 -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
         echo "firewall: Half-Life/CounterStrike game ports enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # Return to Castle Wolfenstein 
 # 
 if [ $WOLF_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables  -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 27950:27965 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables  -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport 27950:27965 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 
27950:27965 -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 27950:27965 --dport 
$UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
         echo "firewall: Castle Wolfenstein game ports enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------- 
 # 
 # Spoofing and Bad Addresses 
 # 
 # Refuse spoofed packets. 
 # Ignore blatantly illegal source addresses. 
 # Protect yourself from sending to bad addresses. 
 # Refuse spoofed packets pretending to be from 
 # the external interface's IP address. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $EXTERNAL_IP -j LnD 
 # Refuse packets claiming to be to or from a Class-A private network. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_A -j LnD 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $CLASS_A -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_A -j LnD 
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 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $CLASS_A -j LnD 
 # Refuse packets claiming to be to or from a Class-B private network. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_B -j LnD 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $CLASS_B -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_B -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $CLASS_B -j LnD 
 # Refuse packets claiming to be to or from a Class-C private network. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_C -j LnD 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $CLASS_C -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_C -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $CLASS_C -j LnD 
 # Refuse packets claiming to be from the loopback. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $LOOPBACK_NETWORK -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $LOOPBACK_NETWORK -j LnD 
 # Refuse malformed broadcast packets. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $BROADCAST_DEST -j LnD 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $BROADCAST_SRC  -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $BROADCAST_DEST -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $BROADCAST_SRC  -j LnD 
 # Refuse Class-D Multicast addresses. 
 # Multicast is only illegal as a source address. 
 # Multicast uses UDP. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_D_MULTICAST -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_D_MULTICAST -j LnR 
 # Refuse Class-E reserved IP addresses. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_E_RESERVED_NET -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $CLASS_E_RESERVED_NET -j LnR 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------- 
 # 
 # DROP (on input), REJECT (output) and LOG anything else on the external (red) interface 
 # 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE -j LnR 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE -j LnR 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE -j LnR 
 # 
 # Masquerade internal traffic 
 # 
 if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
     # All internal traffic is masqueraded externally 
     iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -j SNAT \ 
     --to $EXTERNAL_IP 
            # Note: some may find this works better on machines with non-static  
     # external IP addresses: 
            # iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ethX -j MASQUERADE 
     # Enable IP Forwarding  
     echo 1 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
     # 
     # Unlimited traffic within the local network 
     # 
     # All internal machines have access to the firewall machine 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK -j ACCEPT 
            if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Masquerading internal network" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------- 
 # Zero counts 
 iptables -Z 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------- 
 echo "done" 
 touch /var/lock/subsys/firewall 
 echo 
 ;; 
  status) 
   if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/firewall ]; then 
     echo "Firewall started and configured" 
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 else 
     echo "Firewall stopped" 
 fi 
 exit 0 
 ;; 
  restart|reload) 
 $0 stop 
 $0 start 
 ;; 
  stop) 
   echo "Shutting down Firewall services" 
 # Turn off IP Forwarding 
 echo 0 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
 # Turn off dynamic IP hacking 
       echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr 
 # Flush the rule chains 
 iptables -F 
 # Delete custom chains 
 iptables -X 
 # Zero counts 
 iptables -Z 
 # Set the default policy to DROP 
 iptables -P INPUT DROP 
 iptables -P OUTPUT DROP 
 iptables -P FORWARD DROP 
 # Allow unlimited traffic on the loopback interface 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $LOOPBACK_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $LOOPBACK_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
 # Open the configuration file 
 if [ -f /etc/firewall/firewall.conf.iptables ]; then 
     . /etc/firewall/firewall.conf.iptables 
            if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
                # Allow unlimited local traffic on the internal interface 
                iptables -A INPUT -i $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
                iptables -A OUTPUT -o $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
 else 
     echo "firewall: No configuration file found at /etc/firewall/firewall.conf.iptables" 
     exit 1 
 fi 
 rm -f /var/lock/subsys/firewall 
 echo 
 ;; 
  *) 
 echo "Usage: /etc/rc.d/init.d/firewall.iptables {start|stop|status|restart|reload}" 
 exit 1 
esac 
exit 0 
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#!/bin/bash 
 
source /usr/local/share/dynfw.sh 
 
args 2 $# "${0} IPADDR {on/off}" "Drops packets to/from IPADDR. Good for obnoxious 
                                  networks/hosts/DoS" 
 
if [ "$2" == "on" ]  
then 
  #rules will be appended or inserted as normal 
 APPEND="-A" 
  INSERT="-I" 
  rec_check ipdrop $1 "$1 already blocked" on 
  record ipdrop $1 
elif [ "$2" == "off" ] 
then 
  #rules will be deleted instead 
 APPEND="-D" 
  INSERT="-D" 
  rec_check ipdrop $1 "$1 not currently blocked" off  
  unrecord ipdrop $1 
else 
  echo "Error: \"off\" or \"on\" expected as second argument" 
  exit 1 
fi   
 
#block outside IP address that's causing problems 
#attacker's incoming TCP connections will take a minute or so to time out, 
#reducing DoS effectiveness. 
 
iptables $INSERT INPUT   -s $1 -j DROP 
iptables $INSERT OUTPUT  -d $1 -j DROP 
iptables $INSERT FORWARD -d $1 -j DROP 
iptables $INSERT FORWARD -s $1 -j DROP 
 
echo "IP ${1} drop ${2}." 
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#!/bin/sh 
# 
# firewall      Firewall startup/shutdown script 
# 
# Version:      @(#) /etc/rc.d/init.d/firewall.iptables  08-April-2005 
# 
# 
# Translated to iptables format, with several additions and modifications, 
# from Craig Zeller's (zeller@fatpenguin.com) ipchains-based firewall script, by 
# Bob Sully (rcs@malibyte.net) 
# 
# Thanks to Jeff Carlson (jeff@ultimateevil.org) for his assistance re: DHCP and several other issues,  
# Rohan Amin (rohan@rohanamin.com) and Erik Wasser (erik.wasser@iquer.com) for help with the port-forwarding  
# routine, and Nate Waddoups for his quick PPTP hack. 
# 
# Latest revision: 08-Apr-2005 
# 
# chkconfig: 345 11 91 
# 
# description: IP Firewall startup/shutdown script for iptables 
# 
# probe: true 
# 
# 
# CONSTANTS - Do not edit 
# 
ANYWHERE="0.0.0.0/0"   # Match any IP address 
BROADCAST_SRC="0.0.0.0"   # Broadcast Source Address 
BROADCAST_DEST="255.255.255.255" # Broadcast Destination Address 
CLASS_A="10.0.0.0/8"   # Class-A Private (RFC-1918) Networks 
CLASS_B="172.16.0.0/12"   # Class-B Private (RFC-1918) Networks 
CLASS_C="192.168.0.0/16"  # Class-C Private (RFC-1918) Networks 
CLASS_D_MULTICAST="224.0.0.0/4"  # Class-D Multicast Addresses 
CLASS_E_RESERVED_NET="240.0.0.0/5" # Class-E Reserved Addresses 
PRIVPORTS="0:1023"   # Well-Known, Privileged Port Range 
UNPRIVPORTS="1024:65535"  # Unprivileged Port Range 
TRACEROUTE_SRC_PORTS="32769:65535" # Traceroute Source Ports 
TRACEROUTE_DEST_PORTS="33434:33523" # Traceroute Destination Ports 
# 
# The Loopback interface defines should not be 
# edited unless your Linux distribution defines 
# these differently. 
# 
LOOPBACK_INTERFACE="lo"   # The loopback interface 
LOOPBACK_NETWORK="127.0.0.0/8"  # Reserved Loopback Address Range 
# 
# Source function library. 
# 
. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions 
# 
# See how we were called. 
# 
case "$1" in 
  start) 
        echo "Starting Firewall services" 
 echo "firewall: Configuring Firewall Rules using iptables" 
  # Remove any existing rules from all chains 
     iptables -F 
     iptables -F -t nat 
     iptables -F -t mangle 
     # Set the default policy to drop 
     iptables -P INPUT   DROP 
     iptables -P OUTPUT  DROP 
     iptables -P FORWARD DROP 
 # Allow unlimited traffic on the loopback interface 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $LOOPBACK_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $LOOPBACK_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
 # A bug that showed up as of the Red Hat 7.2 release results in 
     # the following 5 default policies breaking the firewall 
     # initialization: 
 #     fgrep -q '7.2' /etc/redhat-release 
 #     if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then 
 #       iptables -t nat    -P PREROUTING  DROP
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 #       iptables -t nat    -P OUTPUT      DROP  
 #       iptables -t nat    -P POSTROUTING DROP 
 #       iptables -t mangle -P PREROUTING  DROP 
 #       iptables -t mangle -P OUTPUT      DROP 
 #     fi 
     # Remove any pre-existing user-defined chains 
     iptables -X 
     iptables -X -t nat 
     iptables -X -t mangle 
 # Zero counts 
 iptables -Z 
 # Open the configuration file 
 if [ -f /etc/firewall/firewall.conf.iptables ]; then 
     . /etc/firewall/firewall.conf.iptables 
 else 
     # Turn off IP Forwarding & Masquerading 
     echo 0 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward  
     # Turn off dynamic IP hacking 
            echo "0" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr 
  
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        # Allow unlimited local traffic on the internal interface 
        iptables -A INPUT -i $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A OUTPUT -o $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     echo "firewall: No configuration file found at /etc/firewall/firewall.conf.iptables; " 
     echo "firewall: default policies set to DROP on INPUT/OUTPUT/FORWARD chains." 
     exit 1 
 fi 
        # 
        # If your IP address is dynamically assigned by a DHCP server, 
        # your DHCP server's IP address and this machine's IP address are 
        # obtained from /etc/dhcpc/hostinfo-$EXTERNAL_INTERFACE or 
        # /etc/dhcpc/dhcpcd-$EXTERNAL_INTERFACE.info. 
        # 
        if [ $DHCP -gt 0 ]; then 
   # Grab external IP address if already assigned 
          EXTERNAL_IP=$( ifconfig $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE | grep 'inet[^6]' | sed 's/[a-zA-Z:]//g' | awk '{print $1}' ) 
   if [ -n $EXTERNAL_IP ]; then 
            EXT_NETMASK=$( ifconfig $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE | grep 'inet[^6]' | sed 's/[a-zA-Z:]//g' | awk '{print $3}' ) 
            EXTERNAL_NETWORK=$( ipcalc -n $EXTERNAL_IP $EXT_NETMASK | cut -d\= -f2 ) 
            BROADCAST_NET=$( ipcalc -b $EXTERNAL_IP $EXT_NETMASK | cut -d\= -f2 ) 
   fi  
          # Turn on dynamic IP hacking 
          echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr 
          # Incoming DHCPOFFER from available DHCP servers 
          iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp \ 
                   -s 0.0.0.0         --sport 67 \ 
                   -d 255.255.255.255 --dport 68 -j ACCEPT 
          # Initialization of rebinding: No lease or Lease time expired. 
          iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp   \ 
                   -s 0.0.0.0         --sport 68 \ 
                   -d 255.255.255.255 --dport 67 -j ACCEPT 
          # Fall back to initialization 
          # The client knows its server, but has either lost its 
          # lease, or else needs to reconfirm the IP address after 
          # rebooting. 
          iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp \ 
                   -s $DHCP_SERVER_IP --sport 67     \ 
                   -d 255.255.255.255 --dport 68 -j ACCEPT 
          iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp \ 
                   -s 255.255.255.255 --sport 68 \ 
                   -d $DHCP_SERVER_IP --dport 67 -j ACCEPT 
          # As a result of the above, we're supposed to change our IP 
          # address with this message, which is addressed to our new 
          # address before the dhcp client has received the update. 
          # Depending on the server implementation, the destination 
          # address can be the new IP address, the subnet address, or 
          # the limited broadcast address. 
          # If the network subnet address is used as the destination, 
          # the next rule must allow incoming packets destined to the 
          # subnet address, and the rule must preceed any general rules 
          # that block such incoming broadcast packets. 
          iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp \ 
                   -s $DHCP_SERVER_IP --sport 67     \ 
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                   --dport 68 -j ACCEPT 
          # Lease renewal 
          iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp \ 
                   -s $DHCP_SERVER_IP --sport 67     \ 
                   -d $EXTERNAL_IP --dport 68 -j ACCEPT 
          iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp \ 
                   -s $EXTERNAL_IP --sport 68       \ 
                   -d $DHCP_SERVER_IP --dport 67 -j ACCEPT 
          echo "firewall: DHCP Client configured"   
   else 
     # External IP assigned without DHCP (i.e. static); get some more info 
            EXT_NETMASK=$( ifconfig $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE | grep 'inet[^6]' | sed 's/[a-zA-Z:]//g' | awk '{print $3}' ) 
            EXTERNAL_NETWORK=$( ipcalc -n $EXTERNAL_IP $EXT_NETMASK | cut -d\= -f2 ) 
            BROADCAST_NET=$( ipcalc -b $EXTERNAL_IP $EXT_NETMASK | cut -d\= -f2 )    
        fi 
 # 
   # Refuse directed broadcasts; you may choose not to log these, as they can fill up your logs quickly 
 # 
#    iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $EXTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
#             -m limit --limit 1/s            \ 
#             -j LOG --log-prefix "[Directed Broadcast] " 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $EXTERNAL_NETWORK -j DROP 
#  iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $BROADCAST_NET \ 
#             -m limit --limit 1/s            \ 
#             -j LOG --log-prefix "[Directed Broadcast] " 
 iptables -A INPUT  -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $BROADCAST_NET -j DROP 
 # Refuse limited broadcasts 
#     iptables -A INPUT  -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d 255.255.255.255 \ 
#             -m limit --limit 1/s                    \ 
#             -j LOG --log-prefix "[Limited Broadcast] " 
     iptables -A INPUT  -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d 255.255.255.255 -j DROP 
 # 
 # Edit these to match the number of servers or connections 
 # you support. 
 # 
 # X Window port allocation begins at 6000 and increments 
 # for each additional server running from 6000 to 6063. 
 XWINDOW_PORTS="6000:6063"  # (TCP) X Windows 
 # SSH starts at 1023 and works down to 513 for each additional 
 # simultaneous incoming connection. 
 SSH_HI_PORTS="513:1023"   # SSH Simultaneous Connections 
 # 
 # Iptables allows creation of customized chains.  The -l (log) flag no longer 
 # exists.  This is a custom chain which allows logging of DROPped packets. 
 # 
 iptables -N LnD   # Define custom DROP chain 
 iptables -A LnD -p tcp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[TCP drop] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A LnD -p udp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[UDP drop] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A LnD -p icmp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[ICMP drop] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A LnD -f -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[FRAG drop] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A LnD -j DROP 
 # 
 # This custom chain logs, then REJECTs packets. 
 # 
 iptables -N LnR   # Define custom REJECT chain 
 iptables -A LnR -p tcp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[TCP reject] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A LnR -p udp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[UDP reject] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A LnR -p icmp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[ICMP reject] " --log-level=info 
  iptables -A LnR -f -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[FRAG reject] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A LnR -j REJECT 
 # 
 # This chain logs, then DROPs "Xmas" and Null packets which might indicate a port-scan attempt 
 # 
 iptables -N ScanD  # Define custom chain for possible port-scans 
 iptables -A ScanD -p tcp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[TCP Scan?] " 
 iptables -A ScanD -p udp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[UDP Scan?] " 
 iptables -A ScanD -p icmp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[ICMP Scan?] " 
 iptables -A ScanD -f -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[FRAG Scan?] " 
 iptables -A ScanD -j DROP 
 # 
        # This chain limits the number of new incoming connections to preventing DDoS attacks 
        #                                                                                                            
        iptables -N DDoS                # Define custom chain for possible DDoS attacks                                                                                                              
        iptables -A DDoS -m limit --limit 12/s --limit-burst 24 -j RETURN 
 iptables -A DDoS -j LOG --log-prefix "[DDos Attack?] " 
 iptables -A DDoS -j DROP 
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 # 
        # This chain drops connections from IANA reserved IP blocks 
        # 
 iptables -N IANA  
 iptables -A IANA -p tcp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[IANA Reserved - TCP] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A IANA -p udp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[IANA Reserved - UDP] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A IANA -p icmp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[IANA Reserved - ICMP] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A IANA -f -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[IANA Reserved - FRAG] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A IANA -j DROP 
 # 
        # This chain drops connections from IPs in the firewall.banned file 
        # 
 iptables -N Banned  
 iptables -A Banned -p tcp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[TCP Banned] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A Banned -p udp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[UDP Banned] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A Banned -p icmp -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[ICMP Banned] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A Banned -f -m limit --limit 1/s -j LOG --log-prefix "[FRAG Banned] " --log-level=info 
 iptables -A Banned -j DROP 
        # 
        # Disallow packets frequently used by port-scanners 
        #  
 # All of the bits are cleared 
     iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL NONE -j ScanD 
     # SYN and FIN are both set 
     iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,FIN SYN,FIN -j ScanD 
     # SYN and RST are both set 
     iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN,RST -j ScanD 
     # FIN and RST are both set 
     iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags FIN,RST FIN,RST -j ScanD 
     # FIN is the only bit set, without the expected accompanying ACK 
     iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags ACK,FIN FIN -j ScanD 
     # PSH is the only bit set, without the expected accompanying ACK 
     iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags ACK,PSH PSH -j ScanD 
     # URG is the only bit set, without the expected accompanying ACK 
     iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags ACK,URG URG -j ScanD 
 # SYN-Flood  
 # (Request for new connection; large number indicate possible DDoS-type attack;  
 #  same as --syn) 
 iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j DDoS 
 # Enable broadcast echo Protection 
 echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts 
 # Disable Source Routed Packets 
 for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/accept_source_route; do 
        echo 0 > $f 
 done 
 # Enable TCP SYN Cookie Protection 
 echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies 
 # Disable ICMP Redirect Acceptance 
 for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/accept_redirects; do 
       echo 0 > $f 
 done 
 # Don't send Redirect Messages 
 for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/send_redirects; do 
       echo 0 > $f 
 done 
 # Disable ICMP Redirect Acceptance 
 for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/accept_redirects; do 
     echo 0 > $f 
 done 
 # Drop Spoofed Packets coming in on an interface, which if replied to, 
 # would result in the reply going out a different interface. 
 for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/rp_filter; do 
      echo 1 > $f 
 done 
 # Log packets with impossible addresses. 
 for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/log_martians; do 
      echo 1 > $f 
 done 
 # Disallow fragmented packets.  This may not be as necessary as it once was. 
 # Comment it out with # if desired. 
# iptables -A INPUT -f -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -j LnD 
# iptables -A INPUT -f -i $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -j LnD 
 # 
 # Loopback 
 # 
 # Unlimited traffic on the loopback interface (lo) 
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 iptables -A INPUT -i $LOOPBACK_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $LOOPBACK_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
 # 
 # Refuse any connections to/from problem sites. 
 # 
 # /etc/firewall/firewall.banned contains a list of IPs 
 # to block all access, both inbound and outbound. 
 # The file should contain IP addresses with CIDR 
 # netmask, one per line: 
 # 
 # NOTE: No comments are allowed in the file. 
 # 
 # 111.222.333.444/32  - To block a single IP address 
 # 111.222.333.444/8  - To block a Class-A network 
 # 111.222.333.444/16  - To block a Class-B network 
 # 111.222.333.444/24  - To block a Class-C network 
 # 
 # The CIDR netmask number describes the number of bits 
 # in the network portion of the address, and may be on 
 # any boundary. 
 # 
 if [ -f /etc/firewall/firewall.banned ]; then 
     while read BANNED; do 
  iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $BANNED -j Banned 
  iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $BANNED -j Banned 
  iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $BANNED -j Banned 
  iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $BANNED -j Banned 
  iptables -A FORWARD -d $BANNED -j Banned 
                iptables -A FORWARD -s $BANNED -j Banned 
     done < /etc/firewall/firewall.banned 
     echo "firewall: Banned addresses added to rule set" 
 else 
     echo "firewall: Banned address/network file not found." 
 fi 
 # 
 # Refuse connections from IANA-reserved blocks 
 # 
 if [ -f /etc/firewall/firewall.iana-reserved ]; then 
     while read RESERVED; do 
  iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $RESERVED -j IANA 
  iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $RESERVED -j IANA 
  iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $RESERVED -j IANA 
  iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $RESERVED -j IANA 
     done < /etc/firewall/firewall.iana-reserved 
     echo "firewall: Connections from IANA-reserved addresses blocked" 
 else 
     echo "firewall: IANA-reserved address/network file not found." 
 fi 
 # 
 # Localizations 
 # 
 # The /etc/firewall/firewall.local file should contain rules in 
 # standard 'iptables' format. 
 # 
 if [ -f /etc/firewall/firewall.local.iptables ]; then 
     . /etc/firewall/firewall.local.iptables 
     echo "firewall: Local rules added" 
 else 
     echo "firewall: Local rules file not found." 
 fi 
 # 
 # ICMP 
 # 
 # (4) Source Quench. 
 # Incoming & outgoing requests to slow down (flow control) 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 4 \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE  -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 4 \ 
     -s $EXTERNAL_IP  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A FORWARD -p ICMP --icmp-type 4 -j ACCEPT 
 fi 
 # (12) Parameter Problem. 
 # Incoming & outgoing error messages 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 12 \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE  -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
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 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 12 \ 
     -s $EXTERNAL_IP  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A FORWARD -p ICMP --icmp-type 12 -j ACCEPT 
 fi 
 # (3) Destination Unreachable, Service Unavailable. 
 # Incoming & outgoing size negotiation, service or 
 # destination unavailability, final traceroute response 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 3 \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE  -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 3 \ 
     -s $EXTERNAL_IP  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type \ 
     fragmentation-needed -s $EXTERNAL_IP  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A FORWARD -p ICMP --icmp-type 3 -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A FORWARD -p ICMP --icmp-type fragmentation-needed -j ACCEPT 
 fi 
 # (11) Time Exceeded. 
 # Incoming & outgoing timeout conditions, 
 # also intermediate TTL response to traceroutes 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 11 \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE  -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 11 \ 
     -s $EXTERNAL_IP  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A FORWARD -p ICMP --icmp-type 11 -j ACCEPT 
 fi 
 # (0 | 8) Allow OUTPUT pings to anywhere. 
 if [ $OUTBOUND_PING -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 8 \ 
  -s $EXTERNAL_IP  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 0 \ 
  -s $ANYWHERE  -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p ICMP --icmp-type 8 -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p ICMP --icmp-type 0 -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Outbound ping enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # (0 | 8) Allow incoming pings from anywhere 
 #       (stops at firewall). 
 if [ $INBOUND_PING -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 8 \ 
  -s $ANYWHERE  -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP --icmp-type 0 \ 
  -s $EXTERNAL_IP  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Inbound ping enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # Unprivileged Ports 
 # Avoid ports subject to protocol and system administration problems. 
 # 
 
 NFS_PORT="2049"    # (TCP/UDP) NFS 
 OPENWINDOWS_PORT="2000"   # (TCP) Openwindows 
 SOCKS_PORT="1080"   # (TCP) Socks 
 # Openwindows: establishing a connection 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $OPENWINDOWS_PORT -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j LnR 
 # Openwindows: incoming connection 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $OPENWINDOWS_PORT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j LnD 
 # X Window: establishing a remote connection 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $XWINDOW_PORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j LnR 
 # X Window: incoming connection attempt 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $XWINDOW_PORTS -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j LnD 
 # SOCKS: establishing a connection 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $SOCKS_PORT -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE  -j LnR 
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 # SOCKS: incoming connection 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $SOCKS_PORT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j LnD 
 # NFS: TCP connections 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $NFS_PORT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --dport $NFS_PORT -d $ANYWHERE -j LnR 
 # NFS: UDP connections 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --dport $NFS_PORT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j LnD 
 # NFS: incoming request (normal UDP mode) 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --dport $NFS_PORT -d $ANYWHERE -j LnR 
        # 
        # DNAT/SNAT Port Forwarding 
        #  
  if [ $PORT_FORWARD -gt 0 ]; then  
           if [ -f /etc/firewall/firewall.nat ]; then 
             while read IP_PORT; do 
               # extract the protocols, IPs and ports 
        NAT_TYPE=$(echo "$IP_PORT" | awk '{print $1}') 
               NAT_EXT_PORT=$(echo "$IP_PORT" | awk '{print $2}') 
               NAT_INT_IP=$(echo "$IP_PORT" | awk '{print $3}') 
               NAT_INT_PORT=$(echo "$IP_PORT" | awk '{print $4}') 
               # write the rules! 
               # this is the prerouting dnat 
               iptables -A PREROUTING -t nat -p $NAT_TYPE -d $EXTERNAL_IP --dport $NAT_EXT_PORT -j DNAT \ 
                --to-destination $NAT_INT_IP:$NAT_INT_PORT 
               # This allows packets from external->internal 
               iptables -A FORWARD -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -o $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -p $NAT_TYPE  \ 
                -d $NAT_INT_IP --dport $NAT_INT_PORT -m state \ 
                --state NEW,ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT 
               # This allows packets from internal->external 
               iptables -A FORWARD -i $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p $NAT_TYPE  \ 
                -s $NAT_INT_IP --sport $NAT_INT_PORT -m state \ 
                --state NEW,ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT 
               # This enables access to the 'public' server from the internal network 
               iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -d $NAT_INT_IP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
                -p $NAT_TYPE --dport $NAT_INT_PORT -j SNAT --to $INTERNAL_IP 
               echo firewall: dnat: $NAT_TYPE:$EXTERNAL_IP:$NAT_EXT_PORT - $NAT_INT_IP:$NAT_INT_PORT 
             done < /etc/firewall/firewall.nat 
            # unset some variables 
              unset IP_PORT 
       unset NAT_TYPE 
              unset NAT_EXT_PORT 
              unset NAT_INT_IP 
              unset NAT_INT_PORT 
    else 
              echo "firewall.nat (port-forwarding table) not found!  Port-forwarding not enabled." 
    fi 
        fi 
 # 
 # NOTE: 
 #     The symbolic names used in /etc/services for the port numbers 
 #     vary by supplier. 
 # 
 # Required Services 
 # 
 # DNS client modes (53) 
 # 
 if [ $DNS_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
  --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 53 -s $EXTERNAL_IP \ 
  -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p UDP --
sport 53 \ 
  --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 53 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 53 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j 
ACCEPT 
     fi 
     # TCP client-to-server requests are allowed by the protocol 
     # if UDP requests fail. This is rarely seen. Usually, clients 
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     # use TCP as a secondary name server for zone transfers from 
     # their primary name servers, and as hackers. 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP --sport \ 
  $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 53 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
  --sport 53 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 53 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 53 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: DNS client enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # DNS server modes (53) 
 # 
 # 
 # DNS caching & forwarding name server 
 # 
 if [ $DNS_CACHING_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
     # Server-to-server query or response 
     # Caching only name server uses UDP, not TCP 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport 53 --dport 53 -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport 53 --dport 53 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: DNS Caching server enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # DNS full name server 
 # 
 if [ $DNS_FULL_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
     # Client-to-server DNS transaction. 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 53 -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport 53 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     # Zone Transfers. 
     # Due to the potential danger of zone transfers, 
     # allow TCP traffic to only specific secondaries. 
            # /etc/firewall/firewall.dns contains a list of 
            # secondary, tertiary, etc. domain name servers with which 
            # zone transfers are allowed.  The file should contain IP 
            # addresses with CIDR netmask, one per line: 
        if [ -f /etc/firewall/firewall.dns ]; then 
                while read DNS_SECONDARY; do 
            iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
                --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 53 -s $DNS_SECONDARY -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
                --sport 53 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $DNS_SECONDARY -j ACCEPT 
            done < /etc/firewall/firewall.dns 
        else 
            echo "firewall: ** No secondary DNS configured **" 
        fi 
            if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
                echo "firewall: DNS Full server enabled" 
            fi 
        fi 
 # 
 # AUTH (113) - Allowing your outgoing AUTH requests as a client 
 # 
 if [ $AUTH_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 113 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 113 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 113 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 113 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
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     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Auth client enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # AUTH server (113) 
 if [ $AUTH_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
     # Accepting incoming AUTH requests 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 113 -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 113 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Auth server enabled" 
     fi 
 else 
     # Rejecting incoming AUTH requests 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
  --dport 113 -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j LnR 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Auth server requests will be rejected" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # TCP Services on selected ports. 
 # 
 # 
 # Sending Mail through a remote SMTP server (25) 
 # 
 if [ $SMTP_REMOTE_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    # SMTP client to an ISP account without a local server 
    for SMTP_SRVR in ${SMTP_SERVER}; do 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 25 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $SMTP_SRVR -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 25 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $SMTP_SRVR -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
       if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
          iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -d $SMTP_SRVR --sport $UNPRIVPORTS 
--dport 25 -j ACCEPT 
          iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -s $SMTP_SRVR -d 
$INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
    --sport 25 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
       fi 
       if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
     echo "firewall: Clients may access remote SMTP server: ${SMTP_SRVR}" 
       fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # Sending Mail through a local SMTP server (25) 
 # 
 if [ $SMTP_LOCAL_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 25 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 25 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     # Receiving Mail as a Local SMTP server (25) 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 25 -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 25 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: SMTP Local server enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # POP3 (110) - Retrieving Mail as a POP3 client 
 # 
 if [ $POP3_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
    for POP_SRVR in ${POP_SERVER}; do    
        iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 110 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $POP_SRVR -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 110 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $POP_SRVR -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
        if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
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           iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -d $POP_SRVR --sport $UNPRIVPORTS -
-dport 110 -j ACCEPT 
           iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -s $POP_SRVR -d 
$INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
     --sport 110 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
        fi 
        if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
     echo "firewall: Clients may access remote POP-3 server: ${POP_SRVR}" 
        fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # POP3 (110) - Hosting a POP3 server for remote clients 
 # 
 if [ $POP3_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for MY_POP3_CLIENT in ${MY_POP3_CLIENTS}; do 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 110 -s $MY_POP3_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 110 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_POP3_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
        if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
           echo "firewall: Remote site ${MY_POP3_CLIENT} may access local POP-3 server" 
        fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # IMAP (143) - Retrieving Mail as an IMAP client 
 # 
 if [ $IMAP_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
    for IMAP_SRVR in ${MY_IMAP_SERVER}; do 
        iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 143 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $IMAP_SRVR -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 143 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $IMAP_SRVR -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
        if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
           iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -d $IMAP_SRVR --sport $UNPRIVPORTS 
--dport 143 -j ACCEPT 
           iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -s $IMAP_SRVR -d 
$INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
     --sport 143 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
        fi 
        if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
    echo "firewall: Clients may access remote IMAP server: ${IMAP_SRVR}" 
        fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # IMAP (143) - Hosting an IMAP server for remote clients 
 # 
 if [ $IMAP_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for MY_IMAP_CLIENT in ${MY_IMAP_CLIENTS}; do 
        iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 143 -s $MY_IMAP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
          iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 143 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_IMAP_CLIENTS -j ACCEPT 
      if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
    echo "firewall: Remote site ${MY_IMAP_CLIENT} may access local IMAP server" 
      fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # IMAPS (993) - Retrieving Mail as an Secure IMAP client 
 # 
 if [ $IMAPS_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
    for IMAPS_SRVR in ${MY_IMAPS_SERVER}; do 
        iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 993 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $IMAPS_SRVR -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 993 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $IMAPS_SRVR -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
        if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
           iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -d $IMAP_SRVR --sport $UNPRIVPORTS 
--dport 993 -j ACCEPT 
           iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -s $IMAPS_SRVR -d 
$INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
     --sport 993 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
        fi 
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        if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
    echo "firewall: Clients may access remote Secure IMAP server: ${IMAPS_SRVR}" 
        fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # IMAPS (993) - Hosting a Secure IMAP server for remote clients 
 # 
 if [ $IMAPS_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for MY_IMAPS_CLIENT in ${MY_IMAPS_CLIENTS}; do 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 993 -s $MY_IMAP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 993 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_IMAP_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
        if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
      echo "firewall: Remote site ${MY_IMAPS_CLIENT} may access local Secure IMAP server" 
        fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # NNTP (119) - Reading and posting news as a Usenet client 
 # 
 if [ $NNTP_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
    for NEWS_SRVR in ${NEWS_SERVER}; do 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 119 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $NEWS_SRVR -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 119 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $NEWS_SRVR -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
        if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
           iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -d $NEWS_SRVR --sport 
$UNPRIVPORTS --dport 119 -j ACCEPT 
           iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -s $NEWS_SRVR -d 
$INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
     --sport 119 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
        fi 
        if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
    echo "firewall: Clients may access remote NNTP server: ${NEWS_SRVR}" 
        fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # NNTP (119) - Hosting a Usenet news server for remote clients 
 # 
 if [ $NNTP_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for NNTP_CLIENT in ${MY_NNTP_CLIENTS}; do 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 119 -s $NNTP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 119 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $NNTP_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
 
       if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
   echo "firewall: Remote client ${NNTP_CLIENT} may access local NNTP server" 
       fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # NNTP (119) - Allowing peer news feeds for a local Usenet server 
 # 
 if [ $NNTP_NEWS_FEED -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 119 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_NEWS_FEED -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 119 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $MY_NEWS_FEED -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: External NNTP News feed access enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
        # Secure NNTP (563) - Reading and posting news as a Usenet client over SSL 
        # Submitted by Renaud Colinet 
 # 
        if [ $NNTPS_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
    for SNEWS_SRVR in ${SNEWS_SERVER}; do  
              iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
           --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 563 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $SNEWS_SRVR -j ACCEPT 
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              iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
           --sport 563 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $SNEWS_SERVER -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
              if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
                 iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -d $SNEWS_SRVR --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 
563 -j ACCEPT 
                 iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -s $SNEWS_SRVR -d 
$INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
                  --sport 563 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
              fi 
              if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
                 echo "firewall: Clients may access remote secure NNTP server: ${SNEWS_SRVR}" 
              fi 
    done 
        fi 
 # 
 # TELNET (23) - Allowing outgoing client access to remote sites 
 # 
 if [ $TELNET_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 23 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 23 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 23 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 23 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote TELNET servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # TELNET (23) - Allowing incoming access to your local server 
 # Note:  Not recommended! Suggest SSH instead! 
 # 
 if [ $TELNET_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for MY_TELNET_CLIENT in ${MY_TELNET_CLIENTS}; do 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 23 -s $MY_TELNET_CLIENTS -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 23 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_TELNET_CLIENTS -j ACCEPT 
        if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
    echo "firewall: Remote site ${MY_TELNET_CLIENT} may access local TELNET server" 
        fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # SSH Client (22) - Allowing client access to remote SSH servers 
 # 
 if [ $SSH_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 22 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 22 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $SSH_HI_PORTS --dport 22 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 22 --dport $SSH_HI_PORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 22 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
 --sport 22 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $SSH_HI_PORTS --dport 22 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 22 --dport $SSH_HI_PORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote SSH servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
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 # SSH (see config) - Allowing remote client access to your local SSH server 
 # 
 if [ $SSH_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for MY_SSH_CLIENT in ${MY_SSH_CLIENTS}; do 
        iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport $SSH_PORT -s $MY_SSH_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
        iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport $SSH_PORT --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_SSH_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
 
        iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $SSH_HI_PORTS --dport $SSH_PORT -s $MY_SSH_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
        iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
     --sport $SSH_PORT --dport $SSH_HI_PORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_SSH_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Remote site ${MY_SSH_CLIENT} may access local SSH server" 
     fi 
 done 
 fi 
 # 
 # FTP (20, 21) - Allowing outgoing client access to remote FTP servers 
 # 
 if [ $FTP_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     # Outgoing request 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 21 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 21 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     # Normal Port mode FTP data channels 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW \ 
 --sport 20 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 20 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     # Passive mode FTP data channels 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEP 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 20:21 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 20:21 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 
$UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 
$UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote FTP servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # FTP (20, 21) - Allowing incoming access to your local FTP server 
 # 
      if [ $FTP_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
         for MY_FTP_CLIENT in ${MY_FTP_CLIENTS}; do 
            # Incoming request 
               iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED \ 
           --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 21 -s $MY_FTP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
              iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
           --sport 21 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_FTP_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
            # Normal Port mode FTP data channel responses 
               iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
           --sport 20 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_FTP_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
               iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
           --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 20 -s $MY_FTP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
            # Passive mode FTP data channel responses 
               iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED \ 
           --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $MY_FTP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
               iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
           --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $MY_FTP_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
             if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
                echo "firewall: Remote site ${MY_FTP_CLIENT} may access local FTP server" 
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             fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # HTTP (80) - Accessing remote web sites as a client 
 # 
 if [ $HTTP_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 80 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 80 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 80 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 80 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j 
ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote HTTP servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # HTTP (80) - Allowing remote access to a local web server 
 # 
 if [ $HTTP_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for HTTP_CLIENT in ${MY_HTTP_CLIENTS}; do 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 80 -s $HTTP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 80 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $HTTP_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 8080 -s $HTTP_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 8080 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $HTTP_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
 
       if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
   echo "firewall: Remote client ${HTTP_CLIENT} may access local HTTP server" 
       fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # HTTPS (443) - Accessing remote web sites over SSL as a client 
 # 
 if [ $HTTPS_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then  
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 443 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 443 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 443 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 443 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote HTTPS servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # HTTPS (443) - Allowing remote access to a local SSL web server 
 # 
 if [ $HTTPS_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for HTTPS_CLIENT in ${MY_HTTPS_CLIENTS}; do 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 443 -s $HTTPS_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 443 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $HTTPS_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
       if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
   echo "firewall: Remote client ${HTTPS_CLIENT} may access local HTTPS server" 
       fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # HTTP Proxy Client (8008/8080) 
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 # 
 if [ $HTTP_PROXY -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport $WEB_PROXY_PORT -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $WEB_PROXY_SERVER -j 
ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport $WEB_PROXY_PORT --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $WEB_PROXY_SERVER -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j 
ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 
$WEB_PROXY_PORT -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport $WEB_PROXY_PORT --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote sites via HTTP Proxy Server" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # FINGER (79) - Accessing remote finger servers as a client 
 # 
 if [ $FINGER_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 79 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 79 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 79 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 79 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote FINGER servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # FINGER (79) - Allowing remote client access to a local finger server (dangerous!) 
 # 
 if [ $FINGER_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
    for FINGER_CLIENT in $MY_FINGER_CLIENTS}; do 
       iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
    --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 79 -s $FINGER_CLIENT -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
       iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
    --sport 79 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $FINGER_CLIENT -j ACCEPT 
       if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
   echo "firewall: Remote client ${FINGER_CLIENT} may access local FINGER server" 
       fi 
    done 
 fi 
 # 
 # WHOIS (43) - Accessing a remote WHOIS server as a client 
 # 
 if [ $WHOIS_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 43 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 43 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 43 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 43 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote WHOIS servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # GOPHER (70) - Accessing a remote GOPHER server as a client 
 # 
 if [ $GOPHER_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 70 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
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 --sport 70 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 70 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 70 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote GOPHER servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # WAIS (210) - Accessing a remote WAIS server as a client 
 # 
 if [ $WAIS_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 210 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
 --sport 210 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 210 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 210 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Clients may access remote WAIS servers" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
        # Real Video (554) - Real Video Client 
        # 
        if [ $RV_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
            iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
               --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 554 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
               --sport 554 -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 554 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
  --sport 554 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
            if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
                echo "firewall: Real Video client enabled" 
            fi 
        fi 
        # 
        # PPTP (1723) - Accessing PPTP servers as a client 
        # 
        if [ $PPTP_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
            iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
                --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 1723 \ 
                -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP  \ 
                --sport 1723 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS \ 
                -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP \ 
                -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p 47 -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p 47 -j ACCEPT 
            if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
               iptables -A INPUT -i $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -p 47 -j ACCEPT 
               iptables -A OUTPUT -o $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -p 47 -j ACCEPT 
               iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
                  --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 1723 -j ACCEPT 
               iptables -A FORWARD -p TCP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK \ 
                  -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED \ 
                  --sport 1723 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
               iptables -A FORWARD -p 47 -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -j ACCEPT 
               iptables -A FORWARD -p 47 -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK -j ACCEPT 
            fi 
            if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
                echo "firewall: Clients may access remote PPTP servers" 
            fi 
        fi 
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 # 
 # UDP - Accept only on selected ports 
 # 
 # 
 # TRACEROUTE 
 # 
 # Traceroute usually uses -s 32769:65535 -d 33434:33523 
 # 
 if [ $OUTBOUND_TRACEROUTE -gt 0 ]; then 
     # Enable outgoing TRACEROUTE requests 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport $TRACEROUTE_SRC_PORTS --dport $TRACEROUTE_DEST_PORTS \ 
 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $TRACEROUTE_SRC_PORTS \ 
  --dport $TRACEROUTE_DEST_PORTS -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $TRACEROUTE_DEST_PORTS \ 
  --dport $TRACEROUTE_SRC_PORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Outbound TRACEROUTE enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 if [ $INBOUND_TRACEROUTE -gt 0 ]; then 
     # Enable incoming TRACEROUTE query 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport $TRACEROUTE_SRC_PORTS --dport $TRACEROUTE_DEST_PORTS \ 
 -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $TRACEROUTE_SRC_PORTS \ 
  --dport $TRACEROUTE_DEST_PORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Inbound TRACEROUTE enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
        # 
        # DHCP Server 
 # 
        # This assumes that you're running a DHCP server on your firewall to 
        # supply IP addresses to your internal network using dhcpd.  See any 
        # of several DHCP HowTo sites for the actual server setup. 
        # 
        if [ $DHCP_SERVER -gt 0 ]; then 
            iptables -A INPUT -i $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp -s $BROADCAST_SRC \ 
        -d $BROADCAST_DEST --sport 67:68 --dport 67:68 -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A OUTPUT -o $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -p udp -s $INTERNAL_IP \ 
        --sport 67:68 --dport 67:68 -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 67:68 --dport 67:68 -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 67:68 --dport 67:68 -j ACCEPT 
 
           if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
                echo "firewall: DHCP Server enabled" 
           fi 
        fi 
        # 
        # NTP (123) - Accessing remote Network Time Servers 
        # 
        if [ $NTP_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
            iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
        --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 123 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
        --sport 123 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
        --sport 123 --dport 123 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
            iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
        --sport 123 --dport 123 -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 123 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 123 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 123 --dport 123 -j ACCEPT 
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        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 123 --dport 123 -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
            if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
                echo "firewall: NTP Client enabled" 
            fi 
        fi 
 # 
 # ICQ (4000) - The Miribilis ICQ Client 
 # 
 if [ $ICQ_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 4000 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport 4000 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 4000 -j 
ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 4000 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -j 
ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
         echo "firewall: ICQ Client enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # GAMES 
 # Half-Life/CounterStrike 
 # 
 if [ $HALF_LIFE -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport 27000:27050 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED,NEW --dport 27000:27050 -s $ANYWHERE \ 
 -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 27000:27050 --dport 
$UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK -m state --state 
RELATED,ESTABLISHED,NEW --dport 27000:27050 -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
         echo "firewall: Half-Life/CounterStrike game ports enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # 
 # Return to Castle Wolfenstein 
 # 
 if [ $WOLF_CLIENT -gt 0 ]; then 
     iptables  -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 27950:27965 -s $EXTERNAL_IP -d $ANYWHERE -j ACCEPT 
     iptables  -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
 --sport 27950:27965 --dport $UNPRIVPORTS -s $ANYWHERE -d $EXTERNAL_IP -j ACCEPT 
     if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport $UNPRIVPORTS --dport 
27950:27965 -j ACCEPT 
        iptables -A FORWARD -p UDP -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK --sport 27950:27965 --dport 
$UNPRIVPORTS -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
     if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
         echo "firewall: Castle Wolfenstein game ports enabled" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------- 
 # 
 # Spoofing and Bad Addresses 
 # 
 # Refuse spoofed packets. 
 # Ignore blatantly illegal source addresses. 
 # Protect yourself from sending to bad addresses. 
 # Refuse spoofed packets pretending to be from 
 # the external interface's IP address. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $EXTERNAL_IP -j LnD 
 # Refuse packets claiming to be to or from a Class-A private network. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_A -j LnD 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $CLASS_A -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_A -j LnD 
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 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $CLASS_A -j LnD 
 # Refuse packets claiming to be to or from a Class-B private network. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_B -j LnD 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $CLASS_B -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_B -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $CLASS_B -j LnD 
 # Refuse packets claiming to be to or from a Class-C private network. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_C -j LnD 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $CLASS_C -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_C -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $CLASS_C -j LnD 
 # Refuse packets claiming to be from the loopback. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $LOOPBACK_NETWORK -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $LOOPBACK_NETWORK -j LnD 
 # Refuse malformed broadcast packets. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $BROADCAST_DEST -j LnD 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $BROADCAST_SRC  -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $BROADCAST_DEST -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $BROADCAST_SRC  -j LnD 
 # Refuse Class-D Multicast addresses. 
 # Multicast is only illegal as a source address. 
 # Multicast uses UDP. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_D_MULTICAST -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_D_MULTICAST -j LnR 
 # Refuse Class-E reserved IP addresses. 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $CLASS_E_RESERVED_NET -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $CLASS_E_RESERVED_NET -j LnR 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------- 
 # 
 # DROP (on input), REJECT (output) and LOG anything else on the external (red) interface 
 # 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p TCP \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE -j LnR 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p UDP \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE -j LnR 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE -j LnD 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -p ICMP \ 
     -s $ANYWHERE -j LnR 
 # 
 # Masquerade internal traffic 
 # 
 if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
     # All internal traffic is masqueraded externally 
     iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -o $EXTERNAL_INTERFACE -j SNAT \ 
     --to $EXTERNAL_IP 
            # Note: some may find this works better on machines with non-static  
     # external IP addresses: 
            # iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ethX -j MASQUERADE 
     # Enable IP Forwarding  
     echo 1 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
     # 
     # Unlimited traffic within the local network 
     # 
     # All internal machines have access to the firewall machine 
     iptables -A INPUT -i $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -s $INTERNAL_NETWORK -j ACCEPT 
     iptables -A OUTPUT -o $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -d $INTERNAL_NETWORK -j ACCEPT 
            if [ $VERBOSE -gt 0 ]; then 
  echo "firewall: Masquerading internal network" 
     fi 
 fi 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------- 
 # Zero counts 
 iptables -Z 
 # ------------------------------------------------------------- 
 echo "done" 
 touch /var/lock/subsys/firewall 
 echo 
 ;; 
  status) 
   if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/firewall ]; then 
     echo "Firewall started and configured" 
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 else 
     echo "Firewall stopped" 
 fi 
 exit 0 
 ;; 
  restart|reload) 
 $0 stop 
 $0 start 
 ;; 
  stop) 
   echo "Shutting down Firewall services" 
 # Turn off IP Forwarding 
 echo 0 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
 # Turn off dynamic IP hacking 
       echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr 
 # Flush the rule chains 
 iptables -F 
 # Delete custom chains 
 iptables -X 
 # Zero counts 
 iptables -Z 
 # Set the default policy to DROP 
 iptables -P INPUT DROP 
 iptables -P OUTPUT DROP 
 iptables -P FORWARD DROP 
 # Allow unlimited traffic on the loopback interface 
 iptables -A INPUT -i $LOOPBACK_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
 iptables -A OUTPUT -o $LOOPBACK_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
 # Open the configuration file 
 if [ -f /etc/firewall/firewall.conf.iptables ]; then 
     . /etc/firewall/firewall.conf.iptables 
            if [ $MASQUERADING -gt 0 ]; then 
                # Allow unlimited local traffic on the internal interface 
                iptables -A INPUT -i $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
                iptables -A OUTPUT -o $INTERNAL_INTERFACE -j ACCEPT 
     fi 
 else 
     echo "firewall: No configuration file found at /etc/firewall/firewall.conf.iptables" 
     exit 1 
 fi 
 rm -f /var/lock/subsys/firewall 
 echo 
 ;; 
  *) 
 echo "Usage: /etc/rc.d/init.d/firewall.iptables {start|stop|status|restart|reload}" 
 exit 1 
esac 
exit 0 
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#!/bin/bash 
 
source /usr/local/share/dynfw.sh 
 
args 2 $# "${0} IPADDR {on/off}" "Drops packets to/from IPADDR. Good for obnoxious 
                                  networks/hosts/DoS" 
 
if [ "$2" == "on" ]  
then 
  #rules will be appended or inserted as normal 
 APPEND="-A" 
  INSERT="-I" 
  rec_check ipdrop $1 "$1 already blocked" on 
  record ipdrop $1 
elif [ "$2" == "off" ] 
then 
  #rules will be deleted instead 
 APPEND="-D" 
  INSERT="-D" 
  rec_check ipdrop $1 "$1 not currently blocked" off  
  unrecord ipdrop $1 
else 
  echo "Error: \"off\" or \"on\" expected as second argument" 
  exit 1 
fi   
 
#block outside IP address that's causing problems 
#attacker's incoming TCP connections will take a minute or so to time out, 
#reducing DoS effectiveness. 
 
iptables $INSERT INPUT   -s $1 -j DROP 
iptables $INSERT OUTPUT  -d $1 -j DROP 
iptables $INSERT FORWARD -d $1 -j DROP 
iptables $INSERT FORWARD -s $1 -j DROP 
 
echo "IP ${1} drop ${2}." 
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